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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
 1 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Setting of the problem 
In the simplest of terms, the constitutionality of European contract law denotes 
the extent to which the European Union has been conferred competence under the 
Treaties to adopt a comprehensive instrument of substantive contract law. At present, 
European contract law represents one of the most far-reaching and controversial debates 
in the European Union.  As the story is commonly told, with the work of several 
prominent academic projects, certain European Parliament resolutions, and the European 
Council meeting in Tampere serving as catalysts, the Commission promulgated the 2001 
Communication on European contract law1, which placed European contract law on the 
political agenda of the European Union.  This Communication was followed by further 
Communications2 and Progress Reports3 disseminated by the Commission, as well as a 
steady stream of documents issued by other European institutions and bodies on this 
subject4, which continue to refine the dimensions of the European Union’s role in 
European contract law.  The activities envisaged for European contract law emanating 
from these documents, including the ongoing preparation of the Common Frame of 
Reference (the CFR), the proposed Directive on consumer rights5, and the prospect of an 
optional instrument in contract law, have only served to intensify the discussion of the 
future path of contract law at the European level, and indeed, the scholarly literature 
continues to grow at an alarming rate on these matters, as well as others, related to 
European contract law (and European private law generally).  Despite the central 
attention devoted to European contract law, however, a detailed examination of its 
constitutional dimensions continues to lag behind.  
 
In effect, the debate about European contract law at the European level has 
proceeded in a somewhat “backwards” fashion.  While the plans and the activities 
envisaged for “the way forward”6 for European contract law progress, detailed 
assessment of the European Union’s competence to take far-reaching action in this field 
remains largely unattended to, instead of the other way around.  As one scholar recently 
                                                 
1
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract 
Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11.7.2001 (hereinafter 2001 Communication). 
2
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on A More Coherent 
European Contract Law:  An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final, 12.2.2003 (hereinafter 2003 Action Plan); 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract 
Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward, COM (2004) 651 final, 11.10.2004 (hereinafter 
2004 Communication). 
3
 First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review, COM (2005) 456 final, 
23.9.2005 (hereinafter 2005 Progress Report); Second Progress Report on The Common Frame of 
Reference, COM (2007) 447 final, 25.7.2008 (hereinafter 2007 Progress Report). 
4
 See generally Part Two. 
5
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights, COM (2008) 
614 final, 8.10.2008.  See Chapter 7,  § 7.3.3. 
6
 See the title of the 2004 Communication, supra note 2. 
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emphasised, “the most pressing issue on the agenda is the clarification of the 
constitutional competence of the EC to enact a more comprehensive contract law of any 
sort”.7  To date, this plea has not yet been fully answered. 
 
Importantly, this is not to say that there has been no attention paid to the 
constitutional dimensions of European contract law or European private law generally. 
Over a decade ago, an international conference was convened in Scheveningen in 1997 at 
the bequest of the then Dutch Presidency during which the morning session was devoted 
to the question of whether a proper legal basis existed for a European civil code.8  
Likewise, both before and after this conference, the extent of the European Union’s 
competence in contract law and other fields of private law has attracted a multitude of 
varying opinions from scholars in publications too numerous to mention, perhaps 
explaining one commentator’s remark that, “[m]uch ink has already been poured on the 
question of legal competence for Community measures in this field.”9  Nevertheless, 
significant problems exist in the treatment of the constitutionality of European contract 
law.  In particular, three stand out. 
 
First, many crucial questions concerning the limits and the exercise of Union 
competence in European contract law have yet to be fully addressed.  It is usually the 
case that certain Treaty provisions are singled out for analysis, the most prominent 
candidates being Articles 94, 95, 153, 65, and 308 EC (and their counterparts in the 
Lisbon Treaty). Yet, some of these provisions, namely Articles 65 and 153 EC, are 
quickly discarded without cognisance of the extent to which they are interwoven in the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law.  For other provisions, the limits of 
Union competence have been read restrictively without engagement with the evolution of 
the relevant case law, as illustrated by the ongoing controversy concerning Article 95 EC. 
Moreover, rarely does one find detailed discussion of the linkages between these Treaty 
provisions, whether it is confronting the residual scope of Article 94 EC vis-à-vis Article 
95 EC, the symbiotic relationship between Articles 95 and 153 EC, the boundary line 
between Articles 95 and 308 EC, or the extent to which some of these provisions can be 
used together. As a related point, over the years, various alternative or complementary 
routes to Union action in contract law have been put forward in the debate, such as 
enhanced cooperation, an intergovernmental treaty, and the Open Method of 
Coordination (the OMC), without detailed inquiry into their constitutionality and/or 
suitability in relation to European contract law. For that matter, most of the focus has 
                                                 
7
 S. Vogenauer, “The Spectre of a European Contract Law”, in The Harmonisation of European Contract 
Law:  Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice 1, 3 (S. Vogenauer and S. 
Weatherill eds, Hart, 2006). See also S. Weatherill, “Constitutional Issues–How Much is Best Left 
Unsaid?”, in supra, 89; J. Ziller, “The Legitimacy of the Codification of Contract Law in View of the 
Allocation of Competences between the European Union and its Member States”, in The Politics of a 
European Civil Code 89, 89 (M.W. Hesselink ed., Kluwer, 2006). 
8
 For a record of the conference papers, see 5 European Review of Private Law 455 (1997).  See also 
“Editorial: European Private Law between Utopia and Early Reality”, 4 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 1 (1997). 
9
 S. Swann, “Elective European Contract Law. A Possible Response to the Action Plan”, in 
L’Armonizzazione Del Diritto Privato Europeo – Il Piano D’Azione 2003 23, 40 (M. Meli and M.R. 
Maugeri eds, Giuffrè Editore, 2004). 
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been placed on the existence of Union competence, i.e., the legal basis requirement, and 
not so much on the exercise of Union competence in terms of the roles played by the 
principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, and sincere cooperation this context.  
Certainly, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality readily appear in the 
discourse surrounding the debate, very often as arguments opposing far-reaching Union 
action in contract law (and other fields of private law). Yet, generally speaking, there is 
not much deep investigation as to the roles played by these two principles, not to mention 
the principle of sincere cooperation, particularly as regards their interplay with the 
aforementioned Treaty provisions or certain alternative routes put forward in the debate.  
Surely, this is one area in which there may never be unanimous agreement, and for 
certain issues, it is only with recent case law of the Court of Justice that answers have 
started to emerge.  Be that as it may, until issues related to the existence and the exercise 
of Union competence are thoroughly explored, the debate about the constitutionality of 
European contract law continues to be as elusive as ever. 
 
Second, there is no standardised semantic and legal framework governing the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law, which makes delving into this topic 
something of a Herculean task.  Semantically, there are no universal definitions for the 
prevalent terms used in the debate about European contract law. Instead, many terms are 
used in different ways or have the potential to inject particular nuances and biases into 
the discussion, which makes even talking about the constitutionality of European contract 
law extremely difficult.  Legally, there is no template upon which to frame the analysis of 
the relevant Treaty provisions or various alternative and complementary routes to Union 
action that have been contemplated in the debate.  Each of the Treaty provisions under 
discussion – Articles 94, 95, 153, 65, and 308 EC (now Articles 115, 114, 169, 81, and 
352 TFEU, respectively) – underpins a distinct chronology in the Treaty framework and 
enlivens its own set of controversies as part of the debate, which to a great extent have 
not yet been explicitly answered in the case law of the Court of Justice. Furthermore, 
several alternative and complementary routes to a European contract law instrument are 
situated within broader topics that generate a complex and controversial debate of their 
own apart from the debate itself, as in the case of enhanced cooperation vis-à-vis 
“flexibility” and “differentiation” in the European Union or the OMC vis-à-vis the so-
called “new modes of governance”. Most importantly, the “institutional record” of 
constitutionality in the steady stream of documents disseminated by the European 
institutions in this context remains largely unexplored, with the result that the extent to 
which the discussion of constitutionality has played a role in the developments 
underpinning European contract law (and European private law generally) at the 
European level remains unclear. 
 
Third, despite the fact that references to the United States have steadily crept into 
the debate about European contract law, in-depth comparative reflection with the 
European Union is sorely lacking. Generally speaking, such references have either been 
used positively, as a source of potential models for use in the debate about European 
contract law usually involving American Restatements, uniform and model laws, and the 
Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC), or negatively, as an argument against far-reaching 
action in contract law (and other fields of private law) at the European level by pointing 
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to the alleged well-functioning American “internal market” without the need for any such 
federal contract or commercial law code.  Yet, there does not seem to be any realisation 
of the extent to which attempts to unify areas of state private law, including contract law, 
at the federal level have coloured the American private law landscape through the present 
day.  In addition, in seeking to transplant American models to the European Union, there 
does not as yet seem to be much appreciation of the problems resulting from their use in 
the United States and of the dangers, let alone terminological confusion, associated with 
their application to European contract law.   
 
 While these problems are surely not the only ones plaguing the constitutionality 
of European contract law, they have particularly devastating consequences for the 
developments taking place in this field.  They leave the legality of present and future 
European contract law initiatives uncertain. They preclude the identification of the most 
appropriate solutions to the problems that the debate on European contract law is 
supposed to solve. They can also lead to misperceptions about the scope of Union 
competence and the viability of supposed alternatives to Union action in this field, which 
have the potential to put European contract law on the wrong path.   
 
1.2 Controlling purpose  
In view of the aforementioned problems, the controlling purpose of this doctoral 
thesis is to provide a cohesive assessment of the constitutionality of European contract 
law by examining the scope of certain prominent Treaty provisions in the debate about 
European contract law, namely Articles 94, 95, 153, 65, and 308 EC (now Articles 115, 
114, 169, 81, and 352 TFEU, respectively), which can potentially confer competence on 
the European Union to adopt a comprehensive instrument of substantive contract law and 
the viability of certain alternative or complementary routes to the adoption of such an 
instrument contemplated in the debate.  This is with a primary focus as to the limits of 
and the linkages between these Treaty provisions and their interplay with the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, and a secondary focus as to how comparative 
reflection with the United States can contribute to the constitutional assessment of 
European contract law, with the overarching aim that this project can be of practical 
value for European lawmakers and scholars in connection with the initiatives envisaged 
for European contract law in the coming years. 
 
1.3 Scope and potential challenges  
Given the importance of the constitutionality of European contract law, it may be  
wondered why this subject has not yet occupied a premier place in the debate.  In 
response, this issue alludes to three main challenges posed by this subject, which in turn 
draw out the scope and the limitations of this doctoral thesis.  These challenges concern: 
(1) the evolving nature of the debate about European contract law and the overarching 
Treaty framework; (2) the breadth of the debate about European contract law and the 
constitutional inquiry; and (3) the wide expanse for comparative reflection between the 
European Union and the United States in this setting.  At least in part, these challenges 
may explain why issues surrounding the constitutionality of European contract law have 
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been bypassed in the commentary10, as well as why the European institutions have been 
loathe to delve into the matter.11 
 
First, there is the evolving nature of the debate about European contract law and 
the overarching Treaty framework. In essence, the constitutional assessment of European 
contract law is situated within two ever-changing constellations.  On the one hand, the 
debate about European contract law is essentially a “moving target”, since its momentum 
and the constitutional issues underlying it are constantly morphing over time.  As aptly 
described by one jurist:   
 
Anyone taking it up with the intention or hope of keeping up with the  
pace of legal policy development and remaining on top of the current  
stage of academic debate is letting themselves in for a race in which he 
will inevitably feel like the unfortunate hare which, despite all its efforts, 
kept on arriving too late:  something else will have changed or articles  
whose relevance has to be assessed first will have appeared.12 
 
As a result, the debate about European contract law does not follow one single path, but 
instead meanders down several roads, all the while raising unprecedented constitutional 
issues in its wake and whose endpoint has not yet been determined.  The research into the 
constitutionality of European contract law therefore suffers from the limitation that it 
does not have the benefit of hindsight and instead is captured by the ongoing activities 
taking place in European contract law as they occur.  
 
 On the other hand, the overarching Treaty framework in which the constitutional 
inquiry is situated has also evolved considerably during the years in which the debate 
about European contract law has unfolded at the European level.  Over the past decade, 
the Treaty framework comprising the EU and EC Treaties has been the subject of major 
institutional reform.  As set into motion by the Laeken Declaration13, the work of the 
European Convention (also referred to as the Convention on the Future of the European 
Union) paved the way for the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty14) and ultimately the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., E. Hondius, “Towards a European Civil Code”, in Towards a European Civil Code 3, 4, 7 (A. 
Hartkamp et al. eds, 3rd ed., Kluwer, 2004).    
11
 In fact, some of these challenges dovetail with several reasons put forward in the debate to explain the 
neglect of constitutionality at the European level.  See Chapter 8, § 8.2. 
12
 C. Joerges, On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Private Law: Considerations on a Law of Justi(ce)-
fication (Justum Facere) for the EU Multi-level System 1-2 (METRO Institute for Transnational Legal 
Research, 2003) (reprinted in Towards a European Civil Code, supra note 10, 159). Though referring to 
European private law generally, such remarks may be said to have equal resonance with European contract 
law.  For similar remarks of frustration, see, e.g., T. Wilhelmsson, “The Ethical Pluralism of Late Modern 
Europe and Codification of European Contract Law”, in The Need for a European Contract Law – 
Empirical and Legal Perspectives 121, 123 (J. Smits ed., Europa, 2005). 
13
 Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14-15 Dec. 2001, Annex I:  Laeken 
Declaration on the Future of the European Union, [2001] 12 EU Bulletin, point I.27 (hereinafter Laeken 
Declaration). 
14
 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] OJ C 310/1 (hereinafter Draft Constitutional 
Treaty).  There was a previous version of this Treaty promulgated in 2003. See Chapter 8, § 8.3. 
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EU Treaty and replaced the EC Treaty with the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (the TFEU)15.  Consequently, this doctoral thesis has had to straddle 
these ongoing institutional developments, and with the recent entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, has had to contend with the replacement of the well-
recognised provisions of the EU and EC Treaties cited in the debate as well as the 
references to the European Community, now superseded by the European Union or 
Union. 
 
Together, these points have important implications for the scope of this doctoral 
thesis. At present, aside from the proposed Directive on consumer rights16, there does not 
yet exist a definitive proposal for any sort of comprehensive European contract law 
instrument that lends itself to ready-made constitutional evaluation.  Importantly, 
however, this is not fatal to this study because it works within the frame of the debate 
about European contract law as it has developed thus far and is not contingent on the 
political choices to be made.  In line with its controlling purpose, this doctoral thesis 
seeks to lay the constitutional groundwork for the initiatives envisaged for European 
contract law, so as to be of practical value when it comes time for the definitive choices 
to be made. Given that constitutional issues have already started to play a part in steering 
the course of the ongoing activities in European contract law17, laying such groundwork 
in advance would seem to be of the utmost importance. This explains why this thesis 
includes inquiry into the adoption of a comprehensive contract law instrument, whether 
optional or otherwise, as well as several potential alternative or complementary routes to 
such an instrument as highlighted in the institutional documents and discourse 
surrounding the debate. Admittedly, the reference to a “comprehensive” contract law 
instrument is not exact.  It was chosen to correspond to the way in which such an 
instrument has been framed in the debate in terms of denoting a systematic instrument 
encompassing contract law rules relating to commercial and consumer transactions in a 
general sense.18 Consequently, apart from the field of consumer contract law, which is an 
inherent feature of the debate itself, this thesis excludes consideration of the 
constitutionality of instruments gauged at specific types of contracts, such as insurance 
contracts, which manifest special considerations and individualised treatment in the 
debate.19   
 
In addition, the scope of this doctoral thesis encompasses discussion of the 
relevant provisions of the EU and EC Treaties and the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the work 
of the European Convention and the Draft Constitutional Treaty, since all have an 
indelible imprint on the constitutionality of European contract law.20  Importantly, despite 
                                                 
15
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, [2007] OJ C 306/1; consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, [2008] C 115/1 (hereinafter Lisbon Treaty). 
16
 See supra note 5. 
17
 See further Chapter 8, § 8.2 
18
 See 2001 Communication, supra note 1, point 41 and section 4.4 (“comprehensive”); 2003 Action Plan, 
supra note 2, point 4.3 (“non-sector specific measures”); 2004 Communication, supra note 2, point 2.3 
(“non-sector specific measure”).  
19
 As for insurance contracts, see Chapter 5, § 5.2.3. 
20
 See Chapter 8, § 8.3 
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the fact that the Lisbon Treaty now constitutes the governing Treaty framework, this 
doctoral thesis is situated in the analysis of the relevant provisions of the former Treaty 
framework comprised of the EU and EC Treaties, within which references to the 
European Community are still made, alongside that of the Lisbon Treaty.  This is not 
only because the provisions of the EU and EC Treaties lay the groundwork for 
understanding the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, but also for the practical reason 
that at the time of writing the new numbering and nomenclature of the Lisbon Treaty are 
not yet familiar to most readers. 
 
 Second, there is the breadth of the debate about European contract law and the 
constitutional inquiry.  As already alluded to, the breadth of the literature on European 
contract law is massive and has become something of a “cottage industry” unto itself.  
Taking account of the increasing array of books and journals, this makes for super-human 
efforts to keep track of the discourse bearing on the constitutionality of European contract 
law. For that matter, the breadth of the debate is considerably broader than the label, 
European contract law, would indicate. As will be seen in the coming chapters, the debate 
about European contract law emanated from, and still remains entangled with, a larger 
debate about European private law and a so-called “European civil code”. As a result, the 
constitutionality of European contract law inevitably “bumps up” against questions 
concerning the Union’s competence to take action in other areas of private law beyond 
the confines of contract law. Through this linkage, constitutionality can also become 
entangled within a broad array of political, economic, cultural, and social arguments 
relating to the role to be played by a comprehensive European private (or contract) law 
instrument21, whereby the weight of such arguments depends on varying views as to the 
role to be played by such an instrument, e.g., whether it is to make the internal market 
function better or whether it represents deeper social, cultural, or political values.22 This 
makes it quite easy for everything to blur together, and as a result, the objectives 
underlying the debate about European contract law (and European private law generally) 
can become intertwined with the discussion of constitutionality.  This may explain, for 
example, why the potential impact of European contract law for European citizenship and 
European “social justice” have increasingly become subsumed within the discussion of 
legal basis23, or why, given the implications heralded by European contract law for the 
                                                 
21
 For a summary of the various arguments, see, e.g., D. Mazeaud, “Faut-il avoir peur d’un droit européen 
des contrats?”, in De tous horizons: Mélanges Xavier Blanc-Jouvan 309 (Société de législation comparée, 
2005); S. Weatherill, “Why object to the Harmonization of Private Law by the EC?”, 12 European Review 
of Private Law 633 (2004). 
22
 See T. Wilhelmsson, “The Legal, the Cultural, and the Political – Conclusions from Different 
Perspectives on Harmonisation of European Contract Law”, 13 European Business Law Review 541 
(2002).  Compare, e.g., H. Collins, The European Civil Code – The Way Forward (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2008) (advancing significance of European civil code for European transnational civil society and 
European social model); Study Group on Social Justice In European Private Law, “Social Justice in 
European Contract Law: a Manifesto”, 10 European Law Journal 653 (2004) (criticising the European 
contract law project for not acknowledging issues related to “social justice” in contract law).   
23
 See, e.g., M. Hesselink, “European Contract Law:  A Matter of Consumer Protection, Citizenship, or 
Justice?”, 15 European Review of Private Law 323 (2007) (reprinted in, e.g., Constitutional Values and 
European Contract Law 241 (S. Grundmann ed., Kluwer, 2008)); S. Nadaud, Codifier Le Droit Civil 
Européen 223-225 (Larcier, 2008); L. Moccia, “Du ‘Marché’ a la ‘Citoyenneté’:  A la recherche d’un droit 
privé européen durable et de sa base juridique”, Revue Internationale De Droit Comparé 291 (2004). 
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future course of comparative legal research and education, scholars have contemplated 
the Treaty provisions on research and development as a potential legal basis for Union 
action in this setting.24   
 
In response, it is not disputed that the various political, economic, social, and 
cultural arguments have an important role in the debate, and it cannot be foreclosed that 
other Treaty provisions may eventually become relevant in relation to the 
constitutionality of European contract law.  Nevertheless, the scope of this doctoral thesis 
is limited to the examination of Articles 94, 95, 153, 65, and 308 EC (and their 
counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty).  This is because, as illustrated in Part Two, these five 
Treaty provisions have been the predominant focus of the institutional documents and the 
scholarly literature on European contract law. For the same reason, while it remains to be 
seen the extent to which other fields of private law will be included in the initiatives 
envisaged at the European level, the scope of this thesis is delimited to the field of 
contract law in line with the way in which the debate has unfolded at the European level.  
Nevertheless, this study may be of value to the ongoing discourse on the constitutionality 
of Union action in other fields of private law.  Finally, given the increasing volume of 
literature on European contract law and European private law, this thesis does not claim 
to be exhaustive. This doctoral thesis is based on a selection of representative literature 
from scholars inside and outside the European Union, in addition to the relevant 
institutional documents and Treaty materials, which are considered most relevant to the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law. 
 
 Finally, there is the wide expanse for comparative reflection between the 
European Union and the United States in connection with the debate about European 
contract law to account for. On the one hand, inside the constitutional inquiry, the 
assessment of the European Union’s competence under particular Treaty provisions 
relevant to the debate inevitably invites inquiry into comparable provisions of the 
American constitutional framework, such as the Interstate Commerce Clause25 in relation 
to Article 95 EC (now Article 114 TFEU) or the “Necessary and Proper” Clause26 in 
relation to Article 308 EC (now Article 352 TFEU), both of which command 
longstanding jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court going back to the early years of the 
American Republic.27  On the other hand, outside the confines of constitutionality, there 
are several subjects falling within the debate about European contract law that lend 
                                                 
24
 See J. Ziller, The Politics of a European Civil Code, supra note 7, at 112-113 (though rejecting such 
provisions). 
25
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing in relevant part that Congress “shall have Power . .. [t]o regulate 
commerce . . . among the several States”).   
26
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (providing that Congress “shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested 
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
27
 See generally L. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law (3d. ed., Foundation Press, 2000), Chapter 5; E. 
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (3rd ed., Aspen, 2006), Chapter 3; R.D. Rotunda 
and J.E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure (4th ed., West, 2007 and Supp. 
2009), Chapters 3-4. For comparative reflection regarding the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court and 
the Court of Justice, see K. Lenaerts, Le juge et la constitution aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique et dans l’ordre 
juridique européen (Bruylant, 1988).   
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themselves to fruitful reflection with the United States.28  Generally, these subjects fall 
into three baskets or categories.  First, as regards the institutional framework needed to 
support the ongoing activities in European contract law (or European private law 
generally), there has been ongoing discussion concerning the need, or not, for a type of 
European Law Institute, which has beckoned analogy to the American Law Institute (the 
ALI).29 Second, the substance of the contract law rules formulated by academic projects 
associated with European contract law or even as part of a comprehensive instrument to 
be adopted at the European level may merit discussion of the approach taken in the 
United States in instruments such as the UCC.  Third, issues or concerns related to the 
involvement and participation of various interested parts in the debate about European 
contract law may cast an eye to the American scholarship on the decision-making 
processes of the so-called “private legislatures” of the ALI and the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the NCCUSL).30 
 
The detailed discussion of the foregoing subjects would not only make this 
doctoral thesis considerably longer in length, but also would be likely to take the 
constitutionality of European contract law offcourse.  Therefore, the scope of this 
doctoral thesis is limited to those aspects emanating from United States that make a 
salient contribution to the constitutional assessment of European contract law.  This 
means that all such provisions of the American constitutional framework comparable to 
those relevant to the debate about European contract law cannot be treated in depth. This 
also means that this thesis must exclude discussion of those topics falling outside the 
confines of constitutional inquiry, though as will be seen, they are to some extent 
intermingled within the discussion of the debate about European contract law and the 
American private law framework, with the result that this study may at least provide a 
“launching pad” for further development in the literature.   
 
1.4 Structure and caveats to the analysis 
In line with its controlling purpose, this doctoral thesis is divided into three main 
parts concerning the context, the debate, and the constitutionality of European contract 
law.  The ordering of these parts, as well as the chapters within, is purposeful. This is 
because these three parts fit together hand-in-glove, and each builds upon the other.   
 
                                                 
28
 Within the European setting, these issues are related to the “legitimacy” of Union action in European 
contract law and European private law generally. See further Chapter 2, § 2.2.1. 
29
 See, e.g., C.U. Schmid, “Legitimacy Conditions for a European Civil Code”, 8 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 277, 291-294 (2001); Making European Private Law: Governance Design 
209 (F. Cafaggi and H. Muir-Watt eds, Elgar, 2008), particularly L. Liebman, “The American Law 
Institute: a model for the new Europe?”, supra, 209; and H. Collins, “Governance implications for the 
European Union of the changing character of private law”, supra, 269, at 284-286. While removed from the 
political agenda in previous years (see infra Chapter 6, § 6.3.1.1, at 217 n.87), this issue has recently come 
back into view. See, e.g., M.W. Hesselink, “The Common Frame of Reference as a Source of European 
Private Law”, 83 Tulane Law Review 919 (2009). As a related point, especially in the context of a 
European civil code, there was much discussion of the reform of the EU judicial framework, which 
included mention of the American federal court system.  See Schmid, supra, at 288 (and citations therein). 
30
 See Chapter 4. 
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Part One comprises three chapters (Chapters 2-4), which concern the overall 
context or backdrop for the debate about European contract law in the European Union 
and comparative reflection with the United States.  Following from the Introduction, 
Chapter Two sets forth the constitutional framing of European contract law.  It attempts 
to clarify the meaning of the prevalent terminology used in the debate and to fix 
functional definitions for the discussion.  It also elucidates a well-known set of 
Community contract law measures – referred to as the “hard core” of the Community 
contract law acquis – which lie at the heart of the debate and underpin certain perennial 
themes relating to the role and the competence wielded by the European legislator in the 
field of contract law. Chapter Three explores three distinct roles played by the Court of 
Justice in European contract law concerning, first, the Court’s interpretation of measures 
within the “hard core” of Community contract law; second, the Court’s formulation of 
judge-made rules of Community (or Union) law by virtue of what is referred to as 
European “federal common law”; and third, the Advocates Generals’ increasing recourse 
to comparative European contract law materials.  Chapter Four turns to the United 
States and focuses on four major strands of the American private law framework:  
American “federal common law”, uniform and model laws, Restatements, and the 
Uniform Commercial Code. This is done so as to provide a clear understanding of their 
meaning, the problems associated with their usage, and the extent to which attempts to 
approximate areas of private law, including contract law, at the federal level were part of 
their emergence and development.  
 
Part Two concerns the debate about European contract law.  It encompasses 
three chapters (Chapters 5-7), which are roughly divided according to the chronological 
sequence of events through which the debate about European contract law has evolved at 
the European level.  Chapter Five details the beginnings of the debate through the work 
of certain academic projects, the European Parliament’s early resolutions, and the 
European Council meeting in Tampere, with particular emphasis placed on the extent to 
which constitutionality permeated these and other documents issued during this 
timeframe. Chapter Six analyses the Commission’s three Communications on European 
contract law and the responses from the other European institutions and various 
stakeholder groups, with a view to drawing out the extent to which constitutionality, both 
implicitly and explicitly, was interwoven within these various documents. Chapter Seven 
outlines the present path of the debate about European contract law, which includes the 
ongoing preparation of the CFR, the review of the consumer acquis, and the prospect of 
an optional instrument in contract law, which highlights further complexities concerning 
constitutionality at the European level.   
 
Part Three contains five chapters (Chapters 8-12), which are concerned with the 
constitutionality of European contract law.  Chapter Eight provides an overview of the 
constitutional parameters of European contract law in order to evaluate several reasons 
put forward to justify the neglect of constitutionality in the debate at the European level, 
to delineate the overarching Treaty framework governing the discussion, and to clarify 
the roles played by the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality, and sincere 
cooperation in the constitutional assessment of European contract law. Chapter Nine 
examines the extent to which Articles 94, 95, and/or 308 EC (now Articles 115, 114, and 
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352 TFEU, respectively) provide a sufficient legal basis for the adoption of a 
comprehensive European contract law instrument, optional or otherwise, in order to 
achieve the European Union’s objectives in the internal market.  Chapter Ten delves 
into the scope of Article 153 EC (now Article 169 TFEU) in the field of consumer 
protection and the linkage between Articles 153 and 95 EC as far as the adoption of a 
European contract law instrument including consumer contract law, in all or in part, is 
concerned. Chapter Eleven analyses the scope of Article 65 EC (now Article 81 TFEU) 
concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters and the linkage with Articles 95 and 308 
EC (now Articles 114 and 352 TFEU) in connection with the adoption of a European 
contract law instrument. Chapter Twelve examines the constitutionality and/or the 
suitability of several alternative and complementary routes to far-reaching Union action 
in contract law contemplated in the debate, which include enhanced cooperation, an 
intergovernmental treaty, the Open Method of Coordination (the OMC), American 
techniques (i.e., the Restatements, uniform and model laws, and the UCC), and the CFR.  
The study ends with Chapter Thirteen, which sets forth the general conclusions of this 
doctoral thesis. 
 
Admittedly, this three-part structure makes this doctoral thesis quite lengthy, and 
it could be thought better just to launch straight into the constitutional assessment of 
European contract law presented in the third part, without having to wade through the 
first two parts. Yet, this three-part structure emanates from the intent to overcome the 
problems and the challenges underlying this research topic. In essence, the 
constitutionality of European contract law can be viewed as a building containing three 
floors, which must be constructed from the “ground up”.  The first floor or Part One lays 
the foundations for the discussion of the debate about European contract law and for 
comparative reflection with the United States, both semantically in terms of the prevalent 
terminology used in the debate and legally in terms of the template for the approach taken 
to matters of contract law in both the European and American settings. The second floor 
or Part Two sets forth the institutional record of constitutionality at the European level 
and thus contains the “meat” for understanding the extent to which constitutionality 
permeated the debate about the European level, and the ways in which Articles 94, 95, 
153, 65, and 308 EC, along with certain alternative or complementary solutions, 
implicitly and explicitly came into play.  Building on these layers, the third floor or Part 
Three provides the constitutional assessment of European contract law, comprising the 
examination of the scope of the aforementioned provisions (and their counterparts in the 
Lisbon Treaty) that may potentially confer competence on the European Union to adopt a 
comprehensive European contract law instrument and certain alternative and 
complementary routes to such an instrument. In this way, this three-part framework is 
itself an inherent part of this doctoral thesis, with the hope that it can make a definitive 
contribution to the discourse on European contract law and thus enable further research to 
be conducted on this subject, so that potentially further floors of this building can be laid. 
 
 Following from this three-part structure, however, there are certain caveats placed 
on the analysis that should be acknowledged at the outset.  First, as a general matter, the 
presentation of the material is not always linear and sometimes jumps back and forth in 
time.  This is in part the result of the way in which the debate about European contract 
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law has developed at the European level.  This is also to some extent the outcome of the 
three-part framework in the sense that issues covered in one chapter become relevant 
much later on, after other chapters have been presented.  While regrettable, in the 
author’s view this cannot be avoided, given the need to place certain chapters in the 
various parts in order to construct a sound framework for the discussion. 
 
Moreover, with particular regard to the United States, it should not be missed that 
until this doctoral thesis, the extent to which attempts to approximate areas of private law, 
including contract law, at the federal level permeated the American private law 
framework had to a great extent been concealed amidst historical documents and 
scattered literature over the years and hence was relatively unknown even to American 
audiences. In order to provide a cohesive record of such attempts, this warranted 
substantial discussion of the emergence and the development of certain components 
comprising the American private law framework, such as the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the NCCUSL) and the Uniform Commercial 
Code in Chapter 4. This was considered necessary in line with the controlling purpose of 
this study so as to illuminate comparative reflection between the European Union and the 
United States in this setting. 
 
Finally, as already mentioned, Part Two of this doctoral thesis aims to sets forth 
very much for the first time a detailed account of the institutional record of the discussion 
of the constitutionality of European contract law (and European private law generally) at 
the European level, which until now had remained largely hidden beneath the various 
documents issued in the debate. This explains why, in relevant chapters, the discussion 
can be considered descriptive at times.  The presentation of the European institutions’ 
engagement with constitutionality was done with the view to lay the groundwork for the 
analysis of the relevant Treaty provisions that follow. Moreover, given the length of time 
in which the debate about European contract law has gone on and will invariably 
continue, this record may be of benefit to European lawmakers and to present and future 
generations of scholars. 
 
In sum, given all the problems and the challenges underlying the constitutionality 
of European contract law, it may be asked why anyone would want to undertake such an 
endeavour.  In response, for far too long, the constitutionality of European contract law 
has been stunted in various ways, whether by way of assumptions about the scope of 
Union competence and the operation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
the lack of recognition of the extent to which constitutionality has crept into the 
discussion at the European level from the very beginning, and the fallacy of the American 
private law experience.  The time has come to change this path and to place more focus 
on the “constitutional conversation” about European contract law and the “comparative 
conversation” with the United States.  It is therefore the modest hope of the author that 
the work presented here may help to bring the constitutional dimensions of European 
contract law to the forefront and to provide a firm foundation upon which the complex 
issues and the perennial tensions miring this area can be constructively discussed and 
appropriate solutions can be found. 
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2 
 
The Constitutional Framing of European Contract Law 
 
2.1 Introduction   
In order to examine the constitutional assessment of European contract law, one 
must have a firm grasp of the terminology used in the debate and the particular set of 
Community measures that have been adopted in this field.  This is for several reasons.  
To begin with, there is no universal definition for European contract law or much of its 
related terminology for that matter, and in fact, much of the discourse on European 
contract law is mired in terms that may inadvertently inject certain biases into the 
discussion.  Additional difficulties are posed by comparative reflection with the United 
States, since some terms found in the American setting have no ready equivalent to those 
used in the European setting or embody subtleties of the American legal framework.  
Moreover, the collection of Community contract law measures lie at the root of what 
prompted the debate about European contract law in the first place and of the envisaged 
initiatives contemplated for this field.   
 
It is therefore the aim of this chapter to elucidate the prevalent terminology used 
in the European and American settings and these Community contract law measures in 
order to have a constructive discussion about the constitutionality of European contract 
law and a clear understanding of the backdrop to the debate, both of which feed into each 
other.  This will be done in three parts. First, the terminology associated with the 
constitutionality of European contract law is explored, with a view to establishing 
functional definitions for the chapters to come.  Second, the scope of European contract 
law is examined, with focus placed on elucidating a special set of Community contract 
law measures – referred to as the “hard core” of the Community contract law acquis – 
which lie at the heart of the debate about European contract law.  Third, three perennial 
themes underlying the “hard core” of the Community contract law acquis are highlighted, 
in order to set the scene for the launching of the debate about European contract law and 
to underscore several aspects related to the European Union’s competence in this area 
that continue to permeate the constitutionality of European contract law through the 
present day. Together, these three interrelated elements comprise the constitutional 
framing of European contract law. They are the foundations for the constitutional 
assessment of European contract law and the prelude for what is to come.   
 
2.2 Terminology  
As a general matter, the various terms associated with the constitutionality of 
European contract law fall into three main categories or baskets, which derive from the 
very title of this study.  First, there is constitutionality itself.  Second, there is European 
contract law, which is inextricably intertwined with European private law and similar 
variants, such as European civil law or European patrimonial law. Third, there are the 
various processes by which European contract law (and European private law generally) 
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come about, which implicate the well-known “trinity of terms”1   – approximation, 
harmonisation, and coordination – among many others.  
 
On the whole, the definitions of these terms are problematic for several reasons.  
First, there is no general agreement concerning the meanings of various terms used in the 
debate about European contract law. Some are used in different ways by the European 
institutions and scholars, thereby making it difficult to establish common ground, much 
less to find or to maintain formal boundary lines between them.  Others have splintered 
into distinct subsets, which embody their own particular meanings.  As an apt illustration, 
the title of this study – “the constitutionality of European contract law” – could at face 
value be interpreted in a number of ways depending upon one’s view of the “European 
contract law” and the “constitutionality” containers.  Second, much of the sensitivity 
underlying the constitutionality of European contract law leads back to the terms used. 
Many terms have become so “politically loaded” that it is virtually impossible to find 
neutral words to discuss the ongoing activities in this field or to escape the implied 
connotations of terms that have become entrenched in the discourse.  Third, complicating 
matters further is the comparative standpoint with the United States, since each of these 
categories illuminates differences between the European and American settings. 
 
It is often overlooked that these terminological problems have a direct impact on 
the constitutionality of European contract law.  This is because as fleshed out below, 
depending upon which terms are used, this may misdirect or prejudge the discussion of 
the European Union’s competence in this setting. Moreover, there is not as yet any 
convenient, overarching way in which to frame constitutionality without bumping against 
the limitations of some of these terms. This explains the penchant for generic references 
to the Community’s “far-reaching” or “comprehensive” action in contract law, since to 
specify terms such as approximation is to automatically exclude the prospect of an 
optional instrument running alongside the national legal orders as dictated by the case 
law of the Court of Justice.2  As a result, it is argued here that terminology is everything 
in European contract law, particularly when exploring its constitutional dimensions. It 
provides the template for engaging, as much as possible, in an objective “constitutional 
conversation” about European contract law and a “comparative conversation” with the 
United States in this setting.  Thus, each of the three categories of terms will be analysed 
in turn, so as to examine their meanings and to provide a working set of terms to be used 
throughout this discussion. Added to this, certain “comparative leaps” to the United 
States will be made along the way in order to spotlight differences in approach and to 
explain certain terms prevalent in the American setting.  
 
2.2.1 Constitutionality  
The term, constitutionality, is defined here as the determination of the extent of 
the European Union’s competence to adopt a comprehensive instrument in the field of 
contract law and the extent to which certain alternative and complementary routes to 
                                                 
1
 D. Vignes, “The Harmonisation of National Legislation and the EEC”, 15 European Law Review 358, 361 
(1990). 
2
 See Chapter 9, § 9.4.3.  
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Union action can be resorted to in accordance with primary Union law (i.e., the Treaties).  
In particular, constitutionality encompasses inquiry into both the existence and the 
exercise of Union competence.  The existence of Union competence implicates the 
principle of conferral set forth in the first paragraph of Article 5 EC (now Article 5(2) EU 
of the Lisbon Treaty), which mandates that the European Union may only take action 
pursuant to the competences conferred upon it under the Treaties. The exercise of Union 
competence requires compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
laid down in the second and third paragraphs of Article 5 EC (now Articles 5(3)-(4) EU 
of the Lisbon Treaty), as well as the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 
10 EC (now Article 4(3) EU of the Lisbon Treaty). In principle, constitutionality seems to 
be the easiest of the bunch to define.  Within the confines of the discourse on European 
contract law so far, references to “constitutionality” as a shorthand reference or compact 
phrase to denote the inquiry into the European Union’s competence in contract law 
abound without much controversy or need for explanation or justification.3  Thus, 
constitutionality is for the most part a generally accepted term in this context without 
further ado. Nevertheless, certain complications arise.   
 
First, looking below the surface of constitutionality, the meaning and the 
relationship between the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality, and sincere 
cooperation governing Union competence under the Treaties (as well as the allowance for 
certain alternative routes envisaged for European contract law) is far more complex than 
may appear.  Indeed, parsing out the multi-layered conceptions of some of these 
principles and locating a precise boundary line between them is a difficult undertaking, to 
say the least.  Moreover, while the term, constitutionality, is not as such problematic in 
the United States, the American constitutional framework is markedly different from that 
in the European Union, especially as regards the approach taken to the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.  This explains why further discussion of these principles 
must be saved for Chapter 8, where they can be delved into in greater detail within the 
overall context of outlining the parameters of the constitutional assessment of European 
contract law. Suffice to say for now, constitutionality places central focus on the 
application of the four principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality and sincere 
cooperation in relation to particular initiatives envisaged for European contract law.   
 
Second, constitutionality could conceivably be framed in broader terms to 
encompass issues that may be considered to bear in one way or another on the 
“legitimacy” of Union action in European contract law.  Generally speaking, the term, 
legitimacy, is a famously elastic concept capable of many expressions4.  Yet, at least in 
the context of European contract law, it is often depicted in terms of the distinction 
between “formal legitimacy” and “social legitimacy”:  formal legitimacy is generally 
used to signify the importance of adhering to the formal limits of Union competence 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., E. Hondius, “Towards a European Civil Code”, in Towards a European Civil Code 3, 7 (A. 
Hartkamp et al. eds, 3rd ed., Kluwer, 2004). 
4
 For a general account, see, e.g., Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (A. Arnull and D. 
Wincott eds, Oxford Univ. Press, 2002); A. Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique 37-73 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2002). For discussion of the famous dichotomy between “input” and “output” 
legitimacy, see F.W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford Univ. Press, 
1999). 
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under the Treaty, whereas social legitimacy is largely viewed as placing emphasis on 
various aspects linked to the social acceptance of the initiatives envisaged for European 
contract law at the European level.5 For example, social legitimacy has been used to 
underscore the important role of democratic processes in connection with the preparation 
and the adoption of a European contract instrument as in the case of the involvement and 
participation of the European Parliament, the national parliaments, and European civil 
society6, or issues related to the institutional and judicial framework that would be needed 
to support the adoption of such an instrument and to orchestrate the interactions of the 
various actors involved.7  There is no question of the latter’s importance or of the way 
these two expressions of legitimacy build upon each other in relation to European 
contract law, but these broader aspects of legitimacy (and relevant comparisons with the 
American setting8) lie outside the scope of this study. As defined here, constitutionality 
can essentially be considered a distinct subset or component of legitimacy in the context 
of European contract law. 
 
Finally, constitutionality is inevitably drawn into the web of related terms 
carrying the “constitutional” moniker, such as “European constitutional law”, 
“constitutionalism”, “constitutionalisation” and of course “constitution” itself, all of 
which have provoked considerable discussion when applied to the European Union.  In 
this regard, it may be interesting to ponder whether the need for going deeper into 
constitutionality and these related terms would have arisen with quite as much fervor 
today had it not been for the Draft Treaty establishing a “Constitution” for Europe (the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty9), which catapulted centerstage issues relating to the fixture 
of the “constitutional” label on the European project. That said, starting long before the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty, there was already a quite burgeoning scholarship on these 
various terms10, and even with the demise of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, tensions 
remain as regards the application of “constitutional” terminology to the European Union.  
                                                 
5
 See S. Weatherill, “Competence and Legitimacy”, in The Outer Limits of European Union Law 17  (C. 
Barnard and O. Odudu eds., Hart, 2009).  
6
 See, e.g., W. van Gerven, “About Rules and Principles, Codification and Legislation, Harmonization and 
Convergence, and Education in the Area of Contract Law”, in Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays 
in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs 400, 404 (A. Arnull et al. eds, Oxford Univ. Press, 2008); J. Ziller, “The 
Legitimacy of the Codification of Contract Law in View of the Allocation of Competences between the 
European Union and its Member States”, in The Politics of a European Civil Code 89, 102-103 (M.W. 
Hesselink ed., Kluwer, 2006). The conception of a European civil society has given way to its own 
discourse.  See, e.g., Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance (S. Smismans ed., Elgar, 2006); 
“Special Issue: Law, Civil Society and Transitional Economic Governance”, 9 European Law Journal 387 
(2003); O. De Schutter, “Europe in Search of its Civil Society”, 8 European Law Journal 198 (2002). 
7
 See, e.g., C.U. Schmid, “Legitimacy Conditions for a European Civil Code”, 8 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 277 (2001).  
8
 See Chapter 1, § 1.3. 
9
 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] OJ C 310/1 (Draft Constitutional Treaty).  
There was a previous version of this Treaty promulgated in 2003.  See Chapter 8, § 8.3. 
10
 For a brief selection, see Constitutionalism Beyond the State (M. Wind and J.H.H. Weiler eds, 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003); Principles of European Constitutional Law (A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast 
eds, Hart, 2006); M. Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution 402-408 (Hart, 
2006) (and citations therein). The so-called “constitutionalisation” of European contract law and European 
private law generally has taken on its own meaning and discourse:  see infra note 27. 
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This begs the question whether other words, such as “legality”, could presumably fit just 
as well as constitutionality for the purposes of this study and could be used instead. 
 
In response, constitutionality is used here because it is beneficial for embodying 
certain quintessentially “constitutional” aspects of the debate about European contract 
law, which follow from the conception of European constitutional law from whence the 
term emanates. Taking the definition provided in a well-known treatise, European 
constitutional law “consists of all of the rules of Community law relating to the general 
objectives, the allocation of competences and the way in which the legislative, executive 
and judicial functions are performed within the Community”.11  In this regard, there does 
not seem to be much disagreement as to the application of European constitutional law, 
and hence the “constitutional” appellation, to matters concerning the division of 
competence, both vertically between the European Union and the Member States and 
horizontally between the European institutions themselves.12  The vertical division of 
competences between the European Union and the Member States is often labeled by the 
term, “federalism”, in the United States13, and the horizontal division of competences 
between the European institutions is encapsulated by the term, “institutional balance”, in 
the European Union, as opposed to the American parlance of “separation of powers”.14 
Such matters cast a considerable shadow over the discussion of the constitutionality of 
European contract law in various ways, as will be seen in the coming chapters.  In this 
                                                 
11
 K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union § 1-020, at 17 (R. Bray ed., 
2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005).   
12
 See, e.g., A. Arnull et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006) 
S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Longman, 2002); T.C. Hartley, The 
Foundations of  European Community Law: An Introduction to the Constitutional and Administrative Law 
of the European Community (6th ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2007); K. Lenaerts, “The Basic Constitutional 
Charter of a Community Based on the Rule of Law”, in The Past and the Future of EU Law: Revisiting the 
Classics on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (M.P.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai eds, Hart, 
forthcoming). Technically speaking, it has long been recognised that there is a distinction between the 
terms “competences” and “powers” in the EU setting. See R. Schütze, “The European Community’s 
Federal Order of Competences–A Retrospective Analysis”, in 50 Years of the European Treaties – Looking 
Back and Thinking Forward 63, 63 n.3 (M. Dougan and S. Currie eds., Hart, 2009). As a practical matter, 
however, such terms have been used interchangeably by scholars. See G. de Búrca and B. de Witte, “The 
Delimitation of Powers Between the EU and its Member States”, in Accountability and Legitimacy in the 
European Union, supra note 4, 201, at 203 n.3; A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, “The Vertical Order of 
Competences”, in Principles of European Constitutional Law, supra note 10, 335, at 337-338. Given the 
variation in the Treaties, it is somewhat difficult to use only one of the terms consistently.  Still, as a 
general matter, the term, “competence”, will be resorted to. 
13
 While it is not disputed that the notion of “federalism” does not have the same application in the 
European Union as it does in the United States, it is certainly not unknown when placed in a broader frame 
in the sense of power-sharing between the central (Union/federal) authority and that of the constituent 
(Member States/states). See K. Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 
American Journal of Comparative Law 205 (1990).  Indeed, the scholarship on comparative federalism 
between the US and the EU has become, in the words of one scholar, a “cottage industry”: E.A. Young, 
“Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American 
Federalism”, 77 New York University Law Review 1612, 1615 (2002). 
14
 This is not to say that “separation of powers” has no place in the EU, but given its roots in the classical 
functions of a nation-state, it assumes particular nuances, which is framed by the term “institutional 
balance”. See Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, supra note 11, § 13-
008 - § 13-012, at 560-563 (and citations therein). 
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way, constitutionality arguably serves as a more well-targeted descriptor than other, 
somewhat more generic terms and enables parallels to be drawn with the United States in 
this regard. 
 
2.2.2 European contract law and its relationship to European private law 
As alluded to above, European contract law is by no means a simple term and in 
fact represents a multi-layered topic.  This perhaps explains why in the steady stream of 
Commission documents on European contract law, an explicit definition of the term has 
not yet been set down.  In turn, the meaning of European contract law is tied to that of 
European private law and related terms, which have a direct bearing on this study. 
Consequently, the discussion is divided into three subsets so as to examine, first, the 
meaning(s) of European contract law; second, the meaning(s) of European private law 
and similar variants; and third, comparable terms used in the United States. 
 
2.2.2.1 The meaning(s) of European contract law 
At first glance, it could be thought that taking apart its various components – 
“European”, “contract” and “law” – could be helpful for defining European contract law.  
On second thought, however, this does not advance the ball much, and in fact, 
demonstrates that the conception of European contract law itself embodies elements that 
have propelled the debate about this topic forward at the European level. The “European” 
container is not strictly limited to the European Union, but rather must be seen in the 
three dimensions of the international, European and national spheres, which makes it 
difficult to locate its precise boundaries particularly in the Community context.    It also 
remains controversial to what extent there is, or can be, a common “European” 
conception of contract.15  As emphasised by commentators, this alludes to a glaring 
paradox underlying European contract law itself:  on the one hand, there is a mass of 
comparative work aimed at the distillation of common contract law rules shared by the 
Member States; on the other hand, the entire debate is centered around the very lack of 
commonality among national contract laws so as to bolster the need for further action at 
the European level.16 In addition, European contract law covers a variety of sources that 
transcend the classical conception of “law” adopted by way of the prescribed decision-
making procedures of a particular entity, such as international and European principles, 
model laws, and customary practices.17 
                                                 
15
 See, e.g., B. Pozzo, “Multilingualism, Legal Terminology and the Problems of Harmonising European 
Private Law”, in Multilingualism and the Harmonisation of European Law 3, 8 (B. Pozzo and V. Jacometti 
eds., Kluwer, 2006).  This is an issue that plagues the debate through the present day.  See Netherlands 
Delegation, “Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law”, DOC 13697/08ADD 3 LIMITE 
JUSTCIV 202/CONSOM 133, dated 7 Oct. 2008, point (b), at 2.  Indeed, the issue could be considered to 
transcend the mere field of contract law:  see C. Joerges, “The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm 
of Private Law:  A Plea for a New Legal Discipline”, 14 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law 149, 159 (2004).   
16
 See, e.g., N. Roos, “NICE Dreams and Realities of European Private Law”, in Epistemology and 
Methodology of Comparative Law 197, 220 (M. Van Hoecke ed., Hart, 2004); M.W. Hesselink and G.J.P. 
de Vries, Principles of European Contract Law 22 (Kluwer, 2001). 
17
 As regards the distinction between “model rules” and “principles” in relation to the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL), for example, see van Gerven, “About Rules and Principles, Codification 
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Nevertheless, as ventilated from the literature and institutional documents, 
European contract law can essentially be considered an umbrella term that embodies the 
following three interrelated views:  (1) a wide view taking into account the various 
international, European, and national conventions, instruments, and comparative law 
projects; (2) a narrow view focused on the EU/EC contract law acquis; and (3) a future 
view towards the adoption of a European contract law instrument.18  Each of these views 
contributes to pinpointing terms that will be used in the discussion.   
 
First, the wide view envelops several sources of European contract law emanating 
from the international, European, and national levels. They predominantly emanate from 
seven general categories that are briefly listed as follows: 
 
1) International law conventions and instruments adopted under the rubric of 
public and private international bodies19, such as the 1980 (Vienna) United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the 
CISG)20; 
 
2) EU/EC contract law acquis comprising Union and Community measures 
considered to fall within or otherwise touch upon the field of contract law; 
 
3) EU private international law instruments, such as the 1980 Rome Convention 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations21, now converted into the “Rome 
I” Regulation22, and the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Legislation, Harmonization and Convergence, and Education in the Area of Contract Law”, supra note 
6.  
18
 See, e.g., S. Grundmann, “General Standards and Principles, Clauses Générales, and Generalklauseln in 
European Contract Law – A Survey”, in General Clauses and Standards in European Contract Law – 
Comparative Law, EC Law and Contract Law Codification 1, 4-6 (S. Grundmann and D. Mazeaud eds, 
Kluwer, 2006) (framing the matter a “a Multi-Level” European contract law). 
19
 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European 
Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11.7.2001 (hereinafter 2001 Communication), Annex II (“List of 
International Instruments Relating to Substantial Contract Law Issues”). 
20
 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 11 Apr. 1980, 1489 
U.N.T.S  3 (hereinafter CISG).  It is presently in force in most, though not all, Member States; at the time 
of writing, the exceptions are Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and the UK. See http://www.uncitral.org.  Needless 
to say, the commentary and the case law on the CISG are massive, much of which is accessible through 
websites, particularly those operated by Pace University (http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu) and Freiburg 
University (http://www.cisg-online.ch). 
21
 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 19 June 1980, consolidated version, 
[2005] OJ C 334/1 (hereinafter Rome Convention).   
22
 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), [2008] OJ L 177/6 (hereinafter Rome I Regulation).  
Notably, the Rome I Regulation does not apply to all Member States, e.g., Denmark. See generally Rome I 
Regulation: The law applicable to contractual obligations in Europe (F. Ferrari and S. Leible eds., Sellier, 
2009).  
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enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters23, now converted into 
the “Brussels I” Regulation24, among many others25;  
 
4) European (extra-EU) conventions and instruments, such as the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR)26 under the helm of the Council of Europe;27 
 
5) National laws:  various sources of contract law emanating from the Member 
States (or even third States), such as national legislative and executive measures 
or case law; 
 
6) Lex mercatoria:  various national and international customary practices and 
instruments pertaining to international commercial contracts28; and 
 
7) Comparative law materials: which are often referred to under the label of “ius 
commune”, whether in the form of scholarly works such as books or treatises by 
preeminent European jurists29 or the works emanating from a wide array of 
                                                 
23
 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 27 Sept. 
1968, consolidated version, [1998] OJ C 27/1 (hereinafter Brussels Convention). 
24
 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 12/1; corrigendum, [2001] OJ L 
307/28 (hereinafter Brussels I Regulation).  Notably, the Brussels I Regulation does not apply to all 
Member States; for example, the Brussels Convention is still in force in Denmark.  There are also related 
international treaties, such as the Lugano Convention, the parallel treaty to the Brussels Convention, as 
between many Member States of the EU and the remaining States of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA). See generally  Brussels I Regulation 1-21 (U. Magnus and P. Mankowski eds., Sellier, 2007).  
25
 See generally P. Stone, EU Private International Law: Harmonization of Laws (Elgar, 2006). As a 
related point, the relationship between EU private international law instruments and conflict of law rules in 
the Community contract law acquis has been the topic of its own rising discourse.  See generally S. Francq, 
L'applicabilité du droit communautaire dérivé au regard des méthodes de droit international privé 
(Bruylant, 2005). 
26
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222 (hereafter ECHR). 
27
 The interplay between contract law and the ECHR is a rising subject of discourse often viewed through 
the lens of the “constitutionalisation” of private law. See Constitutional Values and European Contract 
Law (S. Grundmann ed., Kluwer, 2008); Special issue on European Constitutionalization of Private Law, 
12 European Review of Private Law No 5(2004); M.W. Hesselink, The New European Private Law: Essays 
on the Future of Private Law in Europe 177-190 (Kluwer, 2002). With particular regard to the ongoing 
developments of the European contract law project, see further C. Mak, “The Constitution of a Common 
Frame of Reference for European Contract Law”, 4 European Review of Contract Law 553 (2008); T. 
Wilhelmsson, “The Ethical Pluralism of Late Modern Europe and Codification of European Contract Law”, 
in The Need for a European Contract Law – Empirical and Legal Perspectives 121, 141-146 (J. Smits ed., 
Europa, 2005). 
28
 See generally R. Goode et al., Transnational Commercial Law:  Text, Cases, and Materials 3-56 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2007); A.M. López Rodríguez, Lex Mercatoria and Harmonization of Contract Law in the EU 
(DJØF, 2003); K.P. Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer, 1999). 
29
 E.g., famously, H. Kötz, 1 European Contract Law (T. Weir transl., Clarendon, 1997) (originally 
published in German as Europäisches Vertragsrecht I (Mohr, 1996)). 
Chapter 2:  The Constitutional Framing of European Contract Law 
 
 
21 
academic projects30, such as the Principles of European Contract Law (the 
PECL)31 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts32. 
 
Noticeably, part of what makes European contract law so difficult to grasp is that 
there are no neat dividing lines between these categories.  European contract law rests 
upon interlocking international, European, and national layers that blur and feed into each 
other.  For example, the existing corpus of Community contract law measures is itself 
grounded in shared principles, concepts, and rules of contract law of the Member States. 
In turn, the national contract laws feed into the comparative law materials, which forms 
its own discrete category at the same time that it is informed by the various measures 
taken at both the European and international levels.  The PECL is an apt illustration 
because it seems to fall squarely into most of the categories.  As a set of common contract 
law principles of the Member States, it constitutes a key element of comparative legal 
materials at the same time that it claims to be part and parcel of other components – 
advocated for use by the national authorities, considered to fall within the lex mercatoria, 
proposed as the applicable law under private international law, and the basis of a 
European contract instrument to be adopted at the European level.33  Moreover, each 
individual category listed above is itself open-ended, thereby encompassing a broad 
spectrum of various instruments that makes the boundaries of European contract law 
further malleable. For example, what is generally referred to as the “lex mercatoria” is 
not considered to represent a coherent and consistent category, but rather a more loose set 
of various legislation, customs and practices concerning international commercial 
contracts within the international and national spheres.34 
 
Despite these complexities, however, the use of the term, “European contract 
law” will be employed with the wide view in mind. This is because most of the 
components play their own role in the constitutional assessment, whether arguing for or 
against the need for a European contract law instrument, helping to delineate its shape, or 
providing an alternative to such an instrument. Thus, while at first sight the title of this 
study may seem a little vague, arguably there is no better substitute that is more well-
suited for this study.  Indeed, to call it “the constitutionality of Community contract law”, 
for example, could imply the exclusion of components, such as comparative contract law 
materials produced by academic projects, which bear directly on the debate and 
constitutional assessment of European contract law.  Even so, scholars often focus on the 
Community contract law acquis35, which leads to the next point. 
                                                 
30
 The various academic projects are generally discussed in Chapter 5, § 5.2.   
31
 See Chapter 5, § 5.2.1. 
32
 See generally M.J. Bonell, An International Statement of Contract Law:  The UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (3rd ed., Transnational, 2005); M. Heidemann, Methodology of 
Uniform Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles in international legal doctrine and practice (Springer, 
2007). 
33
 See further Chapter 5, § 5.2.1. 
34
 See, e.g., F.W. Grosheide, “Legal Borrowing and Drafting International Commercial Contracts”, in 
International Contract Law – Articles on Various Aspects of Transnational Contract Law 221, 225-226 
(F.W. Grosheide and E. Hondius eds, Intersentia, 2004). 
35
 See R. Schulze, “Consumer Law and European Contract Law”, in The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2007 
153, 154-158 (G. Howells et al., Ashgate, 2007) (emphasising the evolution of the definition of European 
contract law from academic construct to Community legislation). 
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In the second, narrow view, European contract law is often used interchangeably 
with the term, “EC contract law”, in order to hone in on the relevant Community acquis 
in the field.36  There is an important link between the definition of EC contract law and its 
scope, as the broader it is defined, the greater its expanse over various areas of 
Community and Union law.37 In principle, EC contract law potentially encompasses a 
plethora of measures spanning the gamut of fields such as competition law, free 
movement of persons, non-discrimination, labour and employment, public procurement, 
intellectual property, data protection, and travel law, not to mention the Community’s 
activities related to the internal market.38 Yet, EC contract law is most often used to 
spotlight a specific subset of Community measures labelled the “hard core” of the 
Community contract law acquis, as discussed below. For now, it should be recognised 
that the term “EC contract law” will be used to denote Community measures adopted so 
far in the field of contract law.  This is so, even though it remains to be seen whether this 
term will recede in favour of “EU contract law” in line with the elimination of the three-
pillar structure and hence the replacement of the European Community with European 
Union or Union as part of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Finally, the third, future view of European contract law is often identified by 
reference to “a” or “the” European contract law39 in order to signify the progression 
towards the adoption of a European contract law instrument at the European level.  It is 
thus akin to various descriptors for such an instrument, such as a European contract act or 
a European contract code.  To avoid confusion with European contract law generally (and 
potential nuances associated with the word “code” discussed below), the term “European 
contract law instrument” will be employed to denote the enactment of a comprehensive 
instrument encompassing contract law rules relating to commercial and consumer 
transactions in a general sense at the European level.   
 
Taking things a step further, the European institutions have started referring to the 
“European contract law initiative”40 or the “European contract law project”41 as a way to 
frame the ongoing activities taking place in European contract law at the European level.  
                                                 
36
 See, e.g., C. Quigley, 1 European Community Contract Law (Kluwer, 1997); S. Grundmann, “The 
Structure of European Contract Law”, 9 European Review of Private Law 505, 508 (2001); K. Reisenhuber, 
“System and Principles of EC Contract Law”, 1 European Review of Contract Law 297 (2005) (and 
citations therein). 
37
 See C. Reisenhuber, supra note 36, at  300-301. 
38
 See, e.g., C. Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law 52-53 (Routledge-Cavendish, 2008); 
S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill, “The European Community’s Competence to Pursue the Harmonisation of 
Contract Law – an Empirical Contribution to the Debate”, in The Harmonisation of European Contract 
Law:  Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice 105, 106 (S. Vogenauer and S. 
Weatherill eds, Hart, 2006).  See also 2001 Communication, supra note 19, Annex I (“Important 
Community Acquis in the Area of Private Law”). 
39
 See, e.g., The Need for a European Contract Law: Empirical and Legal Perspectives (J. Smits ed., 
Europa, 2005); D. Busch, Indirect Representation in European Contract Law 1 (Kluwer, 2005); Editorial, 1 
European Review of Contract Law 1, 1 (2005); S. Weatherill, European Consumer Law and Policy 159 
(Elgar, 2005) 
40
 See, e.g., First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review, COM (2005) 
456 final, 23.9.2005 (hereinafter 2005 Progress Report), point 1. 
41
 See, e.g., id., point 3.   
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Both are beneficial for the very reason that they are means by which to encapsulate on a 
more neutral and general basis such activities without implying any normative judgment 
as to what that endpoint should be or what form it should take, though one wonders 
whether the word “initiative” may be read to imply some sort of linkage to legislative 
action.42 To forestall this, the term “European contract law project” will be used to 
denote in a general sense the ongoing course of events and activities concerning 
European contract law emanating from the debate about European contract law at the 
European level. 
 
2.2.2.2 The meaning(s) of European private law and similar variants 
As already mentioned, the focus on European contract law inevitably brings 
European private law and similar variants into play.  This is perhaps not all that 
surprising, since contract law is generally viewed as a distinct subset of private law, and 
hence as a scientific matter, they are linked.  Thus, European contract law has sprouted 
up like a seed from the mother plant along with other distinct fields of private law, with 
the result that European private law has too become an umbrella term encompassing an 
increasing variety of offshoots – e.g., European tort law, European property law, and 
European family law – making it a challenge to find many fields of private law that do 
not command their own growing discourse. But important to constitutionality, the 
relationship between European contract law and European private law emanates from the 
debate itself. 
 
 As illustrated in Part Two, the debate about European contract law started out 
within a larger debate about the approximation of the private laws of the Member States, 
which to a large extent has continued through the present day despite the “European 
contract law” label.  Consequently, in view of the academic projects and attention 
devoted to it at the European level, European contract law has and continues to be the 
motor for Community developments and activities overall, but the dividing line 
separating it from the overarching momentum of European private law has never 
completely been severed. This explains why it is terminologically difficult to discuss the 
debate about European contract law without mentioning European private law, or why 
institutional documents in the debate may frame the matter as European contract law but 
implicate to varying degrees other fields of private law as well. In other words, the debate 
plays fast and loose with the label, European contract law, and sitting in the background 
are ambiguities that creep into the “constitutional conversation” of European contract 
law, such as whether Community inroads into national contract law are the pathway to 
more far-reaching action covering other fields of private law at the European level. The 
bottom line is the label, European contract law, often implicitly reads or beckons 
European private law, and the debate itself has not yet resolved the linkage or the 
tensions between the two. 
 
                                                 
42
 There may be further nuances between the two.  See, e.g., B. Flodgren, “The European Contract Law 
Project – Reflections on the Lawmaking Process”, in Liber Amicorum in Honour of Sven Norberg: A 
European for all Seasons 219, 220 (M. Johansson et al. eds, Bruylant, 2006). 
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In any case, much of the difficulty in parsing out the definition of European 
contract law also exists for European private law.43 Perhaps even more so for European 
private law because it is seen on a much broader scale and has given way to overarching 
political and institutional issues related to the European multi-level framework, new 
modes of governance, and the dynamics of private and public regulation.44  Like 
European contract law, no explicit definition of European private law can be found in the 
various documents disseminated by the European institutions in the debate, but as 
distilled from such documents and the relevant literature, European private law can also 
be viewed in three ways: (1) the wider view comprising the various European and 
international conventions and instruments; the EU/EC acquis; EU private international 
law rules; national legal systems; lex mercatoria; and comparative materials comprising 
the ius commune aspects of national private legal systems45; (2) a narrower view focusing 
on the Community acquis in private law, i.e. “EC private law”46; and (3) a future view 
looking towards the emergence of “the new European private law”47 or “a” European 
private law48, which embodies the debate about the adoption of a comprehensive 
European private law instrument, often framed as a “European civil code”.  
 
Leaving the word “code” aside for the moment, this in turn warrants inquiry into 
the distinction between “private law” and other spheres – i.e., “civil law”, “commercial 
law”, and “patrimonial law” – with which European private law is generally associated. 
Starting with private law, as a formal matter, this is considered to denote the fields of law 
governing relationships between individuals, as opposed to public law which in principle 
covers fields of law governing relationships emanating from the state or government, 
even though the boundary line between the two is porous and various relationships 
involving public or state entities can fall on the private law side of the line.49 As a 
practical matter, private law generally comprises the fields of contract, tort, property, 
                                                 
43
 See, e.g., K. Boele-Woelki and R.H. van Ooik, “The Communitarization of Private International Law”, in 
International Contract Law – Articles on Various Aspects of Transnational Contract Law, supra note 34, 
343, at 347 (“everyone seems to have their own description of the term and it is used in quite a variety of 
meanings”). 
44
 See Making European Private Law: Governance Design (F. Cafaggi and H. Muir-Watt eds, Elgar, 2008); 
The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (F. Cafaggi ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2006); K. 
Garcia, Le droit civil européen (Larcier, 2008) 
45
 See, e.g., G. Alpa, “European Private Law: Results, Projects and Hopes”, 14 European Business Law 
Review 379 (2003); Boele-Woelki and van Ooik, “The Communitarization of Private International Law”, 
supra note 43, at 351-353; S. Whittaker, “The Interpretation of Concepts in European Private Law”, in The 
Future of European Contract Law - Essays in honour of Ewoud Hondius 333, 333 (K. Boele-Woelki and 
W. Grosheide eds, Kluwer, 2007).   
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 See, e.g., M. Kenny, “The 2004 Communication on European Contract Law: those magnificent men in 
their unifying machines”, 30 European Law Review 724, 724 (2005). 
47
 See, e.g., Hesselink, The New European Private Law: Essays on the Future of Private Law in Europe, 
supra note 27, at 7-8. 
48
 See, e.g., J. Smits, The Making of European Private Law – Towards a Ius Commune Europaeum as a 
Mixed Legal System § 2-3 (N. Kornet transl., Intersentia, 2002). 
49
 See G. Alpa, “European Community Resolutions and the Codification of ‘Private Law’”, 8 European 
Review of Private Law 321, 324 (2000); As a result, the boundary line between “private” and “public” law 
has been considered thin (see The Public Law/Private Law Divide – Une entente assez cordiale? (M. 
Freedland and J-B Auby eds, Hart, 2006)) or ill-defined (see F. Cafaggi, “Introduction”, in The Institutional 
Framework of European Private Law, supra note 44, 1, at 2). 
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family, and succession law.50  Private law is often used interchangeably with the notion 
of civil law, particularly in the debate about European contract law by both scholars and 
the European institutions.51  Private law can also been considered to envelop subject- 
matters falling within the rubric of commercial law.52 Yet, the Member States take 
varying approaches to the organisation of the branches of civil and commercial law, some 
(but not all) segregating them into separate codes.53  Therefore, the use of the term, 
private law, will be preferred, so as to avoid confusion over the varying civil and 
commercial law categories in the Member States, even if references to civil law and to 
some extent commercial law have become commonplace in this context. 
 
 Finally, the term, patrimonial law, is an important subset of private law as far as 
the debate about European contract law is concerned. It is largely equated with the work 
of a prominent academic project involved in the debate, the Study Group on a European 
Civil Code.54 Generally speaking, patrimonial law is generally viewed as denoting the 
law of obligations (including general contract law and special contract law governing 
particular types of contracts, the law of non-obligations (i.e., tort law, unjust enrichment, 
and the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (negotiorum gestio)), as well 
as certain areas of movable property law, but excludes areas such as family law, the law 
of successions, and real property or land law.55 Thus, within the debate, sometimes what 
is referred to as European private law (or a European civil code) is really meant to denote 
the more specific subset of European patrimonial law.56   
 
2.2.2.3 Comparative leaps to the United States  
In the United States, the term, private law, is not as widespread as in the European 
Union, and often the emphasis is put on the particular field concerned, such as contracts 
or torts. Yet, the private law container is not unknown, and this difference in approach 
has certainly not halted the “comparative conversation” between the European Union and 
the United States in this regard.57  Nevertheless, in the American setting, there are certain 
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 See Hondius, “Towards a European Civil Code”, in Towards a European Civil Code, supra note 3, at 6; 
Alpa, “European Private Law: Results, Projects and Hopes”, supra note 45, at 380. 
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 Compare, e.g., Hondius, “Towards a European Civil Code”, in Towards a European Civil Code (3rd ed.), 
supra note 3, with E. Hondius, “Towards a European Civil Code”, in Towards a European Civil Code (A. 
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circulated throughout the debate.  See generally Part Two. 
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 See, e.g., Alpa, “European Private Law: Results, Projects and Hopes”, supra note 45, at 380. 
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 See G. Alpa, “European Community Resolutions and the Codification of ‘Private Law’”, supra note 45, 
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 See Chapter 5, § 5.2.2 
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 See Study Group website, http://www.sgeec.net/. 
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European private law, but it essentially comprises areas of European patrimonial law instead.  See Chapter 
7, § 7.2.3. 
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 See, e.g., D. Caruso, “The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal 
Integration”, 3 European Law Journal 3, 5 n.4 (1997); F.H. Miller, “The Uniform Law Process for the 
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nuances in approach to be aware of as regards the distinction between commercial law 
and contract law. 
 
References to commercial law as a whole and the distinct fields within it (e.g., 
negotiable instruments, the sale of goods, secured transactions, etc.) abound, particularly 
in the discussion of certain American mechanisms relevant to this study, such as uniform 
laws and the Uniform Commercial Code.58 The field of commercial law does include 
aspects of contract law, but it is not exclusively directed at that particular field of law.  
This explains why this study often frames the matter as contract law and other fields of 
commercial law in this regard. Moreover, given its coverage of areas related to contract 
law, such as movable property law, the use of “commercial law” in the United States as 
the comparative reference point to the debate about European contract law may risk 
inciting tensions similar to those underlying the relationship between European contract 
law and European private law in the sense of implying a wider ambit for Union action 
beyond the confines of contract law. Admittedly, the analogies between commercial law 
in the United States and contract law in the European Union are not exact.  Still, on the 
whole, the references to commercial law in the documents and literature in the American 
setting are mainly concerned with aspects of contract law and other areas of state private 
law governing commercial and consumer transactions, which bears a remarkable likeness 
to the debate about European contract law (and European private law generally). For that 
matter, to depict the American setting as limited to “commercial law” is misleading, since 
areas of private law outside the strict confines of commercial law do enter into play in the 
discussion. Thus, while commercial law will be a common reference point in the 
American context, the terms, “American private law framework” has been chosen as 
more suitable, overarching term that dovetails nicely with the European setting. 
 
2.2.3 Approximation and related terminology 
It is certainly no understatement to say that much ink has been spilled over the 
intricacies of what is meant by approximation, harmonisation, and unification.59  
Additional terms, old and new, have made their way into the discussion, such as 
coordination, codification, Europeanisation, Communautarisation, and convergence.  Still 
others have given birth to further subsets, as in the case of the various harmonisation 
models or techniques, e.g., full, complete, total, maximum, minimum, and so on.  These 
                                                                                                                                                 
Development of Private State Law in the United States:  A Model For Other Systems?”, 60 Consumer 
Finance Law Quarterly Report 4, 5 (2006); M. Reimann, “American Private Law and European Legal 
Unification – Can the United States be a Model?”, 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 217, 219 (1996).  See also M. Freedland, “The Evolving Approach to the Public / Private Distinction 
in English Law”, in The Public Law/Private Law Divide, supra note 49, 93, at 95. 
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 See Chapter 4. 
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 As aptly framed by one scholar: “The discussion of the difference between unification and harmonisation 
has lost the lively character it had in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.”  P.J. Slot, “Harmonisation”, 21 
European Law Review 378, 389 n.6 (1996).  Anyone who has perused the literature (mostly in French) 
from that era would wholeheartedly agree.  Similar remarks could made as regards these terms and others, 
as the years went on.  See, e.g., L'harmonisation du droit des contrats en Europe (C. Jamin and D. 
Mazeaud eds, Economica, 2001); F. Osman, “Codification/unification/harmonisation du droit en Europe: 
un rêve en passe de devenir réalité?”, in Vers Un Code Européen de la Consommation/Towards a 
European Consumer Code 12 (F. Osman ed., Bruylant, 1998). 
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terms are certainly not the only ones to have crept into the discussion of European 
contract law and European private law.60 Yet, this group of terms (and sub-terms) 
represents those that most commonly appear in the discourse surrounding the 
constitutionality of European contract law at present.  
 
On the whole, what is shared by all of these terms is that they generally refer to 
processes the objective of which is to eliminate differences, in varying degrees, between 
national laws with a view to bringing such laws closer together largely by way of 
“positive” action of some sort.  Beyond this generality, however, problems of 
terminological clarity and consistency arise. First of all, as highlighted by the debate 
concerning European contract law, the formal distinction between many of these terms 
has eroded in practice, and several others have splintered to the point that two or three 
meanings are hidden within a single term.  For example, one could think it helpful to 
frame these processes in terms of a sliding scale ranging from “bottom up” means of 
organic, voluntary or spontaneous movement bringing national laws closer together to 
“top down” means orchestrated through an institutionalised process. Yet, characteristic of 
the debate about European contract law, the “top down” and “bottom up” approaches are 
not mutually exclusive, but rather interrelated.  This is illustrated by several well-known 
academic projects involved with European contract law, which are situated within the 
“bottom up” approach of producing comparative law materials on contract law but at the 
same time advocate the use of such materials for the promulgation of a European contract 
law instrument.61  Just within the “top down” spectrum itself, there are numerous 
difficulties in attempting to pinpoint such processes to a single location given the 
evolution in their various meanings. 
 
Second, further complications arise in the particular environment in which these 
terms are used, which is touched in some way by European contract law.  Many of these 
terms are specifically associated with the EU Treaty framework and thus are prevalent in 
the discussion of the activities of the European Community in relation to national 
contract (and private) law, but this is not always the case.  Some extend to the national, 
European and international spheres in the broader sense which in turn give way to further 
nuances. Others assume particular nuances when transplanted to the United States on 
account of the federal framework and the creation of certain mechanisms at the state level 
that have no exact equivalent in the EU. 
 
 Third, by focusing on processes that aim to bring national laws closer together in 
some shape or form by way of “positive” action, this means that other types of processes 
are excluded.  For example, mutual recognition, as emanating from the case law of the 
Court of Justice, is generally considered to denote the principle that one Member State 
must admit the free circulation of goods or services that have been lawfully produced or 
marketed in another Member State, so long as overriding requirements of public interest 
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Journal of International Law 1 (1964). 
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established in the case law do not justify the more restrictive rule.62   Thus, it veers on the 
side of the “negative” approach taken by the Court of Justice in eliminating barriers to 
trade caused by a particular national law in the well-aged dichotomy of “positive” and 
negative” integration, although this is not say that it does not pertain to  the adoption of 
“positive” European legislation as well. This explains why it is often framed as a separate 
category straddling the two types of integration.63  In any event, in the debate about 
European contract law, mutual recognition has been deemed to have limited utility since 
the EU private international law rules predicate the choice of applicable law.64 
 
Moreover, it is with some irony that one of the key forms of Union action 
envisaged in the debate about European contract law, that of an optional legal instrument 
evades these confines. This is because in principle such an instrument is conceived to lie 
parallel with or alongside national laws, as opposed to exacting some change to their 
content.65 Certainly, arguments can be made as to the practical effects of such an 
instrument in bringing national laws closer together to varying degrees, but as a formal 
matter, it is not envisaged to embody a process whose objective is directed at exacting 
some change to national laws as such.  In other words, it is portrayed as a supplement, not 
a replacement or an adjustment of the relevant national laws with European norms.  This 
explains why such an instrument is viewed under the case law of the Court of Justice as 
exceeding the ambit of approximation under Article 95 EC and must find homage in 
other Treaty provisions, such as Article 308 EC.66  While the exclusion of certain forms 
of action cannot be helped, their interface with approximation bolsters the need to 
understand the meaning of this and other related processes. 
 
In light of the foregoing remarks, for the purposes of this discussion, these terms 
will be situated within the European Union and will be focused on their usage in relation 
to the ongoing debate about European contract law. The discussion begins with the 
triumvirate of approximation, harmonisation, and unification since these three terms are 
the most prevalent and constitute the reference point around which the other terms 
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revolve. The discussion then examines various models or techniques of harmonisation; 
given their complexity, a separate category has been created, rather than “lumping” them 
into the preceding section. This is followed by the discussion of codification, 
Europeanisation and Communautarisation, coordination, and convergence, respectively.  
Finally, certain “comparative leaps” are made to the United States to parse out certain 
nuances in the American context and to highlight the meaning of federalisation, a key 
term in the American private law framework.  In all, as will be seen, none of these terms 
is perfect.  Each involves its own particular tradeoffs, and it is probably impossible to 
find one term that pleases all, let alone fits all uses. Yet, it is this core set of terms that 
underlies the constitutional assessment of European contract law, and as such, a set of 
functional definitions must be found. 
 
2.2.3.1   Approximation, Harmonisation, and Unification 
Approximation, harmonisation, and unification are probably three of the most 
difficult terms to define and to distinguish clearly both inside and outside the debate 
about European contract law.  There are no universal definitions for these terms, and they 
require wading through an inordinate amount of literature espousing differing views of 
scholars.  Yet, their order of listing here is purposeful.  This is because as distilled from 
the Treaty framework and the literature, while approximation and harmonisation can in 
principle be used to mean the same thing, these two terms embody different nuances and 
approximation can be viewed as an overarching term encompassing harmonisation and 
unification. 
 
To begin, approximation and harmonisation are explicitly mentioned in various 
provisions of the EC and EU Treaties, but unfortunately, the Treaties do not provide any 
explicit definitions. By contrast, unification has never appeared in the text of the Treaties 
as such67, which would seem to beg the question whether it can be used at all within the 
EU legal framework, not to mention why it is grouped together with approximation and 
harmonisation. In the steady stream of literature and institutional documents on European 
contract law, many scholars, as well as the European institutions, often consider 
approximation and harmonisation to be synonymous and use the two interchangeably, 
whereas unification is commonly treated more as a specific subset representing a more 
intensified version of these processes. This is so, although certain commentators have 
sought to highlight a slight nuance between the two.  For example, Professor Walter van 
Gerven opined that harmonisation’s emphasis is more on “purpose”, whereas 
approximation’s emphasis is more on “result”:   
 
While harmonization refers to legislation that is intended to do away with 
disparities, approximation refers to the result to be achieved, i.e., that legal 
systems come closer to each other. The latter, ‘result’, need not necessarily 
be the fruit of a deliberate effort to harmonize, as it can also be the conse- 
                                                 
67
 See, e.g., C. Esplugues, “Use of Separate Conventions Between Member States in the Context of the 
European Community Itself”, in The State of the European Union: Structure, Enlargement and Economic 
Union 151, 153 (J. Usher ed., Longman, 2000).  But see Vignes, supra note 1, at 360 (pointing out that the 
term “uniformity” does appear in the Treaty, albeit not for carrying out measures in the same context as 
harmonisation, approximation, or coordination). 
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quence of incremental development of the law through case law.68   
 
Framed in this way, harmonisation sounds more like “doing it” in the sense of 
harmonising aspects of national laws, whether minimally or exhaustively, whereas 
approximation signifies “working towards it” as in setting the stage for a process that is 
still largely to take place thereafter, whether it be all at once, in stages, etc.69  This seems 
to mark out approximation as more of an overarching process within which 
harmonisation takes place.70 In fact, there is considerable evidence to support this reading 
from the Treaty framework.  
 
Both approximation and harmonisation are explicitly tied to the Community’s 
competence to approximate national laws under Articles 94 and 95 EC.  While detailed 
discussion of these provisions must be saved for a subsequent chapter71, the use of these 
terms in this context provides important clues for parsing out the ambiguous relationship 
between approximation, harmonisation, and unification. Since the original EEC Treaty, 
the term, approximation, has been given pride of place as the heading of a specific 
chapter (and now title) of the E(E)C Treaty concerning “Approximation of Laws”.72  This 
special section of the Treaty originally included, among others, Article 94 EC (ex Article 
100 EEC) and eventually Article 95 EC (ex 100a EEC), both of whose text also pays 
tribute to this term.  Article 94 EC authorised the adoption of directives for the 
“approximation” (e.g., rapprochement; aanpassing; Angleichung; ravvicinamento; and 
aproximación in other language versions) of national laws “as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market”73.  This corresponded to one of the 
Community’s activities enshrined in Article 3(1)(h) EC (ex Article 3(h) EEC) concerning 
“the approximation of the laws of the Member States to the extent required for the 
functioning of the common market”.74 This is not to say that harmonisation (or a 
derivation of it) was wholly absent from the EEC Treaty, but its usage in certain 
provisions seemed to embody a slightly different feel in contrast to approximation, even 
if admittedly this was not always the case.75   
                                                 
68
 W. van Gerven, “Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level”, in The 
Institutional Framework of European Private Law, supra note 44, 37, at 47.  
69
 Multi-stage approximation is further discussed in Chapter 9, § 9.3.3.2. 
70
 See further Osman, in Vers Un Code Européen de la Consommation, supra note 59, at 15 (considering 
coordination or approximation as more of a political objective within which harmonisation and unification 
take place); P-E Partsch, Le droit international privé européen: De Rome à Nice (Larcier, 2003), at 30-31 
(viewing “rapprochement” in largest sense, including harmonisation, unification, and coordination).  As for 
institutional documents in the debate, see, e.g., 2385th Council meeting – Justice, Home Affairs and Civil 
Protection – Brussels, 16 Nov. 2001, DOC 13758/01 (hereinafter 2001 Council Resolution), para. 5 (“the 
search for greater approximation between Member States’ substantive laws, whether by harmonisation or 
unification”). 
71
 See Chapter 9. 
72
 Originally, this was placed in the forefront of the EEC Treaty in Title I “Common Rules”, which 
encompassed Chapter 3 on “Approximation of Laws”.  With subsequent Treaty revisions, this became Title 
VI of the EC Treaty on “Common Rules on Competition, Taxation and Approximation of Laws”, within 
which Chapter 3 on “Approximation of Laws” was placed.  The same is true of the Lisbon Treaty: see infra 
note 78. 
73
 Article 94 EC (ex Article 100 EEC).   
74
 Article 3(1)(h) EC (ex Article 3(h) EEC). 
75
 See, e.g., Article 112(1) EEC; Article 117 EEC; but compare Article 99 EEC. 
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Years later, when Article 95 EC (ex Article 100a EEC) was introduced into the 
Treaty framework by way of the Single European Act, the term, harmonisation, appeared 
alongside approximation in different paragraphs of this provision. The first paragraph of 
Article 95 EC set forth the general outlines of this provision for the adoption of 
“measures for the approximation” of national laws “which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market”, whereas in subsequent paragraphs 
of Article 95 EC concerning special procedures permitting, under certain circumstances, 
national measures that derogated from a particular Community measure adopted 
thereunder, references to singular and pluralised versions of “harmonisation measure” 
(e.g., mesure d’harmonisation; harmonisatiemaatregel; Harmonisierungsmaßnahme; 
misura di armonizzazione; and medida de armonización  in other language versions) were 
used.76  With the Maastricht Treaty and thereafter, references to the term, harmonisation,  
increased.77  Yet, the place of approximation as a distinct heading in the EC Treaty and in 
Articles 94 and 95(1) EC has never been altered, nor was it with the replacement of this 
Treaty with the TFEU under the Lisbon Treaty.78   
 
Accordingly, the text of the Treaty can be read to indicate a subtle distinction 
between approximation, harmonisation, and unification.  As illustrated by Articles 94 and 
95 EC, approximation covers both the use of directives, with which harmonisation is 
equated, as well as regulations, which are associated with unification.79  Article 94 EC 
dictates that approximation can proceed only by way of directive and thus can encompass 
harmonisation, not unification.80 Under Article 249 EC, directives are in principle 
devised to provide leeway to the Member States to “translate” the objectives sought by 
directives into the language of the national legal systems.81  The link between directives 
and harmonisation explains why harmonisation is equated with the (Member) State level 
in the European Union (as well as the United States), since it signifies “the process by 
which state law on a given matter comes to resemble the laws of other states . . . while 
nevertheless retaining its identity as state law”.82  In fact, particularly in the early years of 
                                                 
76
 Under the Single European Act, compare Article 100a(1) EEC with Article 100a(4)-(5) EEC.  With the 
subsequent Treaty revisions, compare Article 95(1) EC with Article 95(4), (5), (8), (10) EC.   
77
 This was particularly the case in relation to various, so-called “flanking” provisions of the Treaty, many 
of which were introduced for the first time with explicit clauses barring harmonisation (e.g., culture, 
education,  and public health) or were supplemented by additional clauses mentioning harmonisation 
measures (e.g., environmental protection) in the Treaty.  For further discussion, see Chapter 10. 
78
 Under the Lisbon Treaty, Title VII of the TFEU is labelled “Common Rules on Competition, Taxation 
and Approximation of Law”, within which Chapter 3 on “Approximation of Laws” contains the 
counterparts to Articles 94 and 95 EC, whose respective references to approximation (and harmonisation in 
the case of Article 95 EC) have been retained without change.  See Articles 114-115 TFEU. 
79
 See, e.g., van Gerven, “Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level”, supra note 
68, at 46; M. Fallon and S. Francq, “Vers un droit proprement communautaire des conflits de lois our de 
juridiction”, in Une Constitution pour l’Europe: Réflexions sur les transformations de droit de l’Union 
européenne 239, 265 (O. De Schutter and P. Nihoul eds., Larcier, 2004).   
80
 van Gerven, “Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level”, supra note 68, at 46. 
81
 See Article 249, third para. EC. This definition was not altered by the Lisbon Treaty. See Article 288, 
third para. TFEU. 
82
 G.A. Bermann, “Harmonization and Regulatory Federalism”, in 1 Harmonization of Legislation in 
Federal Systems 37, 38-39 (I. Pernice ed., Nomos, 1996).  See already F.G. Jacobs and K.L. Karst, “The 
‘Federal’ Legal Order:  The U.S.A. and Europe Compared – A Juridical Perspective”, in 1 Integration 
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the debate, under circumstances where harmonisation was used in the more general sense 
on par with approximation, care was taken to distinguish this conception of 
harmonisation from its meaning sensu stricto related to directives.83 In view of the 
Community’s intervention in contract law by means of a well-known set of directives 
discussed further below, this may explain in part why harmonisation has risen in stature 
in the discourse on European contract law.   
 
Alongside the link between harmonisation and directives lies that between 
unification and regulations. In accordance with Article 249 EC, regulations, in contrast to 
directives, set down directly applicable binding legal rules as a matter of Community 
law.84 Unification thereby represents a more intensified version of harmonisation, since it 
brings about the promulgation of one uniform law at the Community, as opposed to the 
Member State, level.  By stipulating the use of “measures”, Article 95 EC dictates that 
approximation can proceed, inter alia, by way of directives or regulations, thereby 
encompassing in principle both unification and harmonisation.85 This helps to explain 
why scholars do not deny the role to be played by unification especially in the debate 
about European contract law, even if not mentioned explicitly in the Treaties themselves. 
This also explains judgments of the Court of Justice and Opinions of the Advocates 
General assimilating the use of regulations with unification86 and distinguishing 
unification from harmonisation.87 
 
To be sure, unification by itself generates its own set of problems. Given its link 
to the proliferation of one uniform set of Community law rules, unification is invariably 
associated with “uniformity”.88 This is so, even though scholars are quick to point out 
                                                                                                                                                 
Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience 167, 242-243 (M. Cappelletti et al. eds, de 
Gruyter, 1986). 
83
 See Chapter 5, § 5.3. 
84
 See Article 249, second para. EC.  This remained unchanged in the Lisbon Treaty.  See Article 288, 
second para. TFEU. 
85
 This is so, even if the Declaration on Article 100a EEC annexed to the Single European Act ascribes a 
preference for directives under the following circumstances:  “In its proposals pursuant to Article 100a(1) 
the Commission shall give precedence to the use of the instrument of a directive if harmonization involves 
the amendment of legislative provisions in one or more Member States.” Declaration on Article 100a of the 
EEC Treaty, [1987] OJ L 169/24.  Incidentally, the connection between directives and harmonisation seems 
to be underscored by the Declaration itself. 
86
 See, e.g., Case C-386/05 Color Drack GmbH, [2007] ECR I-3699, para. 24; Opinion of Advocate 
General Léger in Case C-281/02 Owusu [2005] ECR I-1383 para. 203 (albeit linking approximation with 
directives and hence assimilating it to harmonisation).   
87
 See, e.g., Case C-350/92 Spain v. Council [1995] ECR I-1985, para. 19; Opinion 1/94 Competence of the 
Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual 
property [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 100; Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-103/06 [2008] 
ECR I-1853, para. 27; Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-513/03 van Hilten-van der Heijden 
[2006] ECR I-1957, para. 76.   
88
 This is so, even if unification has splintered off into nuanced variations such as “uniformisation”, which 
seems to veer towards harmonisation. See U. Drobnig, “Unification of National Law and the 
Uniformisation of the Rules of Private International Law”, in P. Bourel et al., L’influence des 
Communautés européennes sur le droit international privé des Etats membres / The Influence of the 
European Communities upon Private International Law of the Member States 1, 2 (Larcier, 1981); A. 
Jeammaud, “Unification, uniformisation, harmonisation: de quoi s’agit-il?”, in Vers Un Code Européen de 
la Consommation, supra note 59, 35, at 47. 
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that unification and uniformity are not necessarily the same thing, since depending on the 
way uniformity is framed, it invites the distinction between how such law appears “on the 
books” and how it is applied “in practice”.89  For example, as often repeated in the debate 
about European contract law, a uniform European contract law measure in theory may 
still lack uniformity in practice depending on the way that it is applied and interpreted by 
national courts and other national authorities.  
 
In any event, this should not be taken to mean that the scope of harmonisation and 
unification are limited only to those two Community instruments, directives and 
regulations, respectively.  And notwithstanding the emphasis placed on legislative action, 
these terms have also been applied in relation to the workings of the other European 
institutions besides the European legislator, such as those performing judicial or 
executive functions.90  Nevertheless, the bottom line is that the choice between 
unification and harmonisation is not neutral.  As remarked by one scholar, “talking about 
‘harmonization’ of law transmits a signal of tolerance for diversity that is absent in the 
notion of ‘unification’”.91  In the European Union, the association of regulations with 
unification implies that action is to be taken at the central or European level.  As such, 
unification embodies tensions that harmonisation does not.   
 
In view of the foregoing, for the purposes of this study, harmonisation is used in 
this discussion to denote the process of eliminating differences in national laws through 
the adoption of an instrument that emanates from EU institutional processes but 
maintains the character of Member State, as opposed to European (or international) law, 
i.e., it has the identity of a national norm. For example, this would encompass the 
Community legislator’s foray into contract law by means of the various directives 
comprising Community contract law acquis.  By comparison, unification signifies the 
process leading to the adoption of an instrument applicable throughout the Member 
States, which emanates from EU institutional processes and which embodies the 
character of Community (or international) law, i.e., it has the identity of a European or a 
international norm.  Thus, this could envelop the adoption of a European uniform 
contract law instrument (whether binding or non-binding, optional or otherwise) or the 
use of other instruments such as conventions which while depending on the Member 
States concerned may or may necessitate certain executing measures to become part of a 
particular national legal order, but nevertheless retain the form and the character of the 
instrument concerned.   
                                                 
89
 See, e.g. C. Baasch-Andersen, “Defining Uniformity in Law”, 12 Revue du droit uniforme / Uniform Law 
Review 5 (2007). This has particular resonance in the American context as regards the uniform law process.  
See Chapter 4, § 4.3. 
90
 See van Gerven, “Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level”, supra note 68, 
at 47, 65. 
91
 U. Mattei, “Hard Minimal Code Now – A Critique of ‘Softness’ and a Plea for Responsibility in the 
European Debate over Codification”, in An Academic Green Paper, supra note 64, 215, at 223. See also A. 
Klip, “European Integration and Harmonisation and Criminal Law”, in D. Curtin et al., European 
Integration and Law: Four Contributions on the Interplay between European Integration and European 
and National Law to celebrate the 25th Anniversary of Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law 109, 110 
(Intersentia, 2006); M. van Hoecke, “The Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe: Some 
Misunderstandings”, in The Harmonisation of European Private Law 1, 2-3 (M. van Hoecke and F. Ost 
eds., Hart, 2000). 
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Approximation will be used here as the container term for the institutionalised 
process at the European level covering harmonisation and unification in the general 
sense.  While harmonisation has also been used in the same way, this will not be done 
here in order to preclude unnecessary confusion between the two terms in terms of having 
to clarify harmonisation’s general meaning from its more specific meaning associated 
with the use of directives.  This also proves a convenient, overarching way to describe the 
activities (legislative, judicial, or otherwise) surrounding European contract law at the 
European level without being hemmed in by either harmonisation or unification. For 
example, as will be seen in Chapter 3, approximation aptly describes the role played by 
the Court of Justice, given its interpretation of the Community contract law acquis, 
thereby involving harmonisation, as well as its formulation of judge-made rules of 
Community and Union law under the rubric of European “federal common law”, which 
falls on the unification side of the line.92 Admittedly, these definitions may go against the 
grain of standard practice of European institutions and scholars in the debate, which have 
grown accustomed to using approximation and harmonisation interchangeably. Yet, these 
definitions may finally help to draw markers between these three terms and to highlight 
their nuances, which is important not only for clarity’s sake, but also because they are the 
gateway through which the other terms are viewed. 
 
2.2.3.2  Harmonisation models   
 With the definition of harmonisation in place, this leads to the discussion of the 
various types of models or techniques subsumed within harmonisation. In this regard, one 
often finds the standard “laundry list” of harmonisation models used at the European 
level, which invariably includes total, full, maximum, exhaustive, complete, minimum, 
optional, partial, and alternative harmonisation, alongside the constant evolution of new 
terms.93  In principle, the definitions are clear enough, but in practice, there seems to be 
some ambiguity surrounding some of these models and even blurring between them. 
With some irony, one could say that these models are themselves in need of some 
harmonisation, and in fact, it is particularly in light of the Commission’s professed shift 
from minimum to maximum harmonisation as part of its review of the consumer acquis 
within the European contract law project that renewed reflection has been placed on this 
topic.94  
                                                 
92
 See Chapter 3. 
93
 For example, the term “reflexive harmonisation” has emerged in the literature, although not as yet in the 
discourse on European contract law. See C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU:  The Four Freedoms, 
supra note 62, at 610 (and citations therein). Moreover, the term “horizontal harmonisation” has been 
coined by one commentator to denote the harmonisation of national laws on a broad scale beyond specific 
sectors as in the case of “vertical harmonisation”:  see M. Radeideh, Fair Trading in EC Law: Information 
and Consumer Choice in the Internal Market, supra note 62, at 98.   
94
 For a recent selection, see, e.g., H-W. Micklitz, “The Targeted Full Harmonisation Approach:  Looking 
Behind the Curtain”, in Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law 47 (G. Howells and R. 
Schulze eds, Sellier, 2009); S. Weatherill, “Maximum or Minimum Harmonisation: What Kind of ‘Europe’ 
Do We Want?”, in The Future of European Contract Law – Essays in honour of Ewoud Hondius, supra 
note 45, 133; with particular regard to the proposed Directive on consumer rights, see Chapter 7, § 7.3.3. 
Even beforehand, major “alarm bells” were sounded with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 
which even though it was not the first measure to be adopted under maximum harmonisation (indeed, it 
was the revision of the Consumer Credit Directive that was said to have been the first in this “wave”:  see 
infra § 2.3.3), still promoted much concern and criticism of the Commission’s actions in this regard.  See 
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 Generally speaking, there can be said to be a sliding scale of harmonisation 
models, which predicates the extent to which residual leeway is left for Member State 
action. First, on the side of strong Community action without much leeway for the 
Member States is total  harmonisation, which has also been called maximum or full 
harmonisation.95  This model generally occurs in situations where a Community norm 
replaces the national provisions in the relevant area and thus no derogations are allowed, 
save for what is provided in the Community harmonisation measure itself (e.g., there 
could be safeguard clauses or derogations provided therein). This means that there is no 
room for the Member States to supplement or to lay down different rules other than those 
provided for in the Community harmonisation measure itself.  
 
Importantly, total harmonisation can become entangled with issues surrounding 
the scope and the degree of harmonisation envisaged.  On the one hand, total 
harmonisation has been used to point to the scope of harmonisation, i.e., the coverage of 
the relevant field by the harmonisation measure concerned.  Hence the association of total 
harmonisation with exhaustive harmonisation96 or complete harmonisation in the sense 
that the Community measure regulates the area “completely” or “occupies the field”, 
such that national laws are ousted or pre-empted in the relevant field.97  By contrast, the 
term, partial harmonisation has then been used in this context to denote the fact that 
Community harmonisation is instead only “partial”, meaning that it only covers certain 
                                                                                                                                                 
G. Howells, “Unfair Commercial Practices Directive – A Missed Opportunity?”, in The Regulation of 
Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29: New Rules and Techniques 103 (S. Weatherill 
and U. Bernitz eds, Hart, 2007); H-W. Micklitz, “Minimum/Maximum Harmonisation and the Internal 
Market Clause”, in European Fair Trading Law: The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 27 (G. 
Howells et al., Ashgate, 2006).  Beyond the consumer sphere, see W. Devroe, “Limits of Differentiation in 
European Economic Law: Ne Bis In Idem and Minimum versus Maximum Harmonisation, 16 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 141 (2009). 
95
 See, e.g., J. Stuyck, E. Terryn and T. van Dyck, “Confidence through fairness? The new Directive on 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market”, 43 Common Market Law Review 
107, 115 n.43 (2006). 
96
 See, e.g., M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and 
Differentiation 128-131 (Hart, 2004); S. Weatherill, “Beyond Preemption? Shared Competence and 
Constitutional Change in the European Community”, in Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty 13, 17-18 (D. 
O’Keeffe and P.M. Twomey eds, Wiley Chancery Law, 1994); E. Vos, “Differentiation, Harmonisation 
and Governance”, in The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law 145, 148-149 (B. de Witte et al. eds, 
Intersentia, 2001).  Compare A. de Vries, Tensions within the Internal Market: The Functioning of the 
Internal Market and the Development of Horizontal and Flanking Policies 250-251 (Europa, 2006). 
97
 Some scholars find exhaustive or complete harmonisation to be more of a “theoretical” possibility on the 
grounds that it is rarely the case that the Union occupies the field completely.  See, e.g., M. Radeideh, Fair 
Trading in EC Law: Information and Consumer Choice in the Internal Market, supra note 62, at 97 n.55.  
That being said, this seems to depend on the eye of the beholder in terms of delineating the area concerned 
and the relevant measures that have been adopted therein.  To be clear, the conception of preemption is not 
limited to the so-called “occupation of the field”.  For a selection of literature on the doctrine of pre-
emption in the EU, see M. Waelbroeck, “The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption–Consent and 
Re-delegation”, in II Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe 549 (T. 
Sandalow and E. Stein eds, Clarendon, 1982); E.D. Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State Law in the 
European Economic Community: A Framework For Analysis”, 29 Common Market Law Review 447 
(1992); R. Schütze, “Supremacy Without Pre-emption? The Very Slowly Emergent Doctrine of 
Community Pre-emption”, 43 Common Market Law Review 1023 (2006). 
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issues, leaving the rest to the Member States.98 The determination of the scope, 
exhaustive or not, of the Community harmonisation measure has crucial implications for 
assessing the compatibility of diverging national rules either on the basis of the measure 
concerned or on the basis of the free movement rules, namely Articles 28-30 EC.99  On 
the other hand, total harmonisation has been used to denote the degree of harmonisation 
and is thus equated with full or maximum harmonisation in the sense that the Community 
measure lays down the common standard to be followed within the regulatory space 
covered – i.e., the floor and ceiling of regulatory protection – with the result that Member 
States cannot go any further upwards as would be the case with minimum harmonisation 
discussed further below.100   
 
Admittedly, it not always clear in what way commentators and even the Court of 
Justice are using these terms101, and care should be taken not to confuse the scope of 
harmonisation (the area covered by the Community rules) with the degree of 
harmonisation (the type of harmonisation model chosen within the space covered by 
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 See, e.g., E. Vos, “Differentiation, Harmonisation and Governance”, supra note 96; M. Radeideh, Fair 
Trading in EC Law: Information and Consumer Choice in the Internal Market, supra note 62, at 97.  
99
 Under vested case law of the Court of Justice, the determination that a Community harmonisation 
measure exhaustively covered the area concerned dictated that such a measure would form the relevant 
framework for assessing the national rules at issue, whereas if this was not the case, then the relevant 
framework would be constituted by the general provisions of the Treaty, namely Articles 28-30 EC.  On the 
one hand, this is somewhat strange since secondary Community law (i.e., the measure concerned) by its 
very nature does not supersede primary Community law (i.e., the Treaty). On the other hand, this is 
understandable in the sense that a Member State is bound to the standard laid down in the Community 
harmonisation measure as decided by the European legislator and cannot attempt to maintain barriers to 
free movement by seeking refuge in justifications outside.  Recent case law has presented some interesting 
nuances in this regard, however.  Compare Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, judgment of 24 March 2009, not yet reported, paras 23-26, with Case C-470/03 AGM-
COS.MET Srl v. Suomen valtio and Lehtinen [2007] ECR I-2749, paras 50-54.  See also Opinion of 
Advocate General Trstenjak in Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 VTB-VAB NV and Others (“VTB-
VAB”), not yet reported, para. 99; the Court did not get to this issue:  Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 
VTB-VAB, judgment of 23 April 2009, not yet reported, para. 67. 
100
 See, e.g., M. Radeideh, Fair Trading in EC Law: Information and Consumer Choice in the Internal 
Market, supra note 62, at 99-101. This is demonstrated by Ratti (Case 148/78 [1979 ECR 1629),  a case 
commonly associated with the model of “total harmonisation” and involving certain Italian rules, some of 
which provided for more stringent protection and some of which provided for less stringent protection 
below the standard set by the Community measure concerned.   
101
 For example, in a recent judgment, the Court referred to “complete” and “exhaustive” harmonisation, 
whereas the Advocate General resorted to “full”, “maximum”, complete”, and “exhaustive” harmonisation 
in a case that, in the Court’s view, concerned the degree of harmonisation set by a particular Community 
measure: compare Case C-374/05 Gintec International Import-Export GmbH (“Gintec”) [2007] ECR I-
9517, paras 17, 18, 20, 25, 27-29, 34, 39, 63, with Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in 
Case C-374/05 Gintec, caption A, paras 22, 29, 31, 33, 41, 47, 81.  This has also occurred in the triumvirate 
of judgments concerning the Products Liability Directive. All of these cases are discussed further in 
Chapter 10, § 10.2.2. Noticeably, the Court of Justice has been reticent to use the term “maximum 
harmonisation” and so far, the term has appeared in the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
in the Gintec case, supra; the Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in the VTB-VAB case, infra note 104; 
and the Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven in Case C-326/88 Hansen [1990] ECR I-2911, para. 10. 
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those Community rules).102 Practically speaking, however, it is sometimes difficult to 
separate the two, as illustrated by the interplay between full harmonisation and full 
targeted harmonisation.  As noted above, full harmonisation is generally used to mean 
the same thing as total or maximum harmonisation103, although this is not always the 
case.104 Recently, in the context of the Commission’s plans for revising the Community 
consumer contract law acquis by way of the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights105, 
the term, full targeted harmonisation, was used alongside that of full harmonisation. In its 
proposal, the Commission defined full targeted harmonisation as harmonisation “targeted 
at those issues raising substantial barriers to trade for business and/or deterring 
consumers from buying cross-border”.106 This implies full harmonisation on a more 
limited scale, i.e., laying down a common Community standard not across the board but 
just for certain specific areas, thereby relating to the scope of the proposed Directive. At 
the same time, this term is situated within the discussion of the shift from minimum 
harmonisation (embodied in the measures that would be replaced by this new Directive) 
to maximum harmonisation, thereby straddling the line with the degree of harmonisation 
involved. Reading between the lines, full targeted harmonisation appears to be a 
politically preferable term to take into account Member State sensitivities concerning 
further Community inroads into what used to be space for Member State action, either in 
terms of the shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation or to areas subject to 
Community standards that were not previously covered.  In any event, only full 
harmonisation was used in the text of the proposal itself107, and it remains to be seen the 
extent to which full targeted harmonisation will be used on a more general scale. To 
avoid confusing the degree and the scope of harmonisation involved, the term maximum 
harmonisation, will be used in this study to denote the degree of harmonisation 
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concerned, particularly because it is widely used in the literature on European contract 
law.  
 
Continuing along the spectrum, there are the intermediary models of optional, 
partial, and alternative harmonisation. Optional harmonisation denotes the model of 
harmonisation, whereby national operators are provided with the “option” of following 
the Community harmonised standard or the relevant national standard in the context of 
domestic transactions, whereas for cross-border transactions, such operators must abide 
by the harmonised rules.108  Two points of clarification are in order.  First, to some ears, 
optional harmonisation may imply some sort of harmonisation process on a more 
voluntary basis, say where the Member States are given the “option” to decide whether or 
not to adhere to the particular Community harmonised rules.  Yet, this has not been the 
way this term has been used in the literature and institutional practice so far.  Second, 
optional harmonisation must not be confused with the adoption of an optional legal 
instrument as far as European contract law is concerned, since as already explained, such 
an instrument is viewed in principle as exceeding the ambit of approximation (and hence 
harmonisation) altogether.109 By comparison, alternative harmonisation permits the 
Member States to choose between certain alternatives provided in the Community 
harmonisation measure concerned in order to achieve the objectives pursued.110 Apart 
from its linkage to the scope of  harmonisation set forth above, partial harmonisation has 
also been used to denote the harmonisation model whereby harmonised rules are set 
down only for cross-border, not domestic, transactions.111  As far as European contract 
law is concerned, these three models have not garnered much attention, which explains 
why the spotlight is largely placed on minimum harmonisation.  
 
 Finally, minimum harmonisation is one of the most well-known harmonisation 
models, and until recently, was considered an ingrained feature of the Community 
contract law acquis.112  Minimum harmonisation means that a common, minimum 
standard is established in a particular Community harmonisation measure, but that the 
Member States can provide for more stringent rules within the area covered by the 
measure.113  The idea is that the Community harmonisation measure provides the “floor” 
of protection, but the Member States can go further upwards to the “ceiling” of the Treaty 
(namely, the free movement rules) in this regard.114 Thus, minimum harmonisation is 
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 See Slot, “Harmonisation”, supra note 59, at 383-384; C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, 
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concerned with the degree of harmonisation involved.115  To be clear, minimum 
harmonisation means that the Member States can go further in providing for a more 
protective standard of protection, but they cannot below the Community minimum 
standard.116 Sometimes the minimum harmonisation clause in the measure concerned is 
explicit in terms of the more stringent protection to be provided by the Member States.117  
Moreover, minimum harmonisation is different from the special procedure laid down in 
Article 95(4)-(10) EC (now Article 114(4)-(10) TFEU in the Lisbon Treaty).118 Unlike 
minimum harmonisation, opting-out by way of this procedure is subject to much more 
strict control by the Commission on a case-by-case basis, meaning that it is not given to 
all Member States collectively, but instead is granted to a particular Member State on an 
individual basis, provided that it satisfies all of the requisite conditions for either 
maintaining (Article 94(4) EC) or introducing (Article 95(5) EC) more stringent or 
otherwise derogating national rules.  At base, while it could appear as such, minimum 
harmonisation is not an “oxymoron” in terms119, but rather an ingenious way in which to 
reconcile the achievement of the Community’s internal market objectives whilst 
providing the Member States with a certain amount of leeway (in accordance with 
Community law) to provide for a more stringent standard of protection in certain 
domains, including consumer protection. It is for this reason that it assumed an important 
role in the development of Community (consumer) contract law as seen below. 
 
2.2.3.3  Codification 
In the European Union, the term, codification, can assume various forms. In 
particular, it has a specific meaning associated with the Commission’s “Better 
Lawmaking” programme, whereby it signifies bringing the various amendments to a 
particular Community or Union measure adopted at different times together in one 
instrument.120 Yet, as far as the debate about European contract law (and European 
private law generally) is concerned, codification is generally viewed as denoting the 
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 See, e.g., Case C-361/89 Di Pinto [1991] ECR I-1189, paras 21-22. 
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119
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adoption of a comprehensive instrument at the European level. It can thus be viewed as a 
more wide-scale form of approximation. As explained by one scholar: 
 
Codification is therefore ‘comprehensive’ in two regards:  first, in that 
it is conceived and structured as a whole which implies that it normally 
includes, or is intended to include, more than one chapter of in casu 
private law; and secondly, in that it takes a global view aiming to regulate 
matters in general, for reasons of legal certainty and consistency, which  
does not preclude rules focusing on the protection of specific interests  
from being incorporated in the larger whole. In consequence, to unify 
the general part of contract and certain specific types of contract only, is 
not codification in the proper sense of the word whilst unifying large 
parts of the ‘patrimonial’ law . . . . would deserve that denomination.121 
 
In this way, the use of codification in conjunction with contract law through reference to 
a “European contract code” can be either be viewed as ill-fitting in line with the remarks 
above or else may imply that it is merely the prelude of more to come. To complicate 
matters further, codification within the context of European contract law does not 
necessarily have to mean a code that replaces national law, since references to various 
designs of “optional codes” supplementing national laws abound.122   
 
Despite the sensitivities it embodies, however, a European contract code has 
become a steady fixture in the debate. In fact, since the very beginning, the debate about 
European contract law has been encapsulated within the discussion of a “European civil 
code” or similar derivation123, and despite recent protestations to the contrary by the 
Commission124, the discourse still continues to refer to such an instrument.125  In all 
fairness, the references to a “European contract code” and a “European civil code” are 
useful as a shorthand reference for the adoption of a comprehensive Community 
instrument without having to go through the histrionics of explaining what is 
comprehensive, far-reaching, or the like.  And with particular regard to a “European civil 
code”, it can assume broader, holistic dimensions, as illustrated by its association in a 
recent publication with the building of a European civil society.126 
  
Even so, the drawbacks associated with the use of the terms, European contract 
code and a European civil code, are heavy because they may be likely to inject 
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sensitivities concerning the European Union’s encroachment on the competences of the 
Member States. These terms are even more potentially damaging because they threaten to 
misalign, even silence, the “constitutional conversation” about European contract law.  
Most scholars, even those who are well-known for arguing that the European Union has 
sufficient competence to adopt a European contract law instrument, admit that it does not 
have sufficient competence to adopt a comprehensive instrument covering vast areas of 
civil (or private) law as often signified by a European civil code.127 Thus, under 
circumstances where the two terms are intertwined, this essentially provides an “easy 
way out” of the constitutionality of European contract law, since it leads to 
generalisations, mostly of a negative nature, about Community competence, which may 
preclude a more in-depth assessment in the field of contract law. 
 
Thus, while it is not disputed that both a European contract code and a European 
civil code have utility, the terms carry considerable “political baggage” in the 
“constitutional conversation” of European contract law. Consequently, codification and 
its variants will not generally be relied upon in this study, save where reference is made 
to them in the relevant scholarship.  As already mentioned, in their place, the term, 
European contract instrument will be employed, so as to denote in a general sense the 
adoption of a comprehensive contract law instrument at the European level without 
provoking anxieties and misunderstandings underlying the word “code”. 
 
2.2.3.4   Europeanisation and Communautarisation 
Depending on the way they are used, Europeanisation and Communautarisation 
can embody aspects of approximation, harmonisation, and unification.  By their roots to 
“Europeanise” or “Communautarise”, frequently, Europeanisation and 
Communautarisation are used to denote the intervention of the European Union or 
Community in a particular domain, especially that of private law or contract law.128 In 
other words, they can largely be seen as general container terms for harmonisation and 
unification of national laws on par with approximation.129  They are also not necessarily 
limited to the sphere of legislative action at the European level.  For example, 
Europeanisation has been used to denote the prospect of the Court of Justice’s fashioning 
“Europeanised” concepts of contract law in its judgments.  
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Yet, there is an important difference between the two.  In contrast to 
Communautarisation, Europeanisation has been defined more broadly in reference to 
“national laws being harmonized through, or because of, not only Community law but 
also because of other harmonizing factors, such as the Human Rights Convention or other 
Treaty law, the influence of comparative law, etc.”130  In particular, scholars link 
Europeanisation with the emergence of a new “ius commune” and the growing together 
of national legal systems in various ways outside institutionalised processes emanating 
from the European level.131 As such, Communautarisation is the more specific term 
honing in on Community action, whereas Europeanisation encompasses a broader 
spectrum of activities that may conceivably extend beyond such action.  This makes 
Europeanisation somewhat imprecise in terms of delineating its expanse beyond the 
European Union. Moreover, depending upon the eye of the beholder, one or both of these 
terms can sometimes, though certainly not always, be considered to inject a subtle 
negative bias regarding the European Union or Community’s inroads in national contract 
law and thus may invoke sensitivities regard the impact and the extent of its action in this 
field (or others).132  For that matter, given the linkage between Communautarisation and 
the European “Community”, it may be wondered whether this term may fall into disuse 
as the result of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, given its elimination of the 
three-pillar structure and hence the replacement of European Community with European 
Union or Union. As such, while these terms do arise in the discussion, there must be 
caution in their use, and due to these varying perspectives, they will not be generally 
relied upon here. 
 
2.2.3.5  Coordination 
Like approximation and harmonisation, coordination is a process that appeared in 
the Treaty framework since the original EEC Treaty and is equally chameleonic.  
Coordination can be used to denote a number of different forms, which can largely be 
subsumed within the two-fold distinction between mandatory or binding coordination, on 
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the one hand, and certain, so-called “softer” forms of coordination ,on the other.133 First, 
mandatory or binding coordination refers to the process by which EU or EC law leaves 
intact the separate national legal systems but makes their coordination mandatory, such 
that it determines the applicable national law in cross-border settings.134 This can be 
considered the formal definition of coordination (i.e., “coordination sensu stricto”).  On 
the face of the various provisions in which this form of coordination appears in the 
Treaties, coordination sensu stricto can in principle be considered “one stop short” of 
harmonisation, let alone unification, because even though EU/EC law is imposing a 
binding solution, it does not require the elimination of differences among the national 
laws so that they resemble each other in a similar substantive sense so as to facilitate the 
tasks to be achieved in the relevant policy field. Coordination in this sense has thus been 
considered to evoke a “lighter touch” on the part of the European institutions because it 
has a lesser impact on the legal orders of the Member States.135  This explains why 
coordination invariably appears in the context of sensitive policy sectors, such as that 
concerning the economic policies of the Member States136, for which approximation may 
be considered as going too far. This is so, although coordination has the tendency of 
becoming blurred with harmonisation in certain cases.137  Article 47(2) EC is a notable 
example in this regard, since although this provision concerning the right of 
establishment (and by cross-reference, Article 55 EC on the free movement of services) 
within the free movement provisions of the Treaty prescribes the “coordination” of 
national laws138, it is often combined with Article 95 EC whose harmonising objectives 
take precedence, as illustrated by the Tobacco Advertising case law.139   
 
Second, “softer” forms of coordination have been used to denote processes that 
transcend approximation in some shape or form, especially by virtue of coordination’s 
association with the Open Method of Coordination (the OMC) as part of the so-called 
“new modes of governance” in the European Union. Although difficult to generalise, the 
OMC is based on looser coordination practices, such as guidelines, exchange of best 
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practices, benchmarking, and action plans, among the Member States, and diverges from 
traditional Community decision-making processes, which may explain why it has been 
contemplated in the debate about European contract law.140  To avoid confusion, 
coordination will be used in its strict sense for the purposes of this study. 
 
2.2.3.6  Convergence 
Convergence can be considered among the widest of the terms mentioned here 
because it encompasses institutionalised processes emanating from the European Union 
(e.g., approximation) and in the broader European sense (e.g., the ECHR framework 
concerning the protection of fundamental rights), as well as more organic processes.  As 
described by one scholar, “convergence is a generic name comprising both approximation 
of laws through an institutionalized (legislative or judicial) process and the growing 
together of legal systems as a result of voluntary action, or even spontaneous behaviour, 
on the part of legislatures, regulators or courts.”141 Convergence is therefore a wonderful 
umbrella term encompassing various sorts of holistic processes taking place at the 
national level without necessarily being tied to any sort of Community institutionalised 
action for the purposes of European contract law. At the same time, it may cause 
uncertainty in the sense of failing to delineate just what side – approximation and/or more 
voluntary forms of action – the emphasis is placed. Hence while convergence is 
beneficial for denoting more organic processes of bringing national (contract) laws closer 
together, these ambiguities should be kept in mind, since they have filtered into the 
debate about European contract law.142 
 
2.2.3.7   Comparative leaps to the United States  
Not surprisingly, several of the abovementioned terms that emanate from the EU 
Treaty framework or otherwise embody a distinctive European flavour are not used much 
in the United States as far as the discourse on American private law is concerned. 
Nonetheless, some of the most prevalent terms in the debate about European contract 
law, particularly approximation, harmonisation, unification, and codification find 
parallels with the American setting.  As documented in a coming chapter, the term, 
codification, has beckoned its share of debate stemming from its association with the 
“Uniform Commercial Code”.143  Moreover, one of the mainstays of the American 
private law framework is the adoption of uniform laws at the state, not federal, level.144 
This explains why such laws have been classified under the rubric of harmonisation by 
American scholars.145   
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By comparison, the term, “federalisation”, can be equated with unification as 
described above because it denotes the process of  bringing state laws closer together by 
taking action at the federal level covering a particular area or field and thus bringing it 
within the ambit of federal competence, i.e., federalising it.146 It is commonly associated 
with the adoption of federal legislation by Congress, as illustrated by its usage in relation 
to the prospect of a federal Uniform Commercial Code or the adoption of federal 
instruments covering certain areas of contract and commercial law in the United States.147 
Presumably it may also apply to the actions taken by the executive and the judicial 
branches at the federal level in this regard.148 Federalisation is therefore highly useful 
because by a single word it is able to impart federal action over one or more fields of 
state (private) law.   
 
Recently, federalisation has started to make its way into the discourse concerning 
European contract law and European private law generally.149  In principle, there would 
seem to be no reason why it could not be applied in the European setting as an 
overarching term akin to approximation in the sense of denoting action taken at the 
centralised, European level comparable to the federal level in the United States. In 
practice, however, given the sensitivities concerning the application of the “federal” label 
to the European Union, this may require putting in place the necessary caveats to make 
clear that its usage does not imply that the European Union is being equated with the 
federal structure of a nation-state such as the United States. At base, while federalisation 
will be used in the discussion of the American private law framework, terms such as 
approximation, harmonisation, and unification seem to fare just as well on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
 
2.3 The scope of Community contract law and its “hard core”  
 As mentioned above, the narrow view of European contract law encompasses a 
plethora of Community and Union measures in a wide variety of policy fields, but it has 
become a standard practice in the commentary on European contract law to focus on a 
certain collection of Community measures rooted for the most part (though not 
exclusively) in the internal market on the grounds that measures in other policy fields, 
such as competition law, intellectual property law, and employment law, are based upon 
special considerations peculiar to those fields.150  As for what makes up this collection, 
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 See, e.g., J. Lookofsky, “Desparately [sic] Seeking Subsidiarity: Danish Private Law in the 
Scandinavian, European, and Global Context”, 19 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 
161, 166 (2008); R. Van den Bergh, “Subsidiarity as an Economic Demarcation Principle and the 
Emergence of European Private Law”, 5 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 129, 130 
n.7 (1998). 
150
 See, e.g., S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill, “The European Community’s Competence to Pursue the 
Harmonisation of Contract Law–an Empirical Contribution to the Debate”, supra note 38, at 106-107;  K. 
Reisenhuber, “System and Principles of EC Contract Law”, supra note 36, at 300-301. 
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the exact number often varies. This can be attributed to a number of factors, such as the 
constant stream of new Community measures151 or differing opinion among 
commentators as to the impact, or not, of particular measures on contract law.152 
Moreover, some scholars consider measures within the context of specific fields such as 
insurance contract law153 and financial payment systems154, which embody a complex 
legal framework unto themselves, whilst others point to measures that play an important 
role in the development of European private law generally, e.g., the Defective Products 
Directive.155 
 
 In all likelihood, there may never be unanimous agreement as to the exact number 
of relevant Community measures in this area.  Nevertheless, there is a special set of 
Community measures that are a solid fixture in the lists of scholars and European 
institutions alike in the debate about European contract law.156 This collection of nine 
directives can be called the “hard core” of the Community contract law acquis and is 
listed in chronological order as follows: 
 
(1) The Doorstep Selling Directive (85/577/EEC); 
(2) The Commercial Agents Directive (86/653/EEC); 
(3) The Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC (replaced by the new Consumer 
Credit Directive (2008/48/EC)); 
(4) The Package Travel Directive (90/314/EEC); 
(5) The Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EC); 
                                                 
151
 E.g., Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2006 on services 
in the internal market, [2006] OJ L 376/36 (often referred to as the Services or Bolkenstein Directive); 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive 
on electronic commerce), [2000] OJ L178/1 (often referred to as the E-commerce Directive). 
152
 For example, some may include measures situated within Community consumer law overall, such as the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Directive 2005/29/EC, [2005] L 149/22), the Price Indication (also 
called the Unit Prices) Directive (Directive 98/6/EC, [1998] L 80/27), and the Injunctions Directive 
(Directive 98/27/EC, [1998] OJ L 166/51), the latter two of which are part of the Commission’s plans for 
the review of the consumer acquis discussed in Chapters 6-7.  The Price Indication Directive is one of the 
rare measures based on Article 153 EC. See Chapter 10, § 10.2.3.2.  
153
 See Chapter 5, § 5.2.3. 
154
 See, e.g., Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Nov. 2007 on 
payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, [2007] OJ L 319/1. The Directive touches on certain rights 
related to payment services contracts concluded by consumers and commercial parties.  See Twigg-Flesner, 
The Europeanisation of Contract Law, supra note 38, at 63.   
155
 E.g., Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, [1985], OJ L 
210/29 (often referred to as the Defective Products or Product Liability Directive). In fact, the case law on 
this Directive has had an important role in relation to Article 153 EC. See Chapter 10, § 10.2.2. 
156
 As for scholars:  compare, e.g., O. Radley-Gardner et al., Fundamental Texts on European Private Law 
(Hart, 2003); Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law, supra note 38, at 54-63; N. Reich, 
“Economic Law, Consumer Interests and EU Integration”, in H-W. Micklitz et al., Understanding EU 
Consumer Law 1, 36-37 (Intersentia, 2009); S. Weatherill, “European Private Law and the Constitutional 
Dimension”, in The Institutional Framework of European Private Law, supra note 44, 79, at 81-82.  As for 
the European institutions:  see 2001 Communication, supra note 19,  point 8 ns10-11, Annex  I (“Important 
Community Acquis in the Area of Private Law”). 
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(6) The Timeshare Directive (94/47/EC) (replaced by the new Timeshare 
Directive (2008/122/EC)); 
(7) The Distance Selling Directive (97/7/EC); 
(8) The Consumer Sales Directive (1999/47/EC); and 
(9) The Late Payments Directive (2000/35/EC). 
 
These directives are carved out as the “hard core” of EC contract law because of 
their importance to the constitutional assessment of European contract law.  The “hard 
core” provides the platform for the debate about European contract law and for the 
various initiatives contemplated at the European level as a result.  The “hard core” also 
underlies issues relating to the Community’s competence in the field of contract law, 
which have become interwoven into the constitutional framework surrounding European 
contract law through the present day.  Furthermore, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
the “hard core” provides the basis upon which to analyse the role played by the Court of 
Justice in European contract law.  As such, while the debate about European contract law 
may progress for years and even decades to come, arguably, the discourse will continue 
to pay tribute to the “hard core” of Community contract law.  
 
On the whole, these directives are familiar to those well-versed in the debate 
about European contract law and have generated quite comprehensive study already, 
which will not be repeated here.157 Rather, the aim of this section is to provide a brief 
description of these directives in the order listed above, with a focus on drawing out 
salient points bearing on the constitutionality of European contract law – i.e., the nature 
and the scope of Community legislative action in the field of contract law – which will 
then be evaluated in the section that follows.   
 
2.3.1 The Doorstep Selling Directive (85/577/EEC) 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC to protect the consumer in respect of contracts 
negotiated away from business premises (the Doorstep Selling Directive)158 was based on 
Article 94 EC (then Article 100 EEC).  The justification for this Treaty provision was 
based on the fact that although it was a “common form of commercial practice in the 
Member States for the conclusion of a contract or a unilateral engagement between a 
trader and a consumer to be made away from the business premises of a trader . . . such 
contracts and engagements are the subject of legislation which differs from one Member 
State to another”.159  As “any disparity between such legislation may directly affect the 
functioning of the common market”, it was considered necessary to approximate the 
national laws in this field.160 No limitation was carved out as regards its coverage of only 
cross-border transactions; the Directive applied to both inter-State (cross-border) 
                                                 
157
 In addition to numerous scholarly monographs, the Consumer Law Compendium contains detailed 
inquiry:  see Chapter 7, § 7.3.1. 
158
 Council Directive 85/577/EC of 20 Dec. 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated 
away from business premises, [1985] OJ L 372/31 (hereinafter Doorstep Selling Directive). It is one of the 
eight Directives included in the Commission’s review of the consumer acquis and would be replaced by the 
proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights:  see Chapter 7, § 7.3. 
159
 Id., first recital. 
160
 Id., second recital. 
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transactions and intra-State (domestic) transactions, i.e., those concluded by consumers 
and traders within the same Member State.  
 
Stripped to its essence, the Directive sought to do two things.  First, it provided 
the consumer with the right to cancel certain contracts for the supply of goods and 
services that were concluded in the context of a “doorstep selling situation”161 with a 
period of at least seven days.162  This would have the effect of releasing the consumer 
from any obligations under that contract.163  Second, it required the trader to provide the 
consumer with written notice of this right at a particular time depending on certain 
circumstances related to the “doorstep selling” context.164  This right was not subject to 
uniform wording, being called the right of cancellation and the right of renunciation 
throughout the Directive165, and the word “contract” itself was not defined.166 
 
Noticeably, the Directive stipulated that much depended on the national contract 
law rules, e.g., the sending of the notice of the consumer’s exercise of the right of 
cancellation and the legal effects of such cancellation were governed by national law.167 
Moreover, for certain aspects, the Member States were given discretion to choose as to 
whether certain subjects fell under the scope of the Directive, e.g., whether the Directive 
should apply only to contracts that exceeded a certain amount168; or whether the Directive 
should exclude certain contracts where the consumer had requested the visit of the 
trader.169  The Directive included a minimum harmonisation clause170, and made clear the 
Member States’ freedom to prohibit, either totally or partially, the conclusion of doorstep 
selling contracts in the interests of consumers must not be affected.171 
 
2.3.2 The Commercial Agents Directive (86/653/EEC) 
Council Directive 86/653/EEC on the coordination of the laws of the Member 
States relating to self-employed commercial agents (the Commercial Agents Directive)172 
was adopted under Article 94 EC (then Article 100 EEC), as well as Article 47(2) EC 
(then Article 57(2) EEC) concerning the right of establishment. It was the earliest of the 
directives within the “hard core” falling outside the consumer contract sphere, although 
“protective” aspects concerning commercial agents’ relations with their principals ran 
through the Directive. No limitation was carved out as regards its coverage of only cross-
border relations; the Directive applied to both cross-border and purely domestic 
                                                 
161
 Id., Article 1. 
162
 Id., Article 5; fifth recital. 
163
 Id., Article 5(2). 
164
 Id., Article 4. 
165
 Id., fourth recital, Articles 4, 7. 
166
 Id., Articles 2-3. 
167
 Id., Articles 5(1), 7. 
168
 Id., Article 3(1) 
169
 Id., Article 3(3). 
170
 Id., Article 8. 
171
 Id., sixth recital. 
172
 Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 Dec. 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States 
relating to self-employed commercial agents, [1986] OJ L 382/17 (hereinafter Commercial Agents 
Directive). 
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situations. At first glance, as evidenced by its title (and one of its legal bases), the 
Directive seemed to be directed at the “coordination” of the laws of the Member States.  
Yet, with a closer look at the Preamble and its substantive provisions, the Directive 
sought to approximate, more aptly to harmonise, the laws of the Member States relating 
to commercial agents.173  As indicated by the Preamble, “the differences in national laws 
concerning commercial representation substantially affect the conditions of competition 
and the carrying-on of that activity within the Community and are detrimental both to the 
protection available to commercial agents vis-à-vis their principals and to the security of 
commercial transactions”174. Moreover, “those differences are such to inhibit 
substantially the conclusion and the operation of commercial representation contracts 
where principal and commercial agents are established in different Member States”.175  
This necessitated “approximation of the legal systems of the Member States to the extent 
required for the proper functioning of the internal market”.176   
 
The Directive was divided into several parts, setting forth common rules 
concerning the rights and obligations of commercial agents and principals177; the 
commercial agent’s remuneration178; and the conclusion and termination of agency 
contracts.179  The Directive contained elaborate definitions of what was meant by a 
“commercial agent”180, but as far as the relations between such agents and principals 
were concerned, provisions such as the duty to act “in good faith”181 and what was meant 
by an “agency contract” were not defined.182  There was no minimum harmonisation 
clause, although it gave the Member States certain alternatives in a few provisions.183 
 
2.3.3 The Consumer Credit Directive (87/102/EEC) (replaced by the new 
Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC)) 
 
Council Directive 87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (the 
                                                 
173
 Commercial Agents Directive, Article 1 (“harmonization measures”); third recital (“harmonization”); 
fifth recital (“harmonizing”).  Approximation was used only once:  see infra note 176 and accompanying 
text. 
174
 Id., recital 2. 
175
 Id. (emphasis added). 
176
 Id., recital 3. Incidentally, the Directive went even further by underscoring that the rules concerning 
conflict of laws did not remove the inconsistencies in this field even if made uniform and for that reason, 
“the proposed harmonization is necessary notwithstanding the existence of those rules”. Id. 
177
 See id., Articles 3-5.  
178
 See id., Articles 6-12. 
179
 See id., Articles 13-16.   
180
 As defined in the Directive, commercial agents were self-employed intermediaries having “continuing 
authority to negotiate the sale or the purchase of goods on behalf of another person known as the principal, 
or to negotiate and conclude such transactions on behalf of and in the name of the principal”:  id., Article 
1(2). 
181
 Id., Articles 3(1), 4(1). 
182
 See, e.g., id., Chapter IV “Conclusion and termination of the agency contract”. 
183
 See id., Articles 7, 17. 
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Consumer Credit Directive)184 was based on Article 94 EC (then Article 100 EEC).  As 
explained in the Preamble, this was because “wide differences exist in the laws of the 
Member States in the field of consumer credit” and those differences “can lead to 
distortions of competition between grantors of credit in the common market” and “have 
an influence on the free movement of goods and services obtainable by consumers on 
credit and thus directly affect the functioning of the common market”.185  Those 
differences also resulted in “unequal consumer protection in the field of consumer credit 
from one Member State to another”.186 No limitation was carved out as regards its 
coverage of only cross-border transactions; the Directive laid down rules applicable to 
consumer credit agreements concluded in the context of cross-border and purely domestic 
transactions.   
 
Generally, it laid down a set of common rules concerning pre-contractual and 
contractual information187 and particular issues connected with such agreements, such as 
repossession of goods188, early repayment by the consumer189, and assignment190. As 
regards common rules concerning the calculation of the annual percentage rate of 
interest191, this was a particular point of contention, which ultimately led to two 
subsequent amendments of the Directive within which to put a single Community 
formula in place.192 The Directive contained a minimum  harmonisation clause.193  In a 
similar vein, the Directive left open certain choices for the Member States, such as the 
provision for a cooling-off period allowing the consumer to cancel the credit 
agreement.194 In situations involving credit granted for the acquisition of goods, it was 
left to the Member States to establish the conditions under which goods may be 
repossessed with the stipulation that this should not entail any unjustified enrichment195, 
although this latter concept was not defined. 
 
 In 2008, the Community legislator adopted Directive 2008/48/EC on credit 
agreements for consumers (the new Consumer Credit Directive), which repealed the old 
Directive.196  It was based on Article 95 EC, not Article 94 EC like its predecessor.  As 
explained in the Preamble, the impetus stemmed from two sources:  first, the evolution in 
                                                 
184
 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 Dec. 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, [1987] OJ L 42/48 (hereinafter 
Consumer Credit Directive).  It has been replaced by a new Directive, as discussed below. 
185
 Id., recitals 1, 2, 4. 
186
 Id., recital 7. 
187
 Id., Articles 4, 6. 
188
 Id., Article 7. 
189
 Id., Article 8. 
190
 Id., Article 9. 
191
 Id., Article 1a; Annex. 
192
 Council Directive 90/88/EEC of 22 Feb. 1990 amending Council Directive 87/102/EEC, [1990] OJ L 
61/14; Directive 98/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Feb. 1998 amending Council 
Directive 87/102/EEC, [1998] OJ L 101/17. 
193
 Consumer Credit Directive, supra note 184, Article 15. 
194
 See id., Annex I. 
195
 Id., Article 7. 
196
 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, [2008] OJ L 133/66 (hereinafter 
new Consumer Credit Directive).  Under Article 27, the deadline for transposition is 12 May 2010. 
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the types of credit instruments on the market that called for the revision and the extension 
of the Directive’s scope197; and second, the impact of the existing differences among the 
laws of the Member States on the internal market, which “in some cases leads to 
distortions of competition among creditors in the Community and creates obstacles to the 
internal market where Member States have adopted different mandatory provisions more 
stringent than those provided for in Directive 87/102/EEC”.198 As a result, the Directive 
sought “to facilitate the emergence of a well-functioning internal market in consumer 
credit” by providing for “a harmonised Community framework in a number of core 
areas”199.  It also sought to provide a “sufficient degree of consumer protection to ensure 
consumer confidence” so as to stimulate the free movement of credit in the EU.200   
 
On this basis, the new Consumer Credit Directive replaced the scheme of 
minimum harmonisation under the previous Directive with that of “full harmonisation” in 
order to ensure that “all consumers in the Community enjoy a high and equivalent level 
of protection of their interests and to create a genuine internal market”201.  This was one 
of the controversial aspects of the Directive202, which may explain the lengthy recitals 
making clear the extent to which the Member States were free to retain or to introduce 
legislation on matters falling outside the scope of the Directive.203  The Directive also did 
not regulate contract law issues related to the validity of credit agreements, which would 
fall within the ambit of national legal regimes.204  Indeed, as before, the Directive sought 
to harmonise only “certain aspects” of national law concerning consumer credit 
agreements205 and was applicable to consumer credit agreements concluded in both the 
inter-State and intra-State settings. It was longer than its predecessor and contained 
augmented sections concerning such matters as pre-contractual and contractual 
information and the consumer’s right of withdrawal from a consumer credit agreement.206 
 
2.3.4 The Package Travel Directive (90/314/EEC) 
Council Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package  
                                                 
197
 Id., recital 5. 
198
 Id., recital 4. 
199
 Id., recital 7. 
200
 Id., recital 8 (emphasis added). 
201
 Id., recital 9; see also Article 22(1).  
202
 See, e.g., Second Report of the European Parliament, A5-0224/2004, dated 2 April 2004, at 84, available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu; Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, [2003] OJ C 231/1, 
points 2.4.2-2.4.3, 2.4.7, 4.11-4.12.  
203
 New Consumer Credit Directive, recitals 9-11, 22. 
204
 Id., recital 30. 
205
 Id., Articles 1-2. 
206
 Among the noticeable changes, the Directive introduced a provision giving the consumer the right to 
withdraw from the consumer credit agreement generally within a period of fourteen days and the right to 
repay early at any time.  See id., Articles 14, 16. It also contained significantly revised provisions on linked 
credit agreements. See id., Article 15. The notion of linked contracts would figure in the case law of the 
Court of Justice on this Directive:  see Chapter 3, § 3.3.2. 
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tours (the Package Travel Directive)207 was adopted under Article 95 EC (then Article 
100a EEC).208  As the Preamble indicated, “national practices in this field are markedly 
different, which gives rise to obstacles to the freedom to provide services in respect of 
packages and distortions of competition amongst operators established in different 
Member States”.209 As such, the establishment of common rules on package travel would 
“contribute to the elimination of those obstacles and thereby to the achievement of a 
common market in services”.210  Moreover, “disparities in the rules protecting consumers 
in different Member States are a disincentive to consumers in one Member State from 
buying packages in another Member State”.211  The purpose of the Directive was 
therefore to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to packages sold and 
offered for sale in the territory of the Community.212  No limitation was carved out as 
regards its coverage of only cross-border transactions; the Directive  included 
transactions in both cross-border and purely domestic settings. 
 
The Directive established a set of common rules relating to package-travel 
contracts largely dealing with pre-contractual and contractual information, the form and 
elements of such contracts, and a right of withdrawal.213  In particular, it contained 
provisions concerning damages stemming from the failure to perform or the improper 
performance of the contract.214, though the Community legislator did not provide an 
explicit definition of the concept. It was not strictly limited to the contractual sphere, and 
included rules on matters such as advertising and presentation of package travel 
materials215 and the provision of security on the part of the package travel organiser 
and/or retailer.216  It also included a minimum harmonisation clause.217 
 
2.3.5 The Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EC) 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive)218 was based on Article 95 EC (then Article 100a EEC).  The 
                                                 
207
 Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours, 
[1990] OJ L 158/59 (hereinafter Package Travel Directive). It is included as one of the eight Directives as 
part of the Commission’s review of the consumer acquis (see Chapter 7, § 7.3) and is presently undergoing 
public consultation (see http://ec.europa.eu/consumer/rights/cons_acquis_en.htm). 
208
 Incidentally, under the Single European Act, Article 100a EEC had initially prescribed the cooperation 
procedure.  This was changed to the co-decision procedure under the Maastricht Treaty. This explains why 
the directives adopted under Article 100a EEC before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (i.e., 1 
Nov. 1993) were adopted by the Council alone, as compared to those adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council together thereafter. 
209
 Package Travel Directive, supra note 207, recital 2. 
210
 Id., recital 3. 
211
 Id., recital 8. 
212
 Id., Article 1. 
213
 Id., Article 4.  There was also an Annex containing a list of various elements to be included in the 
contract if relevant to the particular package. 
214
 Id., Article 5. 
215
 Id., Article 3. 
216
 Id., Article 7.   
217
 Id., Article 8. 
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 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, [1993] L 95/29 
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purpose of the Directive was to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to 
unfair terms in contracts concluded between sellers or suppliers, on the one hand, and 
consumers, on the other.219 As indicated in the Preamble, the laws of the Member States 
relating to contract terms between traders of goods and services and consumers “show 
many disparities, with the result that the national markets for the sale of  goods and 
services to consumers differ from each other and that distortions of competition may arise 
amongst the sellers and suppliers, notably when they sell and supply in other Member 
States”.220  Moreover, “consumers do not know the rules of law which, in Member States 
other than their own, govern contracts for the sale of goods or services” and “this lack of 
awareness may deter them from direct transactions for the purchase of goods or services 
in another Member State”.221  As a result, “in order to facilitate the establishment of the 
internal market and to safeguard the citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods 
and services under contracts which are governed by the laws of the Member States other 
than his own, it is essential to remove unfair terms from those contracts”.222 The 
Directive covered both cross-border and domestic transactions, since such rules will help 
sellers and suppliers “in their task of selling goods and supplying services, both at home 
and throughout the internal market.”223  
 
On the whole, the Directive laid down rules that applied across the board to all 
consumer contracts and thus constituted a paradigm shift from previous directives that 
had merely set forth rules on information disclosure and formation of consumer 
contracts.224  Nevertheless, its scope was limited in certain ways. In particular, it covered 
only contractual terms that had not been individually negotiated, i.e., where the term 
concerned was “drafted in advance and the consumer had not been able to influence the 
substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard 
contract”.225 Yet, the twelfth recital underscored that in accordance with the minimum 
                                                                                                                                                 
review of the consumer acquis and would be replaced by the proposed Directive on consumer rights: see 
Chapter 7, § 7.3. 
219
 Id., Article 1(1).  Although not mentioned explicitly in the definition of seller or supplier under Article 
2(c), the Directive assumed that such contracts pertained to the supply of services or the sale of goods:  see 
id., Article 4; recitals 2, 6, 7, 16, 18, 19. 
220
 Id., recital 2. 
221
 Id., recital 5. 
222
 Id., recital 6. 
223
 Id., recital 7. 
224
 See, e.g., Weatherill, European Consumer Law and Policy, supra note 39, at 115 (“first incursion of 
Community law into the heartland of national contract law thinking”); U. Bernitz, “The Commission’s 
Communications and Standard Contract Terms”, in The Harmonisation of European Contract Law: 
Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice, supra note 38, 185, at 185 (“one of 
the most comprehensive and far-reaching pieces of European private law legislation so far”).  Not 
surprisingly, there is a mountain of literature devoted to this Directive. For a brief selection and further 
citations therein, see P. Nebbia, Unfair Contract Terms in European Law: A Study in Comparative and EC 
Law (Hart, 2007); L. Niglia, The Transformation of Contract in Europe (Kluwer, 2003); Standard Contract 
Terms in Europe: A Basis for and a Challenge to European Contract Law (H. Collins ed., Kluwer, 2008); 
“Special Issue on the Unfair Contract Terms Directive”, 5 European Review of Private Law No. 2 (1997); 
“Special Issue on The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: The Case of the Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts”, 3 European Review of Private Law No. 2 (1995). 
225
 Unfair Contract Terms Directive, supra note 218, Article 3(2). 
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harmonisation clause provided therein226, the Member States had the option of affording 
consumers a higher level of protection through more stringent national provisions.227  
 
The heart of the Directive concerned the assessment of the unfairness of terms 
used in consumer contracts.  Importantly, this was done by way of a three-part scheme.  
There was a “general clause” of Article 3(1) defining in a general way the factors 
rendering a particular term “unfair”.228 This provision stated that a term was unfair “if, 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer”.229  
Good faith was not defined, however. This “general clause” was backed up by Article 4 
providing further guidance as to the assessment230, as well as an Annex providing an 
indicative, non-exhaustive (so-called “grey”) list of the types of clauses that could be 
regarded as unfair. The Directive contained related rules concerning the effects of terms 
deemed unfair and the form of such terms in written contracts231, as well as provisions 
concerning the enforcement of unfair terms.232  
 
2.3.6 The Timeshare Directive (94/47/EC) (replaced by the new Timeshare 
Directive (2008/122/EC)) 
 
Directive 94/47/EC on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of  
contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable property on a timeshare 
basis (the Timeshare Directive)233 was adopted under Article 95 EC (then Article 100a 
EC).  In the Preamble, the justification for the Directive stemmed from the fact that, 
“disparities between national legislations [sic] on contracts relating to the purchase of the 
right to use one or more immovable properties on a timeshare basis are likely to create 
barriers to the proper operation of the internal market and distortions of competition and 
led to the compartmentalization of national markets”.234 No limitation was carved out as 
regards its coverage of only cross-border transactions; the Directive applied to both cross-
border and purely domestic ones.   
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 Id., Article 8. 
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 Id., recital 12. 
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 J. Stuyck, Case note, 38 Common Market Law Review 719, 721 (2001). See generally General Clauses 
and Standards in European Contract Law, supra note 18. 
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 Unfair Contract Terms Directive, supra note 218, Article 3(1).  While the notion of “good faith” was not 
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 Id., Articles 5, 6. 
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 Id., Article 7. 
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Notably, the Directive only covered “certain minimal items” in order to provide 
effective protection for purchasers (akin to consumers) in this field.235  The Preamble 
explained that, “the legal nature of the rights which are the subject of the contracts 
covered by this Directive varies considerably from one Member State” and for this 
reason, “references should therefore be made in summary form to those variations, giving 
a sufficiently broad definition of such contracts, without thereby implying harmonization 
within the Community of the legal nature of the rights in question”.236  In other words, 
the Directive was “not designed to regulate the extent to which contracts for the use of 
one or more immovable properties on a time-share basis may be concluded in Member 
States or the legal basis of such contract”237.  In fact, the limited nature of the Directive 
was one of its most glaring features.  Not only was this apparent in its title referencing its 
coverage of “certain aspects” of timeshare contracts, but also quite uniquely, Article 1 
made clear that the Directive would only cover those aspects of timeshare contracts 
relating to “information on the constituent parts of a contract and the arrangements for the 
communication of that information”, on the one hand, and “the procedures and 
arrangements for cancellation and withdrawal”, on the other.238  The Member States 
would remain competent for all other matters, such as the determination of the legal 
nature of the rights that were the subject of the contracts covered by the Directive.239  
There was also a minimum harmonisation clause allowing Member States to maintain or 
enact more favourable provisions for protecting purchasers in the field concerned.240 
 
 In 2009, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 
2008/122/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, 
long-term holiday products, resale and exchange contracts (the new Timeshare 
Directive)241, which repealed the previous Directive.242  It is based on Article 95 EC and 
is essentially a “beefed up” version of its predecessor. As explained in the Preamble, 
there were various “regulatory gaps” left open by the previous Directive in terms of its 
lack of coverage of new holiday products and certain transactions related to timeshare, 
and even the subjects that were covered were in need of updating and clarifying, 
particularly in order to prevent the development of holiday products aimed at 
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 Id., recitals 8, 9.  Under Article 2, fourth indent, a purchaser was very much akin to the status of a 
consumer for the purposes of this Directive. References to consumers also seemed to be sprinkled through 
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circumventing the Directive.243  These gaps “create appreciable distortions of competition 
and cause serious problems for consumers, thereby hindering the smooth functioning of 
the internal market” and warranting a new, up-to-date directive.244  As such, the aim of 
the Directive was to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and to 
achieve a high level of consumer protection by approximating the laws of the Member 
States in respect of certain aspects of the marketing, sale and resale of timeshares and 
long-term holiday products.245 As with the old Directive, it applied to transactions 
between traders and consumers246, whether cross-border or domestic. Yet, on the basis of 
the interests of enhancing legal certainty and fully achieving the benefits of the internal 
market for consumers and businesses, the Directive “fully harmonised” the laws of the 
Member States, as opposed to the previous minimum harmonisation model.247 The 
Directive sought to soften the blow by stating, inter alia, that it was without prejudice to 
a host of national rules, such as general contract law remedies and the determination of 
the legal rights that are the subject of the contracts covered by the Directive.248 
 
As far as its content is concerned, the new Timeshare Directive contains a battery 
of more detailed rules on various aspects that far surpasses the old Directive, such as pre-
contractual information249 and the right of withdrawal250, even setting out in several 
annexes standard information for the various types of contracts concerned and a standard 
withdrawal form for facilitating the right of withdrawal.251  The enforcement mechanisms 
are also considerably enhanced.252  Yet, as its title indicated, it still covered only “certain 
aspects” of these various types of timeshare products, and glaringly, in the updated 
definitions of timeshare contracts and related products, the concept of “consideration” 
was left undefined.253 
 
2.3.7 The Distance Selling Directive (97/7/EC) 
Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts 
(the Distance Selling Directive)254 was based on Article 95 EC (then Article 100a EC).  It 
established a minimum set of common rules concerning the regulation of distance 
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 Id., recital 2.   
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 Id., Article 1(1). 
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 Id., Article 1(2). 
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 See id., Articles 4-5. 
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 See id., Articles 6-11. 
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 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts, [1997] OJ L 144/19 (hereinafter Distance Selling Directive). It 
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contracts between consumers and suppliers in the EU.255  As explained in the Preamble, it 
was “essential to the smooth operation of the internal market for consumers to be able to 
have dealings with a business outside their country, even if it has a subsidiary in the 
consumer’s country of residence”256, but “some Member States have already taken 
different or diverging measures to protect consumers in respect of distance selling, which 
has had a detrimental effect on competition between businesses in the internal market”.257 
The Directive covered cross-border and purely domestic transactions.258 
 
 Much of the Directive was taken up with rules concerning information disclosure 
and the consumer’s right of withdrawal.  The Directive set forth the information which 
must be given to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the contract and the manner it 
must be given, “with due regard to the principles of good faith in commercial 
transactions”, though such principles were not explicitly elaborated.259 It also contained 
various rules on the consumer’s right to withdraw from the contract260. The consumer 
was given a period of at least seven working days in which to exercise the right of 
withdrawal under Article 6(1), which was accompanied by a Statement issued by the 
European Parliament and the Council noting their intention to examine the possibility and 
the desirability of harmonising the method of calculating the cooling-off period under 
existing Community consumer protection legislation.261 There were additional rules 
protecting consumers in relation to the performance of the contract, payment by credit 
card and inertia selling262, as well as its enforcement.263 The Directive contained a 
minimum harmonisation clause, which explicitly allowed, with due regard to the Treaty, 
the introduction of a ban in the general interest as regards the marketing of certain goods 
and services particularly medicinal products, by means of distance contracts.264 Its 
novelty lay in the fact that alongside those minimum set of rules, the Directive would be 
supplemented where appropriate by voluntary arrangements of the traders concerned.265 
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2.3.8 The Consumer Sales Directive (1999/44/EC) 
Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees (the Consumer Sales Directive)266 was adopted under Article 95 
EC. Starting off with a reference to Article 153 EC in its first recital, the Preamble 
underlined that “consumers resident in one Member State should be free to purchase 
goods in the territory of another Member State on the basis of a uniform minimum set of 
fair rules governing the sale of consumer goods”.267  Yet, the laws of the Member States 
concerning the sale of consumer goods were “somewhat disparate, with the result that 
national consumer goods markets differ from one another and that competition between 
sellers may be distorted”.268  Consequently, “the creation of a common set of minimum 
rules of consumer law, valid no matter where goods are purchased within the 
Community, will strengthen consumer confidence and enable consumers to make the 
most of the internal market”.269 While seeking to improve the cross-border sale of 
consumer goods, the Directive covered both cross-border and domestic transactions. 
 
Since the “main difficulties” encountered by consumers concerned the non-
conformity of goods with the contract, the Directive sought to lay down rules in that 
respect, “without however impinging on provisions and principles of national law relating 
to contractual and non-contractual liability”.270 This explains its title referring to “certain 
aspects” of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees in the internal market.  
The Directive set forth various rules relating to the conformity of  goods under the 
contract, the rights and remedies of the consumer against the seller for lack of 
conformity, and guarantees.271 It stipulated that the rights accorded under the Directive 
did not prejudice other rights which the consumer could invoke under national rules 
governing contractual or non-contractual liability.272 It also included a minimum 
harmonisation clause.273   
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  Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects 
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2.3.9 The Late Payment Directive (2000/35/EC) 
Directive 2000/35/EC on combating late payment in commercial transactions (the 
Late Payment Directive)274 was adopted under Article 95 EC.  It concerned commercial 
transactions between traders, as opposed to those involving consumers.275 As indicated in 
the Preamble, there was mounting problems in the internal market caused by late 
payments by debtors.276  Late payments constituted “a breach of contract which has been 
made financially attractive to debtors in most Member States by low interest rates on late 
payments and/or slow procedures for redress”.277 The differences in the payment rules 
and practices of the Member Sates were considered an obstacle to the proper functioning 
of the internal market, which had “the effect of considerably limiting commercial 
transactions between the Member States” and contradicted Article 14 EC whereby 
“entrepreneurs should be able to trade throughout the internal market under conditions 
which ensure that transborder operations do not entail greater risks than domestic 
sales”.278 Moreover, “[d]istortions of competition would ensue if substantially different 
rules applied to domestic and transborder operations”.279  As a result, the Directive 
established rules applicable to all payments made as remuneration for commercial 
transactions280, covering cross-border and domestic transactions.  In doing so, the 
Directive sought not to affect national provisions “relating to the way contracts are 
concluded or regulating the validity of contractual terms which are unfair to the 
debtor”.281  It also contained a minimum harmonisation clause, which allowed the 
Member States to maintain or introduce national legislation which was more favourable 
to the creditor than what was provided in the Directive.282 
 
The Directive was of a limited nature, essentially focusing on the following three 
aspects:  interest in the case of late payments283, recovery procedures for unchallenged 
claims284, and retention of title285.  As for recovery procedures, this was to ensure that 
they would be completed in a short time, but the provisions did “not require the Member 
States to adopt a specific procedure or to amend their existing national legislation in a 
specific way”.286  For the retention of title provision, this too did not seek to disturb the 
national legal regimes. As defined in the Directive, retention of title denoted a contractual 
agreement allowing the seller to retain title in the debtor’s goods until the price was paid 
in full.287  The idea underlying the Directive was to ensure that where such a retention of 
                                                 
274
 Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late 
payment in commercial transactions, [2000] OJ L 200/35 (hereinafter Late Payment Directive).   
275
 Id., recital 13. 
276
 Id., recital 7. 
277
 Id., recital 16. 
278
 Id., recital 10 (emphasis added). 
279
 Id. 
280
 Id., Article 1. 
281
  Id., recital 19. 
282
 Id., Article 6(2). 
283
 Id., Article 3. 
284
 Id., Article 5. 
285
 Id., Article 4.  
286
 Id., recital 5 
287
 See id., Article 2(3).   
Chapter 2:  The Constitutional Framing of European Contract Law 
 
 
60 
title clause had been agreed between a creditor and a buyer, the creditor was put in the 
position to exercise the clause throughout the Community, but this depended upon 
whether the clause was valid under the applicable national provisions designated by 
private international law.288   
 
2.4 Perennial themes underlying the “hard core” of Community contract law 
Through these broad brush strokes, three perennial themes bearing on the 
constitutionality of European contract law can be gleaned from the “hard core” of 
Community contract law.  The first relates to matters concerning Community competence 
and the roles played by Articles 94 and 95 EC.  The second implicates the relationship 
between consumer contract law and general contract law. The third implicates the 
problems generated by the piecemeal nature of the “hard core” at the European and 
national levels. Each are evaluated in turn. 
 
2.4.1 Community competence and the roles played by Articles 94 and 95 EC 
One of the most predominant themes underlying the “hard core” relates to the use 
of the Community’s competences under Articles 94 and 95 EC concerning the 
approximation of national laws for the purposes of the internal market.  While the vast 
majority of the directives embodied objectives related to consumer protection as well, it 
has been these Treaty provisions, mainly Article 95 EC, which have served as the legal 
bases for the foregoing directives.289  Even after the introduction of Article 153 EC by 
way of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which preceded the timeframe in which many of 
these directives were adopted (and as illustrated by the Consumer Sales Directive was 
cited in the text itself), this did not affect the steady reliance on Article 95 EC.  The use 
of the Community’s internal market competences coloured the Community contract law 
acquis with particular characteristics, and in doing so, highlight several interrelated issues 
concerning the interplay between the Community’s internal market and consumer policy 
objectives, the extent of the Community’s competence under Articles 94 and 95 EC, and 
the potential role of Article 153 EC. 
 
 First, while the vast majority of the directives rest upon the Community’s dual 
objectives rooted in the internal market and consumer protection, the use of Articles 94 
and 95 EC demonstrates the place of consumer protection objectives inside, as opposed to 
outside, the Community’s internal market programme. In fact, as examined in greater 
detail in a coming chapter, it was the symbiotic relationship between the protection of 
consumers’ economic interests and the internal market programme within the 
development of Community consumer policy, which gave birth to several directives 
within the “hard core”.290  This relationship has come to be symbolised by the exultation 
of the “Janus face” of Community consumer contract law, one side geared at protecting 
consumers and the other side aimed at furthering the establishment and functioning of the 
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internal market.291 Nevertheless, as recognised by commentators, it is the “market 
making” of Article 95 EC that underpins the various directives.292 This has led to tensions 
underlying Community contract law in terms of building a truly integrated market, on the 
one hand, and ensuring a high level of consumer protection in the European Union, on 
the other. As such, the perennial question to find the right balance between the two 
underlies some of the sensitivity for resorting to Article 95 EC in relation to the adoption 
of a consumer contract law instrument in the debate about European contract law. This 
also raises provocative questions about the severance of Community consumer contract 
law measures from the internal market programme by virtue of recourse to Article 153 
EC as opposed to Article 95 EC. 
 
Second, the directives within the “hard core” highlight issues relating to the scope 
of the Community’s competence under Articles 94 and 95 EC and the European 
legislator’s justifications for relying on these provisions.  In the first place, hardly 
anything has been made of the fact that all of the foregoing directives cover not cross-
border transactions, but also purely domestic ones.  Given the ensuing debate about the 
scope of Article 95 EC, these measures demonstrated its extension to purely domestic 
transactions very early on. In the second place, the justifications underpinning some of 
these directives are significant, which is borne out by their chronological progression.  As 
illustrated by the early directives, much of the language attesting to the particular 
measure’s elimination of obstacles to trade and/or distortions of competition is framed in 
hypothetical or subjective terms without much substantiation.  While the Doorstep 
Selling Directive is often held up as a quintessential example293, others embody similarly 
tenuous reasoning.  It is somewhat understandable that the earlier directives would be 
framed in “looser” terms, as compared to the more recent directives that evidence 
alignment with the case law on Article 95 EC, e.g., citing “appreciable” distortions of 
competition.294  Even so, the rationale for these directives has remained rooted in the 
likelihood of obstacles to trade and distortions of competition caused by disparities in 
national contract laws. This is so, even for some of the early directives that were adopted 
before the case law on Article 95 EC proclaimed as much. Importantly, while some 
directives are concerned with differences in national mandatory or protective standards, 
many are framed more generally on grounds that such differences in consumer and 
commercial contract laws are as such to inhibit or to deter cross-border transactions from 
taking place and to cause detrimental effects on competition between businesses in the 
internal market.  As such, these directives permeate the inquiry into the scope of Article 
                                                 
291T. Wilhelmsson, “The Abuse of the ‘Confident Consumer’ as a Justification for EC Consumer Law”, 27 
Journal of Consumer Policy 317, at 319 (2004) (and citations therein). 
292
 See, e.g., G. Howells and T. Wilhelmsson, “EC consumer law: has it come of age?”, 28 European Law 
Review 370 (2003); S. Weatherill, “Constitutional Issues–How Much is Best Left Unsaid?”, in The 
Harmonisation of European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal 
Practice, supra note 38, 89; C.U. Schmid, “The Instrumentalist Conception of the Acquis Communautaire 
in Consumer Law and its Implications on a European Contract Law Code”, 1 European Review of Contract 
Law 211 (2005).  This has in fact prompted specific terms within which to frame EC contract law:  see, 
e.g., H-W. Micklitz, “The Concept of Competitive Contract Law”, 23 Pennsylvania State International 
Law Review 549 (2005); N. Reich, “European Consumer Law and its Relationship to Private Law”, 3 
European Review of Private Law 285, 289 (1995) (referring to “European trade practices law”). 
293
 See Weatherill, “Constitutional Issues–How Much is Best Left Unsaid?”, supra note 292, at 91. 
294
 See Chapter 9.   
Chapter 2:  The Constitutional Framing of European Contract Law 
 
 
62 
95 EC, especially as regards the assessment of the parameters of obstacles to trade and 
appreciable distortions of competition that this provision is charged to eliminate. 
 
Alongside these arguments often comes some variation of the so-called consumer 
confidence rationale, which increasingly appears in a number of the directives within the 
“hard core”.  As illustrated by these directives, the idea behind this rationale seems to be 
that disparities between national rules cause consumers to abstain from engaging in cross-
border transactions, and therefore, by approximating national contract laws so as to set 
down a set of common European rules in the relevant area, the measure concerned gives 
consumers the confidence to partake of such transactions, thereby enhancing the free 
movement of goods and services in the internal market.295  At present, it remains 
controversial in academic circles, and as yet unsettled by the Court of Justice, the extent 
to which arguments relating to consumer confidence can be used to justify measures 
based on Article 95 EC.296  That being said, these directives demonstrate that where such 
arguments have been used, they have appeared alongside justifications rooted in the 
elimination of obstacles to trade and distortions of competition caused by disparities in 
national laws, not in place of them.   
 
Finally, reliance on Articles 94 and 95 EC was not without political compromise 
in the form of minimum harmonisation. As seen above, minimum harmonisation clauses 
can be found in most of the original measures within the “hard core”, whereas, the recent 
revisions of several of these directives profess a shift to maximum (or full) 
harmonisation, thereby removing the assumption that minimum harmonisation is an 
automatic accompaniment of the Community contract law acquis. 297 The Commission’s 
arguments used to justify such a shift is the subject of increasing commentary from 
scholars, much of it critical at least as regards the shift across the board as opposed to a 
case-by-case basis where the need for maximum harmonisation can be shown.298  This 
discussion is linked to the Community’s competence in this area. Recourse to the special 
procedure of Article 95(4)-(9) EC on grounds of consumer protection is foreclosed, 
which has served to place renewed attention on Article 153 EC as a “safe haven” for 
preserving recourse to minimum harmonisation in this area. The matter also raised 
questions in the literature as to whether the case law on Article 95 EC emanating from the 
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first Tobacco Advertising judgment dictated such a shift, though at present this seems to 
have been decided in the negative.299 As a result, the dichotomy between minimum and 
maximum harmonisation enlivens the controversy surrounding the scope of Article 95 
EC and its relationship to Article 153 EC. 
 
In sum, the roles played by Articles 94 and 95 EC in the “hard core” of 
Community contract law illuminate key constitutional issues, which surprisingly have so 
far not been tested.  Despite the uncertainties related to the “consumer confidence” 
rationale, the “loose” justification for Articles 94 and 95 EC on occasion, and questions 
concerning the possible recourse to Article 153 EC in place of Article 95 EC, the 
Community’s competence to adopt any of the foregoing measures has yet to be 
challenged before the Court of Justice, whether directly by way of an action for 
annulment or indirectly by way of a preliminary ruling on the validity of Community law 
or an objection of illegality.  Surely, there is a growing body of case law concerning the 
Court’s interpretation of these directives, but as regards the matter of legal basis, there 
has not been one case so far over the course of the past three decades.  The result is that it 
draws attention to various issues percolating below the surface of European contract law, 
which brings the need to confront the constitutionality of European contract law around 
full circle. 
 
2.4.2 Relationship between consumer and general contract law  
As demonstrated by the “hard core”, consumer contract law commands the 
prominent place within the Community contract law. In other words, Community 
contract law has been primarily grounded in rules concerning transactions between 
consumers and traders referred to as “B2C” (business to consumer) transactions, as 
compared to rules concerning commercial transactions between traders referred to as 
“B2B” (business to business) transactions.  This has injected various issues relating to the 
relationship between consumer contract law and general contract law, which comes into 
play in the debate about European contract law and the constitutionality of the initiatives 
envisaged in this area.  On the one hand, it was the consumer element that served as the 
inroad into contract law (and even private law generally to some extent) at the European 
level.300 This is evidenced by the fact that the categories of consumer contract law and 
European contract law are blurred, one often serving as a subset for the other. 301   On the 
other hand, consumer contract law has been viewed as feeding into general rules of 
contract law, as illustrated by scholars who prefer to view Community contract law 
beyond its consumer underpinnings302, as for example constituting a European “market 
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Miller and P.C. Zumbansen eds., Berghahn, 2004).   
300
 Niglia, supra note 132, at 589.  
301
 See, e.g. S. Weatherill, European Consumer Law and Policy, supra note 39, at 149; H-W. Micklitz, “An 
Expanded and Systematized Community Consumer Law as Alternative or Complement?” 13 European 
Business Law Review 583 (2002). 
302
 This has been greatly prompted by two particular directives within the “hard core”, the Unfair Contract 
Terms and Consumer Sales Directive, which have “generated a readiness to consider the shape of contract 
law beyond the consumer sphere”:  S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill, “The EC’s Competence to Pursue the 
Harmonisation of Contract Law – an Empirical Contribution to the Debate”, supra note 38, at 106. See also 
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law”303 or “business law”, even if it is one based on a high level of consumer 
protection.304 As a result, the question of segregation or integration of consumer contract 
law vis-à-vis general contract law looms large in the debate about European contract 
law.305  As will be seen, the ongoing activities taking place the European contract law 
project continue to be mired in this relationship, whether it is the plans for the revision of 
the Community consumer contract law acquis or the treatment of such issues in the 
Common Frame of Reference and potentially one or more optional instruments in 
contract law.306 This infuses the constitutional assessment of European contract law, 
particularly in terms of the controversy surrounding the extent of European Union’s 
competence to adopt a systematic instrument covering commercial or B2B transactions 
apart from the consumer contract law field. 
 
2.4.3 Problems associated with the piecemeal nature of the “hard core”  
Finally, whether it be consumer or commercial transactions, the “hard core” is 
filled with directives relating to significant, albeit discrete, topics.  Even if the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive and Consumer Sales Directive are deemed to go quite far in 
their application to the substance of consumer contracts, nonetheless as illustrated by the 
aforementioned directives, the “hard core” of the Community contract law acquis is 
limited in nature in terms of the “certain aspects” addressed and embodies an 
“interstitial” quality within the broader backdrop of the contract law regimes of the 
Member States.  In other words, these directives signified the Community’s piecemeal 
approach in the field of Community contract law, which was not conceived to blanket the 
field, but instead to deal only with a specific set of issues relating to certain types of 
contracts, marketing techniques, contractual settings, etc. when the particular need arose.  
 
As illustrated by the directives above, however, there were significant problems 
associated with this approach at both the European and the national levels.  At the 
European level, problems stemmed from, among other things, the European legislator’s 
failure to provide definitions for key terms as well as the numerous gaps and 
inconsistencies in the various directives, and at the national level, these directives 
introduced unknown or inconsistent terminology and imposed additional legal layers, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Schmid, “The Instrumentalist Conception of the Acquis Communautaire in Consumer Law and its 
Implications on a European Contract Law Code”, supra note 292, at 212 (posited as laying down a “basic 
law of contracts”).  Yet, other scholars do not go so far. See, e.g., P. Remy-Corlay, “The Law of Sales: 
Acquis and Improved Acquis in European Contract Law”, 4 ERA-Forum 39 (2003). 
303
 Grundmann, “Consumer Law, Commercial Law, Private Law: How can the Sales Directive and the 
Sales Convention be so Similar”, supra note 266, at 238. See also B. Lurger, “The Future of European 
Contract Law between Freedom of Contract, Social Justice, and Market Rationality”, 1 European Review of 
Contract Law 442, 457 (2005) (and citations therein). 
304
 Reisenburger, “System and Principles of EC Contract Law”, supra note 36, at 305-306. 
305
 Compare, e.g., G. Howells, “The Scope of European Consumer Law”, 1 European Review of Contract 
Law 360 (2005);  B. Lurger, “The Future of European Contract Law between Freedom of Contract, Social 
Justice, and Market Rationality”, 1 European Review of Contract Law 442, 454-462 (2005) (and citations 
therein); U. Mattei, The European Codification Process: Cut and Paste 129-159 (Kluwer, 2003); R. 
Schulze, “Consumer Law and European Contract Law”, in The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2007 (G. 
Howells et al., Ashgate, 2007).  
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 This is captured in D. Staudenmayer, “The Place of Consumer Contract Law Within the Process on 
European Contract Law”, 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 269 (2004). 
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which wreaked havoc with the coherence of the national legal systems in various ways.307 
As one scholar summed it up, the Community’s “functionally selective approach . . . led 
to an incomprehensible permeation of national systems with islands of Community law 
that grow ever larger, causing numerous fragmentations, unforeseen constraints to 
harmoni[s]ation and contradictions.”308 These problems combined to produce something 
of a “countermovement”309 against Community contract law and to draw attention to the 
possible need for a more systematic response to matters of contract law at the European 
level.  In this way, the “hard core” set the scene for a fundamental reevaluation of the 
Community’s role in contract law and for ways to address the various problems plaguing 
the Community contract law acquis at the European and the national levels.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 In view of the foregoing discussion, at the base of European contract law lies both 
the raison d’être for the debate and for the various solutions contemplated as a result.  
For this reason, the nuances underlying all of the terminology used in the debate had to 
be meted out so as to ensure a constructive discussion of the constitutionality of European 
contract law from both the European and American perspectives.  By the same token, the 
“hard core” of the Community contract acquis provides the contours for the European 
legislator’s role in European contract law and the perennial themes permeating the 
debate.  In much the same way, the “hard core” illuminates the role played by the 
European judiciary in European contract law, which leads to the next chapter. 
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 The commentary on this point is pervasive.  In the words of one commentator: “Up until 1998 . . . I 
couldn’t find a single reference which would not have condemned European Contract Law as fragmentary, 
pointillistic and inconsistent”:  S. Grundmann, “Plan of Action for a Coherent European Contract Law – 
Observations”, 4 ERA-Forum 125, 125 (2003).  For a brief selection of scholarly criticism and some quite 
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or Fragmented Harmonisation, 10 European Review of Private Law 77 (2002) (“jack and the box effects of 
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and Consequences”, 10 European Review of Private Law 761 (2002). 
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Gerven, “Comparative Law in a Texture of Communatarisation of National Laws and Europeanisation of 
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433, 433-40 (D. O’Keeffe ed., Kluwer, 2000)  (underscoring the “dark side” of harmonisation more 
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(A. Harding and E. Örücü eds, Kluwer, 2002)). 
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Paste, supra note 305, at 109 (calling it an “academic jihad against Brussels bureaucrats”). 
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3 
 
The Role of the Court of Justice in European Contract Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In tandem with the role of the European legislator in the development of the 
Community contract law acquis, increasing attention has been placed on the role of the 
Court of Justice in European contract law (and European private law generally).  For the 
most part, such attention centers on the Court of Justice (the Court), as opposed to the 
Court of First Instance (the CFI, now the General Court in the Lisbon Treaty1) and the 
EU Civil Service Tribunal, both of which are also part of the institution of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.  This can largely be explained by the fact that the vast 
majority of case law concerning Community contract law, particularly that of the “hard 
core”, has been placed before the Court pursuant to its exclusive jurisdiction (at least for 
the present time2) over preliminary rulings and infringement actions.3  Consequently, the 
literature is replete with a wide variety of opinions as to the extent to which the Court can 
play the role of a “private law court”4 in furthering the approximation of private law, 
particularly contract law, and smoothing out the deficiencies in the Community acquis.5    
 
 This chapter offers a broader perspective.  It highlights that there are in fact three 
key roles played by the Court of Justice as a whole in European contract law (as well as 
                                                 
1
 See Article 19 EU and the relevant provisions of the specific chapter concerning the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in the TFEU (Articles 251-281 TFEU) of the Lisbon Treaty. 
2
 In line with the changes brought by the Nice Treaty, the possibility of conferring jurisdiction on the CFI 
(now the General Court) to deliver preliminary rulings in “specific areas as laid down by the Statute” was 
envisaged. See Article 225(3) EC (now Article 256(3) TFEU).  To date, this has not yet come about.  See 
generally K. Lenaerts, D. Arts and I. Maselis, Procedural Law of the European Union § 1-049 - § 1-055, at 
22-29 (R. Bray ed., 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2006). 
3
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, neither direct nor indirect actions challenging the legality of Community 
consumer contract law measures have yet been brought before the Union courts, whether by way of actions 
for annulment, preliminary rulings on the validity of Community (now Union) law, or objections of 
illegality. 
4
 C.U. Schmid, “The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court: A Methodological Comparison”, 
ZERP-Diskussionspapier 4/2006, available at http://zerp.uni-bremen.de/index.pl.  
5
 For a recent selection of literature on this subject, see, e.g., Schmid, “The ECJ as a Constitutional and a 
Private Law Court: A Methodological Comparison”, supra note 4; W. van Gerven, “The ECJ Case-law as a 
Means of Unification of Private Law?”, in Towards a European Civil Code 101 (A. Hartkamp et al. eds, 3rd 
ed., Kluwer, 2004) (and citations therein); P. Rott, “What is the Role of the ECJ in EC Private Law? – A 
Comment on the ECJ judgments in Océano Grupo, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, Leitner and Veedfald”, 1 
Hanse Law Review 6 (2005); H. Unberath and A. Johnston, “Law at, to or from the Centre? The European 
Court of Justice and the Harmonization of Private Law in the European Union”, in The Institutional 
Framework of European Private Law 149 (F. Cafaggi ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2006); S. Weatherill, “An 
Ever Tighter Grip: The European Court’s Pro-Consumer Interpretation of the EC’s Directives Affecting 
Contract Law”, in Liber Amicorum Guido Alpa: Private Law Beyond the National Systems 1037 (M. 
Andenas et al. eds, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2007). For a broader 
perspective, see W. Devroe, “Impact van door het Europees Hof van Justitie ontwikkelde algemen 
beginselen op privaatrechtelijke verhoudingen”, in De invloed van het Europese recht op het Nederlandse 
privaatrecht 133 (A. Hartkamp et al. eds, Kluwer, 2007). 
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European private law generally), with primary focus placed on the Court and the 
Advocates General for the purposes of this study.6  First, there is the Court’s 
interpretative role by virtue of its interpretation of various measures falling within the 
Community contract acquis.  Second, while perhaps not as widely recognised, there is the 
Court’s lawmaking role by virtue of its formulation of Community and Union judge-
made rules of law falling under the rubric of what is called European “federal common 
law”.  Third, while not yet undertaken by the Court itself, there is the recourse made to 
comparative European contract law materials in the Opinions of the Advocates General. 
 
In view of the foregoing remarks, the aim of this chapter is to examine these three 
components on the basis of recent and noteworthy case law, in order to provide a “vivid 
snapshot” of the contribution made by the Court of Justice to European contract law and 
its potential for furthering the judicial approximation of contract law at the European 
level.  The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part examines the Court’s 
interpretative role, with particular regard to its interpretation of several directives falling 
within the “hard core” of Community contract law. The second part analyses the Court’s 
lawmaking role by highlighting several examples of European “federal common law” in 
the field of contract law.  The third part explores the use of comparative European 
contract law materials in the Opinions of the Advocates General and the potential 
implications for the Court’s role in European contract law.  Importantly, these three parts 
are not airtight, but instead very much interrelated.  As will be seen, certain cases falling 
within the Court’s interpretative role also highlight instances of the Court’s lawmaking 
role, and the Advocate General’s recourse to European contract law materials is situated 
within both.  
 
3.2 The Court of Justice’s Interpretative Role 
In a steady stream of cases, the Court has been faced with interpreting various 
provisions of directives falling within the “hard core” of Community contract law.  In 
particular, two sets of cases stand out.  The first set of cases – Travel Vac7, Dietzinger8, 
and Berliner9 – concerns the Court’s interpretation of the Doorstep Selling, the 
Timeshare, and the (old) Consumer Credit Directives, thereby highlighting the 
relationship between certain directives within Community contract law.  The second set 
of cases – Océano Grupo10, Freiburger11, Mostaza Claro12, and Pannon13 – concern the 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, it is not foreclosed that the CFI (now the General Court) and the EU Civil Service Tribunal may 
make a contribution to European contract law, whether in the interpretative or lawmaking contexts as 
discussed below (or even in the context of a case lodged at the General Court involving a challenge to the 
validity of a Community contract law measure if ever such a case is brought before the Union judicature).  
7
 Case C-423/97 Travel Vac SL v. José Antelm  Sanchis  (“Travel Vac”) [1999] ECR I-2195. 
8
 Case C-45/96 Bayerische Hypotheken-un Wechselbank AG v. Dietzinger (“Dietzinger”) [1998] ECR I-
1199. 
9
 Case C-208/98 Berliner Kindle Brauerei AG v. Siepert (“Berliner”) [2000] ECR I-1741. 
10
 Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA and Salvat Editores v. Murciano 
Quintero and Others (“Océano Grupo”) [2000] ECR I-4941. 
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 Case C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft and Co. KG v. Hofstetter 
(“Freiburger”) [2004] ECR I-3403. 
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 Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL (“Mostaza Claro”) [2006] ECR I-10421.  
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 Case C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Gyórfi (“Pannon”), judgment of 4 June 2009, not yet reported. 
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Court’s interpretation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, thereby providing a 
window into the interplay between Community contract law and the contract law regimes 
of the Member States.  These two sets of cases provide a firm grounding for evaluating 
the Court’s interpretative role in European contract law. Indeed, it is not surprising that 
most of the discourse on the Court’s role in European contract law in one way or another 
mentions this jurisprudence. 
 
3.2.1 Relationship between the directives within Community contract law – Travel 
Vac, Dietzinger, and Berliner 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Doorstep Selling Directive established a set of 
common rules for consumer contracts involving the sale of goods and services concluded 
in the “doorstep selling” context, the heart of which concerned the consumer’s right of 
cancellation that would release the consumer from any obligations under the contract.14  
Through the preliminary ruling procedure, the Court has been confronted with complex 
questions concerning the application of this Directive to various types of contracts, which 
essentially find the parties in the underlying national proceedings “fighting for their 
right” of cancellation as provided in the Directive.  At the same time, these cases have 
required the Court to confront head-on the relationship between various directives within 
Community contract law acquis. 
 
 Starting with Travel Vac15, delivered in 1999, this case concerned the potential 
overlap between the Doorstep Selling Directive and the Timeshare Directive.16 
Specifically, the case raised the issue of the potential applicability of the Doorstep Selling 
Directive to a timeshare contract that would have fallen within the scope of the 
Timeshare Directive but for the fact that it was concluded before the date that the latter 
Directive had to be transposed by the Member States.17  Thus, the consumer’s right of 
cancellation hinged on the Doorstep Selling Directive, thereby presenting the Court with 
questions as to whether a timeshare contract fell within the scope of this Directive and in 
turn, what in fact constituted a timeshare contract.  This was particularly the case, since 
under Article 3(2)(a) of the Doorstep Selling Directive, “contracts for the construction, 
sale and rental of immovable property or contracts concerning other rights relating to 
immovable property” were excluded from its scope, thereby begging the question 
whether the timeshare contract at issue fell within this exclusion.  
 
All of the parties in the underlying national proceedings, as well as the Spanish 
Government and the Commission, had differing opinions on the concept of a timeshare 
                                                 
14
 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 Dec. 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated 
away from business premises, [1985] OJ L 372/31 (hereinafter Doorstep Selling Directive). See Chapter 2, 
§ 2.3.1. 
15
 Case C-423/97 Travel Vac [1999] ECR I-2195. 
16
 Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 Oct. 1994 on the protection of 
purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable 
properties on a timeshare basis, [1994] OJ L 280/83 (hereinafter Timeshare Directive). It has recently been 
repealed.  See Chapter 2, § 2.3.6. 
17
 Opinion of Advocate General Alber in Case C-423/97 Travel Vac, para. 7. 
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contract and whether it fell within the scope of the Directive.18  In his Opinion, Advocate 
General Alber drew attention to the differences between the directives: the Timeshare 
Directive intended to protect a consumer who purchased rights to use immovable 
properties on a timeshare basis, whereas the Doorstep Selling Directive afforded 
protection to a consumer “not primarily because he purchases certain goods but because 
of the way in which the goods are purchased or the contract concluded.”19  He also 
underlined that the two Directives laid down different time periods in which the 
consumer could renounce the contract:  the Doorstep Selling Directive provided for a 
period of at least seven days, whereas the Timeshare Directive allows ten days.20  
Importantly, neither Directive expressly stated whether it applied to contracts covered by 
the other.21  This brought him to the concept of a timeshare contract.  The Advocate 
General recognised that a so-called “timeshare contract” was not a contract whose 
features could be clearly defined and that the interpretation and the form of such a 
contract differed widely among the Member States.22  As a consequence, the relevant 
features of the timeshare contract concerned must be examined in order to determine 
whether it fell within the scope of the Directive, regardless of whether it was described as 
a “timeshare contract” in the national proceedings.23  In line with the objectives of the 
Doorstep Selling Directive, the Advocate General found that contracts mainly concerning 
rights other than those relating to immovable property fell within its scope24, and thus,  
for the contract at hand, it had to be determined whether “the real property rights are of 
limited significance, both in terms of their content and having regard to the whole 
contract.”25 He answered this question in the affirmative, given that the major part of the 
contract comprised services and other contractual obligations.26 
 
In its judgment, the Court followed suit, but its judgment was startlingly short.  
Rather than delve into the concepts of a timeshare contract and immovable property, the 
Court implicitly adopted much of the Advocate General’s reasoning on the issue. It held 
that neither Directive ruled out the application of the other, and “since a contract like that 
at issue in the main proceedings does not only concern the right to use a time-share 
apartment, but also concerns the provision of separate services of a value higher than that 
of the right to use the property”, that contract was not excluded by the Doorstep Selling 
Directive.27 The Court’s ruling in Travel Vac left lingering issues in its wake, however.  
First, given that the period of transposition period for one of the Directives had not yet 
expired at the time of this case, the case did not address the situation where both the 
Doorstep Selling and the Timeshare Directives would be equally applicable.28 Indeed, 
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 See Case C-423/97 Travel Vac, paras 18-21. 
19
 Opinion of Advocate General Alber in Case C-423/97 Travel Vac, para. 21. 
20
 Id., para. 25. 
21
 Id., para. 26. 
22
 Id., paras 27, 29, 33. 
23
 Id., paras 27-28. 
24
 Id., para. 31. 
25
 Id., para. 35. 
26
 Id., paras 30, 36.   
27Case C-423/97 Travel Vac, paras 23, 25-26. 
28
 See EC Consumer Law Compendium – Comparative Analysis (H. Schulte-Nölke et al. eds.) (Version of 
Feb. 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/cons_acquis_en.htm#comp (hereinafter 
Consumer Law Compendium), at 207.  
Chapter 3:  The Role of the Court of Justice in European Contract Law 
 70 
Advocate General Alber’s remarks about the inconsistencies between the Directives 
begged questions as to how to reconcile the two Directives under such circumstances. For 
this reason, this case stood as a figurehead for criticism surrounding the incoherent nature 
of the Community contract acquis in Commission documents disseminated in the debate 
about European contract law.29  Moreover, Travel Vac made apparent the continuing 
divergences in the treatment of timeshare contracts among the laws of the Member States. 
The fact that the Timeshare Directive did not speak to the concept of a timeshare contract 
was revealing.  To recall, the Directive had expressly disavowed the harmonisation of the 
timeshare contract regimes of the Member States.30  As stressed in the Advocate 
General’s Opinion, this meant that no general rules could be laid down on the concept of 
a timeshare contract.  That said, the Court’s elaboration, albeit sparse, of the nature of a 
timeshare contract for the purposes of determining whether it was a contract related to 
immovable property did not go unnoticed31 and filtered into cases concerning the 
interpretation of other Community instruments.32 
 
In the parallel cases of Dietzinger33 and Berliner34, the Court was presented with a 
parallel situation involving the nature of a guarantee contract for the purposes of 
interpreting the Doorstep Selling Directive and the (old) Consumer Credit Directive.35  
Dietzinger, decided in 1998, concerned the relationship between a credit agreement 
involving a commercial loan given by a German bank to a business run by Mr. 
Dietzinger’s father, on the one hand, and a guarantee contract (also called a contract of 
suretyship36) concluded by Mr. Dietzinger with that bank at his parents’ home securing 
his parents’ obligations under that loan, on the other.37 Thereafter, Mr. Dietzinger 
attempted to cancel the guarantee contract on the grounds that he was not informed of his 
right of cancellation under the Doorstep Selling Directive. Consequently, by way of a 
preliminary reference request from the German Federal Court of Justice, the Court was 
presented with the question whether a guarantee contract fell within the scope of this 
Directive.38   
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 See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11.7.2001 (hereinafter 2001 Communication), point 35. 
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 See Chapter 2, § 2.3.6. See also Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-73/04 Klein and 
Others v. Rhodos Management Ltd. [2005] ECR I-8667, paras. 20-21. 
31
 See E. Ioratti, Case note, 9 European Review of Private Law 441, 444 (2001) (focusing on the time-share 
regimes in Italy and Spain). 
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 See Case C-73/04 Case C-73/04 Klein and Others v. Rhodos Management Ltd. [2005] ECR I-8667, paras 
21-22 (concerning the interpretation of Article 16(1)(a) of the Brussels Convention). 
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 Case C-45/96 Dietzinger [1998] ECR I-1199. 
34
 Case C-208/98 Berliner [2000] ECR I-1741. 
35
 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 Dec. 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, [1987] OJ L 42/48 (hereinafter 
Consumer Credit Directive).  It has recently been repealed:  see Chapter 2, § 2.3.3. 
36
 A guarantee may also be called contract of suretyship: see Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case 
C-45/96 Dietzinger [1998] ECR I-1199, para. 13.  The terminology itself begged for further elaboration and 
common understanding among the contract laws of the Member States:  see further infra note 174. 
37
 This was not the first time that issues concerning the interplay between guarantee contracts and the 
Doorstep Selling Directive was brought before the Court.  There had been a previous case, Case C-24/93 
Commerzbank Frankfurt, involving a similar factual scenario, but it was withdrawn before the Court was 
able to rule.  See Report on the operation of Directive 87/102/EEC, COM (95) 117, 11.5.1995, point 344.  
38
 Case C-45/96 Dietzinger, para. 11. 
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Noticeably, the very concept of “contract” was not defined anywhere in the 
Doorstep Selling Directive.39  Thus, the question whether a guarantee contract was a 
contract for the supply of goods or services concluded between a consumer and a trader 
in the “doorstep selling” context could not be answered by the explicit text of the 
Directive.  All four Member States (Germany, Belgium, France, and Finland) involved in 
the proceedings argued that a guarantee contract fell outside the Directive, since a 
guarantee contract was considered to be a unilateral undertaking on the part of the 
guarantor, as opposed to a bilateral or synallagmatic contract involving mutual and 
reciprocal obligations on the part of both parties, which was allegedly required by the 
Directive.40 In their view, the protection of guarantors was “a matter for national law 
alone”.41  By comparison, Mr. Dietzinger and the Commission advocated a broad reading 
of the Directive to include guarantee contracts on the grounds that just “[l]ike a 
purchaser, a guarantor undertakes to perform obligations and is even more in need of 
protection since he receives no consideration in exchange for his commitment.”42   
 
 In its judgment, the Court held that a guarantee contract could in principle fall 
within the scope of the Directive. It based its holding on several points, which forced it to 
elaborate the notion of a guarantee  contract.43  A guarantee contract was considered the 
provision of a service, as it was “merely ancillary to the principal contract, of which in 
practice it is usually a precondition”.44 Moreover, “nothing in the wording of the 
[D]irective requires that the person concluding the contract under which goods and 
services are to be supplied be the person to whom they are supplied”, meaning that the 
unilateral nature of the guarantee contract did not oust it from the Directive’s scope.45   
There was also a “close link” between a credit agreement and a guarantee contract and 
the fact that “the person guaranteeing repayment of a debt may either assume joint and 
several liability for payment of the debt or be the guarantor of its repayment”.46  
Importantly, however, the Court limited its holding according to the status of the parties 
involved. The Directive covered “only a guarantee ancillary to a contract whereby, in the 
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  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-45/96 Dietzinger, para. 11. 
40
 Case C-45/96 Dietzinger, para 14-15; compare Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-45/96 
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context of ‘doorstep selling’, a consumer assumes obligations towards a trader with a 
view to obtaining goods or services from him.”47 Moreover, since the Directive was 
designed to protect only consumers, a guarantee contract fell within its scope only where 
“the guarantor has entered into a commitment for a purpose which can be regarded as 
unconnected with his trade or professor”.48  Since the instant case involved a guarantee 
contract securing the performance of a credit agreement by a third party acting in a 
commercial capacity (as had been the case with Mr. Dietzinger’s parents), it fell outside 
the scope of the Directive.49   
 
Dietzinger received mixed opinion from scholars, some criticising the lack of 
protection given to the party concerned, whereas others praised the Court for not unduly 
expanding the limits of the Directive concerned.50  Overall, the Court’s judgment exposed 
a “protection gap” in the scope of the Doorstep Selling Directive as regards guarantees 
for business loans that were not covered, as opposed to guarantees for consumer loans 
that were, which was singled out as something to be remedied in the revision of this 
Directive several years later.51 This case also exposed inconsistencies in the language 
versions regarding the treatment of contracts falling under the scope of the Doorstep  
Directive, whereby certain kinds of guarantee contracts fell easily within the scope of the 
Directive according to some language versions, but not others.52 
 
 Thereafter, Berliner53, decided in 2000, presented the Court with a startlingly 
similar question to Dietzinger, only this time in connection with the (old) Consumer 
Credit Directive. The case involved a loan contract granted by a commercial undertaking, 
Berliner, to a third party, Mr. Diesterbeck, which was secured by a guarantee contract 
entered into by Mr. Siepert.54  Pursuant to the German legislation implementing the 
Consumer Credit Directive, both Mr. Diesterbeck and Mr. Siepert were considered 
consumers.55 Mr. Siepert had not been informed of his right of cancellation and thereafter 
sought to exercise this right in reliance on this Directive. Like the Doorstep Selling 
Directive, the Consumer Credit Directive did not contain an explicit provision either 
including or excluding guarantee contracts from its scope.  Hence the key issue was 
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whether a guarantee contract could be considered a consumer credit agreement under the 
Consumer Credit Directive.56  In essence, the Court was being asked whether the 
Consumer Credit Directive should be interpreted in the same way as the Doorstep Selling 
Directive.57 
 
Not surprisingly, many of the parties’ arguments resembled those made in 
Dietzinger.  In particular, the same three Member States (Germany, Belgium, and 
Finland) submitted that the Consumer Credit Directive could not apply to guarantee 
contracts because they were not credit agreements, i.e., bilateral or synallagmatic 
contracts, but rather unilateral undertakings guaranteeing the repayment of credit.58  
France switched sides, however, joining Spain, the Commission, and Mr. Siepert in 
arguing that due to the “close link” between the guarantee contract and the credit 
agreement, the former could be covered by the Directive.59 The Commission added that it 
was “an unintentional oversight” that the Directive was silent as to the matter of 
guarantee contracts.60   
 
The Court held that the Consumer Credit Directive did not apply to a guarantee 
contract where both the guarantor and borrower were acting as consumers.61 Leaving 
aside Advocate General Léger’s slightly caustic remark concerning the Court’s dubious 
reasoning on certain points in Dietzinger62, the Court’s judgment was largely a condensed 
version of the Advocate General’s Opinion.  Both approached the matter from the 
classical modes of interpretation by looking to the text, scheme, and purpose of the 
Directive. This made the Advocate General’s more strenuous engagement with contract 
law concepts stand out.  First, as regards the text of the Directive, the Court quickly 
dispensed with the matter by reiterating the definition of credit agreement in the 
Consumer Credit Directive and then stating that it was “common ground that a contract 
of guarantee is not a credit agreement” as defined in that Directive.63  By comparison, the 
Advocate General delved into the notion of a guarantee contract so as to distinguish the 
two: 
 
A guarantee constitutes a personal security. More precisely, what is con- 
cerned is an agreement by which a person makes a commitment to the 
creditor, in the form of a guarantee, to discharge the obligation of the  
principal debtor should the latter have failed to do so himself. Therefore  
a guarantee representsneither [sic] a ‘loan[’], nor ‘a deferred payment[’],  
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nor ‘other similar financial accommodation[‘] within the meaning of the 
Directive. Furthermore, in so far as the guarantee commitment does not  
entail any quid pro quo on the part of the creditor or the principal debtor,  
the guarantee also constitutes a unilateral contract.64 
 
In his view, the Consumer Credit Directive contained a series of provisions that indicated 
that its scope was strictly limited to bilateral or synallagmatic contracts.65  As such, the 
Dietzinger judgment, in which the unilateral nature of a guarantee contract did not 
preclude its applicability to the Doorstep Selling Directive, could not be transposed to the 
instant case.66  
 
Second, as far as the scheme of the Directive was concerned, both the Court’s and 
the Advocate General’s reasoning were grounded in the Community legislator’s intent.  
For the Court, although the Annex to the Directive mentioned the existence of a security 
in the credit agreement, it could not be inferred in the absence of an explicit provision 
that the Directive also governed the legal situation created by the guarantee contract.67  
Likewise, the Advocate General noted that the Directive contained various references to 
both real securities and personal securities, which demonstrated that the Community 
legislator was aware of the fact that credit agreements were frequently subject to the 
condition that the consumer obtain a guarantee, but the fact that the Directive did not 
contain any provisions on the status or the treatment of guarantees meant that the 
Community legislator intended to exclude guarantee contracts.68  
 
 Finally, as regards the purpose of the Directive, the Court again focused on 
legislative intent.  Given that the Directive recognised a guarantee as part of the credit 
agreement from the borrower’s perspective but stayed silent as to the legal implications 
demonstrated the European legislator’s intention to exclude guarantee contracts from its 
scope.69  This led the Court to contrast the two Directives:  for the Doorstep Selling 
Directive, the sole restriction that it placed on the types of contracts falling within its 
scope was that they must concern the supply of goods or services, provided that the 
purposes pursued by the consumer is to be regarded as his trade or profession70, whereas 
the Consumer Credit Directive was almost entirely concerned with the information given 
to the principal debtor, not with safeguarding the guarantor, and thus was not designed to 
apply to guarantee contracts.71  And while not explicitly citing Dietzinger, the Court 
hastened to add that the scope of the Consumer Credit Directive could not extend to 
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guarantee contracts “solely on the ground that such agreements are ancillary to the 
principal agreement whose performance they underwrite”, since there was no support for 
such an interpretation in the wording, scheme, and purpose of the Directive.72  The 
Advocate General reached similar conclusions, finding that Consumer Credit Directive 
was focused on protecting the recipients of credit, not guarantors, and although 
guarantors may be in a “weak position” comparable to that of the borrower in a credit 
agreement, protection for borrowers under the Directive was of a different nature than 
that for guarantors.73  
 
As a result, taking Dietzinger and Berliner together, a guarantee contract that 
would have fallen within the scope of the Doorstep Selling Directive did not fall within 
the scope of the Consumer Credit Directive.   Framed another way, the two cases brought 
to the fore the different nature of directives within the acquis, i.e., those pertaining to 
certain types of contracts and others pertaining to selling methods, whose interpretation 
would lead to different outcomes. 
 
3.2.2 Relationship between Community contract law and the national contract law 
regimes - Océano Grupo, Freiburger, Mostaza Claro, and Pannon 
 
 The second set of cases concerns the Court’s interpretation of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive.74 To recall from the previous chapter, the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive was one of the most far-reaching directives in the Community contract law 
acquis.75  By setting forth a set of common rules concerning the regulation of unfair 
terms in consumer contracts, it had a significant impact on the contract law regimes of the 
Member States.76   The heart of the Directive concerned the assessment of the unfairness 
of particular terms in consumer contracts, thereby including certain concepts that were 
unknown or defined differently in the Member States, particularly that of “good faith”, 
which appeared as part of the definition for deeming a particular term unfair.77  In the 
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aftermath of implementing this Directive, the extent of divergences between the Member 
States as to the evaluation of unfair terms was widely discussed in the commentary.78 
Consequently, the case law on the interpretation of this Directive was watched with bated 
breath, particularly as to the extent to which the Court would formulate uniform notions 
of unfairness and good faith, which would bring clarity and uniformity to this area. 
 
On the whole, much of the Court’s case law on this Directive has been concerned 
with the duty placed on national courts to examine of their own motion (or ex officio) 
whether a particular term in a consumer contract is unfair in accordance with its 
provisions.  Hence the judgments in Océano Grupo79, Cofidis80, Mostaza Claro81, 
Pannon82, and Asturcom83, as well as those to come84, are focused to a large extent on 
procedural matters relating to the interplay between so-called “national procedural 
autonomy” and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.85  At the same time, 
however, most of these cases – i.e., Océano Grupo, Mostaza Claro, and Pannon, as well 
as Freiburger86 spliced in between – directly confronted the Court with the assessment of 
unfair terms pursuant to this Directive and thus provided reflection on the relationship 
between this Directive and the national contract law regimes. 
 
The five joined cases grouped under the heading of Océano Grupo87, decided in 
2000, constituted the Court’s first opportunity to interpret provisions of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive.88  The cases stemmed from standard form contracts concluded 
between various consumers resident throughout Spain and two Spanish companies 
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concerning the sale of home encyclopedias. The contracts contained a clause stipulating 
that the courts in Barcelona, where the companies had their principal place of business, 
would have exclusive jurisdiction in the event of a dispute arising out of such contracts.89  
Thereafter, in the context of litigation brought against these consumers by the companies 
for unpaid amounts due under the contract, one such Barcelona court submitted a request 
to the Court for a preliminary ruling as to whether the Directive required it to examine the 
unfairness of a term of its own motion, which would have the result that it would be able 
to decline jurisdiction in the case.90 
 
In its answer to the referring court, the Court found that the term at issue in the 
underlying national proceedings satisfied all of the criteria enabling it to be classified as 
unfair under the Directive.91 The Court explained that a term of this kind obliged the 
consumer to travel far from home for the purposes of litigation, and especially for cases 
involving small amounts of money, the resulting costs could cause the consumer to 
forego any legal remedy or defence, thereby recognising that it fell squarely within the 
category of terms listed in the Annex to the Directive that have the effect of excluding or 
hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action.92  In contrast, such a term made it 
easier for the company to deal with litigation and enter an appearance in such matters.93 
Consequently, the Court concluded that where a jurisdiction clause like the one at issue is 
included in a consumer contract, it must be regarded as unfair for the purposes of the 
Directive.94   
 
Thereafter, in Freiburger95, decided in 2004, the Court refined its approach taken 
in Océano Grupo.  This case concerned the alleged unfairness of a particular term in a 
consumer contract between a German couple, Mr. and Mrs. Hofstetter, and Freiburger, a 
German construction company, for the sale of a parking space in a multi-story car park.96  
The term stipulated that the total purchase price for the parking space would be due upon 
the delivery of a bank guarantee by the contractor, and in the event of late payment of this 
amount, the purchaser would be required to pay default interest.97  The bank guarantee 
was duly delivered to the Hofstetters, but they refused to pay the purchase price until 
after they had accepted the parking space free of defects.98 As a result, Freiburger brought 
an action to enforce the contract99, and it was in this context that the German Federal 
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Court of Justice made a reference as to whether such a clause was unfair under the 
Directive.100 
 
Advocate General Geelhoed issued a short but biting Opinion in the case, 
stressing the limits of the Court’s “interpretational function” in relation to the assessment 
of potentially unfair terms under the Directive: 
 
[T]here are reasons for setting strict limits to this interpretational task,  
given that the Directive allows the Member States a wide margin of  
discretion in deciding what terms they consider unfair within their  
respective national legal spheres. To construe this interpretational  
task broadly would significantly affect this discretion, which . . .  was  
expressly not the intention of the Community legislature.  In short, it is  
primarily for the national court to decide whether a clause which is the  
subject of proceedings before it is to be treated as being unfair.101 
 
He also stressed that that there was no need for the Court to ensure the uniform 
application of Community law under these circumstances:  “The terms in question are 
relevant only in private-law relations which are to a significant extent still governed by 
national law, under which the same type of terms may even have different legal effects in 
different national legal systems.”102 Advocate General Geelhoed’s remarks seem to have 
infiltrated the Court’s judgment to some extent. 
 
The Court ruled that as to the question whether a particular term is, or is not, 
unfair, the Directive requires that the answer should be reached taking into account the 
nature of the goods or services for which the contract is concluded and by referring to, at 
the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of 
the contract.103 It then added: “It should be pointed out in that respect that the 
consequences of the term under the law applicable to the contract must also be taken into 
account. This requires that consideration be given to the national law.”104 The 
aforementioned language in what is now infamous paragraph 21 of the judgment was the 
Court’s creation; it did not appear in the text of the Directive itself.105 On this basis, citing 
relevant paragraphs of the Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court underlined that it was 
only able to interpret the general criteria used by the European legislator to define the 
concept of unfair terms, and that it could not rule on the application of those general 
criteria to a particular term, “which must be considered in the light of the particular 
circumstances of the case in question”.106  As far as its previous ruling in Océano Grupo 
was concerned, the Court distinguished the case as follows: 
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 [T]hat assessment was reached in relation to a term which was solely to the 
 benefit of the seller and contained no benefit in return for the consumer. 
 Whatever the nature of the contract, it thereby undermined the effectiveness 
 of the legal protection of the rights which the Directive affords to the  
 consumer. It was thus possible to hold that the term was unfair without  
 having to consider all the circumstances in which the contract was  
concluded and without having to assess the advantages and disadvantages  
that that term would have under the national law applicable to the contract.107 
 
In contrast, that did not apply to the term involved in Freiburger.108 The Court concluded 
that it was left to the national court to decide whether the term was unfair in accordance 
with the Directive.109  
 
In subsequent rulings, the Court has continued to underscore its holding in 
Freiburger.  In Mostaza Claro110, decided in 2006, the Court prefaced its judgment with 
a reference to the case, so as to reiterate that it was for the national court alone to decide 
whether a particular term was unfair under the Directive.111  Advocate General Tizzano 
went a bit further in his Opinion, not just underlining the significance of Freiburger, but 
also declaring that Océano Grupo constitutes “a precedent that is most exceptional and is 
therefore not generally applicable”, since in the majority of cases it will not be clear 
whether a term is unfair and therefore will be for the national courts to decide.112    
 
Recently, the Pannon case113 presented the opportunity for the Court to revisit its  
approach to the assessment of unfair terms in a case that bore remarkable resemblance to 
Océano Grupo.  By way of a preliminary reference request from a Hungarian court, the 
case concerned the alleged unfairness of a particular term included in a standard form 
contract for mobile telephone services between a consumer and Pannon, a commercial 
trader.114 In a flashback to Océano Grupo, the term at issue required the consumer to 
accept the jurisdiction of the court located in the place where Pannon had its principal 
place of business for any dispute arising under the contract.115  Among the questions 
referred116, the national court sought guidance from the Court on the factors that it must 
consider in assessing the unfairness of a particular term under the Directive.117   
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In response, the Court disposed of this issue in eight paragraphs.118 After 
reiterating its previous decisions in Freiburger and Océano Grupo119, the Court pulled 
the two together by declaring that while it was true that in exercising its preliminary 
ruling  jurisdiction in the latter case, it interpreted the general criteria used by the 
Community legislator in order to define the concept of unfair terms, in accordance with 
the former case, it could not rule on the application of those general criteria to specific 
terms, which must be considered in the light of the particular circumstances of the 
underlying proceedings.120 Thus, it was for the national court to assess whether a 
contractual term may be regarded as unfair within the meaning of the Directive.121  Yet, 
in so doing, the Court stated that the national court must take into account that a term like 
the one in the instant case may be considered to be unfair.122   
 
Notably, the Court’s judgment in Pannon did not involve the submission of an 
Advocate General’s Opinion, which under the relevant rules of procedure is allowed for 
cases raising “no new points of law”.123  The fact that the Court decided the case without 
the procedural entourage of an Advocate General’s Opinion suggested that the Court was 
not using this case to signal a major departure from its approach to the assessment of 
unfair terms. This is important for analysing the significance of what the Court, 
inadvertently or not, left out.  While the Court paid heed to previous findings made in 
Freiburger, there was no reference to the language of infamous paragraph 21, placing 
emphasis on the national contract law surroundings.124  It is not clear whether this 
omission was purposeful, but on balance, this seems to be more the result of the 
particular circumstances of the case concerned.   Given Pannon’s striking resemblance to 
Océano Grupo, where the Court had declared the particular term unfair, this was a case in 
which taking account of the particular national contractual context was not going to loom 
that large. In this way, the Court’s judgment in Pannon staked out a middle ground.  
While the Court was careful not to overstep its bounds as dictated by Freiburger, it 
sought to nudge the national court towards the outcome in Océano Grupo so as to give it 
a “helping hand” in the assessment of the term at issue in the national proceedings.  In 
other words, Pannon was a nice blending of the two cases.   
 
 By and large, the Court’s jurisprudence on the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
produced something of a letdown in the literature as far as the Court’s contribution for 
furthering the harmonisation of national contract laws set in play by this Directive was 
concerned.  Freiburger was a particular source of disappointment in light of the Court’s 
emphasis on national law in paragraph 21, which was considered to further, not foreclose, 
the divergent approaches of the Member States in relation to the assessment of unfair 
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terms and thus to preclude the development of harmonised concepts.125  Mostaza Claro 
also beckoned similar remarks.126 The result of Freiburger and progeny is that the 
assessment of the unfairness of the relevant terms will maintain the national flavor of the 
Member State where such assessment takes place, as opposed to being framed under 
European concepts that could be applied substantially the same way throughout the 
European Union. 
 
Yet, one wonders whether this criticism of the Court’s case law misses the larger 
point.  Early on, in its 2000 Report on the implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, the Commission recognised the close relationship between the control of unfair 
terms and the surrounding national contract laws, much of which was not harmonised by 
the Directive and raised a number of problems, which provoked the question of a more 
comprehensive approximation of national contract law and other fields of private law.127  
To recall, the scheme set forth in the Directive had already placed considerable emphasis 
on the unfairness assessment taking place against the background of national contract 
law.128 Thus, with or without the Court’s “overindulgence” in Freiburger in emphasising 
national law, the Court’s jurisprudence on this Directive could not make up for the 
European legislator’s limited approach or overcome the continuing divergences among 
the national contract law regimes, which have been displayed through the steady stream 
of cases presented to it.  
 
Taken together, the two sets of cases discussed above demonstrate that the 
Court’s interpretative role takes a “backseat” to that of the European legislator in terms of 
what has, or has not, been achieved by the decision-making process.  These cases provide 
apt illustrations of the inconsistencies and the lacunae in the various directives 
comprising Community contract law, on the one hand, and the ongoing divergences in 
national contract laws, on the other, both of which the Court itself is unable to remedy.  
Thus, while an important feature (and criticism) of the Court’s interpretative role has 
been its unwillingness to interpret the various directives by analogy and thus to stay close 
to the text of the particular directive concerned at the expense of providing a more 
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coherent framework129, the foregoing cases find the Court walking a “fine line” of 
adjudicating the cases before it whilst careful not to encroach on the competences of the 
European legislator and of the Member States in terms of discerning what areas that the 
European legislator intended, or not, to place within the scope of the directive concerned 
and a fortiori what areas remain outside for the Member States.  In this way, the Court’s 
interpretative role beckons further reflection as to the need for a more comprehensive 
legislative response to the problems of the Community contract law acquis.  
 
3.3 The Court of Justice’s Lawmaking Role 
      Alongside the interpretation of various provisions of Community contract law 
stands another way in which the Court of Justice contributes to the development of 
European contract law. This is the Court’s lawmaking role by virtue of its formulation of 
Community and Union judge-made rules of contract law falling under the rubric of what 
is called European “federal common law”. Although references to judicial lawmaking by 
the Court of Justice have crept into the literature over the years, it has only been recently 
that European “federal common law” has started to garner detailed attention in the 
literature.130  Not surprisingly, the prospect of the Court’s formulation of judge-made 
rules of law commands particular sensitivity in the European setting, especially in 
Member States where it is considered that the judicial task does not in principle include 
making law at all but is strictly confined to interpretation. Moreover, the use of the term, 
European “federal common law”, itself should not be read as implying that the European 
Union embodies a “federal” construct or a “common law” system akin to the United 
States in which the doctrine of American “federal common law” originated.  Thus, to be 
clear, European “federal common law” denotes a special term of art modelled after the 
American setting because of its particular embodiment of the formulation of judge-made 
rules of law at the European level.  Indeed, as with American “federal common law”131, 
European “federal common law” is equally entangled in the debate about the 
approximation of contract law and other fields of private law.  
 
Generally speaking, the analysis of the emergence and the development of 
European “federal common law” in the European Union is an extensive undertaking, 
much like that of American “federal common law” in the United States.  As discussed 
elsewhere, there is an overarching framework governing the Court of Justice’s 
formulation of European “federal common law”, the examination of which far exceeds 
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the scope of this study.132  Therefore, this discussion concentrates on the following two 
points:  first, the definition of European “federal common law” and its so-called “hard 
core”; and second, certain illustrations of European “federal common law” in the field of 
contract, with particular regard to measures falling within the “hard core” of the 
Community contract law acquis.  This is because these two points provide the template 
for evaluating the Court’s lawmaking role in European contract law. 
 
3.3.1 Definition of European “federal common law” and its “hard core” 
European “federal common law” can be defined as “Union and Community 
concepts, principles and rules of decision formulated by the Court of Justice that are not 
clearly suggested from the face of a provision of primary or secondary Community 
law.”133  Three important points follow from this definition.  First, this definition is a 
functional one.  It essentially envisions European “federal common law” as “gap-filling 
sensu lato”, meaning that it transcends the mere filling-in of missing terms and concepts 
in a provision of Union or Community legislation, and in fact embodies the notion of 
filling all gaps that may be considered to preclude the achievement of the objectives of 
the Union legal order.134 Thus, it is not merely limited to filling in a missing term in a 
Community measure with an autonomous Community or Union concept, but extends to 
the formulation of rules, as in the case of contract law, and even broader principles, such 
as the principle of State liability essential to the Union legal order. 
 
     Second, the distinction between judicial interpretation and judicial lawmaking is 
quite difficult to discern in the context of European “federal common law”. This can be 
explained by the fact that the Court’s lawmaking role often takes place within the context 
of its preliminary ruling jurisdiction. This demonstrates that judicial interpretation and 
judicial lawmaking are very much interrelated in the European Union, since it is often 
through the Court’s interpretation of a provision of Community law that the need for 
judicial lawmaking arises.135  This has particular resonance in the field of contract law, 
where the Court has been confronted with the prospect of formulating European “federal 
common law” in the context of its interpretation of various Community contract law 
measures as demonstrated below.   
 
Third, this definition brings to light what can be called the “hard core” of 
European “federal common law”, which especially arises in matters of private law, 
including contract law.136 This denotes the fact that European “federal common law” 
includes judge-made rules fashioned by the Court of Justice for which the Community (or 
the Union) has not yet received legislative competence, either explicitly or implicitly, 
under the Treaties.137 To explain, in the process of deciding a case, the Court is 
confronted with a term, a concept, or a rule derived from the Treaties or a particular 
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Community measure, e.g., what is a “contract” or what is “damage”, for which the 
European legislator has not yet been given competence under the Treaties. Yet, in order 
to make the objectives and choices under the relevant provision of the Treaty or the duly-
adopted Community measure work for the fields in which the European legislator has 
been given competence to act, say as regards the internal market, the Court is 
nevertheless faced with the prospect of formulating European “federal common law”.  
Illustrations of the “hard core” of European “federal common law” can be found in the 
field of contract law. 
 
3.3.2 Illustrations of European “federal common law” in contract law 
Leitner138, delivered in 2002, is one of the most well-known examples of 
European “federal common law” because it intensified criticism about the Court’s 
lawmaking role in the field of contract law.  The case involved a preliminary reference 
from an Austrian court concerning the interpretation of Article 5 of the Package Travel 
Directive139, which laid down certain rules concerning the liability of the package 
organiser and/or retailer for “damage resulting for the consumer from the failure to 
perform or the improper performance of the contract.”140  Specifically, the fourth 
subparagraph of Article 5(2) provided in relevant part:  “In the matter of damage other 
than personal injury resulting from the non-performance or improper performance of the 
services involved in the package, the Member States may allow compensation to be 
limited under the contract.”141  However, the term, “damage” was left undefined in the 
Directive. 
 
Thereafter, a dispute arose in the Austrian courts between Ms. Leitner and TUI 
Deutschland, a package travel organiser, arising out of a two-week package club holiday 
booked by her parents through an Austrian travel agent.142 Ms. Leitner contracted 
salmonella poisoning from the food served by the club responsible for her package 
holiday eight days after her arrival, which caused her to be violently ill and to require her 
parents’ care for the remaining six days of the vacation.143 Ms. Leitner brought an action 
for damages against TUI Deutschland, claiming recovery for material damages (i.e., 
physical pain and suffering caused by the food poisoning) and for non-material damages 
to compensate her for the loss of the enjoyment of her package holiday.144 The Austrian 
first instance court awarded Ms. Leitner compensation for her material damages, but 
dismissed her claim for non-material damages.145 She appealed to case to the Austrian 
Landesgericht (Regional Court) of Linz, which requested a preliminary ruling from the 
Court as to whether the Directive covered non-material damage.146 Notably, as part of its 
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request, the Austrian court underscored the differences between Austrian contract law, 
which did not provide for such compensation, and the contract law regimes of other 
Member States, such as Germany, which did, thereby contemplating that this may 
preclude the achievement of the Directive’s objectives of eliminating obstacles to trade in 
the internal market and ensuring a uniform level of consumer protection in the European 
Union.147   
 
The case provoked serious disagreement among the parties involved. Three out of  
the four Member States that submitted written observations in the case (Austria, France, 
and Finland) argued, along with TUI Deutschland, that the existence of a right to 
compensation for non-material damage could not be found in the absence of an express 
reference thereto in the Package Travel Directive itself.148  Since the Directive prescribed 
“minimum harmonisation”, all that could be inferred from Article 5 was that the Member 
States have the right to provide for such compensation in their national legislation.149  In 
contrast, Belgium and the Commission advocated a wide interpretation of “damage” that 
would in principle include non-material damage.150  The Commission expressly noted 
that “liability for non-material damage is recognised in most Member States, over and 
above compensation for physical pain and suffering traditionally provided for in all legal 
systems, although the extent of that liability and the conditions under which it is incurred 
vary in detail”.151 
 
In a short judgment totaling six paragraphs, the Court held that Article 5(2) of the 
Directive included the right to compensation for non-material damage.152  It based its 
finding on the purpose and the text of the Directive.  On the basis of the second and third 
recitals, the purpose of the Directive was to eliminate disparities between national laws 
and practices concerning package holidays, which were liable to give rise to distortions of 
competition between operators in different Member States.153 Thus, “the existence in 
some Member States but not in others of an obligation to provide compensation for non-
material damage would cause significant distortions of competition”154.  As regards the 
text of the Directive, the Court reasoned that although Article 5 referred to the concept of 
“damage” in a general way, the fact that the fourth subparagraph of Article 5(2) provided 
that the Member States may, in the matter of “damage other than personal injury”, allow 
compensation to be limited under the contract meant that the Directive “implicitly 
recognises the existence of a right to compensation for damage other than personal injury, 
including non-material damage”.155 As a result, the Court’s judgment signified a 
Community concept of “damage” that effectively conferred on consumers the right to 
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compensation for non-material damage for the non-performance or improper 
performance of the services constituting a package holiday under the Directive156    
  
The Court’s judgment in Leitner should be read against the accompanying 
Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, which provided additional arguments supporting a 
wide view of damage on the basis of the Directive.  As part of his rationale157, the 
Advocate General elaborated a broad definition of “material damage” that included non-
material damages within its scope:  “material damage is damage to the person, in other 
words both physical and psychological damage, in the sense of the psychological stress 
suffered as a result of physical damage (pretium doloris, Schmerzengeld).”158  Though in 
doing so, he prefaced this with acknowledgment of “the caution required in a matter 
which, even at the terminological level, is marked by a notable inconsistency between – 
and even within – different legal authorities”.159  In fact, Advocate General Tizzano’s 
Opinion in Leitner is one of the few Opinions to date that explicitly referred to one of the 
Commission’s Communications on European contract law160 in the context of 
highlighting the Member States’ divergent approaches to the concept of “damage”, which 
bolstered the “demand for the Community to intervene in this field in response to the 
discrepancies, if not the flagrant inequalities, resulting from what has been referred to as 
real assessment chaos”.161  He also compared the Package Travel Directive to the 
Defective Products Directive162, spurred by arguments of the Austrian and French 
Governments to read the two Directives synonymously by virtue of the fact that the latter 
Directive had explicitly left it to the Member States to regulate aspects of civil liability in 
relation to non-material damage caused by defective products.163 This led the Advocate 
General to draw out the various differences between the two Directives, concluding that 
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no analogies could be drawn in this regard, since they were adopted at different times, 
regulated different types of liability, and their different wording was “anything but 
accidental”.164  
 
The Court’s judgment in Leitner was the subject of mixed opinion by scholars.  
Among others, one commentator argued that the competence to “fill in the blanks” in 
Community directives lay with the Member States, not the Court of Justice.165  By 
comparison, others pointed out that the judgment was in line with most Member States’ 
general contract law regimes166, and that it could “turn out to be an important signpost for 
the future development of European contract law”.167  It is rarely mentioned in the 
commentary that the differences in national laws as regards non-material damage had in 
fact been raised in the decision-making process concerning the Package Travel Directive 
but never found its way into the final text, thereby prompting calls for the harmonisation 
of this matter at the European level.168  As such, the case may have inflamed fears of the 
Court’s perceived encroachment on the competences of the European legislator and of the 
Member States in terms of what had, or had not, been set down in the measure concerned.  
Yet, in light of the failure of the European legislator to provide a definition of “damage” 
in the Package Travel Directive, it fell upon the Court of Justice to elaborate this concept 
in line with its mandate under the Treaty to assist the national court in the adjudication of 
the case at hand and to secure the uniform application of Community law, which given 
the variation among the national laws in the area of contract law concerned as highlighted 
by the Advocate General and the national court was in some peril.   
 
 Hamilton169 provides a comparable illustration of the Court’s lawmaking role in 
contract law. This case followed in the footsteps of the Court’s previous rulings in 
Heininger170, Schulte171, and Crailsheimer Volksbank172 concerning the Court’s 
interpretation of the Doorstep Selling Directive.173  These three cases concerned a set of 
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interrelated transactions involving a contract for the purchase of immovable property, on 
the one hand, and a secured credit agreement financing the purchase of the property, on 
the other, within the German legal setting.174 By way of background, Heininger175 
concerned the issue whether the Doorstep Selling Directive was applicable to a secured 
credit agreement despite the explicit exclusion of contracts for the sale of immovable 
property from its scope, which the Court held that it was.176 One of the most well-known 
aspects of the case was the Court’s ruling that the consumer’s right of cancellation under 
the Directive did not start until notice of that right had been given to the consumer, with 
the result that German legislation imposing a one-year limitation period on the right of 
cancellation from the conclusion of the contract was precluded by the Directive.177   
 
A few years later, the issues raised in Heininger were revisited in the companion 
cases of Schulte178 (delivered by the Grand Chamber) and Crailsheimer Volksbank179 
(delivered by the Second Chamber) decided on the same day.180 The two cases revolved 
around three interrelated issues.  The first issue concerned the effects of the cancellation 
of the secured credit agreement on the contract for the purchase of immovable property, 
i.e., whether the purchase contract could “piggyback” on the secured credit agreement so 
as to fall within the scope of the Doorstep Selling Directive and thus evade the exclusion 
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of contracts for the sale of immovable property.  In response, the Court held that it could 
not.181 The second issue implicated the effects of the cancellation of the secured credit 
agreement, the question being whether German legislation requiring consumers to repay 
the amount of the loan immediately and with interest deterred them from exercising their 
right of cancellation and was therefore precluded by the Directive.  The Court held that it 
was not.182  The third issue pertained to the effects of the German bank’s failure to inform 
the consumer of the right of cancellation of the secured credit agreement.183 Recognising 
that this had resulted in financial risks for the consumers in the underlying national 
proceedings184, the Court sought refuge in the third indent of Article 4 of the Directive185 
declaring that the Member States were required to ensure that their legislation protects 
consumers who had been unable to avoid exposure to such risks by adopting measures 
allowing them “to avoid bearing the consequences of the materialisation of those 
risks”.186  
 
This paved the way for Hamilton.187 At issue was whether German legislation 
providing that the consumer’s right of cancellation expired one month after both parties 
had fully performed their obligations under the contract was precluded by the Doorstep 
Selling Directive.188 The Court ruled that the German legislation was an “appropriate 
consumer protection measure” within the third indent of Article 4 of the Directive.189 In 
doing so, the Court examined various provisions of the Directive, which included Article 
5 governing the exercise of the right of cancellation.  Under Article 5(1), which provided 
in relevant part that, “[t]he consumer shall have the right to renounce the effects of his 
undertaking”, the Court interpreted “undertaking” as meaning that the right of 
cancellation can be exercised “as long as the consumer is not bound, at the time that the 
right is exercised, by any undertaking under the cancelled contract”.190  The Court then 
explained:  “That logic flows from one of the general principles of civil law, namely that 
the full performance of a contract results, as a general rule, from discharge of the mutual 
obligations under the contract or from termination of that contract”.191 Then, looking to 
Article 5(2) of the Directive, which provided that exercising the right of cancellation 
released the consumer from “any obligations under the cancelled contract”, the Court 
inferred that the reference to “obligation” presupposed that the consumer has exercised 
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his right of cancellation in relation to a contract that was in the process of being 
performed, whereas after the full performance of the contract, there was no further 
obligation.”192  This allowed the Court to distinguish the instant case from its previous 
rulings in Heininger, Schulte, and Crailsheimer Volksbank, which concerned credit 
agreements that had not been fully performed.193   
 
The Court’s reference to the “general principles of civil law” must be read 
alongside the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, which fleshed out this issue 
in greater detail.   The Advocate General surmised that there were good arguments  to 
find that a Member State was entitled, in the exercise of the discretion accorded under the 
third paragraph of Article 4 of the Directive, to fix a time-limit during which the right of 
cancellation may be validly exercised.194 He considered that the placing of such a time 
limit was “a principle common to the laws of the Member States”195, which he supported 
with reference to comparative European contract law materials disseminated by several 
academic groups.196  He also surmised that the principle “might well ultimately appear at 
Community level in the context of the creation of a common frame of reference for 
European contract law”, citing recent Commission documents on European contract 
law.197  On that basis, he argued that “the existence of a general principle of limitation 
should therefore be recognised, while leaving the Member States the necessary discretion 
to implement it in their respective legal systems”.198  The Advocate General bolstered this 
argument with a comparison of other directives within the “hard core” of the Community 
contract law acquis, which in his view suggested the existence of a principle common the 
laws of the Member States and also found at Community level on the fixing of such a 
time limit.199 Noticeably, the Court did not pay heed to the European comparative 
contract law materials or examine other directives within the Community contract law 
acquis as the Advocate General had done.  Nevertheless, Hamilton heralded the Court’s 
recognition of “general principles of civil law” on which the Court elaborated rules of 
contract law.   
 
 In sum, both Leitner and Hamilton illuminate several themes underpinning the 
Court’s lawmaking role in European contract law, which bear considerable resonance 
with the Court’s interpretative role in this setting.  First, they constitute examples of the 
“hard core” of European “federal common law” and the tensions that it engenders. As 
illustrated by the foregoing cases, the Court was faced with the formulation of judge-
made rules of contract law, which in principle the Community has not yet been given 
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explicit or implicit competence under the Treaties, in the context of deciding a case 
concerning duly-adopted Community contract law measures for which the Community 
has been given the requisite competence to adopt under the Treaty.  In these cases, the 
European legislator’s competence to adopt the relevant directives pursuant to its internal 
market competences under Article 95 EC was not in dispute.  As a consequence, these 
cases find the Court formulating European “federal common law” so as to enable such 
measures to work in the relevant field. Yet, in doing so, the Court’s lawmaking role is 
nevertheless feared to trespass on the competences of the European legislator and of the 
Member States in terms of what has not (yet) been decided upon in the decision-making 
process and hence in principle left to the Member States in the area concerned.200 In this 
way, the Court’s lawmaking role augments the controversy surrounding the limits of both 
judicial and legislative competence in the field of contract law, which strikes at the heart 
of the debate about European contract law. 
 
 Second, it is not coincidental that in both Leitner and Hamilton, the Opinions of 
the Advocates General referred to, among other things, the Commission’s 
Communications on European contract law and other activities taking place as part of the 
debate about European contract law.  Indeed, the very nature of European “federal 
common law” brings to the fore differing approaches to matters of contract law among 
the Member States, as illustrated by Leitner, and the need to situate the Community 
contract law rules  against the background of the overarching national contract law 
regimes, as illustrated by Hamilton, which in turn beckons the need for a more 
comprehensive and cohesive response at the European level.  The Leitner case is an 
especially well-fitting example, since it subsequently appeared in the Commission’s 2003 
Action Plan on European contract law in order to illustrate both the inconsistencies in the 
treatment of the concept of “damage” among the various directives and the threat of 
fragmentation of national contract law legislation as a result of the Court’s interpretation 
of “damage” solely in light of the Directive concerned.201  In this way, the Court’s 
lawmaking role takes part in the overall momentum concerning the need for greater 
approximation of contract law in which the debate about European contract law is 
incased.   
 
3.4 Recourse to European contract law materials by the Advocates General 
At present, there has been increasing recourse made to comparative materials 
formulated by various academic groups involved with European contract law and other 
fields of  European private law in the Opinions of the Advocates General.202  For 
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example, references to the Principles of European Tort Law formulated by the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code and by the European Group on Tort Law were cited by 
one Advocate General as part of the analysis of an unjust enrichment claim brought 
against the Community.203  With particular regard to European contract law, there is a 
growing number of references to materials such as the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts204, the Principles of Law series disseminated by the 
Study Group on a European Civil Code205, and the Principles of European Contract Law 
(the PECL) authored by the Commission of European Contract Law, often referred to as 
the Lando Commission.206  In particular, the PECL is one of the most prevalent sources 
of comparative European contract law materials, which has started to appear in 
conjunction with references to the Draft Common Frame of Reference – Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law (the DCFR), one of the foremost 
activities taking place in the debate about European contract law207, in the Opinions of 
the Advocates General.208  Therefore, the discussion is divided into two parts so as, first, 
to provide some salient illustration of the ways in which comparative European contract 
law principles are put to use by the Advocates General, with particular regard to the 
PECL and the DCFR; and second, to assess the potential implications of the Advocates 
Generals’ recourse to these materials as part of the Court of Justice’s role in European 
contract law. 
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3.4.1 Illustrations:  Quelle, Ilsinger, and Messner 
Advocate General Trstenjak’s Opinion in Quelle209, delivered in 2007, was an 
early example of the use of the PECL in the context of the interpretation of the Consumer 
Sales Directive.210  This case was the first time that the Court was asked to interpret the 
Consumer Sales Directive in the context of the preliminary reference procedure.211 At 
issue was whether the Directive precluded a German rule providing that in cases 
involving the replacement of defective goods the seller can charge the consumer for his 
use of those goods.212   
 
In her Opinion, Advocate General Trstenjak explained that the issue boiled down 
to the expression “free of charge” in Article 3 of the Directive.213 She approached the 
matter from the classic modes of interpretation, looking to the text, the context, and the 
purpose of the Directive.214   Her reference to the PECL came within the discussion of the 
text of the Directive.  Article 3(2) of the Directive gives the consumer the right “to have 
the goods brought into conformity free of charge” either by repair or replacement.215  As 
between repair and replacement, the Advocate General stressed that the consumer must 
choose what is both possible and proportionate, thereby making reference to two 
provisions of the PECL to support her point:  Article 9:102(1) stating that the aggrieved 
party is entitled to the remedying of a defective performance; and Article 9:102(2)(a) 
stipulating that the specific performance cannot be obtained where it would be unlawful, 
impossible or cause the debtor unreasonable effort or expense.216  She went on to 
conclude that based on the “normal meaning” of the expression “free of charge”, the 
German law was precluded by the Directive.217  Although this already indicated the 
answer to the referring court’s question, the Advocate General found that the context and 
the purpose of the Directive strengthened this conclusion.218  In this way, the Advocate 
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General’s reliance on the PECL was helpful for bolstering her assessment of the issue 
concerned and for providing a context for the interpretation of the Directive concerned. 
 
In its judgment, the Court followed the Advocate General’s approach by looking 
to the text, context, and purpose of the Directive and held that the German rule was 
precluded by the Directive.219  It emphasised that the text and the travaux préparatoires 
indicated that the European legislator intended to make “free of charge” an essential 
element of the protection afforded to consumers under the Directive, and this meant that 
the seller could not make any financial claim in connection with bringing the defective 
goods in conformity.220 Yet, the Court made no reference to the PECL in its judgment.  
 
In 2008, Advocate General Trstenjak submitted her Opinion in Ilsinger.221   By 
way of a preliminary reference request from an Austrian court, this case pertained to the 
interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation.222 In particular, one of the questions 
concerned whether, for the purposes of the national court’s jurisdiction, the consumer’s 
claim should be deemed a right related to a contract under circumstances where the 
entitlement of the prize was not made conditional on the ordering of any goods.223  This 
brought into play the issue as to what was considered the conclusion of a consumer 
contract for the purposes of interpreting certain provisions of the Brussels I Regulation.   
Advocate General Trstenjak began by recognising that the Brussels I Regulation did not 
define when a consumer contract was concluded and that there were no binding rules at 
Community level determinative of the matter.224  Nevertheless, she surmised that it was 
possible to deduce when and under what conditions a contract is concluded from various 
sources, which included comparative materials of European contract law as well as 
European private law generally.225  In this regard, she referred to relevant provisions of 
the DCFR, which in her view “may in the future be the starting point for a uniform 
system of European private law”, as well as those of the PECL, so as to find that a 
contract was concluded on the basis of the concordance of intentions between the 
parties.226  This was further supported by legal literature on European contract law and a 
comparative survey of the laws of several Member States.227  The Advocate General also 
cited certain provisions of the DCFR, alongside the relevant legal literature and the laws 
of certain Member States, in connection with the related question regarding the 
classification of the type of contract at issue.228  Yet, when it came to the legal 
classification of prize notifications, she noted that the laws of the Member States took 
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divergent approaches.229 Consequently, the Advocate General concluded that it was for 
the national court to determine whether a contract had been concluded in the underlying 
proceedings by taking into account, among other things, whether the conditions of offer 
and acceptance were satisfied, thereby giving rise to a concordance of intentions.230 
 
In its judgment, the Court reached similar conclusions to those of the Advocate 
General, but the references to the DCFR and the PECL (as well as the legal literature and 
national laws cited by the Advocate General) were absent.  The Court noted that the 
relevant provision of the Brussels I Regulation required the conclusion of a consumer 
contract, which conceivably meant that one of the parties merely indicates its acceptance 
without assuming any legal obligation to the other party to the contract.231 Yet, it 
continued, “it is necessary, for a contract to exist within the meaning of that provision, 
that the latter party should assume such a legal obligation by submitting a firm offer 
which is sufficiently clear and precise with regard to its object and scope as to give rise to 
a link of a contractual nature as referred to by that provision”.232  This was satisfied only 
where, in the context of a prize notification such as that at issue in the instant case, there 
has been a legal commitment contracted by the mail-order company, i.e., that company 
must have expressed clearly its intention to be bound by such a commitment, if it is 
accepted by the other party, by declaring itself to be unconditionally willing to pay the 
prize at issue to consumers who so request.233 It was for the national court to determine 
whether that requirement was fulfilled in the instant case.234  
 
Advocate General Trstenjak’s recent Opinion in Messner235 provides a salient 
comparison. The circumstances at issue in Messner bore some similarity to Quelle236, 
only this time involving a preliminary reference request from a German court on the 
interpretation of the Distance Selling Directive.237   The main issue presented by this case 
concerned whether German legislation entitling the seller, in the context of the repayment 
of the purchase price of the goods sold, to deduct from that price compensation for the 
consumer’s use of such goods was precluded by Article 6 of the Directive concerning the 
right of withdrawal.238 In the underlying proceedings, a consumer, Ms. Messner, 
purchased a second-hand laptop computer from a company engaged in an internet mail-
order business. Thereafter, the computer display became defective, but the seller refused 
to repair the defect free of charge, so she sought to withdraw from the contract and get 
her money back. The “rub” in the case was that despite the lapse of about eight months, 
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the consumer’s withdrawal took place within the period laid down to that end, since the 
consumer had not received effective notice of such right from the seller, and thus placed 
the consumer within the terms of the German legislation stipulating that in such 
circumstances the consumer must pay compensation for the benefits obtained by the 
consumer from the use of the goods concerned, which turned out to be higher than the 
purchase price paid by the consumer for the computer in the first place.239    
 
In her Opinion, Advocate General Trstenjak approached the matter from the 
standpoint of the text, scheme, and purpose of the Directive.  The text of the Directive did 
not produce a clear answer since there was no explicit definition of the concept of costs 
or charges within the meaning of Article 6’s stipulation that the only charge that could be 
imposed on the consumer as a result of the exercise of his right of withdrawal was “the 
direct cost of returning the goods”.240 As regards the scheme and purpose of the 
Directive, in her view, compensation of the kind provided under German law would 
impair or even undermine the aim pursued by the European legislator in adopting the 
Directive, especially since this could deter the consumer from exercising his right of 
withdrawal.241  She supported this finding with detailed analysis of the distribution of risk 
between the seller and the consumer underlying the Directive.242  In this regard, she 
mentioned “in passing” that certain comparative European contract law materials, as well 
as the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights, took a different 
approach.243 In particular, she cited relevant provisions of the Acquis Principles of 
Existing EC Contract Law and the DCFR, which expressly required the consumer to pay 
compensation in the case of normal use of the goods.244 This evoked the following 
response:   
 
It should be noted that these works and legislative proposals are based on a 
different concept of compensation for use than the exclusion relating to the 
bearing of costs under Directive 97/7.  Apart from the fact that in my view  
they lead to complex problems of distinguishing between inspection or 
testing and use, which are detrimental to legal certainty and  can ultimately 
mean that purchasing by distance selling is less attractive to consumers, they 
are merely proposals and cannot assist in the interpretation of the directive  
in force.245 
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The Advocate General ultimately concluded that a provision of national law, as in the 
case of the German legislation, was precluded by the Directive.246   
 
 In its judgment, the Court reached a similar, though slightly different, conclusion.  
On the one hand, as the Advocate General had done, the Court found that a provision of 
national law that provides in general that, in the case of withdrawal by a consumer within 
the withdrawal period, a seller may claim compensation for the value of the use of the 
consumer goods acquired under a distance contract was precluded by the Directive.247  
On the other hand, however, the Directive did not preclude, in principle, a provision of 
national law that requires a consumer to pay fair compensation “in the case where he has 
made use of the goods acquired under a distance contract in a manner incompatible with 
the principles of civil law, such as those of good faith or unjust enrichment.”248  In that 
regard, the Court cautioned that this was on condition that the purpose of the Directive 
and, in particular, the functionality and the efficacy of the right of withdrawal are not 
adversely affected, as in the case where, for example, the amount of compensation were 
to appear disproportionate in relation to the purchase price of the goods concerned or the 
provision of national law were to put on the consumer the onus of proving that he did not 
use those goods during the period for withdrawal in a manner going beyond what was 
necessary to allow him to make effective use of his right of withdrawal.249  Despite the 
Court’s explicit reference to “principles of civil law”, there was no mention of any 
European contract law materials such as those cited in the Advocate General’s Opinion. 
 
3.4.2  Implications for European contract law 
As evidenced by the steady stream of Advocate General Opinions to date, 
references to European contract law materials, such as the PECL or the DCFR, generally 
serve as an “interpretative aid”, not as a direct source of authority that dictates the result 
in a particular case.250  For example, as shown by Ilsinger, they may assist an Advocate 
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 Id., paras 99, 111. 
247
 Case C-489/07 Messner, para. 29.   
248
 Id., para. 26 (emphasis added). 
249
 Id., para. 27.  The Court further stressed that this was left for the national court to determine:  see paras 
28-29. 
250
 Incidentally, while situated in wholly different settings, it should be noted that much of the usage made 
of the European contract law materials discussed above bears remarkable resonance with the discourse in 
the United States concerning the functions played by international and foreign law sources in the case law 
of the US Supreme Court, a topic that in the past few years set off a firestorm in the academic and political 
settings. For a recent selection of publications (including further citations to the relevant legal literature and 
case law, as well as to extra-judicial writings and speeches by members of the US Supreme Court), see 
“The Supreme Court – 2004 Term”, 119 Harvard Law Review 103 (2005); “Agora: The United States 
Constitution and International Law”, 98 American Journal of International Law 42 (2004); R.D. Glensy, 
“Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority”, 45 
Virginia Journal of International Law 357 (2005); M. Tushnet, “Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation:  An Episode in the Culture Wars”, 35 University of Baltimore Law Review 299 (2006); M. 
Tushnet, “When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme 
Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law”, 90 Minnesota Law Review 1275 (2006). For a European perspective, 
see, e.g., B.S. Markesinis et al., Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: a new source of inspiration? 
(Routledge, 2006). This may provide fruitful comparisons for the purposes of developing a framework 
concerning the uses put to European contract (or private) law materials in the Opinions of the Advocates 
General, detailed discussion of which regrettably goes beyond the scope of this study. 
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General in an “informative sense” in terms of filling gaps or gaining a perspective on 
ambiguous matters for which there is no direct answer or source on point.  As illustrated 
by Quelle and Hamilton, they may also serve a “confirmatory” role by supporting or 
strengthening an Advocate General’s particular interpretation of a certain matter.  Or, as 
captured by Messner, such materials may be of use in a more “contrasting” fashion by 
demonstrating a particular approach that need not be adhered to in the case at hand.  
Above all, as stressed by Advocate General Trstenjak in Messner, comparative European 
contract law materials are “merely proposals” and do not control the interpretation of 
binding Community law rules.251   
 
In this way, the use of comparative materials concerning European contract law 
(and European private law generally) can be considered part and parcel of the Advocate 
General’s overarching duty enshrined in Article 222 EC of assisting the Court of Justice 
by bringing to its attention all possibly relevant issues for the purposes of adjudicating the 
case before it.  It is therefore on par with the other kinds of legal sources  that regularly 
appear in the Opinions of Advocates General, which in fact seems to be the way 
Advocate General Trstenjak framed the matter at a recent conference on the CFR.252  
Indeed, as illustrated by the examples above, such materials are often presented alongside 
an array of scholarly literature and a comparative summary of the laws of the Member 
States in a particular area, among other things.  Therefore, such materials take their place 
within the context of the Court of Justice’s comparative method of interpretation.253  This 
may explain why this subject has not yet provoked much discussion in the commentary 
so far. 
 
Yet, there seems to be more to it than that.  The use of these comparative 
materials raise issues that bear directly upon the Court’s  interpretative and lawmaking 
roles in connection with European contract law. Importantly, the nature of these materials 
as common principles, rules, and values shared by the Member States could prove a 
useful tool to be used by the Court of Justice for discerning commonalities among the 
laws of the Member States and thus may go some way in contributing to the judicial 
approximation of national contract law (and other areas of national private law) at the 
European level.  As evidenced by the Hamilton and Messner cases, such materials could 
constitute a concrete source of so-called “principles of civil law”, which could be used by 
the Court to bring national contract laws closer together in the process of interpreting 
relevant provisions of Community (or Union) law and formulating judge-made rules 
under the purview of European “federal common law” within the context of its 
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 See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
252
 Presentation of Advocate General Trstenjak at ERA Conference, “The Draft Common Frame of 
Reference”, Trier, 6-7 March 2008.  See also V. Trstenjak, “Die Auslegung privatrechtlicher Richtlinien 
durch den EuGH: Ein Rechtsprechungsbericht unter Berücksichtigung des Common Frame of Reference”, 
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 145 (2007). 
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 See, e.g., H.G. Schermers and D.F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union § 46- § 52, 
at 24-27; K. Lenaerts, “Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law”, 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 873 (2003) (and citations therein) (printed with some 
modification as K. Lenaerts, “Interlocking Legal Orders or the European Union Variant of ‘E Pluribus 
Unum’”, in Law and Justice in a Multi-State World: Essays in Honour of Arthur T. von Mehren 751 (J.A.R. 
Nafziger and S.C. Symeonides eds, Transnational, 2002)). 
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adjudication of the cases brought before it pursuant to its competences under the Treaties.  
Indeed, as shown by Ilsinger, this has as much salience for the “hard core” of the 
Community contract law acquis as for measures in other fields of Community (and even 
Union) law touching on matters of contract law. 
 
That being said, certain problems arise. First, since the various European 
comparative contract materials have been formulated by academic groups of a private or 
non-governmental nature254, they do not have (yet) any binding authority as a matter of 
EU law and have not (yet) been adopted by the European institutions within the confines 
of the decision-making process.  This may serve to undercut their potential recourse by 
the Court of Justice.  In fact, this may be one of the reasons to explain the glaring 
difference in the treatment of such materials in the Opinions of the Advocates General, as 
compared to the Court’s judgments.  So far, neither the Court nor the CFI (not to mention 
the EU Civil Service Tribunal) have referred to such comparative law materials in its 
judgments, even if a few judgments of the CFI could be interpreted as leaving the door 
slightly ajar in this regard.255  Furthermore, as demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, 
some of the most controversial cases have been those in which differences exist among 
national contract laws, as opposed to cases where commonalities among the national 
contract laws can be found. This strikes at the heart of issues concerning the character 
and the content of these European “comparative” materials, especially the extent to which 
they can be considered to embody common rules and principles shared by the Member 
States as opposed to hiding differences or advocating a change in course, which are 
controversial themes underpinning the work of the academic projects involved in 
European contract law and European private law generally.256   
 
The references to the DCFR in the Opinions of the Advocates General merit 
special remarks.  As will be seen in coming chapters, it is not entirely clear at the time of 
writing how the DCFR will be incorporated into the final version of the CFR, much less 
how the CFR will be used by the Court of Justice.257 This places even further attention on 
important and as yet unanswered questions concerning the formal status of the CFR (i.e., 
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 This is so, although certain groups have received funding from the European institutions.  See Chapter 5, 
§ 5.2.1. 
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 Se, e.g., Joined Cases T-8/95 and T-9/95 Pelle and Konrad v. Council and Commission [2007] ECR II-
4117, paras 43, 54, 97 (finding the PECL not relevant because the case concerned the Community’s non-
contractual liability, thereby begging the question as regards its application in connection with the 
Community’s contractual liability); Case T-333/03 Masdar (UK) Ltd  v. Commission [2006] ECR II-4377, 
paras 89-104 (upheld on appeal in Case C-47/07 P Masdar (UK) Ltd v. Commission, judgment of 16 Dec. 
2008, not yet reported) (sidestepping the Principles of European Law on Benevolent Intervention 
(negotiorum gestio) promulgated by the Study Group on a European Civil Code).  As far as the Court of 
Justice is concerned, in one case, it cited the specific paragraph of the Advocate General’s Opinion 
containing reference to certain provisions of the PECL, the DCFR, and the CISG, but seemingly only in 
reference to the first sentence concerning the recognition of a common principle among the laws of the 
Member States in connection with the consideration of default interest: compare Case C-275/07 
Commission v. Italy, judgment of 19 March 2009, not yet reported, para. 98 with Opinion of Advocate 
General Trstenjak in Case C-275/07 Commission v. Italy,  para. 90.  In other words, so close but yet so far. 
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 See further Chapter 5, § 5.2. 
257
 For example, in the 2004 Communication on European contract law, the Commission has considered 
that the CFR would serve as an “inspiration” for the Court’s interpretation of the Community contract law 
acquis: see Chapter 6, § 6.4.2. 
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its legal basis, its binding effects, its scope, its content, and its purpose) and its 
relationship with the DCFR, all of which are percolating in the commentary and the 
institutional documents as part of the debate about European contract law. The fact that 
the DCFR incorporates certain European contract law materials, such as the PECL and 
Principles elaborated by the Acquis Group and the Study Group on a European civil 
code, albeit with certain amendments, begs further questions in terms of the status of the 
DCFR and ultimately that of the CFR vis-à-vis the works of these groups taken 
separately.  
 
In this way, the usage of comparative European contract law materials by the 
Advocates General, as much as their non-usage by the Court, place further attention on 
the debate about European contract law. Such materials highlight deficiencies in the 
relevant Community (contract) measures and the need to find common ground among the 
national laws, which prompted their reference in the first place. Such materials also direct 
attention to legislative developments at the European level and heighten questions 
concerning the status, the form, and the constitutionality of initiatives contemplated in the 
debate, as in the case of future decisions to be taken on the CFR.258     
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In closing, three main points emanate from the foregoing discussion concerning 
the role played by the Court of Justice in European contract law. First, it is important to 
recognise the Court of Justice’s distinct roles of interpreting the Community contract law 
acquis, formulating European “federal common law”, and utilising comparative 
European contract law materials. Until now, the discourse has been primarily focused on 
the Court’s interpretative role. The Court’s formulation of European “federal common 
law” dramatically changes this picture.  Likewise, with the coming developments of the 
European contract law project, it remains to be seen the extent to which activities, such as 
the CFR, may wield considerable impact on both the Court’s lawmaking and 
interpretative roles and the ways in which such materials are utilised by the Advocates 
General. Second, while the role of the Court of Justice in European contract law is 
broader than commonly perceived, it remains a limited one.259  Whether it is 
interpretation, lawmaking, or recourse to comparative European contract law materials, 
these roles are of an “interstitial” or piecemeal character; they are not comprehensive. As 
such, the Court by itself cannot remedy the problems plaguing the Community contract 
law acquis and the divergences among the laws of the Member States, if anything making 
them further apparent. The Court’s discomfort in deciding various cases, many of which 
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 See V. Mak, “Harmonisation through ‘Directive-Related’ and ‘Cross-Directive’ Interpretation: The Role 
of the ECJ in the Development of European Consumer Law”, Tilburg Institute of Comparative and 
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 This is indeed a common remark among scholars over the years. See, e.g. A. Hartkamp, “Perspectives 
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cause it to be drawn further and further into the national contract regimes and the 
incoherent maze of Community measures is almost palpable in certain judgments. This 
may explain in part why several of the Court’s well-known judgments concerning the 
“hard core” of Community contract law are so short in length.260  Finally, the common 
thread interwoven though these three distinct roles carried out by the Court of Justice in 
European contract law is that by exposing the underlying divergences among the national 
contract laws, as well as the inconsistencies and gaps in the various Community contract 
law measures, they enliven the discussion as to whether a more comprehensive approach 
to matters of contract law at the European level may be necessary.  As seen in the next 
chapter, these remarks mirror the role played by the American federal judiciary in 
relation to the approximation of contract law and other fields of commercial law in the 
United States. 
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 See, e.g., Case C-423/97 Travel Vac [1999] ECR I-2195 (5 paras); Case C-168/00 Leitner [2002] ECR 
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4 
 
The American Private Law Framework 
 
4.1 Introduction   
As one prominent American legal scholar remarked over fifty years ago:  “It is a 
noteworthy but little noticed fact of our political history how often issues which might 
have been resolved in favor of nation-wide uniformity have been resolved instead in 
favor of decentralization.”1  These remarks have particular salience for American private 
law. Particularly to European audiences, the bulk of much American private law is 
generally depicted as resting on a sturdy framework of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(the UCC), uniform state laws promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the NCCUSL), and Restatements published by 
the American Law Institute (the ALI). Looking below the surface, however, one 
discovers that many of these components have been subject to longstanding debate and 
are inextricably intertwined with the prospect of federalisation, especially in relation to 
contract law and other fields of commercial law, which form a critical subset of 
American private law. For example, as will be seen, the emergence and the development 
of the NCCUSL and the UCC were mired in proposals to federalise portions of state 
contract and commercial law, and the doctrine of American “federal common law”, 
which is entangled with some these components, emanated from the American federal 
judiciary’s aspirations for a uniform commercial law throughout the country.  As a result, 
the extent to which matters concerning the interplay between federal and state 
competence have become interwoven into the fabric of the American private law 
framework is not often appreciated or fully grasped, particularly in the debate about 
European contract law in which analogies to the United States are frequently made.   
 
In view of the foregoing remarks, the aim of this chapter is to examine the 
following four key strands of the American private law framework:  (1) the doctrine of 
American “federal common law”; (2) the NCCUSL and the uniform law process; (3) the 
ALI and the Restatement project; and (4) the UCC, with a view to clarifying their 
meaning, the problems associated with their usage, and the extent to which these strands 
are related to the prospect of federalisation of contract and commercial law in the United 
States.  This chapter is divided into four parts in line with the ordering of these strands as 
listed above. Each part is further divided into three sections concerning a general 
overview of each strand, its origins, and certain tensions underlying it. Notwithstanding 
their presentation, these strands are very much interrelated.  Indeed, it is the linkage 
between them, much like successive layers of sedentary rock, which together form the 
foundations of American private law. 
 
Importantly, this examination does not claim to be exhaustive.  Each of these 
strands commands a massive, and still growing, literature in and of itself, and they are 
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 H.M. Hart, Jr., “The Relations between State and Federal Law”, 54 Columbia Law Review 489, 528 
(1954).   
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certainly not the only aspects of the American private law framework that could be 
posited to have relevance to the debate about European contract law. For example, the 
role played by American “national” legal education and scholarship2 and the debate about 
the codification of American law that took place during the early to mid 1800s3  
inevitably spring to mind, among other things.4  Nevertheless, emphasis is placed on 
these four strands because they have steadily permeated institutional documents and 
scholarly literature on European contract law and provide the basis for comparative 
                                                 
2
  See, e.g., The common law of Europe and the future of legal education / Le droit commun de l’Europe et 
l’avenir de l’enseignement juridique (B. De Witte and C. Forder eds, Kluwer, 1992); M.A. Eisenberg, 
“Why is American Contract Law so Uniform? – National Law in the United States”, in Europäisches 
Vertragsrecht 23 (H-L. Weyers ed., Nomos, 1997) (printed with some modification as M.A. Eisenberg, 
“The Unification of Law”, in The Common Core of European Private Law 35 (M. Bussani and U. Mattei 
eds, Kluwer, 2003)). Compare M. Reimann, “American Private Law and European Legal Unification – Can 
the United States be a Model?”, 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 217, 222-224 
(1996).   
3
 See generally C.M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform 
(Greenwood Press, 1981); M.J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of 
Legal Orthodoxy (Oxford Univ. Press, 1992); L.M. Friedman, The History of American Law (3rd ed., Simon 
and Schuster, 2005).  Notably, the American codification debate is often symbolised by the ardent battle 
between David Dudley Field, who formulated several draft codes for the State of New York, and his 
opponent, James C. Carter, a notable member of the New York Bar, which is often viewed as America’s 
equivalent to the “Thibault-Savigny” debate in the European setting that has arisen as part of the discourse 
on European contract law and European private law generally. See David Dudley Field Centenary Essays – 
Celebrating One Hundred Years of Legal Reform (A. Reppy ed., New York Univ. Press, 1949); M. 
Reimann “The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the New York 
Civil Code”, 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 95 (1989). This subject embodies noteworthy 
themes regarding means by which to remedy uncertainty and complexity of American common law. In fact, 
the prospect of codification in the American context has been used to counteract objections to the 
codification of common law systems as part of the debate on a European civil code. See G. Weiss, “The 
Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World”, 25 Yale Journal of International Law 435 
(2000).  Still, given the diffuseness of this debate, its varying acceptance among the states, and its links to 
philosophical underpinnings of the common law system in the early years of the American Republic, it will 
not be treated in detail here. It should be clarified, however, that this debate was rooted at the state level, 
meaning that there was no proposals for federal codification, since this was considered impossible in light 
of the 19th century constitutional theory. G. Gilmore, “Commercial Law in the United States: its 
codification and other misadventures”, in Aspects of Comparative Commercial Law: Sales, Consumer 
Credit and Secured Transactions 449, 453 (J.S. Ziegel and W.F. Foster eds, McGill Univ. Press, 1969). 
4
 Interestingly, the interstate compact was floated from time to time as a possible mechanism alongside 
others, such as uniform laws and the UCC, to bring about the unification of commercial law in the United 
States.  See, e.g., A. Dunham, “A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws”, 30 Law and Contemporary Problems 233, 242-243 (1965); P.A. Freund, “The Device of an 
Interstate Compact in relation to the Uniform Commercial Code”, 3 State of New York Law Revision 
Commission for 1955 Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 2109, 2175  (1955). Ultimately, however, it 
never rose to much prominence in this regard, though it is still contemplated with respect to specific 
projects or issues in the commercial law setting. See, e.g., C. Davis and D.M. Branson, “Interstate 
Compacts in Commerce and Industry: A Proposal for ‘Common Markets Among States’”, 23 Vermont Law 
Review 133 (1998). Generally speaking, an interstate compact is a type of agreement entered into by a 
particular group of states, which is authorised by Article I, section 10 of the US Constitution (known as the 
“Compact Clause”).  There is no exact analogy to an interstate compact in the EU, and arguably, it seems to 
sit halfway between an intergovernmental agreement and enhanced cooperation (discussed in Chapter 12) 
among the Member States. Thus, this topic may lead to fruitful reflection in connection with the debate 
about European contract law or otherwise in the European setting. 
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reflection between the European Union and the United States in relation to the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law. 
 
4.2 The doctrine of American “federal common law”  
4.2.1 General overview 
In the simplest of terms, American “federal common law” denotes the making of 
federal judge-made law by the American federal courts, comprising the US Supreme 
Court (the Court) and the lower federal courts, as well as state courts5, in the United 
States.  It has the been the subject of US Supreme Court jurisprudence and scholarly 
literature going back to the early days of the American Republic.6 It also embodies 
remarkable parallels with European “federal common law” as regards the overarching 
framework governing the scope of the American judiciary’s competence to formulate 
such judge-made rules, which regrettably exceed the scope of this inquiry and cannot be 
delved into here.7  Still, American “federal common law” has particular salience for this 
discussion due to its entanglement with judicial approximation and the course of its 
development in the contract law field. 
 
4.2.2 Origins of American “federal common law” 
The origins of American “federal common law” are rooted in two landmark cases:  
Swift v. Tyson8 and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins9.  To European readers, wrapped up in 
these two cases are unique attributes of the American legal system and the relationship 
between the American federal and state courts, which include the use of diversity 
jurisdiction allowing citizens from different states to adjudicate their cases in the federal, 
as opposed to the state, courts10 and the nature of American common law itself, which is 
rooted in judicial decisions or case law.11 That said, these two cases not only paved the 
way for American “federal common law”, but also implicate the American federal 
judiciary’s attempt to unify certain areas of state private law, with the result that their 
legacy lives on in the ongoing discussion of federal competence in this area. 
 
4.2.2.1 The case of Swift v. Tyson 
Swift v. Tyson12 was decided by the US Supreme Court in 1842.  The opinion was  
                                                 
5
 See infra note 69. 
6
 See generally R.H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (6th 
ed., Foundation Press, 2009), Chapter 7 (hereinafter Hart and Wechsler). 
7
 See generally K. Lenaerts and K. Gutman, “‘Federal Common Law in the European Union: A 
Comparative Perspective from the United States”, 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 1 (2006). 
8
 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
9
 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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 See US Constitution, Art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  It is presently codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For 
further discussion of the role of diversity jurisdiction in the United States and comparative reflection with 
the EU judicial system, see Lenaerts and Gutman, supra note 7, at 20-23 (and citations therein).  
11
 See L. Weinberg, “Federal common law”, 83 Northwestern University Law Review 805, 834 (1989) 
(underscoring that American common law “is not the law of general understandings, common to all 
English-speaking people. In the United States today, common law means judge-made law, in equity and in 
criminal cases no less than in actions at law. It is case law.”). 
12
 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
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authored by Justice Joseph Story on behalf of a near-unanimous Court.13   On its face, it 
involved a mere issue of state commercial law arising out of certain speculative land 
transactions that ended up in a New York federal court pursuant to its diversity 
jurisdiction.14  As base, however, “the conclusion is inescapable that [Justice Story] and 
his colleagues had decided to use this ridiculous case as the opportunity for federalizing – 
or nationalizing – a large part of the common law of the United States.”15 As framed by 
the Court, the issue boiled down to whether a doctrine of New York commercial law as 
promulgated by state court decisions was obligatory on the Court if it differed from the 
principles of general commercial law.16  In response, the US Supreme Court answered 
with a resounding no.   
 
At the heart of the opinion was the Court’s interpretation of Section 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, known as the Rules of Decision Act, which governed the source of 
law that should be applied by the federal courts in diversity cases. Couched in notoriously 
ambiguous language, the Rules of Decision Act then provided: 
 
[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or 
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provided, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the 
United States in cases in which they apply.17 
 
In Swift, the Court found that “laws” in the abovementioned passage was generally 
understood to mean legislative rules and enactments of the state, not state court decisions 
since such decisions were only evidence of what the laws were, but were not laws 
themselves.18 On that basis, it reasoned that the Rules of Decision Act only required the 
federal courts to follow state court decisions in matters of “local”, not “general”, concern: 
 
 In all the various cases, which have hitherto come before us for decision, this 
 [C]ourt have [sic] uniformly supposed, that the true interpretation of the  
34th section [of the Judiciary Act of 1789] limited its application to state  
laws, strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and  
the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and  
titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to  
real estate, and other matters immovable and intra-territorial in their nature  
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 Justice Catron was the sole dissenter.  He quarrelled with the breadth of the Swift opinion as regards 
matters of commercial law beyond the point of law at issue in the case:  id., at 23-24. 
14
  The plaintiff, Mr. Joseph Swift, was a citizen of Maine, whereas the defendant, Mr. George W. Tysen 
(his name was misspelled in the heading of the case, but due to its fame, the error persisted) was a citizen of 
New York. For detailed account of the factual and procedural background of this case, see T. Freyer, 
Harmony and Dissonance: The Swift and Erie Cases in American Federalism (New York Univ. Press, 
1981).   
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 G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 3 (Yale Univ. Press, 1977).  
16
 Swift, 41 U.S. at 18.  
17
 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92 (emphasis added).  It is presently codified, as amended, at 28 
U.S.C. § 1652, which provides:  “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of 
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decisions 
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” 
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 Swift, 41 U.S. at 18. 
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and character. It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply,  
or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at  
all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent 
operation, as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or  
other written instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial  
law . . . . 19 
 
As a result, the Court held that the Rules of Decision Act was “strictly limited to local 
statutes and local usages of the character before stated” and did “not extend to contracts 
and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof 
are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles 
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence”, which the federal courts could decide for 
themselves.20  As a result, the Court brushed aside the decisions of the New York courts 
and formulated a broad rule of negotiability regarding bills of exchange, which led to a 
jury verdict in favour of Mr. Swift.21 
 
The distinction between “general” and “local” matters was of great importance in 
the Swift opinion because it delineated the scope of the federal courts’ lawmaking power. 
Under Swift, the federal courts were bound to follow state court decisions, as well as state 
statutes, in matters of “local” concern, such those concerning real (immovable) property 
law, which were seen as being confined to a single state. In contrast, in “general” matters 
such as contract and commercial law that were considered to transcend the interests of a 
single state, the federal courts were not bound by state court decisions and could 
elaborate their own rules, although (at least initially) they were still bound by state 
statutes on the subject.22  
 
At base, Swift v. Tyson embodied the US Supreme Court’s aspiration for uniform 
commercial law throughout the country.23  The idea was that the state courts would 
                                                 
19
 Id., at 18-19 (emphasis added). 
20
 Id., at 19. The Court did acknowledge that state court decisions on such “general” matters would be 
given “the most deliberate attention and respect”, but they would not be considered “conclusive authority” 
as such.  
21
 See Freyer, supra note 14, at 16-17. 
22
 M.A. Field, “Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law”, 99 Harvard Law Review 881, 902 
(1986). However, there is some dispute on this point.  See C.A Heckman, “Uniform Commercial Law in 
the Nineteenth Century: The Decline and Abuse of the Swift Doctrine”, 45 Emory Law Journal 45 (1978); 
C.A. Heckman, “The Relationship of Swift v. Tyson to the Status of Commercial Law in the Nineteenth 
Century and the Federal System”, 17 American Journal of Legal History 246 (1973). Matters are 
complicated by fact that the application of Swift to uniform state laws promulgated by the NCCUSL 
(discussed infra § 4.2) was unclear for many years due to arguments that state statutes “declaring” or 
“codifying” the common law should be treated the same way as state court decisions, which resulted in the 
formulation of independent rules by the federal courts; however, the US Supreme Court’s decision in Burns 
Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487 (1934), ultimately rejected this contention, albeit only four years 
before Swift’s overruling in Erie. See B.I. Bittker, “The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, Swift v. 
Tyson, Uniform State Commercial Laws, and Federal Common Law: Ships That Passed in the Night?”, 8 
Constitutional Comment 87, 102 (1991); E.L. Rubin, “Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of 
State Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System”, 49 Ohio State Law Journal 1251, 1263-1264 (1989). 
23
 It should not be lost from sight that it was Justice Story who authored the opinion in Swift, since he was 
strongly associated with federalising commercial law as well as admiralty law in the United States.  See, 
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follow the federal courts’ pronouncements on “general” matters such as contract and 
commercial law and hence divergences among the states on such matters would be 
eliminated.  Yet, this aspiration was not predicated on any binding obligation of the state 
courts to adhere to the federal courts’ decisions, but rather on what was hoped to be their 
persuasive force.24  The rationale of Swift v. Tyson is somewhat difficult to understand by 
today’s standards and has in fact evoked a number of differing views.25 Often, 
explanations point to what has been called the “declaratory” theory of law, which 
conceived of the common law as based on principles existing independently of judicial 
decisions such that the role of the judges was merely to find, declare, and apply those pre-
existing principles to the case at hand.26  The emphasis on contract and commercial law 
in Swift was also explained by the fact that these fields were rooted in prevailing notions 
of the lex mercatoria (“law merchant”), which embodied a set of international 
commercial laws, customs and trade practices as part of the general law of nations 
prevalent at that time.27  At base, however, Swift is hard to pin down because the crucial 
distinction between “general” and “local” matters eroded, and it was gradually 
transformed by the federal courts to encompass many “local” areas, such as those 
involving real property and tort law, which went far beyond the ambit of Justice Story’s 
opinion in that case.28  
 
Ultimately, the US Supreme Court’s aspirations for uniform commercial law were 
not realised, and the Swift doctrine had devastating results.  In Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins29, discussed below, the Court acknowledged this in the strongest of terms: 
 
Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects, 
political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not 
accrue. Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of  
common law prevented uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a 
satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and  
that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties. On the other hand, 
the mischievous results of the doctrine had become apparent. . . . . Swift 
 v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens and citizens. It made 
rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” vary according to whether 
enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege  
of selecting the court in which the right should be determined was conferred  
upon the noncitizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection  
                                                                                                                                                 
e.g., Gilmore, supra note 15, at 30-31; M.J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 
250-252 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1977).   
24
 “Hoped” is used purposefully here, since this did not turn out completely as expected, which was a point 
underscored in Erie:  see infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
25
 For a summary of the positions, see generally Hart and Wechsler, supra note 6, at 554-556. 
26
 See, e.g., E.A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the 
Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America 51 (Yale Univ. Press, 2000).    
27
 See further B. Clark, “Erie’s Constitutional Source”, 95 California Law Review 1289, 1292 (2007); 
Heckman, “The Relationship of Swift v. Tyson to the Status of Commercial Law in the Nineteenth Century 
and the Federal System”, supra note 22, at 248-250. 
28
 For detailed discussion, see Freyer, supra note 14, at 45-100.  
29
 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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of the law. In attempting to promote uniformity in the law throughout the  
United States, the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration  
of the law of the state.30 
 
On the whole, there were many factors that contributed to Swift’s demise31, and 
the scene was set for its overruling in Erie. Yet, no case could ever eliminate the place of 
Swift v. Tyson from the American legal landscape. It will forever represent the attempt to 
achieve greater uniformity in American private law at the federal level by judicial means. 
At the same time, Swift  displayed the fallacy of attempting to do so through the federal 
courts at the expense of the states, something that would not be attempted again in the 
American setting. 
 
4.2.2.2 The case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins32 was decided by the US Supreme Court in 1938.  
It was a classic tort case, a personal injury action brought by a citizen of Pennsylvania, 
Mr. Harry J. Tompkins, who had been gravely injured by a passing train of a New York 
corporation, the Erie Railroad Company.33  The nature of the case was not without 
importance, since it implicated one of the local fields of law, that of tort law, which the 
Swift doctrine eventually came to invade.34  As in Swift, the case was brought before a 
New York federal court pursuant to its diversity jurisdiction.35  The defendant, the Erie 
Railroad Company, rested upon the relevant state (Pennsylvania) court decisions that 
were in its favour, whereas the plaintiff, Mr. Tompkins, relied on the Swift doctrine to 
argue that the state court decisions were not controlling and that the Railroad’s liability 
should be determined by the federal courts as a matter of “general law”.36 
 
 The Court’s opinion in Erie was written by Justice Louis Brandeis.37  It was 
divided into four parts, united under the main question as to “whether the oft-challenged 
                                                 
30
 Id., at 74-75 (citations omitted).  
31
 See, e.g., Field, supra note 22, at 900-902; H.J. Friendly, “In Praise of Erie – And of the New Federal 
Common Law”, 39 New York University Law Review 383, 405-407 (1964). 
32
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
33
 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.  For a narrative account of this case, see I. Younger, “What Happened in Erie”, 56 
Texas Law Review 1011 (1978). 
34
 The extension of the Swift doctrine to the area of tort law had become particularly apparent in the 
Supreme Court’s case law concerning railroads and their employees. See Heckman, “Uniform Commercial 
aw in the Nineteenth Century: The Decline and Abuse of the Swift Doctrine”, supra note 22, at 57-60.  See 
also Erie, 304 U.S at 76 n.12. 
35
 Erie, 304 U.S at 69. Interestingly, as explained by one scholar, the applicant’s choice of court was 
apparently for more calculated reasons, given that Mr. Tompkins could conceivably have chosen a US 
federal court in Pennsylvania or a state court in either Pennsylvania or New York. At the time, the Third 
Circuit (which included federal courts in Pennsylvania) generally deferred to local state law, which 
favoured Erie Railroad, whereas the Second Circuit (which included federal courts in New York) applied 
Swift “general common law” rules on a much broader basis, which was of benefit to Mr. Tompkin’s case.   
Purcell, supra note 26, at 96-97. 
36
  Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. 
37
 Justice Butler, joined by Justice McReynolds, dissented, and Justice Reed submitted an opinion that 
concurred in part with the majority opinion.  See infra note 41. There were only eight, as opposed to nine, 
justices because Justice Cardozo did not take part in the case.  Erie, 304 U.S at 80. 
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doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved”.38  The Court answered this question 
in the affirmative, thereby expressly overruling a case that had built up a substantial body 
of case law for the past ninety-six years.  The Court explained:  “If only a question of 
statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so 
widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course 
pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so.”39  As indicated by this 
statement, the Court’s judgment in Erie rested on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds, the former by virtue of its re-interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act so as to 
include state court decisions as “laws” of the states40, and the latter by virtue of its 
declaration that the Swift doctrine was “an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the 
Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should 
make us hesitate to correct”.41  In short, the Swift doctrine was held to have invaded rights 
reserved to the states under the US Constitution.42  In one of the most celebrated passages 
of the case, the Court declared:  
 
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And 
whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a 
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal  
concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no  
power to declare substantive rules of common law in a state whether  
they be local in their nature or “general’, be they commercial law or a  
part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to  
confer such a power upon the federal courts.43 
 
It is no understatement to say that much ink has been spilled over the meaning and the 
import of the abovementioned statements, as well as the constitutional rationale of Erie 
generally.44  Thus, it is paramount to underline three main points concerning the 
implications of Erie’s holding; Erie’s prohibition against “federal general common law”; 
and the scope of federal judicial competence.  
                                                 
38
 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69 (citations omitted).  The first part concerned the Swift holding, its application and its 
transformation; the second part outlined the “defects, political and social” caused by the Swift doctrine; the 
third part embodied the constitutional grounding of the Court’s decision; and the fourth part constituted the 
application of the Court’s holding to the instant case. 
39
 Id., at 77-78 (citations omitted). 
40
 Id., at 78-79.  For the text of the Rules of Decision Act, see supra note 17. 
41
 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Justice Holmes).  Notably, it was the constitutional underpinnings of the 
Court’s judgment that was the major bone of contention between the Justices.  It was at the root of the 
Justice Butler’s dissenting opinion:  see id., at 88 (“There is nothing to suggest that consideration of any 
constitutional question is necessary to a decision in the case”).  As for Justice Reed’s concurring opinion, 
he agreed with the majority opinion “except in so far as it relies upon the unconstitutionality of the ‘course 
pursued’ by the federal courts”:  id. at 90. 
42
 Erie, 304 U.S. at 80 (though making clear that it was not holding the Rules of Decision Act or any other 
act of Congress unconstitutional). 
43
 Id., at 78. 
44
 For a recent selection of literature with further citations therein, see, e.g., Hart and Wechsler, supra 6, at 
562-564; J. Tidmarsh and B.J. Murray, “A Theory of Federal Common Law”, 100 Northwestern University 
Law Review 585 (Winter 2006); Clark, supra note 27. 
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 First, the implications of Erie’s holding went beyond the instant case.  By 
overruling Swift, the Court held that the federal courts could not infer from their diversity 
jurisdiction the power to formulate independent “general” rules, but instead must follow 
the decisions of the state courts, as well as state statutes, on the matter concerned.45  On 
this basis, the Court reversed the decision of the lower federal court that had decided the 
matter pursuant to “general common law” and remanded the case to be decided in 
accordance with state (i.e., Pennsylvania) law, which resulted in judgment in favour of 
the Erie Railroad Company.46  Generally, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Erie spawned 
two distinct lines of inquiry in relation to the relevant substantive law to be applied by the 
federal courts depending upon whether the source of such law was state or federal law.47  
On the one hand, when a federal court is faced with substantive issues of state law, 
whether pursuant to diversity or another jurisdictional basis, it must look to the law of the 
state in which it is sitting for the controlling rule and cannot assert its independent 
judgment in the matter.48 On the other hand, when the federal court is faced with 
substantive issues of federal law, it is confronted with the possibility of formulating 
“federal common law”, i.e., federal judge-made rules of decision, regardless of whether 
its jurisdiction stems from diversity or otherwise.49   In other words, Erie did not speak to 
the elimination of “federal” judge-made rules, but rather to the elimination of “general 
common law”, which leads to the next point. 
 
Second, Erie’s prohibition against “federal general common law” must not be 
confused with “federal common law”.  As is well-known to American scholars, on the 
same day that Justice Brandeis delivered the Court’s opinion in Erie, he also delivered 
the Court’s unanimous opinion in Hinderlider50, confirming that “whether the water of an 
interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States [concerned] is a question of 
‘federal common law’ upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State 
can be conclusive.”51  Perhaps this was purposeful in order to ensure the viability of 
“federal common law” in the face of Erie, and indeed, the two cases have been seen to go 
hand-in-hand.52  In any event, Erie struck down the federal courts’ ability to formulate 
their own opinion about issues of state law, i.e.,, “general common law”; it did not bar the 
federal courts’ ability for formulate substantive rules of authentic “federal common 
                                                 
45
 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79. 
46
 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.  See Tompkins v. Erie Railroad Co., 92 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1938).  Indeed, Justice 
Brandeis was well-aware that his opinion would deprive Mr. Tompkins of his jury award of a little over 
$30, 000 dollars:  see Purcell, supra note 26, at 107. To add fuel to the fire, Mr. Tompkins’ lawyers had 
convinced him not to settle the case out of court for $ 7500 dollars shortly before the Erie Railroad’s appeal 
to the Second Circuit. See Freyer, supra note 14, at 127. And in what is perhaps one of the most overlooked 
issues in the case, it has been surmised that the Erie Railroad’s lawyer had purposefully sought not to 
overrule Swift but rather to argue for its narrow application in the instant case because the Swift doctrine 
was considered beneficial to the Railroad’s long-term interests.  See Purcell, supra, at 897-101. 
47
 This is not to discount the role played by the state courts, which are also able to formulate “federal 
common law” rules:  see infra note 69.    
48
 Field, supra note 22, at 912 n.141 (and citations therein). 
49
  Id. 
50
 Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).  As with Erie, there were 
a total of eight, not nine, justices since Justice Cardozo did not take part in the decision.   Id., at 111. 
51
 Id., at 110 (emphasis added). 
52
 See Purcell, supra note 26, at 186-191. 
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law”.53  As a consequence, Erie can be equated with clear line-drawing between the two 
domains of state and federal law because it signified that American law must be in the 
form of either state or federal law; there could be no more third option.54   This is often 
associated with the shift from the “declaratory” theory in Swift to the “positivistic” 
conception of common law enshrined in Erie, in the sense that law must emanate from a 
“positive legal source” whether at the state or the federal level.55 Importantly, however, 
Erie said nothing as regards which law – state or federal – applied to which type of 
issue.56  This ambiguity carries over to the final point. 
 
Third, Erie’s implications for the scope of federal judicial competence are 
controversial. Erie’s famous phrase cited above –   
 
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable 
in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial 
law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause of the Constitution purports to 
confer such a power on the federal courts57  
 
– is purposefully conjunctive. The language was directed not only at the federal courts, 
but also at the Federal Government as a whole.58  By overruling the Swift doctrine, Erie 
sought to preserve, indeed restore, the federal-state balance of powers enshrined in the 
US Constitution by ensuring that federal law only governed those matters that the US 
Constitution specifically authorised or delegated to the federal level.59 It is for this reason 
that Erie was heralded as “the very essence” of American federalism.60  
 
It remained unclear under Erie, however, whether judicial lawmaking extended as 
far as Congress’ competence or whether it was precluded even in areas within Congress’ 
reach.61  In that regard, the words “in a state” must be emphasised.  While it may have 
been the case that “Congress has no power to adopt a code of laws governing wholly 
intrastate matters of contract or tort”, this was a entirely different matter from federal 
                                                 
53
 L.H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 472 (3rd ed., Foundation Press, 2000).   
54
 Weinberg, supra note 11, at 820. 
55
 For detailed discussion of the “Brandeisian” nature of positivism in Erie, see Purcell, supra note 26, at 
181-185. This was in fact an important part of Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 745-746 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“the creation of post-Erie federal common 
law is rooted in a positivist mindset utterly foreign to the American common-law tradition of the late 18th 
century. . . . today’s federal common law is not our Framer’s general common law”). 
56
 M.A. Field, “The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law”, 12 Pace Law Review 303, 306 (1992); see also 
Field, supra note 22, at 983. 
57
  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).  
58
 Tribe, supra note 53, at 471.   
59
 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (“Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the states is in 
no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the 
United States.  Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the 
state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.”). 
60
 J.H. Ely, “The Irrepressible Myth of Erie”, 87 Harvard Law Review 693, 695 (1974). Yet, debate 
continues to flourish as regards the significance of Erie on both federalism and separation of powers 
grounds, which cannot be delved into fully here. See E.A. Young, “Preemption and Federal Common 
Law”, 83 Notre Dame Law Review 1639, 1656-1660 (2008) (and citations therein). 
61
 See Field, supra note 22, at 924-927. 
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legislation over interstate matters falling within Congress’s powers under the US 
Constitution.62 In fact, there is wide agreement among scholars that the factual situation 
implicated in Erie – that of tort duties of railroads operating in interstate commerce – fell 
within the scope of Congress’ competence under the Interstate Commerce Clause.63  In 
this sense, the Court’s phraseology was considered to underscore that even where clear 
federal legislative power existed, this did not automatically imply federal lawmaking 
power.64 At the very least, Erie signaled that federal courts were not general lawmaking 
courts that could formulate rules that fell beyond Congress’s purview, as had been the 
case under Swift.65   
 
 Still, the ambiguity pervading this point led to disagreement regarding Erie’s 
implications for the relationship between federal and state competence, especially in 
matters of private law.  On the one hand, Erie has been viewed by some as preserving the 
states’ primary role as “makers of private law”.66  On the other hand, Erie’s capability of 
defending areas of state competence from federal encroachment was perceived by others 
as exaggerated.67  Indeed, Erie wiped the slate clean of Swift “general common law” at 
the same time that it gave birth to the emergence of the so-called “new” American 
“federal common law”.68  As explained by Judge Henry J. Friendly (a former law clerk of 
Justice Brandeis) in a well-known article, Erie “cleared the way for the truly uniform 
federal common law on issues of national concern”, since unlike “general common law” 
formulated under Swift, post-Erie “federal common law” formulated by the US Supreme 
Court was truly federal law and was binding on the state and lower federal courts as a 
matter of the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution.69   In this way, Erie set into 
motion the ensuing course of American “federal common law” and signaled the end of 
judicial attempts to approximate state private law under Swift. Yet, it failed to resolve 
                                                 
62
 A. Hill, “The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution”, 53 Northwestern University Law Review 427, 445 
(1958) (emphasis added).   
63
 See, e.g., L. Weinberg, “Back to the Future: The New General Common Law”, 35 Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce 523, 524-525 (2004); Young, supra note 60, at 1658; further citations in Lenaerts and 
Gutman, supra note 7, at 31 n.175.    
64
 P.J. Mishkin, “The Variousness of ‘Federal Law’: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National 
and State Rules For Decision”, 105 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 797, 800 n.13 (1957).  See also 
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (“It is by no means enough that . . . 
Congress could under the Constitution readily enact a complete code of law governing [the subject matter 
of the case]. Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision 
for Congress.”). 
65
 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.  One scholar even posited that Justice Brandeis had important reasons for 
ignoring the “interstate” aspects of the case so as to make clear that lawmaking was to be dictated by the 
federal legislator, not the federal judiciary. See Purcell, supra note 26, at 172-177. 
66
 G.D. Brown, “Federal Common Law and The Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication – 
A (New) Erie Problem?”, 12 Pace Law Review 229, 251 (1992). 
67
 Field, supra note 22, at 888, 982.   
68
 Friendly, supra note 31, at 405. This is exemplified by the title of his article:  “In Praise of Erie – And of 
the New Federal Common Law” (emphasis added). 
69
 Id., at 384, 405; accord Field, supra note 22, at 897; T.W. Merrill, “The Common Law Powers of the 
Federal Courts”, 52 University of Chicago Law Review 1, 6 (1985); Weinberg,  supra note 11, at 838.  See 
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Although state courts, as well as federal courts, are able to fashion “federal 
common law” rules, there is a complex relationship between the state courts and the Supremacy Clause in 
this regard.  See A. Bellia, Jr., “State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law”, 153 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 825 (2005). 
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certain tensions concerning the relationship between federal and state competence within 
American “federal common law”, which are particularly evident in the field of contract 
law as discussed below. 
 
4.2.3 Illustrations of American “federal common law” in contract law 
By way of background, perhaps the one point of agreement among scholars about 
American “federal common law” is that its definition and scope remain fraught with 
ambiguity. As for its definition, aside from its general description as federal judge-made 
rules of law, there is no universal definition of American “federal common law” and a 
multitude of variations and nuances abound.70 As for its scope, the cases “reveal an 
extensive federal common law, of many different varieties, with no coherent unifying 
principle, and whose current boundaries remain uncertain”.71 Still, the US Supreme Court 
has established some important guidelines. In Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 
Inc.72, Chief Justice Berger elaborated, on behalf of a unanimous Court, the landmark 
ruling on the subject: 
 
 [T]he Court has recognised the need and authority in some limited areas to 
 formulate what has come to be known as ‘federal common law’. These 
 instances are ‘few and restricted’, and fall into essentially two categories: 
 those in which a federal rule of decision is ‘necessary to protect uniquely 
 federal interests’, and those in which Congress has given the courts the 
 power to develop substantive law. The vesting of jurisdiction in the 
 federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate 
 federal common law, nor does the existence of congressional authority 
 under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a common law to 
 govern those areas until Congress acts. Rather, absent some congressional 
 authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law 
 exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and 
 obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes  
 implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign  
 nations, and admiralty cases. In those instances, our federal system does 
 not permit the controversy to be resolved under state law, either because 
 the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are intimately 
 involved or because the interstate or international nature of the controversy 
 makes it inappropriate for state law to control.73  
 
By virtue of these “narrow areas”, the Court sought to confine American “federal 
common law” to certain specific categories, often referred to as “enclaves”74, although as 
                                                 
70
 See Lenaerts and Gutman, supra note 7, at 33-35. 
71
 Field, supra note 22, at 909. 
72
 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
73
 Id., at 640-641 (emphasis added). 
74
 This has continued through the Court’s recent jurisprudence:  see, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692, 726, 729 (2004) (referring to “havens of specialty” and “limited enclaves”); Atherton v. FDIC, 
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noted by scholars,  these enclaves are not considered to be exhaustive.75 Even so, as listed 
above, a core area of American “federal common law” concerns “the rights and 
obligations of the United States”, which provides cogent illustrations of federal 
lawmaking in the field of contract law. 
 
Starting with the landmark 1943 case of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States76, 
the US Supreme Court declared that, “[t]he rights and duties of the United States on 
commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law”, thereby 
necessitating the formulation of a “federal common law” rule.77  The use of state law was 
ruled out as “singularly inappropriate”, since subjecting the rights and duties of the 
United States to state law would lead to much uncertainty and diversity in results given 
the differences between state laws on the subject.78  As a result, the case established a 
firm rule for the use of American “federal common law” in federal contract cases. Even 
so, Clearfield Trust’s preference for a federal rule was criticised as wreaking havoc with 
intrastate uniformity, since it led to different regimes within a particular state depending 
on the type of contract concerned.79 
 
In subsequent cases, the Court chipped away at the Clearfield Trust rule, finding 
that it was inapplicable to certain private transactions.80  For example, in Parnell81, the 
Court held that a dispute between private parties involving the conversion of certain 
Government bonds were governed by state, not federal, law and that the rule in Clearfield 
Trust was not controlling because the dispute did “not touch the rights and duties of the 
United States.”82  The dispute represented “too essentially a private transaction not be 
dealt with by the local law of Pennsylvania where the transactions took place”.83  In 
dissent, Justice Black and Justice Douglas argued that the Clearfield Trust rule should 
apply to all transactions involving commercial paper of the United States and highlighted 
the problems created by the Court’s attempt to carve out certain matters for the 
application of state law:   
 
Federal law is to govern some portion of the dispute between private parties, 
while that portion of the dispute which is ‘essentially of local concern’ is to  
                                                                                                                                                 
rule would be justified . . . are . . . ‘few and restricted’”)(quoting O’Melveny and Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 
79, 87 (1994)). 
75
 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 53, at 473-474; Weinberg, supra note 11, at 812. 
76
 318 U.S. 363 (1943).   
77
 Id., at 366-367. 
78
 Id., at 367.  Somewhat ironically, the Court formulated a uniform federal rule to govern the case that was 
plucked from the “federal law merchant” developed under Swift, reasoning that, “while the federal law 
merchant developed for about a century under the regime of Swift v. Tyson represented general commercial 
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be governed by local law. The uncertainties which inhere in such a dichotomy  
are obvious. If the rule of Clearfield is to be abandoned as to some parties, it 
should be abandoned as to all and we should start afresh on this problem.84  
 
Thereafter, in Kimbell85, the Court ruled that the issue of priority of liens stemming from 
federal lending programmes was controlled by federal, not state, law, pursuant to 
Clearfield Trust.86  Yet, when it came time to formulate an American “federal common 
law” rule, the Court declined to do so, preferring that state law should be incorporated as 
the federal rule:  “Because the state commercial codes ‘furnish convenient solutions in no 
way inconsistent with adequate protection of the federal interest[s],’ we decline to 
override state laws of general applicability on which private creditors base their daily 
commercial transactions”.87  As a result, this case was viewed as embodying a preference 
for state law in commercial cases, one that was considerably fortified in the Court’s 
subsequent opinions in O’Melveny & Meyers88 and Atherton v. FDIC89. 
 
Recently, in Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh90, the Court ruled 
by a narrow 5-4 margin that the interpretation of a federal health insurance contract was 
not covered by the Clearfield Trust rule.91 In a critical dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, 
joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Alito, argued that the case fell squarely within 
Clearfield Trust and its progeny.92 He cited several reasons pursuant to Clearfield Trust 
to apply “federal common law” in this context, including the fact that the real party in 
interest was the United States; there was a need for uniformity in relation to the federal 
program concerned; and the provisions of the contract were “just a few scattered islands 
in a sea of federal contractual provisions”, which made it illogical to treat them 
differently under state law and would in fact lead to state-to-state variation.93   
 
In view of the foregoing, American “federal common law” in the field of contract 
law engenders tensions similar to that of European “federal common law” in this setting.  
First, American “federal common law” presents the ongoing challenge to ensure the 
application of uniform rules, here relating to federal contractual transactions, without 
unduly sacrificing the coherency of state law. For example, the Court’s elaboration of a 
concept of damages extending to non-material damages that was only recognised in 
some, not all, Member States in the Leitner case can be placed side-by-side with the US 
Supreme Court’s Clearfield Trust jurisprudence, which illustrated the overlap between 
American “federal common law” of federal contracts, on the one hand, and private 
transactions related to such federal contracts governed by state law, on the other.  
Together, these cases show the extent to which the interplay between “federal common 
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law rules” and the surrounding areas of state law often leads to problems of 
fragmentation and complexity in the area concerned.  Moreover, American “federal 
common law” also makes divergences among the state contract and commercial laws 
more apparent, as captured by the emphasis placed in Clearfield Trust and its progeny on 
evading the state-by-state variation for resolving contractual transactions involving the 
United States as a party.  In this way, akin to European “federal common law”, American 
“federal common law”, from its origins in Swift  through its development following Erie, 
could not by itself remedy the divergences among state contract laws. Indeed, even 
before the “new” brand of American “federal common law” was underway, attention had 
already turned to the legislative route at both the federal and state levels in the United 
States. 
 
4.3 The NCCUSL and the uniform law process 
4.3.1 General overview  
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the 
NCCUSL),  also referred to as the Uniform Law Commission (the ULC)94, is linked to 
the promulgation of uniform laws in the states, which is generally referred to the 
“uniform law process” or the “uniform state law movement”. The NCCUSL is a private 
organisation comprised of state commissioners from all fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and other US territories95, which is separate from the state and the federal 
lawmaking apparatus.96  The NCCUSL claims a quite distinguished list of members, 
which include former President Woodrow Wilson and several members of the US 
Supreme Court, such as former Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Louis 
Brandeis (author of the Erie opinion).97  As part of the overview of the NCCUSL and the 
uniform law process, three important points should be clarified at the outset.  These 
concern the meaning of uniform laws; the distinction between uniform laws and model 
laws; and the link between the NCCUSL and the American federal system.  
 
4.3.1.1 The meaning of uniform laws  
As enshrined in its constitution, the NCCUSL’s purpose is “to promote uniformity 
in the law among the several [s]tates on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and 
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practicable.”98  The NCCUSL does this primarily through the adoption of uniform acts, 
which are also called uniform (state) laws.   Uniform laws are essentially the “bread and 
butter” of the NCCUSL’s work, or at least what is generally known for in the United 
States.  To a lesser extent, the NCCUSL also promulgates model laws (or acts), which 
essentially require a lesser form of uniformity among the states.  Leaving the distinction 
between uniform and model laws aside for the moment, a uniform law is a special term of 
art to denote an act that is officially adopted by the NCCUSL for passage by the states.  
The NCCUSL certainly does not have the monopoly in this regard, and  uniform (and 
model) law have been used by other entities both inside and outside the United States.99   
 
Nevertheless, at least as the term is used in the context of the NCCUSL, a uniform 
law embodies certain distinct characteristics.  First, a uniform law is of a limited nature.  
It does not lay down comprehensive rules over an entire field of (private) law, but is 
primarily targeted at specific issues or subjects.  In other words, there has never been a 
general uniform law of contracts, but rather several uniform laws touching upon various 
aspects relating to contractual transactions. This highlights the distinction between a 
uniform law and the Uniform Commercial Code, which is a more comprehensive form of 
a uniform law as discussed further below.100 Moreover, the term, uniform law is 
somewhat misleading in the sense that it is not necessarily “uniform” or a “law” in the 
sense of a binding legislative enactment. A uniform law has no formal binding status in 
and of itself.  It receives its binding force only through its adoption by the states, thereby 
explaining the reference to uniform “state” laws.101  Once a uniform law has gone 
through the drafting process, it is officially adopted by the NCCUSL for recommendation 
to the various state legislatures with the hope that it will be taken up by the states in its 
“official” or at least substantially unamended form, thereby achieving greater uniformity 
among the respective states in the area concerned.  As one jurist famously put it, a 
uniform law becomes law “ex propio vigore”, meaning only if the substance of the act 
itself (along with the efforts of the commissioners as seen below) influences the 
respective state legislative authorities to pass it.102  Yet, there is no binding obligation on 
the states to do so.  It is purely up to each state concerned as to if, when and how a 
uniform law should be adopted.  This means that a state is free to disregard a uniform law 
completely or to change it as it sees fit by what are commonly called non-uniform 
amendments.  Depending on the extent and the degree of state variation, this can wreak 
havoc with the envisaged uniformity in the relevant area, which could explain why the 
term, uniform state law, has been called an “oxymoron in terms” on occasion.103  
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4.3.1.2 The distinction between uniform laws and model laws  
Over the years the reference to uniform and model laws in the European setting 
has become blurred, with scholars using model laws to refer to uniform laws promulgated 
by the NCCUSL (as well as the UCC), and uniform laws to refer to international 
conventions.104  This makes it confusing to understand which of the two types of acts are 
being referred to, especially when scholars are making analogies between the European 
and American settings.  This confuses the distinction between uniform laws and model 
laws strictly patrolled by the NCCUSL’s guidelines on its activities. 
 
The NCCUSL has adopted formal guidelines for its work, which set forth the 
criteria for, among other things, the designation of an act as either a uniform law or a 
model law.105  The difference between a uniform law and a model law essentially boils 
down to the prospect of uniformity sought by the act and the role to be played by the state 
commissioners.  First, an act is designated a uniform law if it is expected to be enacted in 
a large number of states and the uniformity of the provisions of the act is considered to be 
a principal objective.106  In contrast, in the case of a model law, uniformity may be a 
desirable, though not a principal, objective, and the act can minimise diversity or 
otherwise achieve its purpose even though it may not be adopted by a significant number 
of states in its entirety.107  For example, through the years, the model law category has 
come to include uniform laws that failed to garner significant adoption in the states.108 
Second, the distinction between a uniform law and a model law implicates the duties of 
the commissioners:  in the case of a uniform law, the commissioners are obliged to 
attempt to secure passage of the act in their state legislatures in “pure” unamended form, 
whereas in the case of a model law, the commissioners have no such duty other than 
supplying copies of the act to those interested in their respective state upon request.109 As 
such, uniform laws and model laws are not synonyms in the American setting, but 
embody important differences in the context of the NCCUSL. 
 
4.3.1.3 The NCCUSL and the American federal system 
 On the whole, one of the most important aspects of the NCCUSL and the uniform 
law process is their linkage to the American federal system. The NCCUSL and the 
uniform law process are equated with the objective to achieve uniformity among the laws 
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of the various states at the state, as opposed to federal, level.  In essence, recourse to 
uniform laws is considered an important “stronghold” of the states in preserving their 
competence in the areas concerned.110  It was therefore seen as the embodiment of  “unity 
out of diversity”111, as a way to let the diversity of the states flourish but at the same time 
to channel that diversity to ensure uniformity among the states in certain areas where 
needed.  As such, the uniform law process is viewed as a crucial part of maintaining the 
delicate balance between federal and state competence in matters of private law.112   
  
At the same time, however, it is important to recognise that from the beginning 
the NCCUSL embodied an ambiguous approach to issues of federal competence over 
such matters.  On the one hand, it is often repeated that an important theme underlying 
the creation of the NCCUSL was that it would strive for uniformity in areas that were 
considered to fall outside the scope of federal competence.113  On the other hand, the 
work of the NCCUSL through voluntary state action was originally conceived as a way to 
preempt federal regulation by making action at the federal level unnecessary114.  In other 
words, the uniform state law process was born out of fears of federalisation115.  This 
implies that the boundaries between federal and state competence was not so clear-cut.   
Regrettably, however, the NCCUSL never worked out an overarching theory as regards 
the division of matters that should be dealt with via uniform state legislation and those 
that were better handled via federal legislation.116  
 
At present, with the expansion of federal competence, this has made the absence 
of such a theory even more apparent and has begged important questions about the role of 
the NCCUSL and the uniform law process in an era in which it is commonly recognised 
that many of the NCCUSL’s uniform laws could very well be the subject of federal 
legislation. Yet, paradoxically, this has been viewed as giving new impetus to the 
NCCUSL because the uniform law process provides an alternative route apart from 
federal legislation and thus a “rallying point for the states against federal 
encroachment”.117  The uniform law process is also often viewed as the “first choice” 
over federal action because it has advantages of resources and experience at the state 
                                                 
110
 Heimanson, supra note 101, at 167.   
111
 W.P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Service: A Centennial History of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 14 (West, 1991).  For similar monikers, see, e.g., Bittker, supra 
note 22, at 94 (calling the NCCUSL “Task Force E Pluribus Unum”). 
112
 See, e.g., B. Overby, “Our New Commercial Law Federalism”, 76 Temple Law Review 297, 314-315 
(2003); A.J. Harno, “Uniform State Laws and the Federal System”, 2 Oklahoma Law Review 38 (1949).   
113
 See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 4, at 236-237; White, supra note 102, at 2100. 
114
 See Dunham, supra note 4, at 237; G.B. Young, “Uniform State Laws”, 8 American Bar Association 
Journal 181 (1922). 
115
 See W.A. Schnader, “Why the Commercial Code Should be ‘Uniform’”, 69 Commercial Law Journal 
117, 117 (1964); E.H. Taylor, Jr., “Foreword: Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law”, 11 Rutgers 
Camden Law Journal 527, 529 (1980); E.H. Taylor, Jr., “Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-
State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions”, 30 Hastings Law Journal 337, 339 (1978).  
116
 This was already alluded to in the early days of the NCCUSL:  see L. Brewster, “The Promotion of 
Uniform Legislation”, 6 Yale Law Journal 132, 138 (1897).  See also Dunham, supra note 4, at 237. 
117
 White, supra note 102, at 2102. 
Chapter 4:  The American Private Law Framework 
 
 120 
level so as to ensure a “smoother” fit within the state legal environment.118 That said, in 
recent decades, the NCCUSL has been confronted with particular challenges and 
opportunities, which have arisen in response to the interface between the federal, state, 
and international levels, which provide further reflection as to the role played by the 
NCCUSL in the American federal system. 
 
As regards the federal-state dynamic, it has been acknowledged that the action via 
the NCCUSL as opposed to action at the federal level is no longer an “all or nothing” 
game in which private law will be regulated either at the state level or preempted 
completely by federal legislation, but instead one of a complex interrelationship between 
the federal and state levels.  On various occasions, the Federal Government exhibits 
willingness to cooperate with the NCCUSL, rather than usurp its function. For example, 
it has turned to the NCCUSL to prepare uniform acts that complement federal policies or 
legislation.119  Congress may also defer to uniform state laws when it enters a particular 
field, thereby allowing the states to “opt out” of the relevant federal legislation provided 
that a similar uniform law is in place, but this is not free from controversy, since this has 
been viewed as a more subtle form of federal intrusion into state domains.120  
 
On the international level, the relationship between the NCCUSL and the Federal 
Government has also been steadily affected by the increasing number of international 
conventions concerning areas of state domain, especially private law. While this brief 
discussion cannot do justice to the issues (constitutional and otherwise) involved, suffice 
to say that the developments on the international plane pose further challenges to the 
viability of the uniform law process at the same time that it provides the NCCUSL with 
new opportunities to increase its presence in the international arena.121  In this way, the 
link between the NCCUSL and the American federal system means that it will continue 
to confront various issues related to the interplay between federal and state competence in 
matters of private law.  It was in fact the prospect of federalisation that prompted the 
creation of the NCCUSL in the first place. 
 
4.3.2 Origins of the NCCUSL 
The NCCUSL was founded in 1892 under the auspices of the American Bar 
Association (the ABA)122 amidst discussion of the need for greater uniformity in state 
law and at what level, state or federal, such action should be taken.  To put matters in 
perspective, the need for uniformity in state commercial law, including contract law, had 
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long been the subject of discussion since the founding of the American Republic and 
hence long before the advent of Swift v. Tyson in 1842.123  Against this background, when 
the ABA was founded in 1878, one of its principal objectives enshrined in its constitution 
was to “promote the administration of justice and uniformity of legislation throughout the 
Union”.124  At the ABA’s first meeting, a Committee on Commercial Law was set up to 
make suggestions to strengthen uniformity among the state laws in this area.125  It was not 
long until proposals were put before the Committee concerning federal bills unifying 
certain aspects of contract and commercial law.   
 
At the ABA’s annual conference in 1887, the Committee on Commercial Law 
issued a report concerning the need for federal legislation to regulate, inter alia, 
commercial transactions between the citizens of different states.126 The report 
recommended that Congress should adopt, pursuant to its competence under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause127, legislation concerning the regulation of bills of exchange and 
commercial paper.128  Although the federal legislation in these areas would only cover 
interstate matters, it was surmised that the states would enact the same provisions for 
intrastate transactions, and together, this would unify commercial law throughout the 
country.129  In the Appendix of the Committee’s report, there was a proposal for a Federal 
bill “to regulate commerce among the several States, and to codify the law relating to 
bills of exchange and other commercial paper”.130  This bill was called the Federal Bills 
of Exchange Act and included provisions concerning bills of exchange, checks, 
promissory notes, and other types of negotiable instruments used in interstate 
transactions.131 It had in fact already been introduced, without success, in the 48th 
Congress on 12 May 1884.132  Full discussion of this bill and the accompanying report 
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was held over to the ABA’s annual conference two years later in 1889.133  In the 
meantime, the need for federal legislation regulating commercial transactions continued 
to be discussed.134 
 
At the ABA’s 1889 annual conference, there was heated debate concerning the 
federalisation of commercial law based on the Commercial Law Committee’s previous 
report and the attached Federal bills of exchange act.135  As framed by the Committee’s 
chairman, George A. Mercer:  “I do not think anybody who reads that report can doubt 
the power of Congress in the matter. Therefore, the main question is about the propriety 
of Congress exercising this power.”136  It was in fact the Federal bill accompanying the 
report, rather than the report itself, which generated most of the attention as regards the 
role that should be played by the ABA vis-à-vis the legislative process.137.  Consequently, 
the ABA adopted a resolution affirming its approval of the report as it related to 
commercial transactions, but expressly stating that the ABA did not commit itself to the 
substance of the Federal bill.138 Interestingly, an amendment was put forward that would 
have explicitly affirmed Congress’ power to regulate interstate commercial contracts, but 
it was not approved.139 In 1890, this led to the introduction in Congress of a proposal for 
a Federal bills of exchange act, which was based on the Federal bill annexed to the 
Committee’s report140.  This bill died in committee.141  By that time, the tide had already 
turned to the prospect of state, as opposed to federal, action. 
 
At the ABA’s 1890 annual conference, Henry C. Tompkins submitted a paper 
entitled, “The Necessity For Uniformity in the Laws Governing Commercial Paper”.142 
Following a diatribe concerning the problems caused by the Swift doctrine143, Mr. 
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Tompkins concluded that there was a strong need for uniformity in the law governing 
commercial paper, but that such uniformity should come by way of state, not federal, 
action.144  The adoption of a commercial code by Congress was only a “partial remedy” 
in his view because Congress’ competence was strictly limited to interstate 
transactions.145 His reasoning in this regard is not altogether clear, but he seemed to argue 
that there was a substantial volume of intrastate transactions with interstate consequences 
that Congress was without power to regulate.146  As a result, he posited that legislation 
adopted by the states was the answer.  Although it would not be possible to get the states 
to adopt a complete commercial code all at once, procuring uniformity “by degrees” 
would be possible by getting the states to adopt statutes unifying particular issues on a 
gradual basis.147 
 
This idea coincided with the ongoing discussion over the past few years in certain 
states urging the creation of committees composed of state representatives charged with 
making recommendations as to uniform laws to be adopted by the states.148  This led to  
the adoption of a resolution at the ABA’s 1889 annual conference for the establishment 
of a Committee on Uniform State Laws containing a member of the ABA from each 
state, which would meet in a convention to consider the various state laws and to make 
appropriate recommendations.149  This resolution was presented by W. A. Collier and 
placed particular emphasis on achieving greater uniformity among laws of the states 
dealing with marriage and divorce, descent and distribution of property, acknowledgment 
of deeds, and the execution and probate of wills.150  
 
Consequently, at the 1890 annual conference, it was this ABA Committee on 
Uniform State Laws, appointed pursuant to Mr. Collier’s resolution, to which Mr. 
                                                 
144
 Id., at 260-262. 
145
 Id., at 262. 
146
 As he explained:  “Many negotiable notes and bills pass from the hands of the citizens in one State into 
those of another, upon which it is clearly not within the constitutional power of Congress to legislate. 
Hundreds of thousands, and even hundreds of millions, of dollars of paper made in one State and 
discounted in the banks of that State are re-discounted in the banks of other States every year. The 
regulation by act of Congress of such paper as that can scarcely be claimed under the power to regulate 
inter-state commerce, and certainly there is no other power given by the States to the Federal Government 
which would authorize such legislation.” Id. 
147
 Id., at 262-263. 
148
 See Armstrong, supra note 111, at 16-18.   
149
 ABA Annual Report 50-51 (1889).  This Committee was initially entitled one concerning “uniform state 
laws relating to wills, acknowledgments, divorce, etc.” (ABA Annual Report 96 (1889)); however, this 
gave way to the more general reference to “uniform state laws, etc.” (ABA Annual Report 11, 96 (1990)). 
150
 ABA Annual Report 50 (1889).  The Resolution read in full: 
 Recognizing the desirability of uniformity in the laws of the several states, especially those  
 relating to marriage and divorce, descent and distribution of property, acknowledgment of 
 deeds, execution and probate of wills; therefore be it 
 Resolved, That the President of this Association appoint a committee, consisting of one from 
 each state, who shall meet in convention at a time and place to be fixed by the President, and 
 compare and consider the laws of the different states relating to these subjects, and prepare and  
 report to this Association such recommendations and measures as will bring about the desired 
 result.   
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Tompkins’ paper was referred.151  This Committee submitted a report of its own, calling 
for a resolution on the passage by each state of an act similar to that which had recently 
been adopted in the State of New York establishing a board of “Commissioners for the 
Promotion of Uniformity of Legislation in the United States”.152  The idea was for the 
New York legislation to serve as a model to prompt the other states into action, albeit 
with certain changes as regards the topics that would covered.153 In addition to those 
topics appearing in the New York legislation, such as marriage and divorce, insolvency, 
and notarial certificates154, three additional topics were added that had appeared in Mr. 
Collier’s previous resolution (i.e., descent and distribution of property, acknowledgement 
of deeds, and the execution and probate of wills).155  To be clear, however, by following 
the model of the New York legislation, this resolution contemplated not a mere 
committee of the ABA as Mr. Collier’s resolution had done, but instead the formation of 
a separate body composed of commissioners on uniform state laws appointed by the 
various states.156 This resolution supporting the New York legislation was approved by 
the ABA on 21 August 1890, and work began on the establishment of the various 
commissions in the states.157 
 
At the next annual conference in 1891, the ABA Committee on Uniform State 
Laws issued a special report on the establishment of these state commissions on uniform 
state laws.158  The report contained discussion of the answers to five main questions that 
had been asked to the each member of the Committee.159 Apart from the first question 
                                                 
151
 ABA Annual Report 385 (1890).  As a side point, the interplay between Mr. Collier’s paper and the 
Committee on uniform state laws stimulated discussion because there had been a resolution, put forward by 
Mr. Samuel A. Champion, proposing that the uniformity of commercial paper should be reviewed by a 
special committee of the ABA set up for that purpose, rather than the Committee on Uniform State Laws.  
This proposal did not succeed, however.  See ABA Annual Report 9-12, 48-52 (1890). 
152
 Report of the Committee on Uniform State Laws, Appointed under Mr. Collier’s Resolution Adopted at 
Chicago, August 1889, ABA Annual Report 336 (1890). 
153
 See W.A. Schnader, Presidential Address “Fifty Years”, Handbook of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (hereinafter NCCUSL Handbook) 35, 36 (1940); W.L. Snyder, 
“The Problem of Uniform Legislation in the United States”, ABA Annual Report 289 (1892). 
154
 ABA Annual Report 336-337 (1890). 
155
 Id., at 337.   Surprisingly, contract and commercial law were not mentioned explicitly, although as seen 
below, this did not last for long.   
156
 As for the relationship between the former committee pursuant to the Collier resolution and the latter 
one modeled on the New York legislation, it was noted by the President:  “The Chair would remind the 
Association that the action taken yesterday contemplated following the lead of the State of New York in the 
act which it adopted. Practically, the labors of the committee appointed last year have been – I will not say 
superseded, but they have been materially lessened by the action which the Association has already taken.”  
ABA Annual Report 50 (1890). 
157
 ABA Annual Report 29-337 (1890). 
158
 Report of the Committee on Uniform State Laws, ABA Annual Report 365 (1891).   
159
 The five questions are listed as follows:   
1) What steps, if any, have been taken in your state (territory or district) toward the formation of 
a Commission on Uniformity of Laws? 
2) In what respects, if any, in your judgment, is a greater uniformity of the laws of the various 
states and territories desirable? (a) Marriage. (b) Divorce. (c) Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases. 
(d) Residence in same. (e) Descent. (f) Distribution. (g) Wills. (h) Probate. (i) Insolvency. (j) 
Notarial Certificates. (k) Commercial Paper. (l) Acknowledgment of Deeds. 
3) If greater uniformity is desirable, how far is it practicable? 
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concerning the progress on the formation of various commissions, the remaining four 
questions were targeted at issues regarding the utility of  the uniform state law process as 
opposed to federal action. Remarkably, some of the questions echoed matters voiced in 
the debate about European contract law, such as the desirability and the practicability of 
achieving greater uniformity in areas of state private law.  
 
In the report, primary focus was placed on the need for unifying contract and 
commercial law, as opposed to areas of family and succession law that were expected to 
meet with resistance in the states.160  There was also general agreement that the desired 
uniformity in these areas would be best secured by uniform state laws, not 
federalisation.161 In this regard, the Committee emphasised that such a systematic 
movement in the direction of uniformity among the states would preserve, not destroy, 
state autonomy and in fact “the proposed method of voluntary state action takes from the 
general government any excuse for absorbing powers now confined to the states.”162  It 
was conceded that proceeding by way of federal action would have the advantage of 
more complete uniformity and of permanency, but there were “insuperable difficulties” 
related to federal action that rendered this route “really out of the question”.163  As 
regards the commercial context, the argument seemed to rest on Congress’s apparent lack 
of federal competence in the relevant areas and the inability to deal with such matters 
sufficiently on the federal level.164 The incongruities with the previous assertion of 
federal competence in interstate transactions and the ABA’s support for federal 
legislation regulating bills of exchange went unaddressed.165  The report concluded with a 
motion for a resolution recommending the passage of acts in the various states to set up 
commissions on uniform state laws.166   The resolution was adopted by the ABA on 28 
August 1891167, which led to the birth of the NCCUSL.   
 
The first meeting of what was then called the “Conference of State Boards of 
Commissioners for Promoting Uniformity of Law in the United States” was held the 
                                                                                                                                                 
4) What special evils or inconveniences, if any, result in your state from the present want of 
uniformity? 
5) Could these inconveniences be adequately or considerably remedied by other methods?  
E.G. (1) By making the lex fore conform more nearly to the lex loci. (2) By statutory 
enactments broading the principle of comity as now recognized by the courts – such as the 
validation of foreign wills and deeds, if valid where executed. (3) By fuller recognition of 
extra territorial judicial appointments such as Receivers, Trustees and Executors. 
Id., at 365-366. 
160
 Id., at 366-367. 
161
 Id., at 366. 
162
 Id., at 370-371 (emphasis added). 
163
 Id., at 373-374. 
164
 Id., at 374. Most of the emphasis was laid on Congress’ lack of competence to unify state laws on 
marriage and divorce, with similar difficulties for national action recognised “in the other matters in 
question”, which seemingly included commercial matters.  Interestingly, the possibility of amending the 
US Constitution was contemplated in this regard, albeit the idea was not to confer upon Congress 
competence in the relevant areas, but rather to adopt so-called “prohibitory amendments” to ensure that the 
matters concerned would be left to the states.  Id.    
165
 See Bittker, supra note 22, at 92 n.20. 
166
 Report of the Committee on Uniform State Laws, ABA Annual Report 375 (1891). 
167
 ABA Annual Report 51-53 (1891).   
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following year in Saratoga Springs, New York for three days starting on 24 August 1892, 
which was considered the founding date of the NCCUSL.168  Seven states were 
represented at that first meeting.169   This was a very small percentage of the forty-four 
states, which then comprised the American Union.170  Over the years, additional states 
joined the NCCUSL, which came to include all of the states at that time, as well as most 
territories, by 1912.171  The report of the NCCUSL’s first meeting demonstrated the 
importance of the event by equating it to the US Constitutional Convention.172 
 
Incidentally, on the same day as the NCCUSL’s first meeting, a paper entitled 
“The Problem of Uniform Legislation in the United States” by William L. Snyder was 
read at the ABA’s 1892 annual conference.173  The paper underscored the importance of 
securing uniformity by way of voluntary action of the states, not the Federal 
Government.174 It set forth a somewhat novel plan for unifying several areas of state 
private law.  As regards state laws in the field of real property, Mr. Snyder advanced the 
possibility of using “alternative legislation”, namely that of optional uniform laws, which 
would provide uniform models co-existing alongside the particular forms in use in a 
                                                 
168
 See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 111, at 11. The NCCUSL underwent several name changes through the 
years, yet some variant of “uniform” has always remained.  At the 1896 meeting, the conference was 
officially designated the “Conference of Commissions on the Uniformity of Laws”. In 1905, it adopted its 
first constitution and by-laws and officially changed its name to “Commissioners on Uniform State Laws” 
which was used (despite efforts to change it in 1912) until 1915 when the present name of the “National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws” was adopted.  Id., at 27, 30.  
169
 The number of states present at the first NCCUSL conference has been subject to differing accounts. 
Several authoritative sources report that seven states (Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) were represented.  See, e.g., id., at 11; Schnader, “Fifty Years”, supra 
note 153, at 38; see also the NCCUSL’s website, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/. Some 
accounts peg the number at nine states, however.  See, e.g., W.B. Graves, Uniform State Action: A Possible 
Substitute for Centralization 34 (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1934); C. Rey, La Commission américaine 
d’uniformité des lois d’Etats 46 (M. Giard, 1927).  Yet, nine states do not seem to coincide with subsequent 
ABA Annual Reports, which account for the progressive appointment of state commissions.  For example, 
in 1893, eleven additional states joined, which added to the original eight (the seven plus Mississippi, 
which had appointed commissioners in 1892 but they had not attended the first conference:  Armstrong, 
supra note 111, at 11) made a total of nineteen states; if there were nine, the number would have been 
twenty, not nineteen.   
170
 Leaving aside the District of Columbia and other US territories, the six remaining states of the fifty that 
now comprise the United States, taking account of their accession dates – Utah (1896); Oklahoma (1907); 
New Mexico (1912); Arizona (1912); Alaska (1959); and Hawaii (1959) – would be admitted in the years 
following the 1892 conference.   
171
 The date of 1912 is pegged as the year in which the NCCUSL encompassed all of the then forty-eight 
states as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Alaska and Hawaii (which joined the NCCUSL in 
1912 and 1920, respectively, but did not accede to the American Union until 1959), as well as the 
Philippines.  See Report of the Forty-fourth Annual Conference of the NCCUSL, ABA Annual Report 692-
693 (1921). Subsequently when the Philippines was granted its independence, it left the NCCUSL.  See 
Schnader, “Why the Commercial Code should be ‘Uniform’”, supra note 115, at 118 n.2. The US Virgin 
Islands was the last to join the NCCUSL in 1988.  See Armstrong, supra note 111, Appendix D (listing the 
years in which each jurisdiction joined the NCCUSL). 
172
 See Armstrong, supra note 111, at 11 (“It is probably not too much to say that this is the most important 
juristic work undertaken in the United States since the adoption of the Federal Constitution”). 
173
 ABA Annual Report (1892), 7, 287-311.   
174
 Id., at 288. 
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particular state.175  For the fields of family, succession, and real property law, the relevant 
state laws would be incorporated into a “uniform statute”, which would contain in a 
systematic fashion the law as it then existed in the states.176  By contrast, for matters of 
contract and commercial law, the states would adopt an “inter-state commercial code”.177  
This would certainly not be the last time that the proposal for a uniform commercial code 
would be made in the American setting.  Yet, the idea of “alternative” uniform state laws 
never caught on in the work of the NCCUSL, even though in hindsight it certainly cast a 
glance to the use of optional instruments in the debate about European contract law over 
a century later. 
 
Ironically, despite the fact that the work of the NCCUSL is perhaps best known in 
the areas concerning commercial transactions, this was not the NCCUSL’s only focus.  
As seen above, the NCCUSL grew out of concerns for uniformity in matters of family 
law, real property, and succession law alongside that of contract and commercial law. In 
fact, the very first acts adopted by the NCCUSL dealt with wills and forms of 
acknowledgement in relation to conveyances of real property.178  Still, it was the field of 
commercial law, including contract law, for which the work of the NCCUSL yielded 
great success. With the establishment of the NCCUSL, several committees were 
appointed, which included one concerning commercial law that was responsible for the 
promulgation of several important uniform laws in this area.  In 1895, a request was put 
to this committee to prepare a bill relating to commercial paper based on the English Bills 
of Exchange Act and other relevant sources.179 This led to the drafting of the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Act (also referred to as the Negotiable Instruments Law or NIL) 
by Mr. John J. Crawford of the New York bar, which was thereafter adopted, with some 
amendment, by the NCCUSL in 1896.180 It was heralded as the first major attempt to 
secure uniformity of state commercial law in America.181 
 
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act did not stand alone for long, however.  
Professor Samuel Williston, a premier authority on American contract law from Harvard 
Law School, was soon charged with drafting four additional uniform acts in the 
commercial law field.182  Based upon his drafts, the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform 
Warehouse Receipts Act were adopted by the NCCUSL in 1906; the Uniform Bills of 
                                                 
175
 Id., at 293-294. 
176
 Id., at 289-290.   He set forth a substantive proposal in this regard:  see id., at 291-307, 309-311. 
177
 Id., 289-290, 307-309. 
178
 See Schnader, “Fifty Years”, supra note 153, at 38. 
179
  Id., at 39-40.   
180
 It is reprinted in C.T. Terry, Uniform State Laws in the United States, fully annotated (Baker, Voorhis 
and Co., 1920 & Supp. 1923). It included provisions on bills of exchange in general, as well as specific 
sections on promissory notes and checks.  
181
 Terry, supra note 180, at 17.  See also Schnader, “Fifty Years”, supra note 153, at 42 (“If it [the 
NCCUSL] had done nothing more than prepare the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, it would have 
fully justified its existence”). 
182
 For the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, Professor Samuel Williston was accompanied by Mr. Barry 
Mohun of the District of Columbia Bar. See W.G. Smith and M.D. Chalmers, “National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in  the United States”, 16 Journal of the Society of Comparative 
Legislation 154, 161 (1916).  
Chapter 4:  The American Private Law Framework 
 
 128 
Lading Act and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act came three years later in 1909.183 These 
acts were followed by the Uniform Conditional Sales Act in 1918, drafted by Professor 
George G. Bogert of Cornell Law School, and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in 1933, 
drafted by Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, then at Columbia Law School.184 This cadre of 
seven uniform acts are commonly grouped together because they established a set of 
uniform rules encompassing a substantial portion of commercial transactions in the 
United States, and together, they would lay significant groundwork for what would later 
become several Articles of the UCC.185   
 
In particular, as seen below, the Uniform Sales Act played a major role in 
providing the impetus for the UCC itself.186 Like the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Act, the Uniform Sales Act was also modeled after the relevant English statute, in this 
case the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893.187 Its object was to establish a uniform set of 
rules concerning the sale of goods.188 In particular, it contained a provision that sought to 
ensure the uniform interpretation of its provisions: “This act shall be so interpreted and 
construed, as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states 
which enact it.”189  This type of clause had started to be inserted in various uniform acts 
by the NCCUSL in order to counteract differing judicial interpretations of such acts.190 In 
the words of the US Supreme Court, such a clause was intended to ensure that the content 
of a uniform act would not merely be regarded as “an offshoot of local law” and that “the 
principle of the Uniform Act should have recognition to the exclusion of any inconsistent 
                                                 
183
  They are reprinted in Terry, supra  note 180. 
184
 They are reprinted in Terry, supra note 180.  Notably, Professor Karl Llewellyn also drafted the 
Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act, which was initially adopted by the NCCUSL in 1926 and then approved in 
amended form in 1927.  Presumably this Act is not included in with the rest because of its poor approval 
rate, i.e., it failed to be enacted by any state. See G. Gilmore, I Security Interests In Personal Property § 
4.4, at 99 (Little Brown and Co., 1965). 
185
 See, e.g., General Comment of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and 
the American Law Institute, Uniform Commercial Code 2008 Edition 2, 2-3 (Thomson West, 2008); R. 
Braucher, “The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code”, 58 Columbia Law Review 798, 799 
(1958); W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 273 (Willmer Bros. Ltd., 1973);  J.J. White 
and R.S. Summers, White and Summers’ Hornbook on the Uniform Commercial Code 2 (5th ed., Hornbook 
series, West, 2000). 
186
 See infra § 4.5.2. 
187
 See Armstrong, supra note 111, at 30. Yet, the linkage between the Uniform Sales Act and the English 
statute was not free from problems.  See, e.g., K. Llewellyn, “The Needed Federal Sales Act”, 40 Virginia 
Law Review 558, 558-559 (1940). 
188
 Terry, supra note 180, at 189. 
189
  See id., § 74 (“Interpretation Shall Give Effect to Purpose of Uniformity”). 
190
 In fact this coincided with the creation, in 1913, of a Committee on Uniformity of Judicial Decisions 
proposed by Mr. Charles Thaddeus Terry, President of the NCCUSL, in an effort to combat problems 
related to differing judicial interpretations of provisions of uniform acts.  See further J.A.C. Grant, “The 
Search for Uniformity of Law”, 32 American Political Science Review 1082, 1087 (1938); Rey, supra note 
169, at 122-128. In the most recent version of the NCCUSL Drafting Rules, available at the NCCUSL’s 
website, supra note 94, a “uniformity of application and construction” provision falls within the standard 
sections to be included in all uniform (but not model) acts so as to foster uniformity after the act’s 
enactment.  Rule 601 provides:  “In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given 
to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.”   
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doctrine which may have previously obtained in any of the states enacting it”.191 It thus 
revealed certain tensions underlying the uniform process law as regards the extent to 
which divergences among the states remained despite the existence of uniform acts. 
 
4.3.3 Tensions underlying the uniform law process 
 In the ensuing decades, various uniform laws were adopted by the NCCUSL in a 
wide array of areas for passage by the states.192 It was not long, however, before certain 
defects associated with uniform laws became apparent. In particular, such defects 
concerned the state-by-state enactment of uniform laws; the degree of state variation; and 
the need for revision. These defects were strongly voiced in the years leading up to the 
Uniform Commercial Code in order to demonstrate the need for such a Code.193  While 
the NCCUSL attempted to remedy these problems, they are nonetheless inherent in the 
nature of the uniform law process and of the utmost significance for assessing the 
effectiveness of uniform laws in achieving the envisaged uniformity in the area 
concerned both then and now. 
 
4.3.3.1 State-by-state enactment  
 First, there were problems relating to the varying acceptance rate of the uniform 
laws adopted by the NCCUSL in the several states.   For many acts in the commercial 
law field, they were considered “success stories”, but even then most were not accepted 
by all states and even if they were, it took several decades.  For example, from its 
promulgation in 1896, it took almost thirty years for all states to adopt the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Act and almost forty years for the Uniform Warehouse Receipts 
Act and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.194  Although never adopted by all states, the 
Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Bills of Lading Act both took at least thirty-five years to 
claim a substantial majority, and both the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and the 
Uniform Trust Receipts Act more than twenty years to do so.195  As the work of the 
NCCUSL progressed, several uniform laws only came to be passed in a few, sometimes 
only one or two, states at most.196   
 
4.3.3.2 State variation  
 Second, the extent of variation among the states in relation to the adoption and 
interpretation of the uniform acts posed significant problems.  State variations stemmed 
from both legislative and judicial causes:  uniform acts were subject to many non-
uniform amendments by the state legislatures in the process of their adoption, and the 
same provision of a uniform act was interpreted differently by the courts in each state.  
For example, as regards the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, there were non-
                                                 
191
 Commercial National Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520, 528-
529 (1915). 
192
 See generally Armstrong, supra 111.   
193
 See, e.g., R. Braucher, “The Progress of the Uniform Commercial Code”, 11 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 293, 294 (1962). 
194
 See Braucher, “The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code”, supra note 185, at 799. 
195
 Id. 
196
 See Schnader, “Fifty Years”, supra note 153, at 44-48.  
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uniform amendments pertaining to more than two-thirds of its sections and conflicts in 
judicial interpretation of about seventy-five sections.197 This degree of state variation via 
legislative and judicial means created additional layers of complexity on the American 
legal framework, thereby hindering the envisaged uniformity among the states. 
 
4.3.3.3 The need for revision  
 Finally, there were problems associated with the need to revise the uniform laws.  
For example, there were inconsistencies between the various uniform laws themselves 
that had to be addressed, and some uniform laws became obsolete and thus required 
replacement or substantial modification.  This resulted in a complex array of multiple 
versions of the same uniform law.  For example, in 1909 and 1922, the NCCUSL 
promulgated a series of uniform amendments relating to the Uniform Sales Act and its 
relationship with both the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and the Uniform Bills of 
Lading Act, but a vast number of states did not enact these amendments with the result 
that there were several versions of these uniform acts in force at the same time.198  The 
need for revision was particularly evident in the case of uniform acts such as the Uniform 
Sales Act, which had been drafted early in the history of the NCCUSL and hence with the 
subsequent expansion of commercial transactions in the United States, necessitated 
extensive amendment.199  With particular regard to the commercial field, the need for 
revision also highlighted the piecemeal nature of the uniform acts in the sense that they 
only covered certain “slices” of the commercial “pie”, and as such, their inconsistencies 
and overlaps made the need for a more coherent legal framework more apparent.  
 
Certainly, this is not to say that uniform laws were completely ineffective. They 
continue to serve as important means by which to achieve greater uniformity, both 
directly and indirectly, among state (private) laws in the United States.200  Nevertheless, 
as a result of these problems, complementary mechanisms came into view in the form of 
the ALI’s Restatement project and the Uniform Commercial Code.   
 
4.4 The ALI and the Restatement project 
4.4.1 General overview  
Like the NCCUSL, the American Law Institute (the ALI) is a  private, non-
governmental organisation201, which boasts a prestigious membership of lawyers, judges, 
and scholars throughout the United States and some foreign countries.202  The ALI was 
created in 1923 under the auspices of the Association of American Law Schools (the 
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 Braucher, “The Progress on the Uniform Commercial Code”, supra note 194, at 294. 
198
 W.E. McCurdy, “Uniformity and A Proposed Sales Act”, 26 Virginia Law Review 572, 584 (1940). 
199
 See infra § 4.5.2. 
200
 See Reimann, supra note 4, at 227. 
201
 Unlike the NCCUSL which is unincorporated, the ALI is a non-profit corporation. It was founded and 
incorporated under the law of the District of Columbia, but its headquarters are in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
202
 For detailed information as regards the membership and structure of the ALI, see its website, 
http://www.ali/org. This website provides a comprehensive bibliography of publications on the ALI and its 
various works, available at http://www.ali/org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.bibliography. 
Chapter 4:  The American Private Law Framework 
 
 131 
AALS).203 Specifically, the ALI grew out of discussions which took place at several 
AALS meetings concerning “the existing dissatisfaction with the law and its 
administration and a recognition of a growing feeling among the members of the legal 
profession that the bar owed a duty to the public to improve the administration of 
justice”.204 The improvement of the law and the administration of justice are fundamental 
themes underpinning the ALI’s activities205, which include but are not limited to the 
Restatements.  This calls to mind three important aspects concerning, first, the work of 
the ALI; second, the Restatement project; and most importantly, the meaning of the term 
“Restatement” itself. 
 
4.4.1.1 The work of the ALI 
 As a general matter, the ALI carries out various types of projects in line with its 
overarching mandate to improve the law and the administration of justice, which 
generally comprise three categories concerning Restatements, model codes (as well as 
other types of statutory proposals), and Principles.206  Leaving aside the Restatements for 
the moment, model codes are used somewhat generically to cover both model and 
uniform codifications, such as the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC), a joint 
endeavor of the ALI and the NCCUSL, and the Model Penal Code, which was adopted 
by the ALI alone, both of which are not law themselves but whose provisions, all or in 
part, have been adopted or exerted great influence in the states.207  Compared to the 
Restatements and model codes, the Principles category is of more recent vintage, starting 
up in the late 1980s and 1990s, and increasingly concerns subjects of international 
relevance, such as the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure that was co-sponsored 
by the ALI and UNIDROIT.208  As framed by the ALI, there are differences between 
model codes and Principles as regards their respective aims in bringing about the 
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 The AALS is a nationwide association founded in 1900 with the purpose to improve the legal profession 
through legal education.  See its website, http://www.aals.org/. 
204
 G.W. Wickersham, “The American Law Institute and the Projected Restatement of the Common Law in 
America”, 43 Law Quarterly Review 449, 449 (1927). Mr. George W. Wickersham was not only involved 
in the meetings that led to the creation of the ALI, but also served as the ALI’s first president from 1923 to 
1936.  See The American Law Institute Seventy-Fifth Anniversary 1923-1998 322 (ALI, 1998) (hereinafter 
Seventy-Fifty Anniversary). 
205
 The ALI’s Charter (available at http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.charter) provides in 
relevant part:  “The particular business and objects of the society [the ALI] are educational, and are to 
promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the 
better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work”.   
206
 The ALI also carries out a wide variety of statutory proposals, studies and projects as well as continuing 
legal education in conjunction with the ABA. See the ALI’s website, supra note 202.  For general 
discussion of the development of the ALI’s work within and beyond these three categories, see Seventy-
Fifth Anniversary, supra note 204, particularly J.P. Frank, “The American Law Institute: 1923-1998”, 
supra, 3; and N.E.H. Hull, “Back to the ‘Future of the Institute’: William Draper Lewis’s Vision of the 
ALI’s Mission During Its First Twenty-Five Years and the Implications for the Institute’s Seventy-Fifth 
Anniversary”, supra, 105.   
207
 For further discussion of the Model Penal Code and other model codes, see the comprehensive 
bibliography on the ALI, supra note 202. As regards the UCC, see infra § 4.5. 
208
 See M. Traynor, “The First Restatements and the Vision of the American Law Institute, Then and 
Now”, 32 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 145, 165-169 (2007). See the ALI’s website, supra note 
202, for a complete list of its projects and ongoing developments. 
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envisaged improvements to the law in the area concerned:  model codes are addressed 
mainly to legislative authorities with a view to their enactment, whereas Principles are of 
somewhat wider ambit, with the aim to provide guidance to legislative, judicial, and other 
institutional authorities depending on the area concerned.209 In truth, there is some 
overlap between the two, and in practice, it is sometimes difficult to make a clear 
theoretical distinction between them.  Nonetheless, taken together, the ALI’s work on 
model codes and Principles signal that the ALI is engaged in projects that are directed in 
varying degrees at bringing about legislative or statutory change, whether at the state, 
federal, or international level.  In this way, they provide a notable contrast with the 
objectives underlying the Restatement project. 
 
4.4.1.2 The Restatement project 
Notwithstanding the ALI’s other tasks, the Restatements undoubtedly remain one 
of the ALI’s signature products. The Restatement project denotes the series of 
Restatements published by the ALI covering discrete fields of American law.  
Restatements are commonly associated with subjects of private law, such as contracts, 
but they are not limited to such.210 To date, there have been three series of 
Restatements.211  Each Restatement is the result of collective deliberation by the ALI 
membership under the helm of one or more Reporters who are responsible for drafting 
the provisions of a Restatement.212  In fact, depending on the particular subject, some 
Restatements have been subdivided into specific topics.213  
 
4.4.1.3 The meaning of a Restatement 
In the American setting, the word, “Restatement”, is a term of art generally 
equated with the ALI.  In basic terms, a Restatement denotes a set of rules that aims to 
synthesise a particular field of American law in clear and simple language.214 The 
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 See the ALI’s website, supra note 202.  See also G.C. Hazard, Jr., The American Law Institute: What it 
Is and What it Does 4 (Centro di studie e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero, 1994). 
210
 For example, there are Restatements on the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and the Law 
Governing Lawyers.  For a comprehensive list, see the ALI’s website, supra note 202. 
211
 At present, the ALI is working on the Restatement Third series, although for certain topics such as 
contract law, the Restatement Second remains applicable. The possibility of a Restatement Fourth series 
has been contemplated.  See Traynor, supra note 208. 
212
  For example, with respect to the First Restatement of the law of contracts, Professor Samuel Williston 
of Harvard Law School served as the Reporter, but thereafter Professor Arthur L. Corbin of Yale Law 
School was appointed as a Special Reporter for the Chapter on remedies.  As regards the Second 
Restatement of the law of contracts, Professor Robert Braucher of Harvard Law School served as Reporter 
for the first half of the project until January 1971 when he was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts; Professor E. Allan Farnsworth of Columbia Law School was then appointed as Reporter 
until the completion of the project.  Albeit not a Reporter, Professor Arthur L. Corbin served as a consultant 
on the Second Restatement until his death in 1967.  As regards the drafting, revision and approval process 
of a Restatement, see the ALI’s website, supra note 202. 
213
 Torts and property are notable examples, since aside from the general volume, there are additional 
volumes concerning specific subjects. For torts, there are specific volumes on apportionment of liability, 
liability for physical harm, and products liability; for property, there are specific volumes on landlord and 
tenant, donative transfers, wills and other donative transfers, mortgages, and servitudes. 
214
 See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 209, at 7  (“they are the product of collective deliberation by recognized 
authorities, endeavoring to synthesize the decisions of courts into clear, consistent and concise language”); 
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function of a Restatement is essentially to “restate” in clear terms what the law is in the 
area concerned.  As framed by Mr. William Draper Lewis, a prominent figure of the ALI, 
[t]the best short description of the Restatement is to say that it is an attempt to give 
orderly expression to the common law” of the United States.215   A Restatement is mostly 
concerned with the decisions of the courts in the relevant area (i.e., common law), but it 
does take account of certain statutory law.216   
 
In the United States, a Restatement has certain distinctive characteristics relating 
to its form and its authoritative status.  First, whatever be the subject, each Restatement 
follows a similar format.  At present217, each Restatement is organised into a series of 
chapters containing various sections, which in turn generally comprise the following four 
components: the Black-letter rule; the Comment, one or more Illustrations; and the 
Reporter’s Note. The Black-letter rule contains the principle or rule of law being 
expounded.218  The Comment provides explanation of the rule concerned and cross-
references to other provisions of the same or other Restatements.  The Illustrations 
provide examples of the application of the rule.  The Reporter’s Note, which was only 
added to the Restatements starting with the second series, sets forth the background and 
the context of the rule, a listing of authoritative sources including the relevant citations to 
case law, statutory enactments and treatises, and any modifications or new additions as 
compared to that in the previous series of Restatements. While this information may seem 
banal, the structure of the Restatement is often used as a point of similarity in relation to 
the work of several academic projects involved in the debate about European contract 
law. Second, as for its status, a Restatement does not constitute binding law in any 
jurisdiction of the United States.  In principle, a Restatement has only persuasive 
authority in the sense that the excellence and the quality of its draftsmanship influence 
the courts to follow it.219  In other words, it is non-binding.  In this way, a Restatement 
                                                                                                                                                 
W.D. Lewis, “History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement of the Law – ‘How We Did 
It’”, in Restatement in the Courts, Permanent Edition 1932-1945 1, 19 (ALI, 1945) (“clear statements of 
the rules of the common law today operative in the great majority of our States, expressed as simply as the 
character of our complex civilization admits”). 
215
 Statement of William Draper Lewis to the ABA, ABA Annual Report 272 (1924).  William Draper 
Lewis was the ALI’s first Director from 1923-1947.  See Seventy-Fifty Anniversary, supra note 204, at 324. 
As regards his important role in the creation and development of the ALI, see publications listed infra note 
221. 
216
 This was assumed from the beginning:  see infra notes 231-232 and accompanying text. 
217
 Originally, the First Restatement series was envisaged to be accompanied by comments, illustrations, 
and treatises so as to provide a set of authoritative sources, but the treatise idea was soon dropped and 
Reporters’ Notes were added later.  See Frank, supra note 206, at 3.  The progression from the First to the 
Second Restatement of Law series on contracts exemplifies the changes in form in the Restatement project.  
See H. Wechsler, “Foreword”, in Restatement (Second) of Contracts VII (ALI, 1979).  
218
  Notably, many publications refer to both principles and rules of law in this regard, but the distinction 
between these two in the context of the Restatement project has not been subject to detailed examination, at 
least as far the present author can see.  This may explain in part why many commentators, as well as the 
ALI itself, rely on generic language such as black-letter “formulations”:  see the ALI’s website, supra note 
202. Yet, for a recent explanation of the so-called “rules versus standards” debate generally with respect to 
the ALI’s work, see Traynor, supra note 208, at 163.  
219
 However, in certain jurisdictions such as the US Virgin Islands, the Restatements have been adopted as 
the controlling authority. See further K.D. Adams, “The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the 
Restatement Movement”, 33 Hofstra Law Review 423 (2004). 
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and a uniform law of the NCCUSL differ fundamentally. Both are non-binding sources, 
but while a uniform law is contemplated to become binding law when adopted by the 
state legislatures, a Restatement is not envisaged to be incorporated into a legislative 
enactment.   
 
 While the Restatement project is firmly ingrained within the work of the ALI, this 
does not mean that the term, “Restatement”, cannot be used outside the United States in 
other jurisdictions, such as the European Union. Generically, a Restatement can be used 
to denote a set of rules or principles purporting to synthesise the law of a particular area. 
In other words, it does not necessarily lose its efficacy if it is dissociated from the 
American setting.  At the same time, however, there remain certain challenges in doing 
so. This stems from the fact that in relying on the term, “Restatement”, certain 
assumptions may automatically be made, particularly when the use of this term is said to 
be linked to the ALI and the Restatement project.  One such assumption is that there are 
principles and rules that do in fact exist and can be “restated” in a clear and coherent 
form. Another assumption is that the recourse to a Restatement implies the use of non-
binding law.  Thus, it becomes confusing when a Restatement is used to denote the 
formulation of principles and rules that are envisaged to become a binding instrument 
enacted at the European level, as illustrated by certain academic projects involved in the 
debate about European contract law discussed in a forthcoming chapter.220  This 
demonstrates that the use of the term, “Restatement”, is liable to provoke tensions that are 
already apparent in the United States and may “pop up” in other settings in which the 
term is employed.  Thus, while the term is useful, there should be caution in making the 
choice wisely. In fact, this argues for a terminological distinction, used here, as regards to 
the notion of “Restatement” in its pure form associated with the ALI, as opposed to a 
more functional sense laying claim to its methodological aspects, which seems to be the 
way in which the academic community is utilising the term in the European setting.  This 
also points to the importance of understanding the origins of the Restatement project in 
the United States. 
 
4.4.2 Origins of the ALI and the Restatement project 
The ALI was founded in 1923 on the basis of a Report presented by a group of 
prominent judges, lawyers, and scholars known as “The Committee on the Establishment 
of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law” at a meeting in 
Washington, D.C. attended by several hundred leaders of the bench, the bar, and law 
schools from all over the country.221  There has been much debate about the intentions of 
the ALI’s founders in terms of the extent to which they aimed to reform American law.222  
                                                 
220
 See Chapter 5, § 5.2.  
221
 Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the 
Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, in Seventy-Fifth Anniversary, supra note 
204, at 173 (hereinafter ALI Report).  It can also be found in The American Law Institute Fiftieth 
Anniversary 1 (ALI, 1973). There were in fact several events that set the scene for ALI’s founding. For 
detailed discussion, see generally Seventy-Fifth Anniversary, supra note 202, H.F. Goodrich and P.A. 
Wolkin, The Story of the American Law Institute (ALI, 1961); Lewis, “How We Did It”, supra note 214.     
222
 See, e.g., “Symposium: Did the First Restatement Adopt a Reform Agenda?”, 32 Southern Illinois 
University Law Journal 1 (2007); N.E.H. Hull, “Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the 
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Nevertheless, the express reference to the “improvement of the law” in the title of this 
Committee was central to the ALI’s creation. The Committee’s report recommended that 
the ALI should be established in order to remedy what were considered to be the two 
“chief defects” of American law:  its uncertainty and its complexity.223 The law’s 
uncertainty was caused by many factors, including the lack of agreement among lawyers 
as to the fundamental principles of the common law, the lack of precision in the use of 
legal terminology, conflicting and badly drawn statutes, and the rising volume of reported 
decisions.224  The law’s complexity was attributed to its lack of systematic development 
and to the widespread variation in the law of the different jurisdictions, state and federal, 
in the United States, among other things.225  On that basis, the Committee recommended 
the creation of an organisation known as the “American Law Institute” with the primary 
objective “to enable the legal profession in America to carry out its public obligation to 
improve the law”.226  This Report was widely received, and the ALI was born.   
 
The origins of the ALI were joined with that of the Restatements.  Alongside its 
recommendations on the establishment of the ALI, the Committee’s Report set forth the 
need for a “Restatement of the Law”, which was envisaged to remedy the uncertainties 
and complexities plaguing American law and thus “will do more to improve the law than 
any other thing the legal profession can undertake”.227  The Report suggested that the first 
task of the ALI should be to produce a Restatement of Law in several areas and set forth 
some general outlines as to how to go about this.  In particular, it underlined three points 
concerning the purpose, the authoritativeness, and the representativeness of the 
Restatement project. 
 
First, the purpose of a Restatement was not only “to help make certain much that 
is now uncertainty and to simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those 
changes which will tend better to adapt the laws to the needs of life”.228  A Restatement 
was viewed in terms of three characteristics:  analytical, critical and constructive.229  It 
would be “analytical” in the sense that each topic would be treated analytically, rather 
than historically, and based on a definite classification of the law as the result of thorough 
                                                                                                                                                 
Origins of the American Law Institute”, 8 Law and History Review 55 (1990) (reprinted in Seventy-Fifth 
Anniversary, supra note 204, 49)). 
223
 ALI Report, supra note 221, at 184. The ALI Report was divided into two main parts.  The first part 
concerned the Committee’s recommendations for the establishment of the ALI and the Restatement project. 
The second part was devoted to the consideration of the law’s uncertainty and complexity, which laid the 
foundations for the Committee’s recommendations in the first part of the Report.   
224
 Id., at 86-189, 225-233. 
225
 Id., at 233-239.  To be complete, the Report underscored that varying law in different jurisdictions 
caused both uncertainty and complexity:  see id., 240-249.   In fact, it underlined that variations among 
state private substantive law were more likely to increase uncertainty and complexity of the law than 
variations in administrative and other public law:  see id., at 249. 
226
  Id., at 210. 
227
 Id., at 194.  Indeed, the first part of the Report concerning the Committee’s recommendations was 
primarily taken up with the development of the Restatements of which the definitive proposal for the ALI 
came later and comprised a much smaller chunk.  See id., at 189-223.   
228
 Id., at 190. 
229
 Id. 
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study by a group of qualified persons.230  It would be “critical” in the sense that it would 
be more than a mere collection and comparison of statutes and court decisions or an 
exposition of existing law as in a treatise or encyclopedia, but instead provide an 
extensive examination of legal theory, including the reasons and uncertainties related to 
the law concerned.231  Lastly, it would be “constructive” in two senses: first, while 
necessarily based to a large extent on the two official sources of law, statutes and 
decisions, it should not be confined to examining and setting forth the application law but 
should also take account of situations not yet discussed by the courts or dealt with by the 
legislatures; and second, where the law was uncertain or where there were differences in 
the law of different jurisdictions, the Restatement would set forth what was believed to be 
the proper rule of law.232  This indicated that a Restatement would not merely “re-state” 
the law, but would also set forth certain changes in the law where necessary.  In the 
Report, there were certain areas in which making changes in the law by way of a 
Restatement was considered inappropriate, e.g., those involving matters of general public 
concern.233  But for the most part, a Restatement would be focused on changes in the law 
for the purposes of either simplifying the law where it was unnecessarily complex or 
adapting it so that it was better able to accomplish its objectives.234  As a consequence, a 
Restatement was conceived from the beginning as a “theoretical hybrid” between a 
neutral exposition of the law “as it is” (descriptive approach) and a statement of 
preference or recommendation as to what the law “ought to be” (prescriptive or 
normative approach).235 It is this dichotomy that lies at the root of certain tensions 
underlying the Restatement method in the United States, as discussed below. 
 
Second, as for authoritativeness, the Committee’s Report expressly emphasised 
that a Restatement should not take the form of a code, i.e., it should not prepared with a 
view to adoption by the state legislatures or Congress as a binding statutory enactment.236  
This stemmed from fears that to do so would jeopardise the flexibility and the “fullness 
of detail” of the common law.237 In this regard, the Report compared the Restatements 
with uniform laws of the NCCUSL in the field of commercial law.  The lack of flexibility 
in uniform laws were viewed as a “distinct gain” since it was more important for the law 
to be certain and to remedy the divergences among the laws of the states in the areas 
concerned.238 In contrast, a Restatement was to be considered a highly persuasive legal 
authority emanating from a preeminent private body, that of the ALI, but it should not 
have the force of law itself.239   
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 Id. at 191. 
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 Id. 
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 Id., at 191-192. 
233
 Id., at 192. 
234
 Id., at 193. 
235
 Twining, supra note 185,  at 274. 
236
 ALI Report, supra note 221, at 201. See also section entitled “Legislative Enactment of the Restatement 
as  a Code of Law Not Desirable”:  id., at 197-199. 
237
 Id., at 198. 
238
 Id., at 200. 
239
 Id. The Report surmised, however, that even if the principles of law set forth in the Restatement would 
not be adopted as a formal code, it was not impossible that they could be adopted by state legislatures “with 
the proviso that they shall have the force of principles enunciated on the basis of the decisions of the 
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Finally, the representativeness of the ALI was linked to the Restatement project.  
The Committee’s Report considered that an important attribute of the ALI was that it 
would be a “representative gathering” of the American legal profession, which included 
judges, lawyers, and scholars.240  This was crucial to bestowing the Restatement project 
with its persuasive authority, since “any [R]estatement of the law to acquire the authority 
necessary to enable it to accomplish results of importance, must be undertaken by an 
organization representative of all branches of the legal profession.”241  Certainly, much 
responsibility for the content of the Restatements would be placed on the shoulders of the 
legal scholars, but it was the triumvirate of the bench, bar, and academia that was deemed 
decisive to the success of the Restatement project.242 
 
Though espoused in 1923, the Committee’s Report served as an “amazingly 
durable blueprint”243 of the Restatement project for the forthcoming years.  On the whole, 
the Report underlined the importance and the distinctiveness of the Restatement project 
on the face of American law.  The Restatements were conceived as a novel mechanism to 
overcome the failure of the courts and the legislatures as instruments for the 
simplification and unification of American law.244  Tellingly, the Report paid heed to the 
defects stemming from the uniform law process of the NCCUSL.245 The Restatements 
therefore embodied a third route apart from the traditional judicial and legislative means 
in American (private) law. The Report was also instrumental in highlighting that the 
ALI’s Restatements and the NCCUSL’s uniform laws served different but related 
purposes. In contrast to the NCCUSL and the uniform law process, the Restatements 
were not fixated on the adoption of uniform substantive law provisions in the various 
states, but rather on more scientific aspirations for achieving greater clarification, 
simplification, and modernisation of American law. Certainly, this is not to say that 
uniformity was not an important goal of the Restatements246, but to some extent, concerns 
for uniformity were overshadowed by these other aspirations, e.g., in cases where the 
“best” rule chosen for a particular issue did not necessarily coincide with the rule 
followed by the majority of the states.247  In this way, the Report foreshadowed certain 
perennial tensions underlying the Restatement project. 
                                                                                                                                                 
highest court of the state, the courts having power to declare modifications and exceptions”.  Ultimately, 
however, the Report put this matter off without committing to it.  See id., at 198-199.   
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 Id., at 206-209.  This is further reflected in the classes of membership of the ALI.  See the Rules of 
Council (as adopted in 2007 and further amended), available at http://www.ali.org/doc/rules_council.pdf,  
Rule 2 (Institute Membership). 
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 ALI Report, supra note 221, at 205. 
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 Report, at 205.  
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 Frank, supra note 206 , at 11. 
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 See Twining, supra note 185,  at 275-276. 
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 References to problems with the uniform law process of the NCCUSL were made several times in the 
Report.  See ALI Report, supra note 221, at 193-194, 215-217, 250-251. As for the Swift doctrine, it 
appeared in a specific section devoted to factors tending to unify American law, but interestingly, it was not 
mentioned by name, and the tenor of much of the discussion seemed to counteract the power of the federal 
courts over state common law.  See id., at 252-253.   
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 L.M. Friedman and G. Teubner, “Legal Education and Legal Integration: European Hopes and 
American Experience”, in 1 Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience 345, 
361 (M. Cappelletti et al. eds, de Gruyter, 1986). 
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 In this regard, scholars have emphasised that the Restatements largely reflect, as opposed to creating, 
uniformity in the area concerned. See , e.g., Eisenberg, “Why is American contract law so uniform? – 
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4.4.3 Tensions underlying the Restatement project 
 It is surely no understatement to say that the ALI and the Restatements have 
beckoned their fair share of controversy over the years. Three tensions underlying the 
Restatement project in the United States stand out for the purposes of this discussion 
because they provide salient reflection with the debate about European contract law in the 
European Union.  These tensions concern the longstanding controversy between restating 
the law “as it is” versus “as it ought to be”; the link between the Restatements and 
codification; and the impact of the Restatement project. 
 
4.4.3.1 Restating the law “as it is” versus “as it ought to be” 
 As noted above, from their inception in 1923, the Restatements were envisaged 
not only to provide a clear and concise synthesis of existing law “as it is”, but also to 
make clear what was believed to be the best solution for the issue concerned or the law 
“as it ought to be”.  Yet, through the course of their development, the Restatements 
continued to beckon much discussion as to whether or to what extent they should embody 
a descriptive statement of the law “as it is” as opposed to a normative statement of the 
law “as it ought to be”.248  For example, the progression from the First to the Second 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts provoked critical remarks regarding the extent to 
which normative goals had been incorporated into the Restatement project, which lead 
one scholar to argue that the Restatements should be called something else. 249    
 
  In response to this criticism, commentators have stressed that there is a very fine 
line between restating existing law as opposed to modernising it, and in fact, the two are 
very much interrelated.250  As Professor Herbert Wechsler, then Director of the ALI, 
explained in a well-known publication, the “as it is” versus  the “as it ought to be” 
dichotomy was superficial because both were equally part of reaching a decision as to 
what the law was in a particular area, and as such, part of the role of a Restatement was 
bring “continual refreshment” of the law. 251  On that basis, he neatly framed the 
approach taken by the Restatements’ drafters as follows:  “we should feel obliged in our 
                                                                                                                                                 
National law in the United States”, supra note 2; A. Rosett, “Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, 
Codification and Reform in International Commercial Law”, 40 American Journal of Comparative Law 
683, 693 (1992). 
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 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 219, at 437-439 (and further citations therein); Frank, supra note 206, at 
10. 
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 W.N. Keyes, “The Restatement (Second); Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal for Its Amelioration”, 
13 Pepperdine Law Review 13, 25 (1985).  In fact, this scholar took issue with Professor Ole Lando, 
Chairman of the Commission on European Contract Law (see Chapter 5, § 5.2.1) because of his assumption 
that the Restatement project still purported to set forth the existing American law: see id., at 25 n.6.  But 
compare the remarks of another scholar in the same Symposium issue: J.W. Wade, “The Restatement 
(Second): A Tribute to its Increasingly Advantageous Quality, and an Encouragement to Continue the 
Trend”, 13 Pepperdine Law Review 59 (1985). 
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 See, e.g., E. Rabel, “A Draft of an International Law of Sales”, 5 University of Chicago Law Review 
543, 563-564 (1938) (framing matters as between a “Scylla and Charybdis”). 
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 H. Wechsler, “Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement Work of the 
American Law Institute”, 13 St. Louis University Law Journal 185, 194 (1968). Professor Herbert 
Wechsler of Columbia Law School served as the Director of the ALI for almost twenty years (1963-1984). 
See Seventy-Fifth Anniversary, supra note 204, at 324. 
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deliberations to give weight to all of the considerations that the courts, under a proper 
view of the judicial function, deem it right to weigh in theirs. . . . In judging what was 
right, a preponderating balance of authority would normally be given weight,  . . . but it 
would not be thought to be conclusive.”252  This standard became an important 
figurehead in the work of the ALI, symbolising that the Restatement project seeks to 
follow the law whenever possible but would diverge where necessary in line with its aim 
to improve the law.253    
 
Arguably, this tension between the descriptive and normative approach of the 
Restatement project may never be completely resolved. As a tribute of the longstanding 
nature of this controversy, at the 2007 Annual Conference, the ALI’s current Director, 
Professor Lance Liebman, contemplated six important questions for the future of the ALI, 
one of which concerned the extent to which a rule enunciated in a Restatement could vary 
from existing law.254 Nonetheless, it is a important reminder of the tensions that 
inevitably accompany projects that stand at the boundary line between “restating” the law 
and choosing the “best” rule that should be applied under the circumstances.   
 
4.4.3.2 The Restatements and codification 
 The connection between the Restatement project and the codification of American 
law has also been a topic of great debate.  This was so, even though as already mentioned 
the “framers” of the ALI negated the possibility that the Restatements would take the 
form of a code, i.e., a comprehensive legislative enactment adopted either at the state or 
federal level.255 The debate usually centers around three main positions in the 
commentary, which view the Restatement project either as a defense of the common law 
against codification; as a substitute for codification; or as a transition to codification.256  
This topic was no doubt encouraged by the fact that the form and the objectives 
embodied by the Restatements as setting out the law in systematic and generalised 
fashion bore much resemblance to that sought by codification.257  
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 Id., at 190 (emphasis added). 
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 In fact, this so-called “working formula” motivates the ALI’s work beyond the Restatement project, and 
as a tribute to its importance, is framed in the ALI’s meeting room.  L. Liebman, Report of the Director, 
American Law Institute Annual Report 2007, available at the ALI’s website, supra note 202, at 2.   
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 Id.  The following year, he found that this question could be answered in the affirmative, i.e., that the 
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 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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 See K.D. Adams, “Blaming The Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law”, 40 Indiana Law 
Review 205, 226-230 (2007) (and further citations therein). See also H.F. Goodrich, “Restatement and 
Codification”, in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays, supra note 3, 241; H.E. Yntema, “The 
Jurisprudence of Codification”, in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays, supra note 3, 251. 
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 See, e.g., A.T. von Mehren, “Some Reflections on Codification and Case Law in the Twenty-First 
Century”, 31 U.C. Davis Law Review 659, 669 (1998) (referring to the Restatement as “an unofficial form 
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Although an important part of the Restatement’s lineage, this topic has become 
somewhat academic from the present standpoint. The Restatements were conceived as, 
and still remain, a non-binding source of law whose raison d’être was to stand apart from 
the relevant lawmaking processes.  Indeed, the merit of the Restatement project was 
largely rooted in not being dependent on the state or federal legislative apparatus.  As 
remarked by the ALI’s first Director, Mr. William Draper Lewis258:   
 
Though the rules are expressed in a form of a code, except in sporadic  
instances, there never has been any desire to give them statutory authority.  
The Restatement is an agency tending to promote the clarification and the 
unification of the law in a form similar to a Code. But it is not a Code or a  
statute. It is designed to help preserve not to change the common system of 
expressing law and adapting it to changing conditions in a changing world.259   
 
In this way, while bearing in mind the similarities between the ALI and codification, 
there remains an important distance between the two.    
 
4.4.3.3 The impact of the Restatements 
 The third tension relates to the impact of the Restatements. As a whole, it is 
difficult to make generalisations in this regard, since some Restatements have been 
highly effective at promoting uniformity, whilst others have been followed only as 
regards particular provisions or have had marginal influence.260 Over the past decades, 
the ALI and the Restatement project have garnered substantial controversy on various 
issues, ranging from the membership and the working methods of the ALI to the viability 
of the Restatement project for successfully achieving its aspirations for improving the 
law.261  In particular, the Restatements share some of the problems embodied by a code in 
terms of achieving real clarification and simplification of the law, since as emphasised by 
one scholar, both are merely “a premature attempt to reach an ideal toward which judges 
and scholars are struggling:  a time when all the rules are simple, clear and coherently 
related”.262   
 
Even so, it is perhaps with comparative reflection between the United States and 
the European Union that the impact of the Restatements can be fully appreciated.  This is 
because after so many years, it is easy to take for granted the role played by the 
Restatements in the American setting.  Despite its purported defects, the Restatement 
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project exacted major improvements to American law by providing a common source of 
legal terminology and by establishing a baseline for sorting out the mass of American 
common law in some of the most important fields of private law, including contract 
law.263  It is when one sets foot in the European setting in which such aspects are only 
beginning to come about at the European level that the true value of the Restatement 
project thus becomes apparent. Nonetheless, the Restatement project did not cure, nor 
was it intended to, the various divergences among state laws bearing directly on 
commercial transactions in the United States.  As such, it was not before long that 
another mechanism came into view:  the UCC. 
 
4.5 The UCC 
4.5.1 General overview  
The Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC or the Code) is a comprehensive 
uniform law on commercial transactions co-sponsored by the NCCUSL and the ALI.  It 
is not a binding enactment in itself, but embodies certain characteristics of a uniform law 
discussed above, meaning that it must be adopted by a particular state legislature for it to 
have binding force within that state. Since it is adopted by each state individually, the 
UCC is applicable to intrastate transactions within the state concerned, and there are 
specific conflict of law provisions in the UCC itself to determine which state’s law is 
applicable in the context of interstate transactions and the parties’ power to choose the 
applicable law.264 In other words, there is no federal statute incorporating the UCC for the 
purpose of regulating interstate transactions, although as seen below the matter was 
repeatedly contemplated. A general overview of the UCC can be gleaned through its 
structure, its functional approach, and its name. 
 
4.5.1.1 Structure 
The UCC encompasses various subjects falling within the rubric of commercial 
transactions, such as sales of goods, leases, and negotiable instruments. It replaced 
several uniform acts promulgated by the NCCUSL, which had previously regulated such 
subjects. It is presently comprised of eleven Articles, of which two of the most well-
known are Article 2 on “Sales” concerning matters relating to contracts for the sale of 
goods and Article 9 on “Secured Transactions” regulating the creation and enforcement 
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of security interests in areas of movable property law.265  Each Article is divided into a 
certain number of parts, which are in turn subdivided into a number of sections. Each 
section is accompanied by the official comment, which contains the references to the 
relevant provisions of any previous uniform acts, purposes of the particular rule and any 
changes made thereto, and cross-references to other sections of the Code. These official 
comments are not formally enacted by the state legislatures when adopting the UCC, 
though they are still considered authoritative statements of the drafter’s intention and thus 
of tremendous guidance to courts, practitioners, and scholars in relation to the 
interpretation of the Code.266  
 
4.5.1.2 Functional approach 
One of the overarching ideas behind the UCC is that “commercial transactions” is 
a single subject with many interrelated parts, such that a transaction may involve many 
aspects of the Code.267  It attempts to deal with all of the phases that may arise in the 
handling of a commercial transaction “from start to finish”.268  In other words, the UCC 
embodies a functional approach. Thus, the UCC is not separated into distinct fields of 
private law, but in fact prides itself on bringing together various areas of law relevant for 
commercial transactions under the same umbrella. A notable example is Article 2, which 
encompasses both the contract law and personal property law phases involved in 
regulating the sale of goods.  Given its functional approach, this explains why the UCC is 
often not thought of as the harmonisation of distinct fields of private law, such as contract 
law, in the American mindset – it is truly “commercial” law.  In doing so, however, it 
makes apparent the linkage between contract law and related fields of private law, which 
reverberates in the debate about European contract law. 
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4.5.1.3 The meaning of the “Uniform Commercial Code” 
The name, “Uniform Commercial Code”, is not without significance, since it can 
be considered a misnomer, particularly when viewed through European eyes.  This is 
because its rules are not exactly “uniform” among the states; it does not cover 
“commercial law” in a comprehensive manner; and strictly speaking, it is not a “code” as 
compared to the European codification experience.  Indeed, it has become quite 
commonplace for scholars to detail the ways in which the UCC is not a uniform 
codification of commercial law. 
 
First, the UCC is not “uniform” in the sense that the same provisions exist in all 
fifty states and territories of the United States.  To date, there is some version of the UCC 
in force in all states and territories, except for Louisiana that adopted most, but not all, 
provisions of the Code.269  Yet, not all states and territories have the same version of the 
Code.  With successive revisions of all or parts of the Code, there is substantial variation 
among the states as to those that adopt, or not, the official amendments made to the Code 
through the years.  For example, in the revisions made to Articles 1 and 2 in 2001 and 
2003, respectively, about half of the states adopted amendments to Article 1 and no state 
has yet enacted the amendments to Article 2.270  In addition to the variations in state 
enactments, the content of the Code itself strays from absolute uniformity.  Certain 
Articles contain “alternative” provisions that contain two versions of a rule, with the 
result that some states adopt one version, while other states adopt another.271  There is 
also much made of the “open-textured” nature of the UCC by virtue of Articles that 
contain broad, open-ended phrases, such as “commercial reasonableness” and “good 
faith”, which allow for considerable flexibility in its interpretation.272 Yet, debate persists 
as regards the extent to which the “open-textured” nature of the Code has receded.273  The 
bottom line is there remains an important caveat attached to the UCC to check the 
particular state’s version of the Code because of potential “traps” in the form of 
divergences from the “official text” promulgated by the NCCUSL and the ALI. 
 
Second, as regards the term, “commercial law”, the UCC does not cover in a 
comprehensive fashion all matters falling within the confines of commercial law or even 
all aspects of the fields that are covered.274  For example, as regards sales law, it does not 
generally cover insurance contracts or other types of services contracts, and most issues 
of contract formation are left to general contract law falling outside the confines of the 
UCC.275 Furthermore, the UCC generally covers both consumer and commercial 
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transactions, as opposed to being limited to the transactions involving merchants, as was 
done in the European commercial codes.276  
 
Finally, there is the issue as to whether or to what extent the UCC can be called a 
“code”, which has been heavily debated in the literature.277  Without delving deeply into  
this well-charted territory, suffice to say that the UCC is a code “within the American 
frame of reference”.278 Among other things, this is because it is supplemented by a large 
body of American law that came before the Code (“pre-Code” law) or was not 
specifically covered by the UCC (“non-Code” law).279  In other words, in contrast to 
European codifications, the UCC maintains, rather than displaces, pre-existing law.  
 
Opinions may continue to vary on the uniformity, the comprehensiveness, and the 
codificatory nature of the UCC.280  Nevertheless, each of the UCC’s composite words 
sets it apart as a landmark feature of American private law.  As enshrined in Article 1, 
one of the UCC’s foremost purposes is “to make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions”281. Although the UCC does not envelop every aspect of commercial law, its 
coverage is still substantial, and while it may remain a “code” with a uniquely American 
mindset, its consolidation of a substantial portion of commercial law into a single 
statutory scheme transcended the problems of selective piecemeal enactment of the 
previous uniform laws by the states.282 In any event, this illustrates that many aspects of 
the “Uniform Commercial Code” cannot be readily assumed. This includes its adoption at 
the state level. 
 
4.5.2 Origins of the UCC 
Already in 1958, an American jurist remarked:  “The problem of a lawyer who 
wants to find out something about the Code is not a dearth of literature on the subject. It 
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is rather that discussion has been too plentiful.”283  Indeed, the literature on the UCC 
envelops various layers including its theoretical underpinnings that are invariably linked 
to the role of Professor Karl Llewellyn284, its legislative history285, its substance286, and 
the discussion of its continuing relevance in the face of a plethora of state, federal, and 
international law instruments.287  Yet, with respect to the “inside story” concerning the 
interplay between the UCC and the prospect of federalisation, the opposite seems to be 
true.  With the deaths of Professor Karl Llewellyn and Mr. William A. Schnader, the two 
primary actors involved with its emergence and development, this has presented 
difficulties in constructing an authentic record of the Code project.288 This is especially 
true with respect to piecing together the discussion of the origins of the Code amidst 
successive proposals for federal legislation, which is scattered among publications over 
the years.  Indeed, as compared to the massive discourse on European contract law, it is 
remarkable that to the author’s knowledge there does not yet exist any coherent study of 
this particular aspect of the Code. At base, rather than leaping fully formed from the 
drafters’ table to the states, the UCC emerged out of demands for federal action and 
continued to be mired in proposals to adopt the Code at the federal level. 
 
4.5.2.1 From the Uniform Sales Act to the Williston-ABA Federal Sales Act 
 The initial impetus for the UCC stemmed in large part from the need to revise the 
Uniform Sales Act. To recall, the Uniform Sales Act had been drafted by Professor 
Samuel Williston and approved by the NCCUSL in 1906 for adoption by the states.289  
By the early 1920s, with the passage of time and the changes in commercial 
developments, the Uniform Sales Act, along with the other uniform acts in the 
commercial law field, were considered to be outmoded and inadequate in many 
respects.290  Moreover, at that time, at least half of the states had not yet enacted the 
Uniform Sales Act.291  Problems regarding the achievement of uniformity in matters of 
commercial law stemming from these uniform acts beckoned discussion beckoned as 
regards the potential federal role in this area, since as long as such acts were not enacted 
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by all or a substantial number of states, this invited the prospect of enactment by 
Congress in order to achieve the requisite uniformity for interstate transactions.292 For 
example, in 1916, Congress enacted the Federal Bills of Lading Act for the interstate (and 
international) setting, which corresponded to the Uniform Bills of Lading Act 
promulgated by the NCCUSL.293 
 
 With this background, in 1921, the ABA Commercial Law Committee submitted 
for the ABA’s consideration a first tentative draft of proposed federal legislation to 
regulate the sale of goods.294  The proposal was formally entitled a “Bill relating to sales 
and contracts to sell in interstate and foreign commerce”, or the Federal Sales Act.295  
The general purpose of the Federal Sales Act was “to unify the law of sales and contracts 
to sell in commerce among the states and with foreign nations”.296  It was drafted by 
Professor Samuel Williston in collaboration with the ABA Committee and was based 
largely on the Uniform Sales Act.297  This explains why it was referred to as the 
Williston-ABA Federal Sales Act. Following further revision, this resulted in the 
promulgation of a second draft of the Act at the ABA’s annual conference in August 
1922.298   
 
The Williston-ABA Federal Sales Act only covered interstate and foreign 
transactions involving the sale of goods.299 The idea was that the law governing interstate 
and foreign transactions concerning sales and contracts of sale should not differ from that 
governing similar intrastate transactions regulated by the Uniform Sales Act.300  In other 
words, it was not an attempt to displace the states and federalise the entire field, but 
rather to achieve greater interstate uniformity, which was in turn envisaged to incite the 
states that had not yet done so to enact the Uniform Sales Act or to make the requisite 
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changes in their version of the Uniform Sales Act to coincide with the Federal Sales 
Act.301 In this way, there would be symmetry in interstate and intrastate uniformity in 
commercial transactions across the country by action taken at the state and federal levels. 
 
 As regards the constitutionality of the ABA-Williston Federal Sales Act, it was 
regarded as falling within Congress’ competence under the Interstate Commerce Clause.  
As the ABA Commercial Law Committee’s then Chairman, Judge William H.H. Piatt302, 
explained:   
 
With the federal control of foreign and interstate commerce, it is illogical  
and inconsistent that there should not long ago have been enacted a  
Federal Sales Act making the law of sales and contracts to sell in foreign  
and interstate commerce, a unity throughout the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
Constitution. I am in full sympathy and accord with the idea against  
increasing federal power and interference with private and local matters,  
but sales and contracts of sale of chattels, goods, wares and merchandise  
touches alike every individual from the highest to the lowest within and  
under the jurisdiction of the [F]ederal [G]overnment and any of the states.303    
 
The second draft of the Federal Sales Act was thereby approved by the ABA for 
submission to Congress.304 
 
A few months later, in December 1922, a bill for a Federal Sales Act was 
formally introduced in Congress.305  It was not adopted “by reason of the shortness of the 
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term”.306   Thereafter, it was resubmitted in Congress in 1923307, 1926308, 1928309 and 
1930310. Together, this spanned five consecutive Congressional sessions.311  Along the 
way, the Federal Sales Act received favorable recommendation from various commercial 
organisations.312 Nevertheless, it remained unsuccessful, despite the ABA’s unwavering 
support from 1921 through 1932.313 Among the reasons to explain its failure were that it 
was passed over for more pressing matters and that its substantial length proved unwieldy 
for arousing Congressional interest.314  In  May 1936, a bill for the Federal Sales Act was 
reintroduced for the sixth time by Walter Chandler, a member of the House of 
Representatives from Tennessee.315 Again, it failed.  Apparently, this was because it had 
been introduced too late in the 74th Congressional session to be acted upon, but still there 
was hope that it would eventually succeed upon its resubmission at the next session.316 
About eight months later, in January 1937, for the seventh time, the bill was introduced in 
the 75th Congress again by Mr. Chandler.317   
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4.5.2.2 The Merchants’ Association Federal Sales Act 
In the meantime, late in 1936, the Williston-ABA Federal Sales Act was taken up 
for study by The Merchants’ Association of New York, a commercial organisation 
composed of leading business and professional men.318  It appointed a Special Committee 
on the Federal Sales Bill composed of lawyers and businessmen with wide experience in 
interstate and foreign commercial dealings.319  The Committee was chaired by Mr. Hiram 
Thomas, a prominent member of the New York bar.320 In February 1937, this Special 
Committee issued a report recommending several amendments to the Williston-ABA 
Federal Sales Act and to the Uniform Sales Act.321 This report laid the basis for the 
preparation of a new Merchants’ Association Federal Sales Act, which was then 
submitted by Mr. Chandler in July 1937 to take the place of the previous Williston-ABA 
Federal Sales Act that had previously been submitted in January 1937.322  The ABA 
praised the work of the Merchants’ Association and supported the adoption of its new 
Federal Sales Act.323  There were considerable differences between the Merchant 
Associations’ Federal Sales Act, the ABA-Williston Federal Sales Act, and the 
NCCUSL’s Uniform Sales Act.324  The primary focus seemed to be on its content and not 
so much on its constitutionality; Congress’s competence to adopt the Merchant 
Associations’ Act seemed to be readily assumed, or at least discussions were quiet.325 
Ultimately, the Merchants’ Association Federal Sales Act died in Congressional 
committee, but the ABA pressed for its submission in the next Congressional session.326 
 
 In January 1940, the Merchants’ Association Federal Sales Act was reintroduced 
for the second time in the 76th Congress by Representative Herron Pearson of 
Tennessee.327  This bill was the subject of an important round table discussion held 
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during the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS) in December 1939.328  This formed the basis of a special Symposium issue 
dedicated to “The Proposed Federal Sales Act” in the Virginia Law Review.329  The 
Symposium issue encompassed the contributions of several persons involved with the 
Federal Sales Act, including Hiram Thomas, Professor Samuel Williston, and Professor 
Karl N. Llewellyn.330 The participants presented various opinions on the Federal Sales 
Act, and on the whole, the Symposium served as a window to broader themes 
underpinning the Federal Sales Act. 
 
First, the matter of preserving interstate versus intrastate uniformity divided the 
contributors.  On the one hand, Mr. Thomas argued that rather than causing confusion 
between a set of rules governing interstate transactions and another governing intrastate 
transactions, the Federal Sales Act would induce the states to adopt the Federal statute to 
govern intrastate transactions and hence there would be one single uniform law regarding 
sales and contracts to sell goods in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.331  
Others, including Professor Williston, countered that because of the significant departures 
of the Merchants’ Association Federal Sales Act from the Uniform Sales Act and the 
slow progress of states in the uniform law process, the Act would only impair interstate 
and intrastate transactions further.332  
 
Second, the matter of constitutionality was not given much attention by the 
participants, with Mr. Thomas merely underlining that Congress’s competence to adopt 
the Federal Sales Act under the Interstate Commerce Clause was “unquestionable”:333  
Tucked away at the end of the Symposium issue, however, was a specific comment 
devoted to this very matter. 334 The comment concluded that the Act was a valid exercise 
of Congress’ competence under the Interstate Commerce Clause, and emphasised that 
given the problems with the uniform law process, the Federal Sales Act was the only 
means by which to unify state laws governing commercial transactions.335  
 
Finally, there was ambivalence among the participants with respect to the 
continued reliance on action taken at the state level. Mr. Thomas underscored the need 
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for the Federal Sales Act by pointing out that the uniform law process was plagued by 
conflicts between the states that had adopted the Uniform Sales Act and those that had 
not.336  He also noted that the US Supreme Court’s decision in Erie, overruling the Swift 
doctrine, perpetuated, instead of ironing out, differences in state commercial laws.337  
Noticeably, Professor Karl Llewellyn’s contribution presented a nuanced position.  On 
the one hand, he recognised that there was a “vital need” for a Federal Sales Act on 
account of the problems with the Uniform Sales Act in terms of its varied enactment 
among the states and the need for its revision.338 On the other hand, however, he urged 
that before proceeding further with the Federal Sales Act, the NCCUSL should be 
allowed the opportunity to remodel the Uniform Sales Act.339 He reasoned that a 
“codificatory act” covering a wide expanse of private law should be treated as permanent, 
not merely ordinary, legislation that “enters into the commercial structure of the country” 
and should therefore receive the benefit of the NCCUSL’s experience.340 Although not 
said as much, Llewellyn’s comments hinted at the beginnings of the path towards the 
UCC. 
 
4.5.2.3 From the Federal Sales Act to the UCC 
Since the late 1930s, prompted by efforts of the Merchants’ Association to bring 
forth a Federal Sales Act, Professor Karl Llewellyn had rallied for a broader reform of 
sales law, and particularly during the years between 1936 and 1940, he had made great 
efforts to bring this about.341  He eventually joined forces with William A. Schnader, who 
as President of the NCCUSL during that time period supported action to be taken through 
the uniform law process.342   In truth, the complete story regarding the progression from 
the Federal Sales Act to the UCC and the roles played by Professor Llewellyn and Mr. 
Schnader in this regard may never be fully known.  There was a complex series of events 
involving Professor Llewellyn’s lobby for passage of the Federal Sales Act in 
conjunction with his wider aspirations for a comprehensive overhaul of commercial 
law.343 In the literature, the most common version seems to be that Professor Llewellyn 
obtained agreement from the Merchants’ Association to put the enactment of the Federal 
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Sales Act on hold pending action by the NCCUSL to revise the Uniform Sales Act.344  
Yet, questions persist as regards the extent to which the Federal Sales Act remained 
viable as the UCC got underway.345 It is perhaps a testament to the ambiguity 
surrounding these events that much of the literature remains silent or else merely jumps 
from the proposals for a Federal Sales Act to the start of preparations for the UCC 
without much detail in between.  It can at least be said that the delays in the enactment of 
the Federal Sales Act and the action taken by the NCCUSL to revise the Uniform Sales 
Act led to plans starting in 1940 by Professor Llewellyn and Mr. Schnader for the UCC. 
 
At the NCCUSL’s annual conference in September 1940, Mr. Schnader first 
publicly unveiled plans for the UCC in his Presidential Address, which looked back at the 
first “fifty years” of the NCCUSL and outlined the future course of action.346  He started 
out by emphasising the importance of the uniform law process, stating that, “certainly in 
matters affecting the conduct of business on a nation-wide scale, efficient state 
government can be conducted only under uniform state laws”.347 He then turned to 
problems associated with the uniform laws in the commercial field, e.g., their need for 
revision, their piecemeal character, and their inconsistencies, which prompted him to ask:  
“Could not a great uniform commercial code be prepared, which would bring the 
commercial law up to date, and which could become the uniform law of our fifty-three 
jurisdictions, by the passage of only fifty-three acts, instead of many times that 
number?”348  Not coincidentally, at the same conference, Professor Llewellyn presented 
the First Draft and Report on the Revised Uniform Sales Act, which constituted a 
completely reworked version of the Uniform Sales Act.349  This prompted the NCCUSL 
to set up a Committee on the Revised Uniform Sales Act, with instructions to produce a 
second draft of the Act “as a chapter in the projected Uniform Commercial Code”.350  
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In 1941, Professor Karl Llewellyn disseminated the Second Draft and Report of 
the Revised Uniform Sales Act.351  This document paid heed to the Federal Sales Act but 
placed primary focus on the NCCUSL:   
 
[W]hile the proposed Federal Act thus serves as an impetus, and an occasion,  
for reexamination of the Uniform Sales Act, and while its proposed provisions  
are extremely suggestive and repeatedly embody mercantile rules of first 
importance, yet the office of the Conference would not be performed by any  
mere approval of the draft before Congress. Such an [Revised Uniform Sales  
Act] can meet all those pressing needs which have given rise to the Federal  
Sales Bill.352   
 
Indeed, by this time, the Federal Sales Act had been overshadowed by the UCC. In the 
aftermath of the 1939 AALS round table discussion, Hiram Thomas and others continued 
to engage in critical study of the Federal Sales Act.353  There was a last-ditch effort to 
reintroduce the Federal Sales Act in Congress in January 1941.354 Yet, by and large, the 
tide had turned to the state level.  Nevertheless, the fact that the Federal Sales Act was 
conceived at all and repeatedly submitted to Congress for adoption testified to the 
problems of achieving uniform commercial law at the state level via the uniform law 
process.355 The prospect of federal action would continue to permeate the Code project. 
 
4.5.2.4 The UCC takes shape:  Federal and state versions 
In the ensuing decade of the 1940s, plans for the UCC solidified. Following initial 
discussions between the NCCUSL and the ALI about co-sponsoring the sales portion of 
the Code, a definitive agreement was reached in 1944 between these two organisations, 
which set out the governing framework for the Code project.356 Professor Karl Llewellyn 
was appointed the Chief Reporter of the UCC, and Ms. Soia Mentschikoff was appointed 
the Associate Chief Reporter.357  On this basis, Professor Llewellyn appointed various 
persons to serve as the drafters of the main Articles of the UCC.358 The drafting of the 
Code was supervised by an Editorial Board composed of members of the NCCUSL and 
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the ALI.359  Between the years of 1944 and 1950, much work went into the preparation of 
the UCC, which culminated in the first Official Text in September 1951, published as the 
“1952 Official Text” of the Code.360  Since the Code’s subtle introduction in 1940, it had 
taken a little over ten years to produce the first complete version of the UCC. 
 
Notably, in what has been called the “almost forgotten Proposed Final Draft” 
promulgated in 1950, the UCC had initially contained both state and federal versions.361  
This meant that the UCC was envisaged to be adopted not only at the state level via the 
uniform law process, but also at the federal level by way of a federal statute applicable to 
interstate and foreign transactions pursuant to Congress’s competence under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.  In the draft text, the federal version was justified as follows:   
 
Today the number of commercial transactions which pass between the  
states or which directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce has  
become so great as to warrant the Congress of the United States in  
entering this field by enacting this Code to apply wherever the contract or 
transaction falls within the permissible jurisdiction of Congress under 
the commerce clause as that jurisdiction has been defined in the recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States construing the words 
“affects interstate commerce”.362 
 
The federal version received the approval of commentators, including those involved 
with the uniform law process. 
 
In a definitive article on the federal version of the UCC, Professor Robert 
Braucher, a longstanding member of the NCCUSL, favored the federal enactment of the 
Code though he found the present text unsatisfactory.363  He proposed certain changes to 
the text, such as clarifying the scope of federal coverage and adding provisions regarding 
federal contracts and federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under the federal 
version of the Code.364 Nonetheless, he emphasised that federal enactment was “vital” 
and should proceed either before or in tandem with state enactment, since this would 
entice the states to ensure that intrastate transactions were governed by a similar set of 
rules, thereby providing a catalyst to state enactment of the Code which under the normal 
workings of the uniform law process would otherwise take several decades.365  As 
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regards the constitutionality of the federal version, he dismissed the matter in one 
sentence, finding that Congress’ power was clear and needed no further discussion.366   
 
Other commentators reiterated the importance of the federal enactment of the 
Code.367  This included William A. Schnader himself, who found that coverage of both 
interstate and intrastate transactions by virtue of the federal and state versions of the UCC 
“would constitute one of the greatest achievements in the history of American law”.368 In 
fact, the prospect of federal encroachment on matters of state competence was confronted 
head-on in one publication, which although published in 1953 still bears resonance today 
for the American and European settings: 
 
Perhaps a bone should be thrown to those who may bark “states’ rights” 
at the fearful prospect of a federal commercial code. Without intending 
to dignify with a reply those whose use of the “states’ rights’ slogan is a 
technique for covertly opposing governmental activity at any level, it  
might be said to those more earnestly concerned over a federal commercial 
law that their fears are too late. The United States is in fact a single market; 
it is the model which we are holding up to Western Europe, rent not only by 
diversity of laws but political and economic barriers as well. The national 
market has been with us for over half a century; federal enactment of the 
Uniform Commercial code is aimed at closing the gap between this fact 
and the backwardness of 48 or so separate legal marketplaces in which  
to shop for different laws.369 
 
In the end, however, the federal version was dropped in the Spring 1951 draft of the Code 
with no explanation.370 Difficulties in getting such a comprehensive act through Congress 
and enthusiastic endorsement of the Code by the states were cited as possible reasons.371 
From then on, the UCC was confined to the state arena, and by the early 1960s, prospects 
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for federal enactment were remote.372 Even so, the prospect of federal action would arise 
again and constitute a major tension underlying the Code project. 
 
4.5.3 Tensions underlying the UCC 
It bears repeating that the UCC has generated a voluminous literature, much of 
which includes critical analysis of the Code project and its various Articles. For the 
purposes of this discussion, three tensions underlying the UCC are singled out because 
they touch upon salient issues within the debate about European contract law. These 
tensions concern the dichotomy between interstate and intrastate uniformity, 
federalisation, and consumer protection.  Each are taken in turn. 
 
4.5.3.1 The UCC and interstate / intrastate uniformity 
As the UCC was adopted at the state, not federal, level along the lines of the 
uniform law process, this invited problems related to the reliance on state legislatures and 
variation in the state versions of the Code, which exacerbated the struggle between 
achieving interstate and intrastate uniformity in commercial transactions in the United 
States.  First, as with uniform laws, the UCC was at the mercy of each individual state 
jurisdiction for enactment.  At present, with the adoption of all (or most) of the UCC by 
all states and territories, this may seem a moot point.  In the beginning, however, the 
adoption of the UCC was not a foregone conclusion. After passage of the Code by the 
first state, Pennsylvania, in 1953373, authorities in New York put a halt to the process by 
referring the matter to the New York Law Revision Commission for recommendations as 
to whether the UCC should adopted in that state.374  After three years of intensive study, 
the Commission decided that the Code should not be enacted in New York until further 
revision had taken place.375 This led to amendment of the Code and the publication of 
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subsequent “official texts”, which resulted in the adoption of the UCC by all states, save 
for Louisiana, by the end of the 1960s.376 For its part, New York adopted the UCC in 
1962, six years after the Commission’s decision.377  The New York events surely did not 
prevent the long-term success of the Code. Still, the UCC took several decades to achieve 
general acceptance in the states.   
 
Moreover, one of the aspirations of the Code was that the states would adopt the 
“official text” of the UCC as promulgated by the NCCUSL and the ALI, but in practice, 
state-by-state variation in the form of state non-uniform legislative amendments and 
divergent judicial interpretations of various Code sections crept into the Code from the 
beginning.   By the early 1960s, of the eighteen states that had already adopted the Code, 
most had inserted non-uniform amendments into their version of the Code.  This led to 
the creation of the Permanent Editorial Board (the PEB) of the UCC in 1961, which was 
responsible for reviewing all proposed non-uniform amendments of the Code in the 
various states and for making the necessary revisions to the Code.378   Nonetheless, state 
variation continued as additional states adopted the Code, which led to a patchwork of 
state versions depending on the extent to which each state took up the official 
amendments to the various Articles of the Code.379  The state variations to the Code and 
the preference for intrastate uniformity within the individual state constituted a 
significant barrier to achieving interstate uniformity in commercial matters covered by 
the UCC, and it was not long until the prospect of adopting the Code at the federal level 
was raised again. 
 
4.5.3.2 The UCC and federalisation  
 The advocacy of a federal Uniform Commercial Code became prevalent in the 
early years of the Code project in response to the proliferation of state variations of the 
Code.  To a large extent, this took the form of repeated threats issued by William A. 
Schnader to goad the states into line with the official version of the Code.  To recall, Mr. 
Schnader was a prominent figure in the Code project380 and at the time of writing was 
also serving as the Chairman of the PEB, which made his statements of great import. The 
rising volume of non-state uniform amendments – “statutory tinkerers” as he called 
them381 – and the slow progress in adoption of the official amendments to the Code 
prompted him to threaten Congressional adoption of the UCC if the states did not repeal 
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their non-uniform amendments.382 As regards the matter of constitutionality, Mr. 
Schnader found that Congress’ competence under the Interstate Commerce Clause easily 
stretched over interstate transactions, but that a Constitutional amendment would be 
needed to allow such a federal code to cover intrastate transactions; yet, even then, he 
found that if the state laws were not made uniform, it was “not unlikely” that a movement 
would be initiated for amending the Constitution in this regard.383  He also reasoned that 
no state could possible afford not to conform its state version to the federal Code.384 
While his threats were well-known, he was not alone in advocating federal action. 
 
In fact, agitation for the adoption of a federal commercial code covering both 
interstate and intrastate commercial transactions began even before the ink was dry on the 
first official text of the Code itself.  In 1947, a Comment was published in the Michigan 
Law Review devoted to the constitutionality of the federal UCC.385 It concluded that 
Congress had competence to enact a federal commercial code covering both interstate 
and intrastate transactions under either the Federal treaty-making power386 or the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.387 After the promulgation of the Code, discussion 
continued.  In particular, in Judge Henry J. Friendly’s article on the “new” American 
“federal common law”, the problems associated with the uniform law process led him to 
advocate broad-scale federal enactment of the UCC that would cover both interstate and 
intrastate transactions.388 While not delving into too much detail as regards its 
constitutionality389, he reasoned that the invasion of intrastate areas of the states was not a 
serious problem since “Congress would simply be enacting a code on a technical subject, 
approved, after years of discussion, by representatives of the states and of the bar 
generally, and already adopted by many states’”.390 He did not envision that this would 
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happen immediately, but noted that it was “comforting to know that if a federal solution 
for Story’s problem is needed, a better mousetrap is at hand”.391  
 
As the Code project progressed, the prospect of federal enactment continued to 
arise in the literature, much of which stemmed from the continuing lack of uniformity in 
relation to the Code in terms of the volume of non-uniform state amendments and 
divergent judicial interpretation of its provisions.392 Many publications expressly 
highlighted Congress’ competence over both interstate and intrastate transactions in this 
context.393 Yet, there was also a steady stream of publications from scholars opposing 
federalisation, stressing that the uniform law process was preferable to federal action on 
various grounds.394 Others took a moderate position, finding that limited federal 
incursions into specific areas were necessary, but not across the board.395   
 
Admittedly, recent references to the enactment of a federal Uniform Commercial 
Code are sporadic at best.  As of 2001, it was remarked that “the idea of a federal code 
for commercial law has never quite gone away”.396  Still, by most present accounts, the 
prospect of federalisation seems to have faded from view without triggering a 
groundswell for federal action even remotely resembling the debate about European 
contract law.397 Indeed, Mr. Schnader’s threats went unheeded, and the UCC remained 
entrenched at the state level. That said, the interplay between the UCC and federalisation 
shows that the prospect of a federal Uniform Commercial Code is a much more persistent 
theme than is commonly perceived.  Furthermore, in constitutional terms, it highlights 
that it has not been so much the existence of federal competence that has been the 
stumbling block, but rather the exercise of such competence. Congress’ competence to 
federalise state contract and commercial law continues to be accepted by scholars as 
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falling within Congress’ competence under the US Constitution, especially under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.398 Nevertheless, there is a longstanding pattern of 
Congressional deference to the states in matters of private law.399  This means that while 
in principle Congress is perceived as having sufficient powers to unify various areas of 
state private law, such as contract law, in practice it generally uses such powers on a 
more limited basis to deal with specific matters that are considered to warrant federal 
action. This is particularly apparent in the area of consumer (contract) law, which leads to 
the next section. 
 
4.5.3.3 The UCC and consumer protection  
 It is certainly no understatement to say that the relationship between the UCC and 
consumer protection has been a core tension underlying the UCC from the beginning.  
The debate over the inclusion of certain provisions regulating consumer transactions in 
the original text of the Code has been called “one of the most violent in the history of the 
Code’s drafting”.400  In later years, with the revision of several Articles, controversies 
over the matter of consumer protection in the Code split the NCCUSL and the ALI401, 
caused resignations of draftsmen and divisiveness among participants, and spurred a vast 
quantity of literature critically examining the politics and the drafting process of the Code 
project generally.402  To be clear, the UCC in principle covers both consumer and 
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commercial transactions, as opposed to excluding consumer transactions outright from its 
scope, save for certain exceptions.403  From the outset, it was generally perceived that 
consumer transactions were already too much a part of commercial law as it had 
developed in the United States to be excluded completely from the Code or to be treated 
the same as commercial transactions in all instances.404 Consequently,  the controversy 
surrounding the treatment of consumer issues in the Code centered on issues of 
substance, not approach, i.e., it was not so much about the scope of application of the 
Code, but rather the extent to which special rules would be carved out for consumers with 
respect to certain issues and how far they would go in ensuring sufficient protection for 
such persons.405   
 
Notably, in the initial drafting of the UCC, there had been an attempt to include 
specific consumer protection provisions, but such provisions were largely eliminated 
from the final text of the UCC.406  In all fairness, emphasis on consumer protection was 
not in the original drafters’ frame of mind, since the rise of the consumer movement in 
the United States started in the 1960s, the decade following the dissemination of the 
original text of the Code.407  Thereafter, with changes made to the UCC, this brought 
attention to the appropriate level of protection afforded to consumers under the Code.  In 
particular, starting in the 1980s and 1990s, with significant revisions to core Articles of 
the Code, such as Articles 2, 3, 4 and 9, along with the insertion of new Articles 2A and 
4A, criticism erupted as regards the treatment of consumer matters in the Code, whereby 
it was often lamented that certain Articles retained the balance in favour of the status quo 
and largely on the side of commercial, as opposed to consumer, interests.408 Certainly, 
this is not to say that the UCC has remained transfixed in the 1950s.  As the matter stands 
at present, many Articles include affirmative provisions on consumer matters.409  
Nonetheless, the UCC’s limited treatment of consumer issues early on served to inject the 
role of Federal Government into the process. 
 
Starting in the 1960s, Congress began to enact consumer protection legislation 
that served to modify or to supplement the rules set out in the UCC. Congress’ first major 
foray was in the area of consumer credit.  In 1968, Congress enacted the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act (the CCPA)410, which is essentially an umbrella statute 
encompassing several federal statutes regulating specific matters concerning consumer 
credit. In the years leading up to the passage of the Act, there was significant divergence 
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and complexity among the various state laws regulating consumer credit, since matters 
were usually scattered across a host of different state statutes.411 With the CCPA, 
Congress stepped in with the objective to lay down a uniform set of rules regarding 
certain matters within the consumer credit field that would provide a baseline of 
consumer protection and a remedy for the substantial divergence among the states in the 
areas concerned.  There were three striking features about the CCPA: its constitutionality; 
its scope, and its interplay with the NCCUSL’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 
 
First, as regards its constitutionality, Congress’ rationale varied depending on the 
particular federal statute, but by and large, most titles of the CCPA were rooted in the 
twofold objective to eliminate divergences among state laws for the purposes of interstate 
commerce and to ensure an adequate level of consumer protection.  For example, as 
regards the regulation of debt collection practices, it was emphasised that existing state 
laws were insufficient to protect consumers against such practices and that even those 
purely intrastate in nature directly affected interstate commerce.412 As a result, the CCPA 
provoked debate as to whether its extension into “local” matters of state competence went 
beyond Congress’s competences under the US Constitution.413 Yet, no part of the CCPA 
was declared unconstitutional, even though there were challenges lodged against 
provisions of the CCPA concerning extortionate credit transactions, the argument being 
that “loan sharking” was a purely intrastate activity that did not affect interstate 
commerce.414  This resulted in the US Supreme Court’s 1971 judgment in Perez v. United 
States415, which upheld the relevant portions of the Act under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.416  
 
Second, as for its scope, the CCPA did not replace state law entirely. Most federal 
statutes housed within the CCPA included provisions making clear that the state laws 
would be displaced only to the extent that they were inconsistent with their provisions, 
and for several, it was further provided that a state law would not be deemed inconsistent 
if it provided a level of protection greater than that afforded by the federal statute 
concerned.417  In other words, the CCPA allowed for minimum harmonisation.  Some of 
the federal statutes also exempted credit transactions under the law of a state that imposed 
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requirements that were “substantially similar” to their provisions.418 This was purposeful, 
as the CCPA had been intended to dovetail with the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 
 
 Third, the CCPA and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (the UCCC or U3C) 
had considerable interplay, having been adopted within months of each other in 1968.419 
The UCCC was a comprehensive uniform act promulgated by the NCCUSL, which was 
designed to regulate virtually all aspects of consumer credit, as opposed to the more 
piecemeal remedy of the CCPA, which was narrower in scope.420  The UCCC was in fact 
prepared with the CCPA in mind421, since states enacting the UCCC would essentially be 
given an “opt out” from the CCPA. Moreover, given its comprehensive nature, the UCCC 
was considered to remove the threat of further federal action in the consumer credit 
field.422 In the end, however, the UCCC did not succeed.  Although it was enacted in a 
few states and had some influence in others, the UCCC was considered a failure and 
eventually turned into a model law by the NCCUSL.423 Thus, the federal overlap on the 
patchwork of numerous state statutes in the consumer credit field remained.  This 
prompted calls for a comprehensive federal consumer credit code to remedy the needless 
complexity and lack of uniformity in this area.424   
 
 In the 1970s and thereafter, Congress proceeded to other areas within the 
consumer sphere, sometimes directly touching upon aspects covered by the UCC.   For 
example, in 1975, Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (the MMWA).425 
The MMWA established certain minimum standards for written warranties on consumer 
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products.426 It sought to fill the gap in the UCC in terms of providing special rules 
regarding consumer warranties, which had not been needed in the case of purely 
commercial dealings.427 But in doing so, it diverged from the relevant provisions of the 
UCC in certain respects.428  Moreover, federal action in the field of consumer protection 
was not necessarily limited to legislation adopted by Congress. For example, the Federal 
Trade Commission has promulgated various regulations with importance to the consumer 
(contract) law field.429  A notable example is the “Door to Door Sales Rule”430, which 
provides buyers with the right to a three-day cooling-off period for sales of consumer 
goods made in the “doorstep selling” setting.431 Yet, this does not displace state laws 
giving the buyer with “substantially the same or greater” rights than that afforded by the 
FTC Rule.432   
 
 On the whole, there are various instances in which federal law has displaced 
portions of the state law, both within and outside the Code, in the field of consumer 
protection. This has produced a complex array of federal and state law sources in the 
consumer sphere, which certain scholars have termed “Swiss cheese”, in the sense that 
federal law may partially, but not totally, preempt some parts of state law and leave other 
parts of the same law intact.433 At base, the treatment of consumer protection, or the 
neglect thereof, in the UCC led to a complex overlay of federal consumer law atop the 
UCC and other state law sources, which as illustrated by the examples above concerning 
consumer credit, consumer warranties, and “doorstep selling”, immediately casts an eye 
to some of the problems arising in the debate about European contract law in the 
European Union. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In view of the foregoing, three important observations emerge from the discussion 
of the four major strands of the American private law framework.  The first observation is 
that the prospect of federalisation is a longstanding fixture of the American private law 
framework. From the Swift opinion in 1842 to the proposals for a Federal Bills of 
Exchange Act and a Federal Sales Act, which gave birth to the NCCUSL and the UCC, 
respectively, this demonstrates that one cannot take at face value the fact that contract 
law and commercial law has always been considered to be purely a state matter in the 
                                                 
426
 15 U.S.C § 2304.  It thus allowed the states to maintain or to enact laws that afforded a higher level of 
consumer protection, provided that such laws were not an undue burden on interstate commerce, i.e., it 
provided for minimum harmonisation.  15 U.S.C § 2311(2).   
427
 Miller and Lackey, supra note 409, at 51-52. 
428
 E.g. eliminating the privity requirements of the UCC and the common law as regards the scope of 
consumer warranty actions and expanding the definition of “consumer”:  id., at 52. 
429
 This is generally pursuant to its mandate under the Federal Trade Commission Act, presently codified at 
15 USC §§ 41-58 as amended. The FTC is also conferred rulemaking power under specific federal statutes, 
e.g., as regards the MMWA, see 16 CFR § 700-703. For a comprehensive list of activities, see the FTC’s 
website, http://www.ftc.gov/. 
430
 16 CFR § 429. 
431
 16 CFR § 429.1. 
432
 See 16 CFR § 429.2.  It is only state laws that are deemed “directly inconsistent” with the FTC rule that 
would be displaced.  Id. 
433
 Miller and Lackey, supra note 409, at 133. 
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United States.  In fact, given the recurring proposals for a Federal Sales Act spanning two 
decades and the repeated proposals for a federal UCC, it is remarkable just how close the 
United States came to a federal enactment approximating areas of state contract and 
commercial law. In this way, it is astounding the extent to which the American literature 
on various mechanisms to achieve uniformity in contract law – whether it is the 
discussion of the Federal Sales Act, the debate about the need for a UCC, let alone a 
federal UCC, or the interplay between the UCC and federal consumer protection 
legislation – echoes the literature on European contract law almost verbatim at times.  
 
At present, one may ask whether retracing the path of attempts to federalise 
portions of contract and commercial  law in the United States has much salience for the 
debate about European contract law at a time in which it is generally considered that the 
days of far-reaching federalisation in the American setting have long passed.  In 
response, as illustrated above, the matter of federal competence, whether real or 
perceived, in this area had an impact on the path of American private law.  It dictated the 
choices early on, and it stimulated the creation of the mechanisms that exist today in the 
American private law framework.  Paradoxically, this was so, even though ultimately 
many of the mechanisms resorted to – i.e., uniform laws, Restatements, and the UCC – 
emerged outside the federal framework and hence were not adopted pursuant to federal 
competence under the US Constitution. As such, comparative reflection with the United 
States highlights the important role, albeit an indirect one, played by constitutionality and 
shows that superficial arguments based on the lack of federal engagement with contract 
law in the United States for the purposes of opposing Union competence in contract law 
in the debate about European contract law do not hold. 
 
 The second observation concerns the difficulties and tensions underlying each 
strand comprising the American private law framework.   American “federal common 
law”, the NCCUSL and uniform laws, the ALI and the Restatements, and the UCC have 
each beckoned their share of controversy especially as regards their role in bringing 
greater uniformity and coherency to areas of American private law, including contract 
law.  The failure of Swift and the injection of American “federal common law” in federal 
contracts, the effectiveness of uniform laws in the face of state variation, the ongoing 
struggle between normative and descriptive aspirations of the Restatement, and the 
problematic interplay between the UCC and consumer protection, to name just a few 
examples, illustrate that these strands have not been a complete panacea for eliminating 
problems related to complexity and divergence in American private law. Consequently, 
this discussion cautions against blindly transplanting models from the American private 
law system into the debate about European contract law without cognisance of their 
distinctive place and problems in American setting.   
 
Finally, the third observation concerns the linkage between the four key strands 
of the American private law framework and American federalism.  Uniform laws, 
Restatements, and the UCC share an important attribute:  they constitute unique 
mechanisms for the approximation of contract law and other fields of private law, which 
are rooted for the most part in action taken at the state, not federal, level.  In other words, 
they are sui generis fixtures of the American private law framework that, despite being 
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situated outside the formal confines of the federal institutional framework, do much to 
sustain the balance of powers between the federal and state levels. In fact, each strand of 
the American private law framework, including American “federal common law”, has 
played an important role in adjusting, maintaining, or restoring the equilibrium in this 
process.   
 
This illuminates remarkable parallels between the United States and the European 
Union in the private law context.  Both entities continue to grapple with similar matters 
regarding the tensions between intrastate and interstate uniformity, the interplay between 
contract law and consumer protection, and how much competence has been given and 
should be exercised at the federal or Union level to make the system work.   Yet, it is 
striking that the approach to matters of contract law in the European and American 
settings emerged from different starting points.  In the American private law framework, 
the Swift doctrine, uniform laws, and the UCC were rooted in eliminating divergences 
among state laws concerning commercial transactions, whereas the debate about 
European contract law has proceeded to a large extent from the opposite direction, i.e., 
from Community measures concerning consumer transactions.  As a result, the burden 
placed on the European Union is somewhat heavier in this regard.  In the United States, 
for example, the UCC came at a time in which consumer protection had not yet achieved 
widespread attention and discussion of the economic, social, and political choices and 
values affecting the substance of the UCC had not yet arisen.  It was only in later decades 
after the Code was up and running that the focus became directed at these issues and the 
scholarship concerning the balancing of consumer and commercial interests in the Code 
erupted. In the European Union, the debate about European contract law must take into 
account an array of issues that remained on the sidelines in the American setting for some 
time, and matters relating to the interplay between commercial transactions and consumer 
protection and the political and social values underlying the formulation of contract law 
rules lie at the heart of much of this debate.    
 
Above all, what has been achieved up until now in the American private law 
framework has not been perfect uniformity.  Indeed, it is commonly remarked that the 
United States contends with an incredible amount of diversity in matters of private law.434  
Without entering into the discussion about the role played by certain compensatory 
factors in the American setting, such as those relating to a common language and a 
common legal culture that assume a different guise in the European Union, the foregoing 
analysis demonstrates that the four strands of the American private law framework 
manifest difficulties in reconciling interstate and intrastate uniformity, i.e., ensuring 
sufficient uniformity across the states and preserving the uniformity of each states’ legal 
system in areas of private law.  Among other things, this is because they form part of the 
“compromise” or “bargain” underlying the American federal system that places primary 
responsibility for matters of private law, including contract law, at the state, not federal, 
level.  The extent to which such a “compromise” can be made in the European Union 
remains to be explored in the forthcoming chapters. 
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5 
 
The Debate Begins 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Technically speaking, one could say that the debate about the approximation of 
private law in Europe1 began even before the founding of the European (then Economic) 
Community in 1957.2  As early as 1949, a prominent English scholar advocated the 
adoption of a uniform code of commercial law for a nascent European Community.3  In 
1955, the conception of a “European civil law” was cited in a publication advocating 
unification primarily in the commercial fields of private law, at least as a first stage.4 As 
the early course of European integration progressed, additional scholars contemplated the 
approximation of private law – including a “European civil code”5 – among the Member 
States.6  As a formal matter, however, the impetus for the debate about European contract 
law (and European private law generally) as understood in the discourse today can be 
traced back to three interlocking elements:  the work of several prominent academic 
projects, certain early European Parliament resolutions, and the European Council 
meeting in Tampere. These three elements combined to place the matter of European 
contract law on the political agenda of the European institutions and led to the 
promulgation of the Commission’s three landmark Communications on European 
                                                 
1
 This leaves aside the various regional initiatives for private law unification, e.g., the proposed 1929 
Franco-Italian Code of Obligations, which was never adopted.  See M. Rotondi, “The Proposed Franco-
Italian Code of Obligations”, 3 American Journal of Comparative Law 345 (1954).  There was also a draft 
code of obligations prepared by the Association Henri Capitant in 1953, which was alluded to in the press 
release for the conference convened by the French Council Presidency in Oct. 2008 entitled, “Which 
European Contract Law For the European Union?”, 23-24 Oct. 2008, available at: http://www.eu2008.fr/ 
Webdav/site/PFEU/shared/import/1023_droit_europeen_contrats/European_contract _law_conference_ 
Press_kit_EN.pdf, at 7. 
2
 The same holds true for the other European Communities. To recall, the European Economic and Coal 
Steel Community Treaty was signed in 1951 and entered into force in 1952; the European (Economic) 
Community and European Atomic Energy Community Treaties were signed in 1957 and entered into force 
in 1958.  See K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union §§ 1-002, 1-006 – 
1-007, at 3-4,  6-7 (R. Bray ed., 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005). 
3
 F.H. Lawson, “Private Law Aspects of Western Union”, 2 Current Legal Problems 226, 236-237 (1949). 
4
 H.K. Elbir, “L’idée d’un droit civil européen”, 6 Annales de la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de 
Bordeaux 71, 84-86 (1955).  
5
 A.G. Chloros, “Principle, Reason and Policy in the Development of European Law”, 17 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 849, 875 (1968). This author would later become a Judge of the Court of 
Justice from 1981 until his death in 1982. 
6
 See, e.g., J.G. Polach, “Harmonization of Laws in Western Europe”, 8 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 148 (1959); G. van Hecke, “Integration economique et unification de droit privé”, 9 Nederlands 
Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht 198 (1962); E. von Caemmerer, “The Problem of the Unification of 
Private Law in Europe”, 36 University of Colorado Law Review 307 (1964); R. David, “Chapter 5 The 
International Unification of Private Law”, in II The Legal Systems of the World / Their Comparison and 
Unification, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law § 180, at 70 (R. David chief ed., 
Mohr/Mouton/Oceana Publications Inc., 1971).  Incidentally, in the Tessili case, the Court of Justice took 
note of differences between national contract laws and the absence at that stage of legal development of any 
unification among the Member States in that regard.  Case 12/76 Tessili [1976] ECR 1473, para. 14. 
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contract law discussed in the next chapter.7   Admittedly, scholars may bicker as to the 
impact of some of these elements taken by themselves, and these three elements may not 
have been the only stimulus for the debate about European contract law at the European 
level.  Nevertheless, these three elements are repeatedly cited in institutional documents 
and scholarly literature as crucial features in the lineage of the debate about European 
contract law. 
 
Importantly, each element in its own way served to drive the momentum of the 
debate forward at the European level and had a decisive impact on the constitutional 
dimensions of European contract law.  The work of certain academic projects not only 
provided a fertile ground for Community developments in contract law and other fields, 
but also filtered into the activities of the European institutions, including those examining 
the Community’s competence in this setting.  The European Parliament’s early 
resolutions advocated the need for far-reaching approximation of private law, with 
particular emphasis on contract law, and in doing so, made an important, albeit largely 
unseen, contribution to situating such endeavours within the Community’s internal 
market competences under the Treaty.  The European Council’s meeting in Tampere 
ingrained the linkage between European contract law and the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (the AFSJ), thereby injecting implicit references to the Community’s 
competence concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters under Article 65 EC. 
 
In light of the foregoing remarks, the aim of this chapter is to examine the 
beginnings of the debate about European contract law emanating from these three 
interlocking elements, with primary focus placed on exploring their impact on the 
constitutionality of European contract law.  The chapter is divided into three parts 
concerning, first, the work of certain academic projects; second, the European 
Parliament’s early resolutions; and third, the European Council meeting at Tampere.  In 
this way, the extent to which these three converging developments infiltrated the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law can be illuminated. 
 
5.2 Academic projects  
Generally speaking, there is a large number of academic projects involved with 
European contract law and other fields of European private law, which encapsulate a 
diverse range of objectives. Such objectives include the promulgation of Principles of 
European Contract Law (the PECL) by the Commission on European Contract Law (also 
referred to as the Lando Commission) or a European contract code by the Academy of 
European Private Lawyers (Académie des privatistes européens)8, both of which are 
aimed at the further approximation of national contract law at the European level.  By 
comparison, there are other academic projects that place central focus on comparative 
                                                 
7
 In particular, this is the way the Commission’s Communications have been presented by Commission 
officials involved with the project.  See, e.g., D. Staudenmayer, “The Commission Communication on 
European Contract Law and the Future Prospects”, 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 673, 
681-684 (2002); D. Staudenmayer, “The Commission Communication on European Contract Law: What 
Future for European Contract Law?”, 10 European Review of Private Law 249, 250-252 (2002). 
8
 This group is also referred to as the Pavia Group or the Gandolfi Group after the chairman, Professor 
Giuseppe Gandolfi.  See generally http://www.accademiagiusprivatistieuropei.it/.  See further infra note 12. 
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research and legal education, as exemplified by the Trento “Common Core” project9 and 
the Ius Commune Casebook Project for a Common Law of Europe10.  Indeed, the work of 
these and other academic groups feeds into the definition of European contract law 
itself.11 
 
It is not the intention here to provide an in-depth analysis of each of the academic 
projects involved in European contract law, let alone European private law generally.12 
There already exists quite an extensive literature on the subject, and to do so invariably 
constitutes a doctoral thesis in itself. Rather, the focus of the present section is limited to 
the following:  (1) the Commission on European Contract Law; (2) the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code; and (3) the Network of Excellence encompassing several academic 
projects involved with the preparation of the Draft Common Frame of Reference. As will 
be seen, this set of academic projects has played an important part in the debate about 
European contract law, and it is their work that has contributed to, and even been 
incorporated into, the particular course taken by the European institutions and the 
constitutional discourse related thereto.13  Moreover, the work of some of these groups 
has been compared to the American Restatements promulgated by the American Law 
Institute.14  Therefore, these academic projects constitute important background for the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law and comparative reflection with the 
United States. 
 
5.2.1 The Commission on European Contract Law  
 The Commission on European Contract Law (the CECL)  is one of the most well-
known academic projects involved with European contract law. It is commonly referred 
to as the Lando Commission after its chairman, Professor Ole Lando, who reportedly 
started the project in the early 1980s because of his frustration with the inability of 
private international law rules to remedy the problems caused by the divergences between 
national contract laws in the European Union.15  It is a private academic body, even if it 
did receive certain financial funding from the European Commission for a certain period 
                                                 
9
   See generally http://www.common-core.org/.  See also  infra note 12. 
10
 See generally http://www.casebooks.eu/. See also infra note 12. 
11
 See Chapter 2, § 2.2.2.1. 
12
 For a more detailed survey, see, e.g., A. Fuchs, “A Common Frame of Reference – How should it be 
filled?”, 4 ERA-Forum 99 (2003); E. Hondius, “European Private Law – Survey 2000-2002”, 10 European 
Review of Private Law 865, 869-876 (2002); R. Zimmerman, “Comparative Law and the Europeanization 
of Private Law”, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 539 (2006). For a somewhat more critical 
bent as regards certain groups, see L. Nottage, “Convergence, Divergence, and the Middle Way in Unifying 
or Harmonizing Private Law”, I Annual of German and European Law 2003 166 (R.A. Miller and P.C. 
Zumbansen eds, Berghahn, 2004). With respect to the specific groups within the Network of Excellence, 
see infra note 60. 
13
 Certainly, this is not to say that other prominent academic projects have not received attention from the 
European institutions.  See, e.g., Chapter 6, §  6.3.1.1. 
14
 See Chapter 4, § 4.4. 
15
 See Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II (Combined and Revised) xi (O. Lando and H. 
Beale eds., Kluwer, 2000). The founding date of the CECL often varies by a few years in the literature, 
which can be explained by the fact that the initial meeting of the members of the CECL began in 1980 but 
the work on the PECL was not undertaken until 1982.  See id., at xi-xii.   
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of time.16 It consisted of several professors from each of the then fifteen Member States 
and certain third States, such as Switzerland.17  It is well-known for its seminal work, the 
Principles of European Contract Law (the PECL), which undoubtedly explains why “the 
Lando Commission has acquired the greatest repute in this respect”18.  It has now since 
disbanded19, but its work continues to influence activities taking place in the debate about 
European contract law, such as the Common Frame of Reference (the CFR).20  
 
The PECL was published in three volumes.  Volume One concerns performance, 
non-performance, and remedies and was published in 1995.21  Volume Two is a revised 
and completed version of the PECL, combining Volume One with additional subjects 
concerning general contract law (formation, authority of agents, validity, interpretation, 
contents, and effects), which was published in 2000.22  Volume Three, published in 2003, 
covers not only principles of general contract law, but also those relating to subjects 
going beyond the scope of contract law strictly speaking, such as assignment of claims, 
set-off, and prescription.23 In all, the PECL consists of seventeen chapters, each of which 
comprises a series of articles followed by comments, illustrations, and/or notes indicating 
the primary sources for each rule and how each rule is treated under each of the Member 
States’ legal systems.24    
 
There are three important aspects concerning the PECL that bear upon the debate 
surrounding European contract law:  its objectives, its drafting, and its scope.  First, the 
PECL is envisaged to have both short-term and long-term objectives.  In the short-term, it 
can provide rules for contracting parties, constitute a modern formulation of the lex 
mercatoria for use by arbitrators and others, and embody a model available for 
legislative, judicial and other types of authorities in developing laws whether at the 
national or international level, whereas in the long-term, the PECL is envisaged to lead to 
the unification of contract law in the European Union usually framed in the form of a 
                                                 
16
 Id., at xv-xvii.  See further Written Question No. 1865/91 by Ursula Braun-Moser (“Codification of civil 
law with a bearing on economic matters in the Community”), [1992] OJ C 102/94; Written Question H-
0558/95 by Marlies Mosiek-Urbahn (“Payment of appropriations for the Lando Commission”), Debates of 
the EP (English ed.) 1995 No. 467, p. 177.  
17
 There were in fact three separate Commissions for each of the three volumes of the PECL:  the first, from 
1982-1990, was responsible for Volume I; the second, from 1992-1996, was responsible for Volume II 
(which revised Part I); and the third, from 1997-2001, was responsible for Volume III.  See Principles of 
European Contract Law Parts I and II, supra note 15, at xi-xiii; Principles of European Contract Law Part 
III ix-xiii (O. Lando et al. eds, Kluwer, 2003). 
18
 G. Betlem and E. Hondius, “European Private Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam”, 9 European Review 
of Private Law 3, 19 (2001). 
19
 See Principles of European Contract Law Part III,  supra note 17, at ix-x. 
20
 As regards their usage as part of the Draft CFR, see Chapter 7, § 7.2.3. 
21
 The Principles of European Contract Law Part I: Performance, Non-Performance and Remedies (O. 
Lando and H. Beale eds, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). 
22
 Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, supra note 15. 
23
 Principles of European Contract Law Part III,  supra note 17, 
24
 See generally M.W. Hesselink and G.J.P. de Vries, Principles of European Contract Law (Kluwer, 2001) 
(hereinafter Hesselink and de Vries). See also the bibliography provided on the CECL’s website,   
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/. 
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European contract code.25 Indeed, long before the first volume of the PECL was 
published, Professor Ole Lando had articulated the need for a comprehensive European 
contract instrument in the EU.26  The need for a set of uniform rules of contract law at the 
European level was rooted in the need to facilitate cross-border trade within the EU and 
to strengthen the internal market.27 The PECL is therefore intertwined with the prospect 
of far-reaching Union action in the field of contract law, and in fact, was deemed to 
become a part of a European civil code.28 
 
Second, with respect to the drafting of the PECL, it is explicitly acknowledged 
that some of the provisions of the PECL “reflect suggestions and ideas which have not 
yet materialised in the law of any State”29.  This is because the overarching objective has 
been to find the “best solutions” to particular issues, i.e., “[t]he search has been for the 
most appropriate rules for the future, not for prevailing trends or for compromises.”30 
Consequently, the PECL is not exclusively grounded in the existing laws of the Member 
States, and some rules emanate from outside the European Union, such as the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) or the law 
of the United States.31  The PECL has been referred to as a “Restatement” of contract law 
drawing upon the model of the American Restatement of the American Law Institute in 
this regard.32   Yet, it has been emphasised  that this analogy is not exact.  The PECL is in 
fact a “Statement” of contract law that does not “re-state”, but rather states very much for 
the first time purportedly common European contract law principles33, and it does so with 
                                                 
25
 Principles of European Contract Law Part III, supra note 17, at xv-xvi; Principles of European Contract 
Law Parts I and II, supra note 15, at xxii-xxiv. See further H. Beale, “The Principles of European Contract 
Law and Harmonisation of the Laws of Contract”, in Festskrift til Ole Lando – Papers dedicated to Ole 
Lando 21, 25 (L.L. Andersen et al. eds, Gadjura, 1997).  To be clear, however, the PECL are designed 
primarily for use in the Member States of the EU:  Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, 
supra note 15, at xxv. 
26
 See, e.g., O. Lando, “European Contract Law”, 31 American Journal of Comparative Law 653 (1983);  
P. Hay, O. Lando and R. Rotunda, “Conflict of Laws as a Technique for Legal Integration”, in 1 
Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience 161, 258 (M. Cappelletti et al. 
eds, de Gruyter, 1986); O. Lando, “Teaching a European Code of Contracts”, in The common law of 
Europe and the future of legal education / Le droit commun de l’Europe et l’avenir de l’enseignement 
juridique 223, 227 (B. De Witte and C. Forder eds, Kluwer, 1992).  But recently compare O. Lando, “Have 
the PECL Been a Success or a Failure?”, 17 European Review of Private Law 367 (2009).   
27
 Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, supra note 15, at xxi. 
28
 See, e.g., Principles of European Contract Law Part III,  supra note 17, at xv; O. Lando, “Why Does 
Europe Need a Civil Code?”, in An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law 207, 212 (S. 
Grundmann and J. Stuyck eds, Kluwer, 2002); Lando, “Teaching a European Code of Contracts”, supra 
note 26, at 236. 
29
  Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, supra note 15, at xxvi. 
30
  Principles of European Contract Law Part III,  supra note 17, at xvi. 
31
 Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, supra note 15, at xxv-xxvi.  See further O. Lando, 
“Salient Features of the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparison with the UCC”, 13 Pace 
International Law Review 339 (2001). 
32
 In fact, the PECL has been inspired, inter alia, by the American Restatements as well as the UCC. See, 
e.g., O. Lando, “The Principles of European Contract Law and American Legal Thinking”, in Law and 
Justice in a Multi-State World: Essays in Honour of Arthur T. von Mehren 741, 743 (J.A.R. Nafziger and 
S.C. Symeonides eds, Transnational, 2002); Hesselink and de Vries, supra note 24, at 12. 
33Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, supra note 15, at xxvi. See further, e.g., Lando, 
“Teaching a European Code of Contracts”, supra note 26, at 230; C. von Bar, “Paving the Way Forward 
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a view to their approximation at the European level beyond a merely non-binding 
status.34  
 
 Third, the scope of the PECL is both under- and over-inclusive.  On the one hand, 
as already mentioned, it covers matters beyond the strict confines of contract law.  From 
the first two volumes, the CECL took a “functional approach” in deciding which topics 
were to be included in the PECL, and thus encompass rules that in some legal systems 
were considered part of the law of torts or restitution.35 With the publication of the third 
volume, the PECL came to encompass matters that relate not only to contractual 
obligations but also to “obligations in general”, although the title of “Principles of 
European Contract Law” was retained nonetheless.36 On the other hand, the PECL is 
confined to general contract law and does not deal with specific types of contract or 
address consumer contracts.37 This is not to say that consumer contracts are excluded 
from its scope, but rather that the PECL did not incorporate special rules in line with 
those set out in the various measures comprising the Community contract law acquis.  In 
other words, the PECL is intended to apply to contracts generally, including contracts 
between businesses and consumers (B2C contracts) as well as contracts between 
businesses (B2B contracts).38 This explains in part the emergence of a separate academic 
project, the Acquis Group, which is devoted to filling this gap as seen below. 
 
5.2.2 The Study Group on a European Civil Code  
 As the successor or “heir apparent” to the Lando Commission39, the Study Group 
on a European Civil Code (the Study Group) continued essentially where the CECL left 
off, with the aim of drafting a set of European principles for other areas of private law, 
namely that of patrimonial law comprising not only the general part of contract law and 
specific types of contracts but also the law of extra-contractual obligations and aspects of 
movable property law.40 The Study Group was constituted in 1998, when it was 
envisaged that the CECL would be bringing its work to a close and has been active since 
1999.41  It was founded under the leadership of Professor Christian von Bar, and  
                                                                                                                                                 
with Principles of European Private Law”, in An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law, supra 
note 28, 137; T. Wilhelmsson, “The Design of an Optional (Re)statement of European Contract Law – Real 
Life Instead of Dead Concepts”, in An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law, supra note 28, 
353, at 354. 
34
 See, e.g., Hesselink and de Vries, supra 24, at 20, 23, 29 (also pointing out differences in relation to the 
respective decision-making processes), R. Van den Bergh, “Subsidiarity as an Economic Demarcation 
Principle and the Emergence of European Private Law”, 5 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 129, 129 n.4 (1998).  
35
 Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, supra note 15, at xxv.  
36
 Principles of European Contract Law Part III,  supra note 17, at xvi. 
37
 Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, supra note 15, at xxv. 
38
 Id. See further Hesselink and de Vries, supra note 24, at 42-46. 
39
 E. Hondius, “Towards a European Civil Code”, in Towards a European Civil Code 3, 11 (A. Hartkamp 
et al. eds, 3rd ed., Kluwer, 2004).   
40
 von Bar, supra note 33, at 139.   
41
 C. von Bar, “From Principles To Codification: Prospects For European Private Law”, 8 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 379 (Summer 2002).  This may explain why although most of the literature 
points to its founding in 1998, some recent publications cite 1999.  See, e.g., E. Hondius et al., 6 Principles 
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“represents the largest – and in this form unique – network of European experts in the 
field of private law”.42  It is a private academic enterprise divided up on a series of 
working teams under the general supervision of certain coordinating groups and 
advisors.43 Thus, although it includes former members of the Lando Commission44, the 
Study Group encompasses a much larger cadre of more than one hundred European 
scholars from the now twenty-seven Member States, as well as certain third States, across 
a wider terrain of private law.45  Its principal aim is to produce a set of principles for 
European patrimonial law, which have now started to be published under the Principles 
of European Law (PEL) series.46 The Study Group’s focus on European patrimonial law 
has been explained by the considerable interdependence between the laws of contract, 
tort, and movable property, which makes it problematic to single out certain fields but not 
others.47 
  
 As a consequence, it has been remarked in the literature that the name, “Study 
Group on a European civil code”, is unfortunate.  In part, this is because the ambit of the 
Study Group does not extend to all fields of “civil law”, i.e., it does not encompass the 
fields of family law, the law of immovable property, and the law of succession. More 
often, this is because of the conflation between the work of the Study Group and tensions 
underlying the term, “European civil code”.  Even if the language of codification has 
been toned down and it has been assimilated that of a “Restatement”48 or set of “model 
rules” of European patrimonial law49, the work of the Study Group has been envisaged to 
lay the basis for the approximation of areas of private law at the European level.50  This is 
so, even if there is no general agreement among many members of the Group itself as to 
what extent this should be the case.51  In fact, Professor Christian von Bar, the Chairman 
of the Study Group, admitted that despite his Group’s nameplate, the term “European 
civil code” should be avoided at all costs, since it “raises emotions and fears which for 
the time being are impossible to overcome”.52  Be that as it may, the Study Group’s 
involvement in the European contract law project has to some extent exacerbated 
                                                                                                                                                 
of European Law (Study Group on a European Civil Code) – Sales vii (Sellier, 2008) (hereinafter 
Principles of European Law on Sales). 
42
 “Communication on European Contract Law: Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract 
Law and the Study Group ona European Civil Code”, 10 European Review of Private Law 183, 192 (2002) 
(hereinafter Joint Response). 
43
 See the Study Group’s website for a comprehensive description:  http://www.sgecc.net/. 
44
 Joint Response, supra note 42, at 189. 
45
 Principles of European Law on Sales, supra note 41, at vii-viii. 
46
 For a list of publications and activities, see the Study Group’s website, supra note 43. 
47
 See, e.g., von Bar, supra note 33, at 140. For the definition of European patrimonial law, see Chapter 2, § 
2.2.2.2. 
48
 von Bar, supra note 33, at 137. 
49
 Principles of European Law on Sales, supra note 41, at vii.  
50
 In fact, this is stated upfront on its website: http://www.sgecc.net/pages/en/introduction/101.scope.htm.  
51
 von Bar, supra note 41, at 380 (with similar remarks about the CECL). As a quintessential example, 
certain members of the Study Group are also members of the Study Group on Social Justice in European 
Private Law, which severely criticised the movement towards further approximation of contract law at 
European level:  see “Social Justice in European Contract Law: a Manifesto”, 10 European Law Journal 
653 (2004). 
52
 C. von Bar, “A Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law – Academic Efforts and Political 
Realities”, 23 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 37, 40 (2008).  
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sensitivities surrounding the potential adoption of a comprehensive instrument of private 
(or even contract) law at the European level.53 At the same time, the Study Group’s 
repeated advocacy in institutional documents of taking a broad view of the national 
private law systems adds to such tensions in terms of the scope, not just the means, of 
Union action. These points have particular resonance in the Study Group’s role in the 
CFR project as part of the Network of Excellence examined below.54   
 
5.2.3  The Network of Excellence  
 While detailed discussion of the CFR must await the next two chapters, it must be 
understood at the outset that the framework for the participation of certain academic 
projects in the CFR project was established under the auspices of the Network of 
Excellence. Starting in May 2005, the Study Group and several other academic projects 
joined together as the Network of Excellence for the preparation of draft or academic 
version of the CFR (the DCFR).55  The Network’s preparation of the DCFR was funded 
by the European Commission as part of the European Community’s Sixth Framework 
Programme for Research.56 The Network of Excellence has also been called the Joint 
Network on European Private Law or the Co-PECL, since the aim was to produce the 
CFR in the form of a set of “Common Principles of European Contract Law”.57  Yet, this 
is somewhat of a misnomer, since the DCFR includes not only common principles but 
also definitions and model rules concerning contract law as well as other fields of private 
law, which largely correspond to the fields of European patrimonial law covered by the 
Study Group.58   
 
At present, the Network of Excellence envelops the following eight academic 
projects:  (1) the Study Group; (2) the Acquis Group; (3) the Project Group on a 
Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law; (4) a group of French academic 
institutions comprising the Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique 
(Association Henri Capitant), the Société de Législation Comparée, and the Conseil 
Supérieur du Notariat; (5) the Trento Common Core Project; (6) the Research Group on 
the Economic Assessment of Contract Law Rules of the Tilburg Law and Economics 
Center (TILEC); (7) the Database Group under the auspices of the Institut Charles 
Dumoulin of the University of Paris XI Faculty of Law; and (8) the Academy of 
                                                 
53
 As a result, this has led to publications in which scholars fervently oppose such codification in 
connection with the work of the Study Group. The classic reference here is to Y. Lequete, “Quelques 
remarques à propos du projet de code civil européen de M. von Bar”, Recueil Dalloz 2202 (2002), among 
others. 
54
 See H. Beale, “The European Commission’s Common Frame of Reference Project: a progress report”, 2 
European Review of Contract Law 303, 304 (2006). 
55
 It is been labeled the academic or draft CFR because it is the product of the academic projects within the 
Network of Excellence.  This is to distinguish it from the so-called political or final version of the CFR 
which is to be adopted at the European level, although its form has yet to be definitively decided.  See 
further Chapter 6, § 6.4.2. 
56
 See materials posted on the website devoted to the Joint Network on European Private Law, available at 
http://www.copecl.org. 
57
  Id. 
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  See Chapter 7, § 7.2.3. 
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European Law in Trier (the ERA).59  The Study Group and the Acquis Group were 
charged with the principal drafting of most of the substantive content of the DCFR, save 
for certain sections dedicated to particular subjects:   the elaboration of a common 
terminology and the revision of the PECL were handled by the French institutions headed 
by the Association Henri Capitant60; and the provisions concerning of insurance contracts 
were dealt with by the Insurance Group.61  The remaining four groups are occupied in 
various ways with the comparative and evaluative analysis of the DCFR.  Consequently, 
encased within the Network of Excellence are several groups that embody very different 
approaches to European contract law.  As regards the substantive drafting of the DCFR, 
aside from the Study Group, the Acquis Group and the Insurance Group stand out. 
 
The Acquis Group, formally labeled the European Research Group on Existing 
EC Private Law, was founded in 2002 and currently comprises over forty legal scholars 
from nearly all Member States.62 The main founders of the Acquis Group are Professor 
Gianmaria Ajani from the University of Torino and Professor Hans Schulte-Nölke from 
the University of Bielefeld.63 As its name indicates, it is focused on the Community 
private law acquis and has placed, at least for now, considerable focus on the field of 
contract law.64  Its objective is to formulate the existing Community acquis in the form of 
a so-called Restatement, which is titled the “Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law” 
or the Acquis Principles.65  As explained by its founders, the Acquis Principles claim 
similarity with the American Restatements to some extent: 
 
[T]he Principles have similar aims to the classical restatements of the  
American Law Institute  and the very successful effort to transfer this  
method to the variety of European national laws. It is an attempt to 
present and structure the bulky, manifold and rather incoherent patchwork 
of EC private law in such way that should allow the current state of its  
development to be made clear, and for relevant legislation and case law to 
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 For full discussion of the role played by these groups within the CFR project, see “Special Issue on 
European Contract Law”, 9 ERA-Forum (2008).  
60
 See Materials for a Common Frame of Reference: Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules (B. 
Fauvarque-Cosson and D. Mazeaud eds, Sellier, 2008).  This work has also been published in French under 
two separate volumes:  see http://www.copecl.org. 
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 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
62
 See the website of the Acquis Group:  http://www.acquis-group.org/. 
63
 Professor Gianmaria Ajani acts as the Speaker of the Acquis Group, and Professor Hans Schulte-Nölke 
acts as the Group’s Coordinator:  see id.  
64
 See R. Schulze, “European Private Law and Existing EC Law”, 13 European Review of Private Law 3, 7 
(2005) (noting while initial focus on contract law, approach applicable to other areas of European private 
law); G. Ajani and H. Schulte-Nölke, “The Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law: A Preliminary 
Output of the Acquis Group”, in Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group), 
Contract I – Pre-contractual Obligations, Conclusions of Contract, Unfair Terms ix (Sellier, 2007) (noting 
that the Acquis Group “aims at formulating the existing EC law in the field of private law  . . . which is 
titled ‘Principles of the Existing EC Private Law’”). 
65
 See Contract I – Pre-contractual Obligations, Conclusions of Contract, Unfair Terms, supra note 65;  
Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Contract II – General Provisions, 
Delivery of Goods, Package Travel and Payment Services (Sellier, 2009).  For a detailed list of  its 
publications, see the Acquis Group’s website, supra note 62. 
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be easily found.66 
 
Pursuant to Article 1:101 of the Acquis Principles of EC Contract Law, for example, the 
Principles are envisaged to serve “as a source for the drafting, the transposition and the 
interpretation of European Community law”.67 That said, its work is not without 
controversy.  Among other things, the extent to which general principles can be identified 
on the basis of a piecemeal set of directives that were not envisaged to operate 
independently of the national contract law regimes has been the subject of debate.68 
Moreover, as regards the objectives of the Acquis Principles of Existing EC Contract 
Law, they are meant to stand by themselves as well as to feed into the ongoing activities 
concerning European contract law at the institutional level, which includes the DCFR69 
and legislative activities focused specifically on the consumer contract acquis.70 In effect, 
the Group has one foot in the European contract law project and another in the parallel 
track of the revision of the Community consumer acquis, which have come together in 
the debate about European contract law as seen in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
 The Project Group on a Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law, 
referred to as the Insurance Group, is another important component of the Network of 
Excellence.  Apparently, the idea for a “Restatement of European insurance contract law” 
originated at an international conference in 1998, and thereafter, the Group was formed 
under the chairmanship of Professor Fritz Reichert-Facilides; upon his death, Professor 
Helmut Heiss took up the reign.71  The Group is associated with the Study Group72 and 
has been charged with elaborating the insurance contract law provisions of the CFR.73  
The Insurance Group adheres to the format of the PECL, with its work on Principles of 
                                                 
66
 Ajani and Schulte-Nölke, “The Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law: A Preliminary Output of the 
Acquis Group”, supra note 64, at ix.  This is inscribed as part of the Principles themselves:  see H. Schulte-
Nölke and C. Busch, Commentary for Paragraph (1): Restatement of the Existing EC Contract Law - 
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Conclusions of Contract, Unfair Terms, supra note 65, 17, at 17-18. 
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 Acquis Principles of Existing EC Contract Law § 1:101(2). 
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 See C. Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law 153-155 (Routledge-Cavendish, 2008) 
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DCFR, see R. Schulze, “The Academic Draft of the CFR and the EC Contract Law”, in Common Frame of 
Reference and Existing EC Contract Law (R. Schulze ed., Sellier, 2008); R. Schulze and T. Wilhelmsson, 
“From the Draft Common Frame of Reference towards European Contract Law Rules”, 4 European Review 
of Contract Law 154 (2008). 
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 See Chapter 7, § 7.3. 
71
 For detailed information and a comprehensive bibliography of publications, see the website of the 
Insurance Group: http://www.uibk.ac/at/zivilrecht/restatement/.  
72
 On the Study Group’s website, it is called an “associate team” within the umbrella of the Study Group’s 
working teams, and the Restatement Insurance Group’s website states that it cooperates with the Hamburg 
branch of the Study Group. 
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 See H. Heiss, “The Common Frame of Reference (CFR) of European Insurance Contract Law”, in 
Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC Contract Law, supra note 69, 229. 
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European Insurance Contract Law claiming a similar moniker (the PEICL).74  It claims to 
share a theoretical link to the American Restatements, even using the term, Restatement, 
as part of its name.  This is to indicate that it follows the “same idea” as that in the United 
States as regards the synthesis of the laws of insurance contracts among the Member 
States.75  There is an important difference, however. Unlike the American context, the 
Restatement Group aims at the drafting of a “European Insurance Contract Act” at the 
European level.76  Indeed, the Group’s preparation of the relevant sections of the DCFR 
was done in the form of an optional instrument that would be capable of being adopted by 
the European institutions in such form.77 Its place in the debate highlights important 
issues concerning the need for Community action, whether by way of approximation or 
an optional instrument, in the area of insurance contract law and the relationship of this 
area to more general matters concerning contract law.78   
 
Taken together, the Lando Commission, the Study Group, and the additional 
academic projects within the Network of Excellence have become firmly ensconced 
within the overall momentum surrounding the European contract law.  As will be seen in 
the coming chapters, the emphasis placed on the relationship between contract law and 
related fields of private law, as well as that between contract law and specific subsets, by 
these groups has become interwoven within the activities of the European institutions in 
the debate.  Likewise, the “functional” linkage between some of these groups and the 
American Restatements of the American Law Institute also percolate through the debate, 
to which additional American mechanisms will be added.  Yet, the work of some of these 
academic projects already fed into the momentum surrounding European contract law 
(and European private law generally) generated by several early European Parliament 
resolutions, to which the discussion now turns. 
 
5.3 The early European Parliament resolutions 
 The European Parliament disseminated three seminal resolutions on the 
approximation of European private law in 1989, 1994, and 2000.  These resolutions are 
often cited in the discourse surrounding European contract law.  Yet, it is not generally 
known that underlying these resolutions lay considerable discussion of the Community’s 
competence in this area and their interplay with the principle of subsidiarity.  These 
resolutions also prompted responses from the Commission, which brought the 
constitutionality of Community action in contract law and other areas of private law to 
the forefront.   Each of these three resolutions is taken in turn. 
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 For the content of the PEICL, see the Insurance Group’s website, supra note 71. Indeed, as underlined by 
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5.3.1 The 1989 Resolution 
On 26 May 1989, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on action to 
bring into line the private law of the Member States.79  The events leading to its passage 
began much earlier in April 1985 when the Parliament tabled a motion for a resolution of 
the same name by two Greek MEPs, Nikolaos Gazis and Georgios Mavros.80  This 
motion for a resolution set the groundwork for the “drawing up of a common European 
civil code” by way of comparative legal research and the formation of an “ad hoc 
committee” to oversee the process.81   
 
This motion was referred to the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens’ Rights, which prompted Mr. Gazis to disseminate a Working Document in 
January 1986 examining in further detail the need for a uniform system of private law in 
the European Community.82  The 1986 Working Document was organised around three 
central questions concerning the need for such a code, whether it was possible, and if so, 
what method should be followed.83 As regards the first question, Mr. Gazis noted that 
despite the fact that there had been a number of special subjects on which common rules 
had been adopted at the European level, “having separate legislation on specific questions 
is a different matter from having a uniform system of law covering all subjects”.84  As 
regards the second question, the difficulties involved were not deemed insurmountable.  
For the civil law systems, this was due to three “optimistic” factors concerning the recent 
codifications in Italy and Greece as well as the Lando Commission’s work on European 
contract law.85  As far as the common law systems were concerned, this was considered 
“the most difficult” case because it was “not just a question of different codes but of 
different legal systems”.86  Yet, there were still reasons for optimism, “at least, initially, 
as far as contract law is concerned”, as shown by the codification of large sections of 
commercial law in England, various international conventions in fields of private law, 
and the situation in the United States “where the existence of the common law and its 
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truly chaotic development in the various states did not prevent all the American states 
from adopting a uniform Commercial Code”.87  In fact, the idea of a Restatement of the 
common law of the UK and Ireland, similar to the American Restatements, was floated 
for use by civil law practitioners on the grounds that it would make it easier for them “to 
understand common law and might be a first step towards the codification of the common 
law”, albeit it was for English lawyers to take the initiative in this regard.88  It was also 
mentioned that “a modernized European civil code” would have influence outside the 
Community for countries with outdated codes or no codes at all.89   
 
On this basis, Mr. Gazis concluded that the private law of the Member States, 
“especially as regards the law [of] obligations and contract, and what are known as 
general principles of civil law”90, can be unified.91 He stressed that this endeavour 
constituted neither “a theoretical scientific activity” nor “a new draft international 
convention to which it would be possible to accede in whole or in part”, but instead was 
aimed at the establishment of “a uniform body of positive law”.92  Moreover, even if one 
or more Member States were not willing to join, unification with less than all the Member 
States would still be “a benefit to a United Europe and its transactions”93.  In this regard, 
he proposed that if the reaction of the Member States was positive, an ad hoc committee 
could be set up, which could organise, together with the Commission, the project as a 
whole.94  In closing, he remarked:  “A common system of private law is a vital and 
indispensable need for second-generation Europe. It is undoubtedly an arduous and time-
consuming task. However, this task will have to be started one day. Why not start 
now?”95 
 
 This Working Document was considered by the Parliamentary Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights at its meetings of 22 and 23 April 1986, whereby the 
Committee decided to draw up a Report and appointed Mr. Gazis as Rapporteur.96  Up to 
this point, there had been no explicit discussion of the Community’s competence to 
engage in this endeavour. Chronology is important here. The initial motion for a 
resolution and subsequent Working Document were made before the Single European 
Act was adopted in February 1986 and entered into force on 1 July 1987.97  In contrast, 
the Report drawn up by Mr. Gazis as Rapporteur on behalf of the Committee was adopted 
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several years later on 28 April 1989 and contained detailed discussion of this subject.98  
The heart of the Report was the Explanatory Statement authored by Mr. Gazis.  It was 
organised into nine separate sections, the first five essentially reflecting the points 
covered in the previous Working Document with some elaboration.99  The remaining four 
sections (Parts VI-IX), along with the Introduction, were brand-new. These concerned the 
legal foundation for the proposal; the type of harmonisation to be carried out; the 
declaration of willingness to participate; and the first steps to be taken, respectively. 
 
In the Introduction, Mr. Gazis underlined that the aim of the motion for a 
resolution was “to bring about the unification of private law of the Member States”, but 
not all branches of private law at the same time.100  Rather, specific branches would be 
progressively chosen for which contract law and “so-called general principles of civil law 
(capacity, conditions, deadlines, prescription and private international law, etc.)” were 
expected to go first.101 The Community’s competence was directly addressed in the 
section concerning the legal foundation for the proposal.  After a short incursion into the 
objectives of the Treaty and various provisions concerning the approximation of national 
laws in areas chiefly of an economic  nature102, the Report focused on the Community’s 
competences under Articles 100 and 235 EEC (now Articles 94 and 308 EC).103  This led 
to the following conclusions: 
 
 A uniform legal system to cover private law as a whole or major branches 
 of it is, particularly since the objectives of the European Community were 
 widened, a necessity for which the fragmented and disjointed harmonization 
 of various individual subject-areas can no longer be a substitute. The EC, in 
 a serious and sensitive area like that of the law, can no longer express itself 
 “with one voice”, as required by the Single [European] Act, through twelve 
different legal systems. There has to be a general legal framework which 
facilitates trade – and competition – and offers trading partners greater security. 
The twelve different systems of law which exist at present are tantamount to 
 twelve frontiers which call for constant vigilance and care, as well as additional 
 expenditure, on the part of those involved in international trade if they are to 
 avoid falling into legal traps. The current system in the private law sector as a 
 whole has clearly been left lagging slowly behind in comparison with the 
 endeavours made in other sectors, even though the institutional powers for a  
 broader updating of the law were always there from the outset (in the form of 
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 Articles 100 and 235).104 
 
Mr. Gazis then drew attention to the Single European Act, which was considered to make 
legal harmonisation more urgently needed on account of the creation of the internal 
market, on the one hand, and simpler to carry out, on the other hand, by virtue of the 
introduction of Article 100a EEC (now Article 95 EC).105  Article 100a EEC was deemed 
more wide-ranging than Article 100 EEC (now Article 94 EC) because it did not require 
a “direct link” to the establishment or the functioning of the common market as a 
precondition; it was not limited to the use of directives; and it stipulated qualified-
majority, as opposed to unanimous, voting in the Council.106  On this basis, he 
proclaimed that “a complete legal foundation for the attempt to unify private law or 
branches thereof” could be found on the combined interpretation of the principles set out 
in the Preambles of the EEC Treaty and the Single European Act, together with Articles 
3(h), 100, 100A and 235.107  In other words, this signified the legal bases of Articles 94, 
95 and 308 EC, alongside  the Community’s activity to approximate national laws “to the 
extent required for the functioning of the common market” enshrined in Article 3(1)(h) 
EC.   
 
 In line with this finding, Mr. Gazis set forth certain novel proposals concerning 
the type of harmonisation envisaged and the involvement of the Member States in this 
regard. While harmonisation could in principle be pursued in different ways, i.e., by 
means of directives, regulations or conventions, here the aim was the unification of 
private law such that the question of harmonisation by way of directives did not arise.108 
Likewise, the idea of drawing up a convention in its traditional form was not suitable, 
since it “probably cannot constitute the ‘substantive law’ of all the Member States (for 
instance, because of non-conformity with other legislation or with a different system of 
law or the Constitution in a certain Member State or States, or even for historical 
reasons)”.109  Therefore, given that the aim was to unify the substantive private law of the 
Member States – since that was “the only thing which will fully meet the requirements of 
a genuinely single market” – this called for a solution whereby the Member States would 
first have to express their intentions in principle of proceeding with unification and then 
an attempt would be made to unify the private laws of those Member States that 
responded positively.110  This led to the contemplation of a solution containing certain 
features both of a convention and a regulation, but without being either a convention of 
the “classical type” to which the Member States were expected to accede with or without 
reservations or a “pure” regulation whose provisions were directly binding on all the 
Member States.111  This solution was considered to fall within the scope of the 
Community’s competence under Article 100a EEC (now Article 95 EC), on the view that 
its broad drafting (merely referring to “measures for the approximation . . .”) allowed 
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“complete freedom of manoeuvre as regards both the extent and the form of 
harmonization carried out”.112  
 
As for what would go into the so-called “convention”, this would have to be 
worked out by those Member States deciding to combine their efforts to draw up a 
uniform system of private law that supplemented their substantive law currently in 
force.113 Yet, in contrast to what usually happens with traditional conventions in which 
countries are subsequently free to accede, “an attempt will be made right from the outset 
to draw up a common system of private law capable of replacing the corresponding 
provisions in the substantive law of the specific Member States which express their 
willingness to pursue this course of action.”114  Likewise, as for what would go into the 
so-called “regulation”, this would have to sought in the fact that even if the framing of a 
uniform body of private law was not intended to involve all Member States from the 
outset or to be mandatorily imposed on all Member States, partial unification of this kind 
(meaning partial as regards the number of participating Member States but complete as 
far as the new law to be adopted was concerned) was still of concern to all Member 
States, since they – including those not involved in the drafting – have an interest in 
ensuring that unification is carried out, even if it is not global.115 This was because even 
partial unification was a measure that has as its object and aim the “better functioning of 
the internal market” in accordance with Article 100a EEC (now Article 95 EC), which 
was not to the desired extent, but at any rate to a degree that constituted serious progress 
in comparison with the situation existing today.116 Of course, the “ideal thing” would be 
for all Member States to acquire a single system of private law, but if that should prove 
unattainable, the unification of certain branches of private law by a “relatively substantial 
number” of Member States would still constitute an “a serious and necessary step 
towards the completion of the internal market ‘without frontiers’”.117    
 
In the section entitled “Declaration of willingness to participate”, Mr. Gazis then 
elaborated specific procedures to determine which Member States would participate in 
the unification project and how to move forward in the process. He broached the subject 
of the participation of the Member States with the recognition that the proposal was “such 
a wide-ranging overthrow of the legal status quo”, that it was likely to encounter strong 
opposition especially from lawyers in the Member States.118  As a first stage, there should 
be negotiations between the Member State Governments concerned, on the one hand, and 
scholars specialising in the relevant fields, on the other hand, in order to come up with an 
initial approach, which could be confined in the beginning to “the law of obligations (or 
contracts) which is the backbone of trade”119 To set the project in motion at this stage, a 
“representative committee of appropriate experts” could be set up, which would be 
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established by the Commission, following consultation with the Member State 
Governments.120 Then, as part of the “first steps” to be taken, if and when the Member 
States (all or some of them)  decide in principle to go ahead with unification, the Member 
States in question, in consultation with the Commission, would set up an “ad hoc 
committee of lawyers responsible for determining priorities and organizing the whole 
undertaking (working parties, etc.).”121 
 
 The European Parliament’s 1989 Resolution followed this Report a month 
later.122 Compared to the detail of the Report, the Resolution was much shorter, 
amounting to about one page. Yet, many of its points can be understood only by looking 
at the two together. The Resolution began by taking aim at the Community’s piecemeal 
harmonisation of “many individual aspects of private law but not whole branches of it”, 
which did “not meet the needs and objectives of the single market without frontiers, 
particularly as formulated since the entry into force of the Single [European] Act”.123  
Consequently, the Parliament declared that, “the most effective way of carrying out 
harmonization with a view to meeting the Community’s legal requirements in the area of 
private law is to unify major branches of that law”, particularly those which were highly 
important for the development of the single market, such as contract law.124  As regards 
the matter of competence, the Parliament simply proclaimed that “the Treaty and the 
Single [European] Act offer a comprehensive legal basis for the objective pursued in this 
resolution”, without mentioning any specific Treaty provisions in this regard.125  There 
was also no reference to the means by which the Code would be formulated, i.e., by way 
of the hybrid convention-regulation method discussed in the Report.   
 
The Parliament concluded the Resolution by making several requests.  First, in 
perhaps its most-cited provision, it asked that “a start be made on the necessary 
preparatory work on drawing up a common European Code of Private Law, the Member 
States, being invited, having deliberated [on] the matter, to state whether they wish to be 
involved in the planned unification”.126 Second, it envisaged that following discussions 
among the Member States that agreed in principle to unification, “a committee of 
appropriate experts” should be set up to define the priorities and to organise the whole 
undertaking of unifying private law in those Member States.127 Finally, in line with the 
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importance of promoting reciprocal understanding of the various systems of private law 
in the Member States, the Parliament requested that aid be given to centres for 
comparative legal studies in the Community and to codifying endeavours in general and 
that the necessary financial arrangements be made to carry out this project.128  
 
With those bold statements, the 1989 Resolution was heralded as “a symbolic 
starting point” for the Community’s engagement in the debate about the promulgation of 
a uniform code of private (and contract) law.129  It is repeatedly cited in documents 
concerning European contract law issued by the European institutions and is a steady 
fixture in the scholarly literature concerning European contract law and European private 
law generally.  Regrettably, however, the Parliament’s explicit engagement with the 
Community’s internal market competences and the unique method of unification 
proposed, that of the convention-regulation hybrid, remained hidden in the documents 
accompanying of the Resolution. 
 
Notably, the Parliament’s assumption of sufficient Community competence to 
unify national private law embodied in the 1989 Resolution may have been glaring when 
placed alongside another resolution of the European Parliament issued about a year later, 
which drew a connection between national private law and the principle of 
subsidiarity.130  On 12 July 1990, the Parliament adopted a Resolution on the principle of 
subsidiarity (the 1990 Resolution)131, the first of many leading up to the 
Intergovernmental Conference on the Maastricht Treaty.132  This 1990 Resolution was 
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generally concerned with the role played by this principle in relation to patrolling the 
division of competence between the European Community and the Member States. 
Among other things, the Parliament stressed that there were very few areas in which the 
Community had been given exclusive competence under the Treaty, and that most areas 
of Community competence were areas in which Member States could also act under the 
rubric of concurrent competences, which were also referred to as shared, parallel, or 
overlapping competences.133  The principle of subsidiarity should therefore “be a guide 
not just to determine legally the areas in which the Community may act (which has been 
done in the Treaties) but also, and especially, as a political guide to the extent of 
Community action in the fields of concurrent competence.”134  On this basis, the 
Parliament declared that “far-reaching competences will remain with the Member States 
in the fields of economics, taxation, education, culture, social security, health, family 
policy, the organization of local government, public transport, infrastructure, police, 
penal code, private law, religion and many other areas”135.   
 
At first sight, this statement seemed to contradict the 1989 Resolution supporting 
the far-reaching approximation of private law at the European level. With a closer look, 
however, the meaning of this statement seems to have been more nuanced when read in 
the light of the reports accompanying this resolution, which had been drafted by Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing as Rapporteur on behalf of the Parliamentary Committee of 
Institutional Affairs.136  In the first interim report dated 22 June 1990,  the above-quoted 
passage was framed slightly differently:  “far-reaching competences will remain, for a 
certain period of time, with the Member States in the fields of economics, taxation, 
education and the provisions of public and private law”.137   In the subsequent interim 
report of 4 July 1990, under the heading entitled “Powers which should not be removed 
from the Member States”, it was explained that in practice, “the complexity of situations 
sometimes leads to a certain overlapping of powers which cannot be ignored”138.  In 
particular, this was the case with “[c]ivil law, the status of individuals and goods, civil 
procedure”, under which “marital status, contracts and the status of minors” were 
expressly listed as examples.139   
 
As a result, these reports suggested that the Member States’ competence over 
private law was not absolute, and this was particularly so with regard to contract law in 
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the second report.  Still, the 1990 Resolution made no reference to the previous 1989 
Resolution, and their relationship remains unclear.  The two Resolutions were written by 
two different Parliamentary Committees with different aims and objectives, and it is 
therefore uncertain how much to read the content of one in relation to the other. Be that 
as it may, the tensions between the 1989 and 1990 Resolutions were never addressed by 
the European Parliament. Five years later, when the Parliament issued its second 1994 
Resolution on the approximation of private law, no reference was made to the 1990 
Resolution, let alone to the principle of subsidiarity in this regard. In the events leading 
up to the 1994 Resolution, however, the Community’s competence in private law was 
given renewed reflection by the Commission.  
 
5.3.2 The Commission’s Response to “Problems of harmonizing civil law” 
On 6 April 1992, in the interim between the 1989 Resolution and the Parliament’s  
1994 Resolution discussed below, a Greek MEP, Filippos Pierros, submitted a written 
question to the Commission entitled “Problems of harmonizing civil law”.140  This was 
not the first time that questions concerning the approximation of civil law had come 
before the Commission by way of Parliamentary questions.141 Yet, it was Commissioner 
Bangemann’s answer to this question that infiltrated the discussion of the Community’s 
competence in matters of private law in the commentary and institutional documents. 
 
Mr. Pierros began by pointing out the “considerable discrepancies between the 
average length of legal proceedings, legal aid provisions, compensation, legal costs, 
appeal procedures etc. in the different Member States”.142 There were different periods of 
time between taking a matter to court and a court judgment depending on the country in 
which the lawyer brought his case, as exemplified by six months in Greece and as much 
as forty-two months in Italy.143 There were also differences in the amount of 
compensation awarded to victims of fatal accidents across the European Union.144  In his 
view, “this undermines efforts to achieve a single European market, reduces prospects of 
fair competition and discriminates against certain European consumers.”145 This led him 
to pose the following question: “What practical measures will the Commission take to 
achieve a minimum degree of harmonization between the Member States on such 
sensitive matters of substantive and procedural civil law?”146 
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 About six months later, on 19 October 1992, Commissioner Martin Bangemann 
provided an answer to this question on behalf of the Commission.147  The beginning lines 
are probably the most well-known:   
 
The Honourable Member is correct in pointing out that discrepancies exist 
in the Member States as regards substantive and procedural aspects of civil 
law. While the Community has no direct power in terms of the EEC Treaty 
to intervene directly in the matters cited by the Honourable Member, Article 
220 of the Treaty does permit Member States, where necessary, to enter  
negotiations with each other to make Conventions with a view to securing 
benefits for their nationals.148 
 
He then gave the examples of the Brussels Convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments and the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, which “go some way to reduce the differences between the Member States in 
relation to civil law”, and noted that steps were being taken to evaluate whether the 
Brussels Convention should be extended to other areas of the law.149 
 
Thereafter, Commissioner Bangemann’s response was cited in the commentary in 
order to substantiate the Community’s lack of sufficient competence to adopt a European 
code of private law.150  Looking closely, however, it is doubtful whether his answer can 
be taken that far, which may explain remarks by at least one scholar not to read too much 
into it.151  Commissioner Bangemann limited his answer to “the matters cited” by Mr. 
Pierros, which were, to recall, “the average length of proceedings, legal aid provisions, 
compensation, legal costs, appeal procedures, etc.”.  Thus, the Commissioner’s response 
seemed to have been focused primarily on procedural, as opposed to substantive, civil 
law matters. The one topic raised in Mr. Pierros’ written question that could be 
considered to concern substantive civil law matters pertained to “compensation” for 
victims of fatal accidents, for which there have been some inroads made at European 
level in this area.152  
 
In any event, it remains ambiguous the extent to which Mr. Bangemann’s answer 
spoke to the Community’s competence to take action in substantive private law, 
particularly as regards contract law. To some extent, this could have been furthered by 
publications authored by Commissioner Bangemann (and other Community officials) in a 
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private capacity expressing a negative opinion on the subject.153 The bottom line is that 
while Commissioner Bangemann’s response no doubt contributed to the discussion of the 
Community’s competence in this setting, even filtering into the Parliament’s 1994 
Resolution, it was certainly not the last word on the matter. 
 
5.3.3 The 1994 Resolution 
On 6 May 1994, the European Parliament adopted a second Resolution on the 
harmonization of certain sectors of the private law of the Member States.154 As evidenced 
by reference to “certain sectors” of private law in its title, there was a subtle change of 
position in this Resolution as compared to the previous one in 1989.  The 1994 
Resolution was short, taking up less than a page.155 The Parliament began by recalling its 
previous 1989 Resolution calling for the necessary preparatory work to be started on a 
common European Code of European Private law and criticising the Commission for not 
yet undertaking such work.156 It then declared that the “progressive harmonization of 
certain sectors of private law is essential to the completion of the internal market”157 and 
made several requests that were similar, though not identical, to those set out in the 1989 
Resolution. The Parliament asked the Commission to start work “on the possibility of 
drawing up a Common European Code of Private Law” and called for the setting up of a 
committee of experts “to propose priorities for partial harmonization in the short term and 
more general harmonization in the long term”.158  Noticeably, the Parliament neither 
defined what it meant by “certain sectors of private law” nor clarified what fields should 
be included in such a Code, although again it put emphasis on contract law, singling out 
the Lando Commission for which “support should continue to be given . . . in its work on 
the harmonization of contract law”.159  
 
  The subtle differences between the 1989 and 1994 Resolutions can only be 
explained by looking at the Explanatory Statement in the accompanying Report drawn up 
by Spanish MEP, Carlos María Bru Puron, as Rapporteur on behalf of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights.160  It was divided into two main parts 
concerning, first, general questions connected with the harmonisation of private law; and 
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second, special areas for harmonisation or unification.161 At the forefront of the first part 
was the discussion of the Community’s competence. Although it was recognised that 
some harmonisation of private law was needed, the question “whether there is a need for 
the general harmonization of private law, however, remains open; it does not appear to be 
essential to the smooth operation of the single market”162. It was further emphasised that 
although there were various Treaty provisions conferring specific competence on the 
Community to take action in certain areas, e.g., Articles 100 and 100a (now Article 94 
and 95) EC in the realm of “private economic law” the Community did “not have general 
competence for harmonizing private law as a whole”, thereby citing Commissioner 
Bangemann’s response mentioned above.163   
 
At the same time, however, the Rapporteur underlined that although “the 
harmonisation or unification of private law as a whole was not possible at present . . . an 
approximation of whole sectors appears attainable and adequate.”164 He proceeded to 
identify certain appropriate sectors for harmonization, which included “the law of 
obligations and contract law”.165  In this regard, he envisaged that some basic legal 
concepts in this area should be harmonised first, using the work of the Lando 
Commission as a first step in this connection.166  Then, he pointed to several fundamental 
principles, which would provide the basis for a “future code of obligations and private 
property contracts at Community level”.167   
 
Depending on the matters concerned, the Rapporteur considered the forms of 
harmonisation or unification that could be availed of, which included mention of 
American models.168  In its general sense, harmonisation could be carried out in the form 
of a convention, a regulation or a directive.169 The Rapporteur surmised that other 
methods to achieve harmonisation could be uniform laws, model laws, and Restatements, 
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but these were not recognised in Community law.170 As for Restatements, the main aim 
was “to influence the development of law directly and indirectly to ensure greater 
uniformity of contract law in the Member States” and was a method identified with the 
work of the Lando Commission.171 In Community law, a Restatement was to be regarded 
as a measure comparable to a recommendation.172  As for uniform laws and model laws, 
there was no further elaboration, save for the reference to the Benelux Uniform Law on 
Trademarks as an example of a uniform law.173  Thus, it remained ambiguous the extent 
to which the meaning of these terms in the American setting was taken into account. It 
also remained ambiguous to what extent the Report considered a uniform law a viable 
instrument, since it made further reference to it as a possible means of unification even 
though, as noted previously, it was not recognised in the Community legal order.174   
 
In closing, Mr. Bru Peron concluded that, “The differences are still too great for 
overall harmonization or unification. In other words, we have not yet reached the stage 
where we can have a European Code.”175  Yet, approximation of laws in certain sectors 
was still advisable and attainable, reiterating the law of obligations and the law of 
contracts as among the most appropriate areas.176   As a result, this seems to explain the 
express emphasis placed on “certain sectors” of private law in the 1994 Resolution, 
although they went unnamed in the final text.  Nevertheless, the reference to a European 
Code of Private Law and to the progression towards “more general harmonization” in the 
1994 Resolution sits somewhat uncomfortably with the accompanying Report that 
disclaimed such broad-scale harmonisation and singled out contract law and the law of 
obligations. 
 
 Importantly, during the time leading up to the final adoption of the Parliament’s 
1994 Resolution, the draft motion for the resolution already prompted a response from 
the European Commission on the issue of the Community’s competence in matters of 
private law.   The Commission made certain written statements in the form of a Projet de 
déclaration and a Note d’information de la Commission as part of its file on the 1994 
Resolution, although these documents do not seem to have been officially published.177  
These statements firmly denounced the Community’s competence to adopt a European 
code of private law.   
 
In the Projet de déclaration, the Commission took note of the European 
Parliament’s 1989 and 1994 Resolutions but underscored that as far as the harmonisation 
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of substantive private law was concerned, the Community was only given competence 
under the limits and the conditions as set out in the Treaties, which excluded the 
possibility of adopting such a code.178 It further stressed that all action of the Union must 
abide by the principle of subsidiarity and must respect the national identities of the 
Member States as enshrined in Articles B and F (now Articles 5(2) and 6(3)) EU, 
respectively.179  The Commission reiterated these remarks in a somewhat stronger tone in 
the Note d’information, stating that the Parliament’s requests exceeded the Community’s 
competences and that the Treaties excluded in principle the “l’uniformisation totale” of 
the substantive private law of the Member States and hence the adoption of a common 
European code of private law. 180 In the heading of both documents, reference was made 
to both the 1994 Resolution and the accompanying Report of Mr. Bru Puron.  Yet, there 
was no mention in either document of the Explanatory Statement, which evidenced the 
Parliament’s intent to scale down its approach in this regard.181 
 
Not long thereafter, the Commission was given another chance to opine about the 
future course of private law, particularly contract law.  By way of written question dated 
29 March 1995, Ms. Marianne Thyssen, a Belgian MEP, asked the European 
Commission, “What progress has it made with its work on the harmonization of contract 
law?”182  About a month later, Commissioner Emma Bonino responded on behalf of the 
Commission, stating in relevant part that, “The Commission does not intend to present 
general proposals designed to harmonise the law of contract. Certain specific initiatives 
at Community level do however contribute to approximating certain aspects of national 
contract law”, thereby citing the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the proposal for the 
Consumer Sales Directive.183  In hindsight, Commissioner Bonino’s answer was tinged 
with a bit of irony when viewed in the light of the present state of the European contract 
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law project. It garnered some attention, but it did not halt the European Parliament’s 
activities.   
 
5.3.4 The 1999 Working Paper 
In the years following the 1994 Resolution, at the request of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market184, the Directorate-General for 
Research of the European Parliament commissioned a Working Paper entitled “The 
private law systems in the EU:  Discrimination on grounds of nationality and the need for 
a European civil code” (the 1999 Working Paper).185  The Working Paper was completed 
in June 1999 by eleven preeminent European legal scholars in consultation with the 
Study Group on a European Civil Code.186  The work was headed by Professor Christian 
von Bar, the chairman of the Study Group, and several, though not all, of the Working 
Paper’s authors claimed membership in the Lando Commission and the Study Group.187 
   
The Working Paper had a two-fold aim:  first, to examine, on the basis of a 
comparative study of legal provisions, the scope and need for the creation of a European 
Civil Code and the Community’s competence to adopt such a code; and second, to 
investigate any forms of discrimination on grounds of nationality that may still be 
permissible under the private law and the procedural law of the Member States.188  It was 
a hefty document totaling a little more than two-hundred pages. As illustrated by its title, 
the focus of the Working Paper concerned various fields of national private law.  It 
devoted specific sections to general contract law, specific types of contract law (service 
contracts and insurance contracts), the law of extra-contractual obligations (tort, unjust 
enrichment and negotiorum gestio), the law governing credit security and the law of civil 
procedure.189  It specifically excluded family law and the law of successions190, but went 
somewhat further than the scope of European patrimonial law, given its inclusion of civil 
procedural law. It was divided into four Chapters, the fourth of which concerned the 
Community’s competence to adopt a European civil code, also framed as a uniform 
European law of obligations and property.191 
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 The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights which had been in charge of the previous 1989 
and 1994 Resolutions changed its name to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Internal Market in the term 
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Chapter Four was co-authored by Professor Walter van Gerven and Professor 
Winfried Tilmann, the two scholars who had taken up the morning session of the 1997 
Scheveningen conference, “Towards a European civil code”, with the discussion of the 
existence, or not, of a possible legal basis for such a code.192  Notably, much of this 
Chapter tracked their previous positions at this conference at which Professor Tilmann 
submitted that Article 95 EC could serve as a viable legal basis and Professor van Gerven 
argued the opposite. The Chapter presented two “alternative” opinions:  the first 
concerned the potential legal bases in the Treaty to support the adoption of a uniform 
European law of obligations and property law193; and the second concerned the use of an 
intergovernmental Treaty concluded by all Member States.194 
 
In the first opinion, Articles 65, 94, 95 and 308 EC were examined as potential 
legal bases for a European civil code195, with the predominant focus placed on Article 95 
EC.196 Article 65 EC was dismissed as an inadequate legal basis, although it was 
surmised that it supported the case for Article 95 EC.197 Articles 94 and 95 EC were 
mutually exclusive with Article 95 EC taking precedence.198 Article 308 EC was 
considered subsidiary to Article 95 EC such that it could not applied to matters within the 
scope of Article 95 EC, although it was considered relevant for the creation of optional 
instruments falling outside the scope of approximation.199 As for Article 95 EC, the 
opinion indicated that this provision could in principle serve as the proper legal basis for 
the unification of the fields of private law concerned, including contract law.  Admittedly, 
much of the discussion was phrased in malleable language and there was no explicit 
affirmative statement about Article 95 EC in this regard.200  Nevertheless, there were 
strong statements affirming that as far as Article 95 EC’s contribution to the 
“functioning” of the internal market was concerned, “[i]f the divergence or territorially 
limited effect of national provisions impedes cross-border activities between economic 
players, remedial action can be taken on the basis of Article 95, even if the activity is not 
                                                                                                                                                 
the extent of discrimination on grounds of nationality in relation to such fields; and Chapter III concerned 
the scope and the need for the creation of a European civil code. 
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classifiable as the exercise of a specific fundamental freedom”.201  Specifically, if 
divergent laws of the Member States relate to the free movement of goods or freedom to 
provide services or if they burden businesses with divergent restrictions or charges which 
distort competition, then Article 95 EC comes into play.202 
 
The second opinion advocated recourse to an international treaty among the 
Member States and was premised on the “political assumption” that Article 95 EC would 
be inapplicable.203 It submitted that “on legal, political or tactical grounds, it is 
inadvisable to create any other legal instrument for the creation of a uniform European 
law of obligations and property than a treaty that would be concluded by all Member 
States”.204 This opinion envisaged an intergovernmental convention negotiated by the 
Member States in accordance with the general rules of public international law.205 As 
regards the choice between the two opinions, there was no stated preference.  Rather, it 
was recommended that “the work on the formulation of standard legal texts for those 
areas where standardisation is needed be expedited by legal scholars and, when this work 
is nearing completion, that a decision be made in the light of prevailing political and legal 
circumstances as to which instrument should be used for the implementation of the 
code”.206  As such, while the opinions differed as to matter of competence, at least there 
seemed to be agreement that work should be undertaken to bring about a European civil 
code in the first place. 
 
5.3.5 The 2000 Resolution 
 On 16 March 2000, the European Parliament reminded the Commission of its 
previous calls for Community action in private law in its Resolution on the Commission’s 
annual legislative programme for the year 2000 (the 2000 Resolution).207  Originally, 
there had been three separate motions for a resolution on this subject208, one of which 
included a provision explicitly stating that “greater harmonisation of civil law has 
become essential in the internal market, as it is becoming increasingly evident in respect 
of a general law of obligations, contracts, consumer affairs and the family”, and 
therefore, the Commission was requested “to draw up a study in this area, with the 
involvement of interested academic groups”.209 Less than a week later, when the various 
                                                 
201
 1999 Working Paper, supra note 185, point 73. 
202
 Id., point 75.   
203
 Id., point 83. 
204
 Id., point 82. 
205
 Id., point 86. 
206
 Id., point 88.   
207
 Resolution of the European Parliament on the Commission’s annual legislative programme for 2000, 
[2000] OJ C 377/323 (hereinafter 2000 Resolution).  
208
 Motion for a resolution by Mr. Swoboda on behalf of the PSE Group on the Commission Annual Work 
Programme 2000 (B5-0228/2000), dated 9 March 2000; Motion for a resolution by Mrs. Hautala, Mr. 
Lannoye, and Mrs. Maes on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group on the Commission’s work programme for 
2000 (B5-0229/2000), dated 9 March 2000; Motion for a resolution by the following Members: Poettering, 
Grossetê, Elles, Fiori, Suominen, and Van Velzen on behalf of the PPE-DE Group on the Commission’s 
annual legislative programme for 2000 (B5-0230/2000), dated 9 March 2000. 
209
 Motion for a resolution by the following Members: Poettering, Grossetê, Elles, Fiori, Suominen, and 
Van Velzen on behalf of the PPE-DE Group (B5-0230/2000), supra note 208, point 29.  This paragraph 
was the first listed under the heading, “On the internal market”. 
Chapter 5:  The Debate Begins 
 195 
motions were consolidated, this paragraph was changed. Gone were the references to 
specific fields of private law including contract law.  What remained was the following:  
“The European Parliament … [c]onsiders that greater harmonisation of civil law has 
become essential in the internal market and calls on the Commission to draw up a study 
in this area”.210   These changes were kept verbatim in the final text of Resolution 
adopted by the Parliament a few days later.211 Nevertheless, the Parliament’s 
encouragement of the harmonisation of the civil law for the purposes of the internal 
market remained, although there was no specification of the relevant fields of private law 
or any mention of the constitutionality of such endeavours. 
 
 The Commission issued a response to the 2000 Resolution on 9 June 2000.212  As 
regards the Parliament’s request concerning the harmonisation of civil law, the 
Commission stated its intention to issue a communication to the European institutions 
and to the general public “with the aim of launching a detailed and wide-ranging 
discussion” on the matter.213 In essence, the Commission was referring to what would be 
the 2001 Communication on European contract law.214   
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5.4 The European Council meeting at Tampere 
 Alongside the European Parliament’s resolutions mentioned above, the European 
Council meeting in Tampere has been viewed as an equally important catalyst for 
jumpstarting the debate about European contract law at the European level.  To capture 
its significance, this section provides an overview of the events leading to Tampere, 
including the dissemination of the Vienna Action Plan, before proceeding to the 
European Council’s Conclusions at Tampere. 
 
5.4.1 Events leading to Tampere and the Vienna Action Plan 
By way of background, one of the major breakthroughs of the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty was the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (the AFSJ). The 
AFSJ had its origins in the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs under the Maastricht 
Treaty.  Under the Amsterdam Treaty, several, but not all, of those fields were transferred 
to the Community pillar and placed within Title IV of the EC Treaty concerning visas, 
asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of person.  What was 
not transferred to Title IV remained in the third pillar of the EU Treaty, renamed Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (the PJCCM).  Together, Title IV of the EC 
Treaty and Title VI of the EU Treaty comprise the AFSJ. One of the fields within Title 
IV of the EC Treaty was judicial cooperation in civil matters enshrined in Article 65 EC. 
Although Article 65 EC will be discussed at length in a coming chapter215, it must be 
pointed out here that among the various types of measures that could be taken on the 
basis of this provision were those “eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil 
proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure 
applicable in the Member States” pursuant to Article 65(c) EC.216  This language of 
Article 65(c) EC would bear directly on the relationship between the European Council’s 
conclusions at Tampere and European contract law. 
 
The creation of the AFSJ received its major impetus from the European Council’s  
meeting in Vienna, which served as the prelude to what would be decided in Tampere. To 
explain, at its meeting in Cardiff on 14-15 June 1998, the European Council requested the 
Council and the Commission to submit an action plan on the creation of the AFSJ for 
examination at its forthcoming meeting in Vienna on 11-12 December 1998.217 This 
resulted in the Council and Commission Action Plan of 2 December 1998 on how best to 
implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the creation of the area of 
freedom, security and justice, which is commonly referred to as the Vienna Action 
Plan.218  The Vienna Action Plan set forth a multiannual programme for the establishment 
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of the AFSJ for the years 1999-2004.219 It was organised into two main parts:  first, an 
introductory section elaborated each of the elements of “freedom”, “security” and 
“justice” and their importance to the European Union; and second, a list of priorities and 
measures were outlined for the areas falling within both Title IV of the EC Treaty and 
Title VI of the EU Treaty.   Generally, the area of “freedom” was linked to the free 
movement of persons and visa, asylum and immigration policies220, and the area of 
“security” denoted the Union’s fight against crime, terrorism, trafficking in persons and 
offences against children, drug and arms trafficking, corruption, and fraud.221 The area of 
“justice” proved to be the embryo for what would become the European contract law 
project and thus deserves detailed scrutiny. 
 
In the first introductory part, the Vienna Action Plan explained that the ambition 
of the area of “justice” was to give citizens “a common sense of justice throughout the 
Union”222. Yet, this would be achieved “while respecting the reality that, for reasons 
deeply imbedded in history and tradition, judicial systems differ substantially between 
Member States.”223  It listed four sections comprising the area of “justice”:  judicial 
cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters; procedures; and 
cross-border litigation.  In particular, judicial cooperation in civil matters was deemed a  
fundamental stage in the creation of a European judicial area that would benefit all EU 
citizens as proclaimed by the following passage:   
 
Law-abiding citizens have a right to look to the Union to simplify and  
facilitate the judicial environment in which they live in the European  
Union context.  Here principles such as legal certainty and equal access  
to justice should be a main objective, implying identification of the com- 
petent jurisdiction, clear designation of the applicable law, availability of  
speedy and fair proceedings and effective enforcement proceedings.224 
  
 These points found their way into the second part of the Vienna Action Plan 
listing the various priorities and measures for the field of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters.225 Point 39 of the Action Plan declared: 
 
 The aim is to make life simpler for European citizens by improving and 
 simplifying the rules and procedures on cooperation and communication 
 between authorities and on enforcing decisions, by promoting the 
 compatibility of conflict of law rules and on jurisdiction and by eliminating 
 obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings in a European judicial 
 area.
226
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There was no further elaboration of what was meant by “eliminating obstacles to the 
good functioning of civil proceedings” nor was there any mention made of the fact that 
this phrase was identical to the language found in Article 65(c) EC.227  
 
Immediately following point 39 of the Vienna Action Plan came various measures 
to be taken in this field within two years and five years, respectively, after the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty.  As for the two-year term, the measures concerned 
pertained to the revision and the preparation of EU private international law 
instruments.228 As for the five-year term, this generally concerned additional EU private 
international law and procedural measures229, but  two categories stood out because they 
were the only two explicitly referring to the approximation of the Member States’ laws in 
this context. The first category listed measures “identifying the rules on civil procedure 
having cross-border implications which are urgent to approximate for the purpose of 
facilitating access to justice for the citizens of Europe and examin[ing] the elaboration of 
additional measures accordingly to improve compatibility of civil procedures”.230  This 
could include, for example, rules on deposition of security for litigation costs, the 
granting of legal aid, and “other possible obstacles of an economic nature”.231  The 
second category concerned measures that should “examine the possibility of 
approximating certain areas of civil law, such as creating uniform private international 
law applicable to the acquisition in good faith of corporal movables”.232  Together, these 
two categories concentrated on the approximation of private international law and 
procedural matters; there were no measures envisaged for the approximation of 
substantive civil law. 
 
This was further underscored in the European Parliament’s Resolution on the 
draft version of the Vienna Action Plan adopted a few months earlier on 13 April 1999.233  
The Parliament devoted several paragraphs to the measures envisaged for the field of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters, stressing that “there is an urgent and vital need to 
promote the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning civil 
procedure, the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction”.234  The Parliament also called on the 
Commission “to take full advantage of the fresh possibilities offered by Article 73m 
(future Article 65) of the EC Treaty in order to draw up its own body of rules in the area 
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of civil law and to promote the compatibility of civil procedures”.235  What was meant by 
“its own body of rules in the area of civil law” was not explained, but reference to Article 
65 EC and “the compatibility of civil procedures” nonetheless seemed to imply a focus 
on private international law and procedural aspects of national laws. Again, there had 
been no explicit discussion of substantive civil law.   
 
5.4.2 The Tampere Conclusions 
 Subsequently, however, the issue of the approximation of both substantive and 
procedural civil law was placed squarely on the agenda of the European Council at its 
meeting held on 15-16 October 1999 in Tampere, Finland.236  This meeting was 
convened specifically to discuss the creation of the AFSJ.237  The importance of the 
meeting in Tampere was signaled by first few lines of the Presidency Conclusions, in 
which the European Council stated its intention to send “a strong political message to 
reaffirm the importance of this objective and has agreed on a number of policy 
orientations and priorities which will speedily make this area a reality”.238  To this end, 
the European Council set down the “Tampere Milestones” which represented the political 
guidelines and concrete objectives for each of the fields falling within the AFSJ for the 
next five years (1999-2004).  At the forefront was the objective of creating a genuine area 
of “justice”, whereby “people can approach courts and authorities in any Member State as 
easily as their own” and “[b]etter compatibility and more convergence between the legal 
systems of Member States should be achieved”.239  
 
This was followed by a specific part of the Tampere Conclusions dedicated to this 
subject, with the objective that, “[i]n a genuine European Area of Justice individuals and 
businesses should not be prevented or discouraged from exercising their rights by the 
incompatibility or complexity of legal and administrative systems in the Member 
States.”240  Within this part, there were three sections concerning “Better access of justice 
in Europe”, “Mutual recognition of judicial decisions”, and “Greater convergence in civil 
law”, within which specific action to achieve each of these objectives was presented. As 
regards better access to justice, this included measures on legal aid and protection of 
victims of crime241.  As for the mutual recognition of judicial decisions, this was heralded 
as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters, and action to 
be taken in both areas was set down.242  But it was the section concerning the greater 
convergence in civil law that stood out for the purposes of this discussion. There were 
only two points, points 38 and 39, falling within this section. In point 38, the European 
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 1999 Vienna Action Plan Resolution, supra note 233, point 23. 
236
 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 Oct. 1999 (hereinafter Tampere 
Conclusions). 
237
 Id., first para. 
238
 Id., second para. 
239
 Id., point 5. 
240
 Id., point 28. 
241
 Id., points 29-32. 
242
 Id., point 33.  For civil matters, this included, for example, measures aimed at the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments and minimum standards on specific aspects of civil procedural law:  see id., 
point 34. For criminal matters, rules regarding extradition, evidence and the securing of assets were 
mentioned:  see id., points 35-36. 
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Council invited the Council and the Commission to prepare “new procedural legislation 
in cross-border cases in particular on those elements which are instrumental to smooth 
judicial co-operation and to enhanced access to law”, listing provisional measures, taking 
of evidence, orders for money payment, and time limits as examples.243  Then came point 
39:   
 
 As regards substantive law, an overall study is requested on the need to  
 approximate Member States’ legislation in civil matters in order to 
 eliminate obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings. The 
 Council should report back by 2001.244 
 
Noticeably, the latter part of this sentence – “by eliminating obstacles to the good 
functioning of civil proceedings” – resembled the identically numbered point of the 
Vienna Action Plan245 and as such Article 65(c) EC.246  Yet, no mention was made of this 
lineage, and there was no elaboration as to what was meant by this passage. 
 
 On its face, it remained unclear the extent to which point 39 of the Tampere 
Conclusions was aimed at the approximation of the substantive civil law of the Member 
States and/or somehow linked to procedural and private international law matters along 
the lines of point 39 of the Vienna Action Plan. A comparison of different language 
versions did not seem to be of much help in this regard.247  The use of this phrase in the 
context of Tampere only begged further questions given the context of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters and the emphasis placed on  measures falling within Article 
65 EC. The reference to “greater convergence in civil law”, as opposed to, say, 
approximation or harmonisation, was also not explained, which injected further questions 
as to the aim of point 39.248  These ambiguities were certainly not helped by the 
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 Id., point 38. 
244
 Id., point 39 (emphasis added). 
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 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
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 For example, in the French, Italian, and Spanish versions, the relevant part of point 39 of Tampere (i.e., 
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svolgimento dei procedimenti civili”; “eliminar los obstáculos al buen functionamiento de los 
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obstacles au bon déroulement des procédures civiles”; “l’eliminazione degli ostacoli al corretto 
svolgimento dei procedimenti civili”; “eliminar obstáculos al buen funcionamiento de los procedimientos 
civiles”, respectively).  Other language versions framed point 39 of Tampere and Article 65(c) EC 
differently.  For example, in the Dutch version, point 39 of Tampere read “onderling aan te passen teneinde 
belemmeringen voor een goede rechtsgang in burgerrechtelijke zaken weg te nemen”, whereas Article 
65(c) EC provided for “de afschaffing van hinderpalen voor de goede werking van burgerrechtelijke 
procedures”.  In the German version, point 39 of Tampere read “die zivilrechtlichen Vorschriften der 
Mitgliedstaaten angeglichen werden müssen”, whereas Article 65(c) read: “Beseitigung der Hindernisse für 
eien reibungslose Abwicklung von Zivilverfahren”.  In the Portuguese version, point 39 of Tampere read 
“eliminar os entraves ao bom funcionamento dos processos civis”, whereas Article 65(c) read:  “Eliminar 
os obstáculos à boa tramitação das acções cíveis”. 
248
 In the context of the debate preceding the European Parliament’s 2001 Resolution on the Commission’s 
2001 Communication (see Chapter 6, § 6.3.1.1), the choice of “convergence” in the Tampere Conclusions 
was picked up by MEP Diana Wallis as something different than approximation: “The Tampere 
[C]onclusions foresaw convergence in civil law. Convergence is a long process, not an abrupt event. It is 
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rephrasing of point 39 of the Tampere Conclusions in subsequent documents prepared by 
the Commission.  For example, in its 2000 Implementation Report on the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive, the Commission described point 39 in the following terms: “The 
Council and the Commission were invited to strive towards greater convergence of 
private law and in particular to prepare a general study on the need to approximation the 
legislation of the Member States in civil matters with a view to eliminating barriers to the 
smooth functioning of civil procedures”.249  On a similar note, certain documents issued 
by the European institutions in the aftermath of Tampere seemed to keep the question 
regarding the confusing interplay between substantive and procedural law alive in 
relation to point 39.250 
 
Despite these ambiguities, however, certain documents prepared by the Council 
leading up to Tampere confirmed that indeed substantive private law – and particularly 
contract law – had been intended.  In a note prepared by the incoming Finnish Presidency 
on 23 June 1999251 concerning the establishment of the European Area of Justice for the 
purposes of Tampere, there was express attention given to the subject of the 
“harmonisation or minimum standards in the field of substantive and procedural 
legislation.”252 Here, the need to define concrete areas of national law where 
harmonisation efforts or the setting of minimum standards should be pursued was deemed 
                                                                                                                                                 
not about imposing a European civil code. It is about channelling and guiding developments in Community 
law to give us a more coherent and less piecemeal approach, ultimately allowing more knowledge of the 
law and greater access to justice across Europe’s internal market.” Remarks of Diana Wallis (ELDR), 
European Parliament Debates, 13 Nov. 2001-Strasbourg. Compare W.A. Kennett, Enforcement of 
Judgments in Europe 4-5 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2000). 
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 Report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC, COM (2000) 248 
final, 27.4.2000, at 31 n.71 (emphasis added).  This also seemed to be the case in the Commission’s 
Communication on the Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006, COM (2002) 208 final, 7.5.2002, point 
3.2.3.3 (“The European Council of Tampere (15 and 16 October 1999) established a map for the effective 
implementation, among others, of the [judicial] civil co-operation provisions introduced by the Amsterdam 
Treaty. The three priorities in this field are better access to justice, mutual recognition of judicial decisions, 
and increased convergence in the field of procedural law.”) (emphasis added). 
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 As for the Council, see, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 743/2002 of 25 April 2002 establishing a 
general Community framework of activities to facilitate the implementation of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, [2002] OJ L 115/1, Article 2(1)(d) (“eliminating obstacles created by disparities in civil law and 
civil procedures”). As for the European Parliament, see Resolution of the European Parliament on the 
prospects for approximating civil procedural law in the Union, [2004] OJ C 97E/643, fifth indent (citing 
both points 38 and 39 of Tampere, but then focusing on measures within judicial cooperation in civil 
matters in relation to private international law and civil procedure). See also Decision 1149/2007/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Sept. 2007 establishing for the period 2007-2013 the 
Specific Programme ‘Civil Justice’ as part of the General Programme ‘Fundamental Rights and Justice’, 
[2007] OJ L 257/16: compare Article 2(1)(b) (“to promote the elimination of obstacles to the good 
functioning of cross-border civil proceedings in the Member States”) with Article 3(a)(iii) (“eliminating 
obstacles to cross-border litigation created by disparities in civil law and civil procedures and promoting 
the necessary compatibility of legislation for that purpose”). 
251
 Finland held the Presidency of the Council from July to Dec. 1999.  
252
 Incoming Finnish Presidency, Preparation of the European Council of Tampere (15-16.10.1999) – 
Establishment of a European Area of Justice (civil matters), DOC 9576/99 LIMITE, dated 23 June 1999, 
point 4, at 8; see also point 3, at 5 (“In establishing the European area of justice the following methods 
should be used: laying down the fundamental principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions, 
harmonisation of certain areas of substantive and procedural legislation, and the removal of technical, 
legal and administrative barriers.”) (emphasis added). 
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a priority in the next few years and in the long run.253  In doing so, this should be focused 
on procedural law as well as some areas of “substantive civil law”.254  As for procedural 
law, this included, for example, service of documents, taking of evidence, provisional 
measures, legal aid, and enforcement of judgments.255 As for substantive civil law, “the 
law of contracts, perhaps specific fields of it such as sales of goods, ‘new’ types of 
contracts (franchise, lease), or bona fide acquisitions” were expressly listed as 
examples.256  There was no further discussion as to the connection of the abovementioned 
areas to the AFSJ or to the Community’s competences, however. 
 
 Nevertheless, the import of the European Council’s proclamations at Tampere did 
not escape the attention of Community officials or scholars. For example, Mr. Dirk 
Staudenmayer, a member of the Commission Working Group responsible for the drafting 
of the Commission’s Communications on European contract law, repeatedly highlighted 
the importance of Tampere as one of the crucial developments on the road towards the 
European contract law project.257  Other prominent Commission members continue to do 
the same.258 Indeed, references to Tampere are a constant fixture in many documents 
circulated by the European institutions concerning European contract law through the 
present day. In essence, point 39 of the Tampere Conclusions served as an important 
“launching pad” for the debate about European contract law (and European private law 
generally), despite the fact that its underlying ambiguities went unaddressed.259   
 
Instead, following Tampere, European contract law became cemented to the 
AFSJ.   As had been requested by the European Council, the Commission proceeded to 
draw up a “scoreboard” to review progress on the creation of the AFSJ every six 
months260, and in the scoreboard issued in the first half of 2001, under the heading 
marked “Greater convergence in civil law”, the Commission indicated that it would be 
preparing “a Green Paper on European Private Law with a view to launching a broad 
debate on the need for, possibilities and methods of harmonisation in certain areas of 
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Law: What Future for European Contract Law?”, supra note 7, at 252. 
258
 See, e.g. Speech of Robert Madelin, Director General of the European Commission Directorate General 
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Joint European Parliament/European Commission Conference on European Contract Law, held on 28 April 
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Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law, supra note 68, at 168; W. van Gerven, “Comparative Law 
in a Regionally Integrated Europe”, in Comparative Law in the 21st Century – W.G. Hart Legal Workshop 
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Amicorum Kurt Siehr 17, 21 (J. Basedow et al. eds, TMC Asser Press, 2000). 
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private law”.261  Notwithstanding the reference to “European Private Law”, this implied 
its forthcoming Communication on European contract law.262  The Commission’s 
activities concerning the European contract law project continued to be listed under the 
section marked “Greater convergence in civil law” for the entire duration of the Tampere 
programme.263  As a result, Tampere spearheaded the debate about European contract law 
at the same time that it begged questions concerning its linkage with the AFSJ and the 
Community’s competence under Article 65 EC. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
By virtue of the work of academic projects, early European Parliament resolutions  
and the European Council meeting at Tampere, three significant themes run through the 
beginnings of the debate about European contract law, which bear directly on the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law.  First, it is easy to miss that the 
beginnings of the debate about European contract law were largely the product of the 
activities of the European institutions and bodies themselves, namely the European 
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Parliament representing the citizens of the Union and the European Council, which 
constitutes a preeminent body comprising the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States and certain Commission officials.264 At the same time, this involved the 
unique blending of the work of European scholars and several European academic 
projects within such institutional activities, which would continue as the debate went on.  
References to the Lando Commission and the Study Group, among others, were sprinkled 
throughout many of institutional documents discussed above, and as illustrated by the 
1999 Working Paper, the participation of certain members of these projects and other 
prominent European scholars was incorporated into the constitutional discourse on this 
debate at the European level.   
 
Second, the impetus of this debate was largely framed from the wider perspective 
of European private law within which contract law was often singled out as a special 
field. This introduced the incestuous relationship between European contract law and 
European private law, which would stimulate tensions as regards the push-pull between 
contract law and the related fields of private law, e.g., whether contract law would be the 
forerunner of further approximation or the extent to which the contract law could be 
segregated from other fields of private law, which continues to affect the discussion of 
the Community’s competence in this setting. 
 
Finally, as evidenced by the foregoing analysis, the discussion of constitutionality 
made its way into the debate from the very beginning, although this generally occurred 
behind the scenes and left various issues unaddressed.  The European Parliament’s early 
resolutions supported far-reaching action in areas of private law, including contract law, 
on the basis of the Community’s competences related to the internal market, i.e., Articles 
94, 95, and 308 EC, though they raised questions concerning the role played by the 
principle of subsidiarity and the possible recourse to novel instruments, such as a hybrid 
regulation-convention, which would not be revisited in later resolutions.  Likewise, 
Article 95 EC was at the forefront of the 1999 Working Paper, but the very fact that the 
discussion was split between two alternative opinions signified the controversy 
underlying Community competence, and regrettably, constitutional issues relating to 
proceeding inside, as opposed to outside, the Treaty framework by way of an 
intergovernmental treaty were not dealt with. Finally, as a result of the European Council 
meeting at Tampere, the debate about European contract law became transfixed within 
the establishment of the AFSJ and the Community’s objectives concerning the field of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters.  Point 39 of the Tampere Conclusions brought 
Article 65 EC implicitly into the debate about European contract law, although the 
linkage between the two was not explained. As such, the scene was set for the 
Commission’s three Communications on European contract law, which would invite 
additional constitutional complexities into the mix. 
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6 
 
The Debate Solidifies 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In view of the momentum produced by the work of academic projects, the 
European Parliament’s early resolutions and the European Council’s meeting at Tampere 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the Commission disseminated three successive 
Communications concerning European contract law: the 2001 Communication on 
European contract law1; the 2003 Communication on a more coherent European contract 
law – An action plan2; and the 2004 Communication on European contract law and the 
revision of the acquis – the way forward3. These Communications constituted a 
fundamental stage in the evolution of the debate about European contract law.  They 
identified the problems underlying the Community contract law acquis and advanced 
potential solutions to such problems at the European level, thereby establishing the 
framework for the debate and the ensuing activities situated within the European contract 
law project through the present day.  At the same time, these Communications and the 
responses they elicited from the European institutions and bodies, the Member States, and 
other interested parties brought the constitutional dimensions of European contract law to 
the forefront.  Therefore, this chapter is divided into three main parts in order to examine 
each of the Commission’s three Communications on European contract law and the 
responses related thereto, with a view to highlighting their implications for the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law.   
 
6.2 The 2001 Communication  
On 11 July 2001, the Commission published the Communication on European 
contract law (the 2001 Communication)4.  It was the first consultation document issued 
by the Commission that “envisaged a more fundamental discussion about the way in 
which problems resulting from divergences between contract laws in the EU should be 
dealt with at European level”.5  The purpose of the 2001 Communication was to 
encourage contributions from all interested parties on the need for “farther-reaching EC 
action in the area of contract law”.6  As indicated by the reference to “European contract 
law” in its title, the 2001 Communication was primarily focused on general rules of 
contract law and specific types of contracts, such as sales and services contracts, but its 
scope did extend to rules on credit securities regarding movable goods, the law of unjust 
                                                 
1
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract 
Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11.7.2001 (hereinafter 2001 Communication). 
2
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on A More Coherent 
European Contract Law:  An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final, 12.2.2003 (hereinafter 2003 Action Plan). 
3
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract 
Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward, COM (2004) 651 final, 11.10.2004 (hereinafter 
2004 Communication). 
4
 2001 Communication, supra note 1. 
5
 2003 Action Plan, supra note 2, point 1. 
6
 2001 Communication,  supra note 1, points 10-11. 
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enrichment, and aspects of tort law.7  As such, it placed the issue of the possible 
approximation of contract law and other fields of private law firmly on the agenda of the 
European institutions. Not surprisingly, it opened up  “a Pandora’s box of controversy”8 
in the European Union, as illustrated by the mountain of commentary that it generated.9  
  
 The body of the 2001 Communication was split into two parts concerning the 
possible problems resulting from divergences of national contract law, on the one hand, 
and the options for future Community initiatives in contract law, on the other.10  In the 
first part, the Commission took note of relevant international instruments in the field of 
contract law, namely the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations and 1980 United Nations Convention on contracts for the international sale of 
goods (the CISG), as well as the relevant Community acquis in contract law and other 
fields of private law.11  This led the Commission to raise the question of problems 
stemming from the acquis and existing divergences in national contract law for the 
uniform application of Community law, on the one hand, and the internal market, on the 
other. As regards the uniform application of Community law, the Commission requested 
information on practical problems resulting from the way in which Community rules 
were applied and implemented in the Member States, thereby calling attention to 
inconsistencies in the various directives and the use of abstract terms that were 
interpreted differently in the national legal orders.12 As far as the internal market was 
concerned, the Commission wanted to find out whether the co-existence of national 
contract laws hindered the functioning of internal market and if so, to what extent.13  In 
this regard, the Commission put forward a list of potential problems relating to the 
conclusion of contracts in cross-border trade, such as the use of standard form contracts 
and conflicting national rules on mandatory terms, higher transaction costs particularly 
                                                 
7
 Id., point 13.  The emphasis placed on other fields of private law was further apparent in the Annexes of 
the 2001 Communication, which went beyond the field of contract law:  see infra note 11.  Yet, the 
Commission drew the line with the fields of employment and family law which were deemed to “give rise 
to particular issues” and were thus excluded: see id., point 14. 
8
 M. Kenny, “Globalization, Interlegality and Europeanized Contract Law”, 21 Penn State International 
Law Review 569, 587 (2003). 
9
 For a brief selection, see An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law (S. Grundmann and J. 
Stuyck eds, Kluwer, 2002); D. Staudenmayer, “The Commission Communication on European Contract 
Law and the Future Prospects”, 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 673 (2002); D. 
Staudenmayer, “The Commission Communication on European Contract Law: What Future for European 
Contract Law?”, 10 European Review of Private Law 249 (2002); S. Weatherill, “The European 
Commission’s Green Paper on European Contract Law: Context, Content and Constitutionality”, 24 
Journal of Consumer Policy 339 (2001); W. van Gerven, “Communication on European Contract Law – 
Codifying European Private Law”, in European Contract Law in Community Law 241 (H. Schulte-Nölke 
and R. Schulze eds, Bundesanzeiger, 2002); “Editorial Comments: On the way to a European Contract 
Code?”, 39 Common Market Law Review 219 (2002).  
10
 2001 Communication, supra note 1, point 15.   
11
 Id., points 17-22.  This was fleshed out further in the accompanying annexes:  Annex I (“Important 
Community Acquis in the Area of Private Law”); Annex II (“List of International Instruments Relating to 
Substantial Contract Law Issues”); and Annex III (“Structure of the Acquis and Relevant Binding 
Instruments”). 
12
 Id., points 35-40.  In particular, the Commission paid heed to the problems highlighted by the Travel Vac 
case (point 35 n.17) and the then pending Leitner case (id., point 38 n.19):  see further Chapter 3. 
13
 Id., point 23.   
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for consumers and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), and competitive 
disadvantages for businesses.14  
 
In the second part of the 2001 Communication, the Commission set forth four  
possible options for future Community initiatives in contract law, stressing that these four 
options were neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive15.  The Commission noted that 
another possible option could be the Member States’ negotiation of an international treaty 
in the area of contract law, but it did not delve further on the grounds that this option 
went “beyond the level of a European initiative”.16   In fact, this option would not be 
raised again in the Commission’s subsequent Communications on European contract law.  
The four options were presented as follows: 
 
(1) Option I:  No EC action; 
 
(2) Option II:  Promote the development of common contract principles leading to 
more convergence of national laws; 
 
(3) Option III:  Improve the quality of legislation already in place; and 
 
(4) Option IV:  Adopt new comprehensive legislation at EC level.17 
 
At first glance, the first three options seemed tame, some commentators even calling 
them “non-options”:  Option I represented the status quo; Option II was already taking 
place in academic and business circles; and Option III was something that the European 
institutions were supposed to do anyway.18  Thus, it was really Option IV that represented 
a definitive advance in the Community’s involvement with contract law since it heralded 
a comprehensive European instrument in contract law.19  On second thought, however, 
there was more than met the eye. Together, all four options served an important role in 
outlining the frame of the future path of the European contract law project. Options II and 
III contained the embryo for the CFR, and each option by itself embodied provocative 
arguments that coloured the constitutional assessment of European contract law.   
 
As regards Option I (no EC action), this signified leaving the solution of any 
identified problems to the market.20  This meant that it would be for the policymakers of 
one Member State to look for solutions to problems relating to contracts involving parties 
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 Id., points 26-33. 
15
 Id., points 41, 46-47.  Indeed, the Commission devised a separate section entitled “Any other option” to 
emphasise this:  see id., point 70. 
16
 Id., point 48. 
17
 Id., point 46.  . 
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 See, e.g., M. Kenny, “The 2003 action plan on European contract law: is the Commission running 
wild?”, 28 European Law Review 538, 542 (2003); N. Reich, “Some critical comments on the Commission 
Communication of 11.7.2001, Com (2001) 398 final ‘On European Contract Law’”, available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/consumers/rights/communication2001_en.htm, at 6. 
19
 2001 Communication, supra note 1, point 41 (“a horizontal measure providing for comprehensive 
harmonisation of contract law rules”). 
20
 Id., point 49. 
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in other Member States.21  The Commission surmised that various incentives offered by 
Member States and trade associations could act to channel the market in a specific 
direction, which could “compensate for economic and psychological risks of cross-border 
trade activity, whether these risks are perceived or real”.22 In essence, although dressed 
up in market mechanisms and never said outright, Option I signified situating the 
resolution of problems caused by the divergences of contract laws at the Member State, 
as opposed to the Community, level.   
 
 Option II (common contract principles) encompassed two elements:  first, 
devising a body of common contract law principles; and second, promoting EU-wide 
standard contract terms.  For the first element, the Commission envisaged “a kind of 
partnership” in which the European institutions, namely, the Commission, would promote 
comparative law research and cooperation between academic scholars and legal 
practitioners (including judges and experts) with the aim to delineate  common principles 
in relevant areas of national contract law.23 Such principles could then be used on a 
voluntary basis by various entities at the Member State level – e.g., contractual parties in 
drafting or executing contracts, national courts and arbitrators in deciding cases, or 
national legislators in preparing legislative measures – and at the European level in the 
context of adopting or revising legislation on contract law.24 These principles would be 
non-binding, the idea being that if used by a large number of national and Community 
entities, this would bring about greater convergence in contract law.25  The non-binding 
character of this option as well as the potential involvement of national legislators, 
judges, and practitioners may explain why this option became known as the 
“Restatement” option in reference to the American Restatements in the United States.26  
As for the second element concerning the promotion of EU-wide standard contracts, the 
Commission explained that such contracts had an important role to play in economic 
transactions, but there were problems resulting from the use of different types of standard 
contracts in the Member States.27 Such problems could be solved if the Commission were 
to promote the development of standard contracts for use throughout the EU.28  
 
 As regards Option III (Improving the acquis), the scope of the acquis was not 
defined and remained somewhat ambiguous when placed alongside the Annexes to the 
Communication, which espoused a broader ambit into various fields of private law 
                                                 
21
 Id., point 51. 
22
 Id., point 50. 
23
 Id., point 52. To be clear, this was not strictly limited to principles; this could also include guidelines or 
specific codes of conduct for specific contracts, and for cross-border contracts, “some common solutions, 
principles or even sets of rules could be defined”.  Id., points 52-53. 
24
 Id., point 53.  
25
 Id., point 55. 
26
 See, e.g., Staudenmayer, “The Commission Communication on European Contract Law and the Future 
Prospects”, supra note 9, at 679.  That said,  this was subject to some disagreement, as some scholars were 
quick to point out that adopting a Restatement of contract law was not an option available to the European 
Union.  See, e.g., Reich, supra note 18, at 6.  For the Parliament’s earlier discussion of this point, see 
Chapter 5, § 5.3. 
27
 2001 Communication, supra note 1, point 56. 
28
 Id. 
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beyond contract law.29  That said, the discussion was primarily aimed at the Community 
contract law acquis, particularly the “hard core” of Community contract law30, with the 
idea to make the acquis “more coherent or to adapt it cover situations not foreseen at the 
time of adoption”.31  As such, this option was targeted at modernising, simplifying, and 
adapting the acquis in response to the criticism regarding its inconsistencies and its lack 
of coherence.32  It as not altogether clear how far this would go. Tellingly, lodged in a 
footnote, the Commission quoted from the Parliament’s 1999 Working Paper so as to 
indicate the aim of fitting the acquis “into the ‘overall picture’ of a codified system”.33  
What was not mentioned, however, was that this quotation was taken from a section of 
the text pressing for a European civil code.34 
 
 Option IV (new comprehensive EC legislation) was the most far-reaching of the 
four options, denoting “an overall text comprising provisions on general questions of 
contract law as well as specific contracts”.35  The Commission did not elaborate further 
on the substantive content of such an instrument, but instead preferred to focus on two 
aspects:  the type of legal instrument and its binding nature.   As far as legal instruments 
were concerned, the Commission presented three choices, and while not voiced outright, 
its preferences were not hard to pick out:   first, a directive would give the Member States 
a certain degree of flexibility but it “may allow differences in implementation which 
could constitute obstacles to the functioning of the internal market”36; second, a 
regulation would give the Member States less flexibility but “would ensure more 
transparent and uniform conditions for economic operators in the internal market”37; and 
third, a recommendation could only be used if a purely optional model would be 
chosen.38  This issue corresponded with the binding nature of such an instrument, for 
which there were also three choices presented:  first, a purely optional model that would 
co-exist with national law (“opt-in”); second, a set of rules that would apply unless 
excluded under the contract and would either co-exist with national law or replace it 
(“opt-out”); and third, a set of rules that would replace existing national law.39  Given the 
attention given to these aspects and, in particular, the explicit linkage between the choice 
                                                 
29
 See supra note 11. 
30
 See 2001 Communication, supra note 1, point 60 n.35; Annex III, supra note 11. 
31
 Id.,  Executive Summary, para. 4. 
32
 Id., points 58-60.  As regards the need for simplification, the Commission linked this objective to various  
Community “Better Lawmaking” programmes:  see id., point 59 ns32-33. 
33
 Id., point 60 n.34 (quoting from 1999 Working Paper).  For further discussion, see Chapter 5, § 5.3.4.   
34
 See European Parliament Directorate General for Research, “Working Paper – The Private Law Systems 
In The EU: Discrimination On Grounds of Nationality And The Need For A European Civil Code”, Legal 
Affairs Series, JURI-103 EN, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu and on the website of the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code, http://www.sgeec.net/ (hereinafter 1999 Working Paper), at 147. 
35
 See 2001 Communication, supra note 1, point 61. See also id., point 41 (“a horizontal measure providing 
for comprehensive harmonisation of contract law rules . . . at EC level”). 
36
 Id., point 63 (emphasis added). 
37
 Id., point 64 (emphasis added). 
38
 Id., point 65 (emphasis added). 
39
 Id., points 66-67. The Commission surmised that the second and third approaches could be combined in 
areas such as consumer protection where in addition to a general set of fall-back provisions, some 
mandatory provisions that could not be waived by the parties would still apply:  id., point 69. 
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of legal instrument and the implications for the internal market, the lack of any discussion 
as to the Community’s competence to undertake this option stood out. 
 
 On the whole, the issue of the existence of the Community’s competence, i.e., 
legal basis, was an implicit, though not exactly explicit, theme running through the 2001 
Communication.  As repeatedly underscored by the Commission, one of the main 
objectives of the Communication was for the Commission to gather concrete proof as to 
“whether the proper functioning of the Internal Market may be hindered by problems in 
relation to the conclusion, interpretation and application of cross-border contracts” and 
“whether different national contract laws discourage or increase the costs of cross-border 
transactions”.40 It was in this context that the Commission stated: “The EC Treaty has 
given the European Institutions powers to facilitate the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market”.41  Although  never stated outright, this strongly alluded to Article 95 
EC.42  As such, the Commission’s pointed questions were interpreted by many scholars 
as tacit compliance with the Court of Justice’s landmark judgment in the first Tobacco 
Advertising case43, so as to lay the groundwork for adopting future measures in this area 
on this provision.44  This was so, even though this judgment (or any other case law 
concerning the Community’s competence for that matter) was not cited anywhere in the 
2001 Communication.45   
 
 The Commission’s choice to deal with the issue of legal basis implicitly was 
jarring, however, when placed alongside its explicit discussion of the exercise of the 
Community’s competence, i.e., the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.  In the 
context of addressing the proposed options for future Community initiatives in contract 
law, the Commission stated: 
                                                 
40
 Id., Executive Summary, third para.  See also id., point 72. 
41
 Id., point 24.  This was reinforced further in other documents circulated by the Commission, such as the 
Communication on E-commerce and Financial Services, which was issued a few months before the 2001 
Communication and was actually referred to therein:  see id., point 5.  There, the 2001 Communication was 
described as “launching a debate on the possible harmonisation of contract law in order to improve the 
functioning of the internal market.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on E-Commerce and Financial Services, COM (2001) 66, 7.2.2001, point 3, third para., at 10 
(emphasis added). 
42
  Yet, this did not discount the potential viability of Article 308 EC.  For example, as regards the proposal 
for a comprehensive Community instrument in contract law, the Commission posited the idea of an 
optional instrument, thereby making reference to the Council Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Company, which was adopted under Article 308 (then Article 235) EC. See  id., point 66 n.37. 
43
 Case C-378/96 Germany v. European Parliament and Council (“Tobacco Advertising I”) [2000] ECR I-
8419.  The judgment was delivered on 5 Oct. 2000, which was about nine months before the issuance of the 
2001 Communication. 
44
 See, e.g., Weatherill, “The European Commission’s Green Paper on European Contract Law: Context, 
Content and Constitutionality”, supra note 9, at 370-371; van Gerven, “Communication on European 
Contract Law – Codifying European Private Law”, supra note 9, at 241-242; “Editorial Comments:  On the 
way to a European Contract Code?”, supra note 9, at 220. See also S. Grundmann and J. Stuyck, “An 
Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law – Scope, Common Ground and Debated Issues”, in An 
Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law, supra note 9, 3, 9 n.25. 
45
 See, e.g., N. Reich, “Critical Comments on the Commission Communication ‘On European Contract 
Law’”, in An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law, supra note 18, 283, at 285-286; 
Weatherill, “The European Commission’s Green Paper on European Contract Law: Context, Content and 
Constitutionality”, supra note 9, at 366-367. 
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 Responses to this document may show that there are impediments to the 
 functioning of the internal market for cross border transactions. If these 
 problems cannot be solved satisfactorily through a case-by-case approach, 
 a horizontal measure providing for comprehensive harmonisation of 
 contract law rules could be envisaged at EC level. However, there are of 
 course limits on the power of the Commission and the other EC institutions 
 to intervene in this area.  Any measure must be in accordance with the 
 principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.46 
 
Without pause, the Commission proceeded directly to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, dedicating four full paragraphs to their relevance in the discussion.47 
 
 The Commission’s statements about the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality were generally geared at clarifying their operational role in this setting. 
As regards subsidiarity, the Commission stressed that this principle “does not rule out the 
legitimate exercise of the EU’s competencies” and that “[w]here the intention is to have 
an impact throughout the EC, Community-level action is undoubtedly the best way of 
ensuring homogeneous treatment within national systems and stimulating effective co-
operation between the Member States”.48  As for proportionality, the Commission stated 
that it was “duty-bound to propose whatever measures are necessary to supplement 
Member States’ efforts to achieve the Treaty’s objectives” and that such legislation 
should be both “effective and should not impose any excessive constraints on national, 
regional or local authorities, or on the private sector, including civil society”.49  This led 
it to emphasise the preparation of communications and other types of consultative 
documents as an important way of involving both civil society and business “with a view 
to producing legislative instruments geared to users’ real needs”.50  It also underlined that 
the 2001 Communication and future documents in European contract law were intended 
to determine if Community action was needed at all and if so, to what extent.51 
 
As a result, the Commission’s differing treatment towards legal basis, on the one 
hand, and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, on the other, was criticised 
largely because it was said to ignore a basic tenet of European constitutional law, which 
predicates that the existence of the Community’s competence must be verified before the 
matter of its exercise can be dealt with.  As remarked by one commentator, “[i]t is 
admittedly constitutionally impure to discuss subsidiarity’s impact on a proposal without 
having established the Community’s competence in the matter in the first place.”52  This 
is undoubtedly correct, but it may be wondered whether this underestimates the 
Commission’s approach in some respects. By its explicit acknowledgment in the 2001 
                                                 
46
 2001 Communication, supra note 1, points 41-42. 
47
 Id., points 42-45. 
48
 Id., points 42-43 (emphasis added). 
49
 Id., point 44. 
50
 Id., point. 45.   
51
 Id. 
52
 Weatherill, “The European Commission’s Green Paper on European Contract Law: Context, Content and 
Constitutionality”, supra note 9, at 371. 
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Communication that subsidiarity pertained to “how the Community powers are to be 
exercised at Community level”53, it is fair to say that the Commission was well aware of 
the distinction between the existence and the exercise of Community competence.   On 
the one hand, the Commission’s repeated inferences to the Community’s competence 
relating to the internal market suggests that it may have considered the choice of the 
relevant legal bases (whether Article 95 EC and/or another Treaty provision54) more or 
less settled, thereby justifying its proceeding to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  On the other hand, in line with the emphasis on the consultative nature 
of the Communication as indicated above, the Commission did not necessarily need to 
deal with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality at all at this stage. Thus, its 
emphasis on these two principles may very well have been an indicator of the 
Commission’s conception as to where the important issues may lie in the debate about 
European contract law, or at least may be read as a defensive maneuver to make clear that 
these principles did not stand in the way of the requisite Community action to be taken in 
this setting, depending upon the outcome of the consultation.  The bottom line was that 
the 2001 Communication pinned Community action in European contract law to its 
objectives related to the internal market.  Nevertheless, the Commission’s lack of full 
engagement with constitutionality begged questions that the European institutions, the 
Member States, and the various stakeholders attempted to confront in their responses to 
this Communication as documented as part of the 2003 Action Plan below. 
 
6.3 The 2003 Action Plan 
On 12 February 2003, the Commission disseminated the Communication on a 
more coherent European contract law – An action plan (the 2003 Action Plan).55  This 
was about one year and seven months after the 2001 Communication, and truth be told, 
there were certain documents issued in the meantime that already hinted at the outlines of 
the Commission’s plans elaborated in this document.56  Nevertheless, it was the 2003 
Action Plan that constituted the next formidable step “in the ongoing process of 
discussion on the developments in European contract law”.57  Specifically, the purpose of 
                                                 
53
 2001 Communication, supra note 1, point 43. 
54
 See  supra note  42. 
55
 2003 Action Plan, supra note 2. 
56
 See, e.g. 2001 Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, COM (2001) 531 final, 2.10.2001, 
point 3.4, first para. (noting contemplation in due course of “a reform of existing consumer protection 
directives to ensure the overall coherence of the consumer protection system”); Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions – Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006, COM (2002) 208 final, 7.5.2002, 
points 3.1.2.2- 3.1.2.3 (envisaging “mix” of regulatory and non-regulatory measures, the former including a 
review of the existing EC consumer contract law measures to remove inconsistencies and to fill in gaps 
(already identifying the Timeshare, Package Travel, and Price Indication Directives) and the latter 
including a “general frame of reference” (soon to be reframed the CFR) that would establish common 
principles and terminology and ensure coherence in the existing and future acquis); Communication from 
the Commission – Follow-up Communication on the Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection, COM 
(2002) 289 final, 11.6.2002, point 27 (envisaging that “[t]he possibilities for reform of contract law 
provisions in existing directives that have proved problematic would be examined” in the forthcoming 2003 
Action Plan). 
57
 2003 Action Plan, supra note 2, point 3.  For a brief selection of literature, see, e.g., L’Armonizzazione 
del Diritto Privato Europeo – Il Piano D’Azione 2003 (M. Meli and M.R. Maugeri eds, Giuffrè Editore, 
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the 2003 Action Plan was to receive another round of feedback from the European 
institutions and other interested parties as regards the set of solutions proposed by the 
Commission to the problems identified.58 The 2003 Action Plan was intriguing as much 
for its substantive content as for the responses to the 2001 Communication submitted by 
the European institutions, the Member States, and various stakeholders contained 
therein59, since both components spoke, explicitly and implicitly, to the constitutional 
dimensions of European contract law.  Therefore, the discussion of the 2003 Action Plan 
is divided into two parts in order to analyse, first, the responses to the 2001 
Communication; and second, the content of the 2003 Action Plan itself. 
 
6.3.1 Responses to the 2001 Communication  
A little over half of the 2003 Action Plan was taken up with the responses to the 
2001 Communication.  In addition to the Commission’s introductory remarks60, the 
Action Plan contained an Annex summarising the 181 responses that it received from the 
European institutions and other interested parties.61 Even so, the full extent of the 
contributors’ engagement with constitutionality could only be gleaned by looking at the 
actual documents submitted by them.62  Therefore, the responses of (1) the European 
Parliament, (2) the Council, (3) the European Economic and Social Committee, and (4) 
the stakeholder groups comprising the Member State Governments, businesses, consumer 
organisations, legal practitioners, and academic scholars are presented, respectively, in 
the four sections that follow. 
 
6.3.1.1 The European Parliament’s 2001 Resolution 
On 15 November 2001, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the 
approximation of the civil and commercial law of the Member States (the 2001 
                                                                                                                                                 
2004); A. Gambaro, “The Plan d’Action of the European Commission – A Comment”, 11 European 
Review of Private Law 768 (2003); J. Karsten and A.R. Sinai, “The Action Plan on European Contract 
Law: Perspectives for the Future of European Contract Law and EC Consumer Law”, 26 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 159 (2003); Kenny, “The 2003 action plan on European contract law: is the Commission 
running wild?”, supra note 18; J. Smits, “Editorial: The Action Plan on a More Coherent European 
Contract Law”, 10 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111 (2003); D. Staudenmayer, 
“The Commission Action Plan on European Contract Law”, 11 European Review of Private Law 113 
(2003). 
58
 Id., point 98.   
59
 Id., Annex (“Reactions to the Communication on European Contract Law”). 
60
 Id., points 4-11. 
61
 Id., point 4.  See Annex (“Reactions to the Communication on European contract law”).  There were two 
accompanying Appendices listing the names of all contributors and a statistical analysis of the 
contributions received per Member State.   
62
 Notably, as far as the European Council was concerned, there was no specific response to the 2001 
Communication as had initially been anticipated.  See Press release, “European contract law: Commission 
sets the stage for a broad debate”, IP/01/996, 13 July 2001 (“The European Council in Laeken is expected 
to take a decision as to the follow-up of the Communication”). This may have been because the European 
Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001 was taken up with pressing political matters, whose 
infamous Laeken Declaration set into motion the Convention on the Future of the European Union. See 
Chapter 8, § 8.3.  Yet, the 2001 Communication and the Council’s response (see infra § 6.3.1.2) were 
mentioned in certain documents submitted to European Council at this meeting. See Presidency 
Conclusions, Laeken European Council, 14-15 Dec. 2001, Annex IV, fifth and sixth indents. 
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Resolution).63 The Resolution contained the Parliament’s response to the 2001 
Communication as well as a broader outlook on the approximation of both substantive 
civil law and private international law.64 The chronology underlying the 2001 Resolution 
is important for understanding its content.  About a month after the Parliament’s 2000 
Resolution65, and hence well before the publication of the 2001 Communication, the 
President of the European Parliament announced that the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
the Internal Market had been authorised to draw up a report on the approximation of the 
civil and commercial law of the Member States.66 Klaus-Heiner Lehne, a German MEP, 
was appointed Rapporteur in this regard.67  
 
Thereafter, the abovementioned Committee held a hearing on this subject, which 
was organised around three themes: the present state of Community policy; initiatives 
aiming at codification at European level and what has been done so far; and what still 
needs to be done.68  Several prominent European scholars participated, including the 
respective chairmen of the Lando Commission, the Study Group, and the Gandolfi 
Group.69  In preparation for this hearing, Mr. Lehne drafted a Working Document, which 
directly confronted the issue of legal basis for a European civil code.70   He took account 
of Article 95 EC, which had served as the legal basis for a number of directives in areas 
of civil law71, but in accordance with the first Tobacco Advertising judgment, he found 
that it was “not possible to base all measures” on this provision.72  He concluded: 
 
In view of the jurisdiction situation adumbrated above, it would probably  
                                                 
63
 Resolution of the European Parliament on the approximation of the civil and commercial law of the 
Member States, [2002] OJ C 140E/538 (hereinafter 2001 Resolution). 
64
 The title of this Resolution drew a distinction between “civil” and “commercial” law, with no 
explanation as to the reason for such a distinction. Given the Parliament’s discussion of the need for 
approximating private international law rules and the Community’s competence under Article 65 EC, this 
may have been intended to parallel the language of that Treaty provision (i.e., Article 65(a), third indent 
EC) and of the measures associated therewith.  See id., recital D; point 17. In any event, as with its early 
resolutions, the Parliament seemingly used the terms “civil law” and “private law” interchangeably.  See 
id., recital C, point 1.    
65
 Resolution of the European Parliament on the Commission’s annual legislative programme for 2000, 
[2000] OJ C 377/323 (hereinafter 2000 Resolution). See Chapter 5, § 5.3.5. 
66
 Report on the approximation of the civil and commercial law of the Member States, A5-0384/2001, dated 
6 Nov. 2001 (hereinafter 2001 Report), at 4. This was done at the sitting of 14 April 2000; the 2000 
Resolution was issued on 16 March 2000. 
67
 Id. 
68
 See Agenda for the Hearing on Approximation of Member States’ Civil and Commercial Law of 21 Nov. 
2000 (PE 294.924/ref.), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/juri/20010305/ 
427685EN.doc. 
69
 Aside from Professor Ole Lando, Professor Christian von Bar and Professor Giuseppe Gandolfi, other 
scholars included Professor Guido Alpa, Professor Christoph Schmidt, Professor Ludovic Bernardeau. 
Members of certain employer and consumer organisations also attended.  
70
 Working Document on the approximation of civil and commercial law in the Member States, PE 
294.922, dated 6 Nov. 2000. 
71
 Id., point 2 (listing eight directives, all of which fell within the “hard core” of EC contract law save for 
the reference to the Defective Products and E-commerce Directives). 
72
 Id., point 4 (citing Case C-378/96 Germany v. European Parliament and Council (“Tobacco Advertising 
I”) [2000] ECR I-8419). He also briefly cited Article 65 EC, but noted that it allowed EU legislation 
covering, among other things, rules on conflict of laws and civil procedure. Id. 
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be difficult to adopt a complete EU civil law code on the model of those  
in the national states. However, it does appear feasible to identify certain  
areas of civil law which have a bearing on the internal market and to take action 
in these areas on the legal basis of Article 95. If the existing directives were 
consolidated in a single text and the outstanding civil law matters relating to the 
internal market were added, this would provide the nucleus and crystallisation 
point for a European Civil Law Code. Under present conditions this seems to be 
the most realistic approach.73 
 
On that basis, he framed the possible contents of such a Code around two cornerstones. 
The first cornerstone would be the codification of the law of the existing Community 
directives.74 The second cornerstone would be “further areas of civil law relevant to the 
internal market”, and based on a study commissioned by the European Parliament, which 
can be assumed to denote the 1999 Working Paper, the “first priorities” should be service 
contracts, insurance contract law, non-contractual debt relations particularly liability law, 
credit security law, and discrimination on grounds of nationality in the abovementioned 
areas.75  His remarks filtered into the text of the Parliament’s 2001 Resolution, which was 
rooted in the Community’s internal market objectives and contained express reference to 
Article 95 EC. 
 
The tenor of the 2001 Resolution emerged from the beginning recitals, which 
placed emphasis on the gaps in the completion of the internal market emanating from 
problems with cross-border contractual transactions.76 The Parliament also acknowledged 
at the outset that “the discussion of large-scale harmonisation of Member States’ core 
civil law is a politically charged and sensitive issue”77, but was one in which  “the 
similarities between the legal traditions of the peoples of Europe ultimately outweigh the 
differences between them”.78 This paved the way to the three substantive parts of the 
2001 Resolution concerning the “current situation”, the “assessment of future 
developments”, and the Parliament’s reactions to the 2001 Communication. 
 
In the first part, the Parliament called attention to the “current situation” 
concerning various Community measures in the areas of private law and private 
international law, which gave rise to problems related to their implementation in 
conjunction with the national civil codes in the Member States and ensuring the uniform 
application of Community law.79  In the second part, the Parliament provided an 
                                                 
73
 Id. (emphasis added). 
74
 Id., point 5(a) (drawing particular attention to six directives, the Doorstep Selling, Defective Products, 
Unfair Terms, Timeshare, Distance Contracts, and Consumer Sales Directives, as well as the future 
Directive on the provision of financial services by distance contracts). 
75
 Id., point 5(b).  For further discussion of the 1999 Working Paper, see Chapter 5, § 5.3.4. 
76
 2001 Resolution, supra note 63, recitals E-I. 
77
 Id., recital C.  
78
 Id., recital A. 
79
 Id., points 1-4. The Parliament also made mention to the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations in point 1, which it had previously signaled was, along with the CISG, insufficient 
to solve the problem of cross-border legal relationships:  id., recital J. In the accompanying Report, there 
was a quite memorable passage describing the insufficiencies of both Community law and private 
international law, which read as follows: 
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“assessment of future developments”, underlining that the advent of electronic commerce 
and the euro stimulated “the need to pursue the harmonisation of contract law with the 
aim of facilitating cross-border transactions in the internal market”80  On this basis, the 
Parliament advocated “a body of law which is close to citizens, accessible, respects 
established traditions and at the same time takes into account the requirements of the 
internal market”.81  This provided a segueway to the third part concerning the 
Parliament’s remarks concerning the 2001 Communication. 
 
The Parliament’s response to the 2001 Communication centered on three key 
points concerning the scope, the timeframe, and the legal basis of the Commission’s 
endeavours.   First, as to scope, the Parliament regretted that the Commission had limited 
the 2001 Communication to the field of contract law, reasoning that the current problems 
concerning the conclusion, the performance and the termination of contracts in the 
European Union could not be solved “unless issues relating to general formal provisions, 
non-contractual liability, the law of restitution and property law” were also addressed.82  
Still, the Parliament privileged the law of contract, advocating in line with the types of 
contracts arising in cross-border trade that a European instrument in the form of a 
regulation should be drawn up for use on an optional basis for legal relationships 
concerning, for example, sales contracts, financial services, and the law on security.83   
 
Second, as for the timeframe, the Parliament set forth an elaborate “action plan” 
for the Commission’s “next step towards achieving the approximation of the civil and 
commercial law of the Member States”.84  This action plan – the “core” of the 2001 
Resolution in the Commission’s words85 – was a five-step timetable for specific measures 
to be achieved between the years of 2004 and 2010.86 By the end of 2004, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
What economic players find when they seek to engage in cross-border activities is the  
great ocean of international private law containing the 20 or 30 greater or smaller islands  
of European Community law. As soon as users leave these safe harbours they risk running 
aground on shallows consisting of either unresolved conflicts of individual private law  
regulations or the absence of coordination between European law and international private  
law.  In some places there is risk of the ocean drying up altogether, because the law of EU 
directives which is purely geared to individual conflict situations is in the long term  
upsetting the inner equilibrium of the national civil codes. 
2001 Report, supra note 66, at 11. 
80
 2001 Resolution, supra note 63, point 6.   
81
 Id., point 8.  It was not clear from the text of the Resolution whether this “body of law” should be viewed 
along the lines of the Parliament’s previous requests for a European code of private law. In the 
Parliamentary Debates, compare the remarks of the Rapporteur, Klaus-Heiner Lehne (“At the end of that 
process, and this is my belief at least, the result should be a common body of law within the European 
Union, for cross-border transactions at least, which is extensive as possible”), with the remarks of Joachim 
Wuermeling (“Mr. Lehne’s draft [report] does not, of course, reiterate the demands that we made in 1989 
and 1994. At that time we demanded that a European Civil Code should be drawn up, but as far as I can 
see, that proposal has not been incorporated in the texts adopted in committee nor in the amendments.”).  
Debates of the European Parliament, Tuesday, 13 Nov. 2001-Strasbourg. 
82
 2001 Resolution, supra note 63, point 13. 
83
 Id., point 11. 
84
 Id., point 14.   
85
 2003 Action Plan, supra note 2, Annex (“Reactions to the Communication on European Contract Law”), 
point 2.2, fifth para.  
86
 2001 Resolution, supra note 63, point 14.   
 Chapter 6:  The Debate Solidifies 
 
 217 
Commission was to promote comparative law research with a view to finding common 
legal concepts, solutions and terminology that could be applied on a voluntary basis along 
the lines of Option II (common contract principles) in several fields of private law 
including contract law, which largely corresponded to the areas of European patrimonial 
law covered by the Study Group on a European civil code.87 Also by the end of 2004, the 
Commission was requested to put forward legislative proposals aimed at the 
“consolidation” of the Community acquis, which tracked Option III (improving the 
existing acquis) of the 2001 Communication.88 In 2005, the common legal principles and 
uniform terminology would be disseminated among European academic and legal circles 
and used by the European institutions in the decision-making process.89 In 2006, they 
would be used in European legislation concerning cross-border or domestic contractual 
relations90, and after a period of reflection on their utility in 2008, they would ultimately 
lead to the adoption of a body of rules on contract law for the European Union in 2010.91  
While it was not explicitly stated whether this “body of uniform rules on contract law” 
represented Option IV (new comprehensive EC legislation), the timeline essentially 
represented the steady progression towards the adoption of a European contract law 
instrument on the basis of the abovementioned options elaborated in the 2001 
Communication.92   
 
Finally, the Parliament expressly confronted the matter of legal basis, calling on 
the Commission “to have recourse to the legal basis provided by Article 95 of the EC 
Treaty (internal market) for the further consolidation and development of the 
harmonisation of civil law”.93  This statement strongly evidenced the Parliament’s 
opinion that Article 95 EC could serve as the legal basis for the approximation of contract 
                                                 
87
 Id., point14(a) (referring to general contract law, the law on sales contracts, the law governing service 
contracts including financial services and insurance contracts, the law governing personal securities, the 
law governing non-contractual obligations (tort law, law of restitution), the law governing the transfer of 
ownership of moveables, the law governing credit guarantees and moveables, and the law on trusts). In that 
regard, the Parliament urged the Commission to seek legal advice from various academic bodies “whilst 
ensuring a balanced view from both civil law and common law traditions”, thereby expressly naming the 
Study Group, the Lando Commission, the Gandolfi Group, the European University Institute in Florence, 
the ERA, and national professional organisations of lawyers and reform bodies in the Member States:  id., 
point 16.  In fact, the Parliament encouraged the Commission to establish a “European Legal Institute” by 
the end of 2002 in which legal policy-makers, administrative authorities, judges and bodies responsible for 
applying the law could cooperate on a scientific basis in relation to the activities elaborated in its action 
plan:  id., para. 15.  It is not clear whether the Parliament was aware of the Council’s report issued about 
five months beforehand on 26 July 2001, which had rejected the establishment of a European Legal 
Institute and a European Legal Academy.  Committee on Civil Law Matters (General Questions), DOC 
11317/01 LIMITE JUSTCIV 105, dated 11 Sept. 2001. This had been in response to a previous report 
issued by the Council Presidency raising this possibility. See Note from Presidency on Harmonisation of 
Civil Law and a European Law Institute, DOC 9747/01 LIMITE JUSTCIV 83, dated 20 June 2001. 
88
 2001 Resolution, supra note 63, point 14(c). 
89
 Id., points 14(e)-(g). 
90
 Id., point 14(h) 
91
 Id., point 14(i)-(j). 
92
 The relationship between such an instrument and the Parliament’s advocacy of optional instruments in 
specific fields of contract law was not explained:  see supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
93
 Id., point 18 (emphasis added). 
 Chapter 6:  The Debate Solidifies 
 
 218 
law and other fields of private law.94  It paralleled the Parliament’s repeated emphasis on 
the need for such approximation for sustaining the operation of the internal market95, and 
it tracked the Mr. Lehne’s Working Document taking a similar position.  Yet, given the 
words, “further consolidation and development”, questions remained as to whether the 
Parliament envisioned Article 95 EC for something less far-reaching, especially when 
placed alongside the Parliament’s call for the “consolidation” of the Community acquis 
and its subsequent statements espousing the use of regulations, as opposed to directives, 
and the importance of the co-decision procedure when adopting further measures in the 
field of civil law.96 Nonetheless, this was one of the rare times in which the Parliament, 
much less any of the European institutions, expressly cited a suitable legal basis in the 
text of the relevant institutional document itself and thus concretised the Parliament’s 
support for the use of the Community’s competence under Article 95 EC in this setting. 
 
Noticeably, Article 95 EC was not the only Treaty provision cited in the 2001 
Resolution.  Article 65 EC appeared quite early on in the recitals of the Resolution97, and 
although not named as a legal basis for any specific measures, it dovetailed with the 
Parliament’s urgent request that “owing to the topical nature of the problem, progress 
should be made first and foremost on the work on the harmonisation of the civil 
procedure of international law (jurisdiction and enforcement) the recognition of 
judgments and mutual assistance”.98  It also brought to light various procedural issues 
related to the harmonisation of contract law, such as determining the competent court in a 
given case, procedural costs, and the effectiveness of legal protection.99 Still, Article 65 
EC was divorced from the Parliament’s discussion of the approximation of substantive 
civil law, including contract law. 
 
6.3.1.2 The Council’s 2001 Report 
On 16 November 2001, one day after the European Parliament’s 2001 Resolution,  
the Council adopted a Report on the need to approximate Member States’ legislation in 
civil matters, which contained its response to the 2001 Communication (the 2001 Council 
Report).100 The Report was drawn up by the Justice and Home Affairs configuration of 
                                                 
94
 Interestingly, this seems to be how the Commission interpreted the Parliament’s statement, since it was 
mentioned as the very last sentence of its description of the 2001 Resolution, following the Parliament’s 
ultimate aspiration for the establishment of uniform body of contract law rules in the EU.  See Annex to the 
2003 Action Plan, supra note 2, point 2.2, eighth para. Still, it was not explicitly stated whether the 
Commission took  this to mean that Article 95 EC was, in the Parliament’s view, the proper legal basis for 
this endeavour or instead whether the Commission merely placed the reference to this Treaty provision at 
the end of the summary in the chronological order in which it was mentioned. 
95
 2001 Resolution, supra note 63, points 6, 8, 10.  For emphasis on the internal market and cross-border 
transactions generally, see also id., recitals E-J.  
96
 Id., points 20-21.   
97
 Id, recital D. 
98
 Id., point 17.   
99
 Id., point 6. 
100
 2385th Council meeting – Justice, Home Affairs and Civil Protection – Brussels, 16 Nov. 2001, DOC 
13758/01. Apart from an initial exchange of views concerning the 2001 Communication and the options 
presented therein (see DOC 11317/01 LIMITE JUSTCIV 105, dated 11 Sept. 2001), there were in fact four 
draft reports issued by the Council that are publicly available:  (1) DOC 11621/01 LIMITE JUSTCIV 110, 
dated 7 Sept. 2001; (2) DOC 11621/01 REV1 LIMITE JUSTCIV 10, dated 2 Oct. 2001; (3) DOC 12735/01 
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the Council.101  This had a noticeable impact on its content because the linkage between 
Community action in the context of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (the AFSJ) 
and the European contract law project was apparent in most of the five sections of the 
Report.  In fact, its very title echoed point 39 of the Tampere Conclusions.102  Similar to 
the Parliament’s Resolution, the 2001 Council Report embodied significant remarks 
concerning the scope of the 2001 Communication, the Community’s competence in the 
field of contract law, and specific recommendations for the Commission’s future 
activities.  In all, the Report manifested a clear intention to go beyond the Commission’s 
focus on contract law while at the same time underpinning the “central role” of this field 
to the internal market. 
 
The first section of the Report, the Introduction, was specifically concerned with 
the “Tampere mandate”.  Here, the Council lost no time in making explicit reference to 
point 39 of the Tampere Conclusions to which it remarked: “On first reading, this 
objective seems extremely ambitious.  A priori it could encompass all private law, 
including law of obligations, property law, family law, law of succession, etc.”103 It noted 
that to date, most discussions had concentrated on the field of contract law and that the 
2001 Communication signified “the pioneering role of contract law in a possible 
Community legislative policy in the field of private law”.104  This led the Council to 
single out contract law and other fields of private law as relevant to the internal market: 
 
academic studies, aimed primarily at giving guidelines on the law of 
obligations, have put forward an economic argument for convergence 
in European law of obligations. Law of obligations (and contract law in 
particular) constitutes the backbone of economic activity. It is argued that 
differences between national laws may therefore have a negative impact  
on cross-border transactions and on the functioning of the internal market.105   
                                                                                                                                                 
LIMITE JUSTCIV 124, dated 18 Oct. 2001; and (4) DOC 13017/01 LIMITE JUSTCIV 129, dated 29 Oct. 
2001 (hereinafter 2001 Report). It was the last report of 29 Oct. 2001 that was adopted at the 16 Nov. 2001 
Council meeting without debate (albeit with slight amendments in certain non-English versions):  see DOC 
14104/01 LIMITE PV/CONS 67, JAI 145, dated 10 Jan. 2002, point 2.  While the proceedings of that 
Council meeting contain a summary, the Council’s Draft Report on the need to approximate Member 
States’ legislation in civil matters, DOC 13017 LIMITE JUSTCIV 129, dated 29 Oct. 2001 (hereinafter 
2001 Council Report) is cited for the purposes of this discussion.    
101
 The Commission stated that the 2001 Communication had been presented to the Internal Market and 
Consumer Affairs configuration of the Council on 27 Sept. 2001 (see Annex to the 2003 Action Plan, supra 
note 2, point 2); however, it was never explained why it was the Justice and Home Affairs, rather than the 
Internal Market, configuration that was charged with issuing the Council’s response. 
102
 To recall, point 39 read in relevant part:  “As regards substantive law, an overall study is requested on 
the need to approximate Member States’ legislation in civil matters in order to eliminate obstacles to the 
good functioning of civil proceedings.” Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 Oct. 
1999 (emphasis added).  
103
 2001 Council Report, supra note 100, point 1, fourth para.   
104
 Id., point 2, second indent.  
105
 Id., point 2, third indent.  Initially, this paragraph was phrased in slightly stronger terms:  see Draft 2001 
Council Report of 7 Sept. 2001, supra note 100, point 2, third indent (“Differences between national laws 
can therefore have a negative impact on cross-border transactions and thereby hamper the potential effects 
of the internal market”).  In the second draft, however, this language was scaled back to how it appeared in 
the final version:  see Draft 2001 Council Report of 2 Oct. 2001, supra note 100, point 2, third indent. 
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By comparison, “[t]hese economic considerations cannot be applied in the same terms to 
other areas of private law (family law, marriage law and the law of succession)”, 
although the principle of the free movement of persons and the creation of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice could provide “an alternative justification” for adopting 
measures in these areas.106 In the Council’s view, these latter areas were “very heavily 
influenced by the culture and traditions of national (or even regional) legal systems” 
which presented difficulties in the context of harmonisation.107  Still, if harmonisation 
measures should prove necessary, “the adequacy of the institutional framework should be 
looked into, in particular in the context of Articles 61 et seq. of Chapter IV of the EC 
Treaty, while bearing in mind the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”.108 
Together, these statements situated the approximation of contract law and the law of 
obligations generally within the Community’s internal market competences, as compared 
to these latter fields linked to the Community’s competences under Title IV of the EC 
Treaty. This was underscored in subsequent sections of the Report. 
 
In the second section, “How do we ensure better compatibility between legal 
systems” the Council noted the inadequacies of private international law instruments, 
which were an “effective, albeit partial means of providing greater legal certainty for 
operatives within the internal market”.109  This called for legislative improvements in this 
area.110 The third section concerned the “acquis communautaire in matters relating to 
property rights”, itself evidencing examination of fields of law beyond contract.  Here, 
the Council devoted ample space to the various problems resulting from Community 
measures in private law, especially contract law111, concluding that “the fragmented 
nature of European harmonisation seems to be behind the wish of some to go one step 
further and hammer out a common law of obligations”.112  On that basis, it should be 
considered whether harmonisation, not just coordination and simplification, of the 
Community acquis would be beneficial113, and if so, the Council preferred “a more 
‘horizontal’ approach aiming at the creation of a European ‘common core’ of private 
law.”114  Moreover, since the acquis was “less significant” in the areas of non-contractual 
liability and property law, the Council found it wise to examine whether the differences 
in the laws of the Member States in these two areas constituted barriers to the proper 
functioning of the internal market in practice.115  
 
                                                 
106
 2001 Council Report, supra note 100, point 3. 
107
 Id.  
108
 Id., point 4, first para. 
109
 Id., point 6, first para. (citations omitted). 
110
 See id., points 6, fourth para., 8. 
111
 Id., point 9. 
112
 Id., 10. Initially, reference to a European civil code had been tacked on to the end of this phrase:  see 
Draft 2001 Council Report of  7 Sept. 2001, supra note 100, para. 26; Draft 2001 Council Report of 2 Oct. 
2001, supra note 100, para. 26.  Yet, this was eventually dropped: see Draft 2001 Council Report of 18 Oct. 
2001, supra note 100, para.9a . 
113
 2001 Council Report, supra note 100, point 12.  
114
 Id., point 11. 
115
 Id., point 13. 
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The fourth section concerned family law.  The Commission neglected to 
summarise this part of the report in the Annex to the 2003 Action Plan, since family law 
was outside the scope of the 2001 Communication.116  Given that this was the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council, its inclusion was not that surprising, considering the increasing 
attention given to family law measures within the AFSJ as recalled in the Introduction of 
the Report.  By calling attention to activities of the European institutions in various 
subjects within family law117 the Council highlighted the importance of this field to the 
free movement of persons to which further study should be devoted.118    
 
In the final section, the Council concluded by giving the Commission a clear 
mandate to communicate the results of the 2001 Communication in due time119 and 
listing several specific recommendations including, among other things, “the 
identification of areas in which the diversity of national legislation in the field of contract 
law may undermine the proper functioning of the internal market and the uniform 
application of Community law”.120 It also reiterated its previous requests for the 
Commission to undertake the studies in the areas of family law, on the one hand, and on 
non-contractual and property law, on the other.121 
 
 In response to the latter request, on 30 July 2002, the Commission published a 
contract notice for a “Study on property law and non-contractual liability law as they 
relate to contract law”.122  Technically speaking, the Council’s Report had focused on the 
impact of divergences in national laws concerning non-contractual liability and property 
law without making the link to contract law.123  Nonetheless, the Commission placed 
emphasis on this aspect of the study124, which left open the possibility that the 
approximation of contract law would not proceed alone.125 On 21 January 2003, the 
Commission announced that the contract had been awarded to two members of the Study 
Group:  its chairman, Professor Christian von Bar and Professor Ulrich Drobnig.126  The 
final report of this study was completed and submitted to the Commission on 23 February 
2004127 and published in book form in the same year.128 As will seen, it filtered into the 
Commission’s plans elaborated in the 2004 Communication.129 
                                                 
116
 Annex to the 2003 Action Plan, supra note 2, point 2.1, seventh para. 
117
 2001 Council Report, supra note 100, points 14-17. 
118
 Id., points 18-19. 
119
 Id., point 21(c), third indent (specifying “no later than 31 December 2002”). Hence the 2003 Action 
Plan came a little late, as it was published on 12 Feb. 2003.  
120Id., point 21(c), second para., second indent. 
121
 Id., points 21(d), (f).   
122
 Contract notice 2002/S 154-122573, SANCO 30.7.2002/B5(02)D/250202, available through Tenders 
Electronic Daily (TED): http://ted.europa.eu.  (hereinafter Contract Notice). 
123
 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
124
 Contract Notice, point 2.6.   
125
 See, e.g., C. von Bar and S. Swann, “Response to the Action Plan on European Contract Law: A More 
Coherent European Contract Law (COM (2003) 63)”, 11 European Review of Private Law 595, 601 
(2003). 
126
 Contract award notice 2003/S 23-018434, SANCO 21.1.2003, B4(02)D/240401, available through 
Tenders Electronic Daily (TED):  http://ted.europa.eu.  
127
 C. von Bar and U. Drobnig, Study on Property Law and Non-contractual Liability Law as they relate to 
Contract Law, submitted to the European Commission – Health and Consumer Protection Directorate 
General – SANCO B5-1000/02/000574, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_ 
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6.3.1.3 The EESC’s 2002 Opinion 
In the meantime, on 17 July 2002, the European Economic and Social Committee  
(the EESC) adopted an Opinion on the 2001 Communication (the EESC’s 2002 
Opinion).130  Similar to the responses of both the European Parliament and the Council, 
the EESC criticised both the scope of the 2001 Communication and the insufficiencies of 
both the Community acquis and the relevant international instruments and linked the 
Commission’s plans for European contract law to the Community’s internal market 
competences. 
 
 First, the EESC criticised the limited scope of the 2001 Communication.  In its 
view, “[w]ith a single currency in the majority of its member countries and its Single 
Market, the Community economic area would indeed be well suited to the creation of a 
uniform contract law”131, but a European initiative in this area “may have to be enlarged, 
to ensure that it remains consistent, to encompass a European law on contractual 
obligations (with possible civil and criminal liability aspects, in addition to contractual 
liability in certain instances of poor execution or failure to execute the contract, or 
clauses incompatible with public policy).”132  In any event, the Commission should be 
encouraged to create “a unitary law applicable to all types”, and a European contract law 
instrument would be entirely justified for cross-border contracts.133 
 
The EESC’s Opinion also devoted attention to the insufficiencies of the relevant 
international instruments and the Community acquis in the field of contract law.134  As 
illustrated by the beginning pages, the Opinion was globally-minded as regards the 
situation of international commercial transactions.135 In particular, it addressed the limits 
of the CISG not only in terms of breadth – its exclusion of the pre-contractual phase of 
                                                                                                                                                 
shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law_/study.pdf. There is no date on the document itself, but the date of 23 Feb. 
2004 is specified on the website of the Study Group on a European civil code: http://www. 
sgeec.net/pages/en/home/134.property_law_and_non_contractual_liability_law_study_prepared_for_sanco. 
htm.  
128
 C. von Bar and U. Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe: A 
Comparative Study (Sellier, 2004). 
129
 See infra notes 332-333 and accompanying text. 
130
 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on European contract law”, [2002] C 241/1 (hereinafter 2002 EESC 
Opinion).    
131Id., point 2.1.3.  In this regard, it should not be missed that the EESC paid particular heed to the 
American and English legal systems, which seemed to be used to distinguish the EU:  “As is the case in the 
United States, which has a Common Commercial Code (CCC) which serves as a reference for parties and 
judges, but where each State has its own law, there are legal differences within the United Kingdom. Unity 
of law is thus not an absolute requirement for a unified market in these two cases. Such a situation also 
exists within the Single Market, but without a uniform code, the role of which could be played in the future 
by Community legislation resulting from the work of the Commission, based on that of the Commission on 
European Contract Law and other commissions working in this area, on cross-border contracts concluded 
in the economic area covered by Community law.”  Id., point 2.1.2.   
132
 Id., point 2.1.3. 
133
 Id., point 2.1.4. 
134
 Id., points 2.3-2.5. 
135
 See id., point 1( “Towards a globalisation law?”). 
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the contract, consumer contracts, and services contracts136 – but also in terms of its public 
international law character, which depended on the ratification by the contracting parties 
and allowed such parties to opt out of specific sections.137  Indeed, “given the low levels 
of ratification of the international conventions relating to substantive contract law issues” 
as listed in Annex II of the 2001 Communication, “[a] code of international trade, 
universally applied and transcending legal systems and cultures, still remains a myth.”138  
 
Finally, the EESC directly confronted the issue of legal basis in its Opinion.  It 
acknowledged that there could be doubts as to whether the Community was competent to 
adopt a European contract law instrument understood in a wide sense (i.e., “consumer 
law, the law on commercial contracts and contract and tort law and the liability arising 
therefrom”).139 Nevertheless, the Community’s “obligations concerning the protection of 
consumer rights and its powers with regard to completion of the Single Market certainly 
give it a solid basis for proposing initiatives pertaining to cross-border contracts.”140 On 
that basis, it recommended the creation of a general European contract law instrument, 
adopted by way of a regulation, covering rules on general contract law as well as specific 
or more detailed provisions for certain contracts or consumer protection.141  It also 
envisaged a steady progression from an opt-in to an opt-out instrument.142 In its view, 
such an instrument would reduce transaction costs and increase legal certainty, 
particularly in the case of small businesses and consumers.143   
 
6.3.1.4  Stakeholder Responses to the 2001 Communication 
 The Commission received contributions from the Member State Governments as 
well as a host of businesses, consumer organisations, legal practitioners, and academic 
scholars, most but not all from within the European Union.144   As for the representation 
of the various stakeholder groups, certain preliminary remarks are warranted.  Of the then 
fifteen Member States, there were five Member States that did not submit any 
response.145 The business category comprised the manufacturing industry, retail, financial 
services, media and other business sectors.146  Legal practitioners included individuals 
and group organisations in various legal capacities such as law firms, and bar 
associations. The academic category enveloped individual professors, institutes, and 
                                                 
136
 Id., points 1.7-1.10. 
137
 Id., points 1.7-1.8.   
138
 Id., point 1.12. 
139
 Id., point 2.2.1.1. 
140
 Id. (emphasis added).  
141
 Id., points 3.5, 3.7-3.8.   
142
 Id., point 3.6. 
143
 Id., points 3-7, 3.10-3.11. 
144
 See Appendix 2 (“Statistical Analysis of Contributions”) annexed to the 2003 Action Plan, supra note 2 
(hereinafter Appendix 2). 
145
 These five Member States were Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain.  For the 
remaining ten Member States (Austria, Belgium, Demark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom), some contributed more than one response or exhibited an amalgam of 
responses from various entities.  See Appendix 2, supra note 144.   
146
 See Appendix 1 (“List of All Contributing Stakeholders”), annexed to the 2003 Action Plan, supra note 
2 (hereinafter Appendix 1). All of the publicly available contributions are available through the 
Commission’s website, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/communication2001_en.htm. 
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scholarly groups from various universities; certain academic projects also submitted 
collective responses on behalf of their membership, e.g., the Gandolfi Group147, the 
Restatement Insurance Group148, and the Joint Response of the Lando Commission and 
the Study Group149.  While the Annex to the 2003 Action Plan provided a general 
summary of the various responses150, there were three subjects that generated substantial 
controversy among the participants: first, the scope of the 2001 Communication, i.e., the 
inclusion or not of fields of private law beyond contracts; second, the impact of 
divergences among national contract laws on the internal market; and third, the various 
options, particularly Option IV (new comprehensive legislation at EC level).   
 
First, opinions were split as regards the focus on contract law vis-à-vis the 
surrounding fields of private law.  For the Member States, reactions centered on the 
inclusion, or not, of such fields.  For example, France and the German Länder opposed 
the inclusion of property law (and tort law in the case of France), whereas Austria raised 
the possibility of including tort law.151  Various European businesses underlined that 
“contract law cannot be looked at in isolation from property law” and posited the 
inclusion of areas such as tax law and company law.152  The academic responses evinced 
broad support for the inclusion of several fields beyond contract law, such as rules on 
property law (e.g., intellectual property and intangible property, security right in 
movables and trusts) and even “the entire law of obligations”.153 
 
Second, there was anything but wholehearted agreement that there were 
significant problems caused by divergences in national contract law that hindered the 
internal market.  As regards the Member States, the Commission was forced to conclude 
that the submissions “affirm that there are problems, or at least there may be”154, although 
there were a few claiming obstacles to cross-border transactions in this regard155.  
Although not discussed in the Annex, the responses of certain Member States attempted 
to ground their arguments in the American setting, stating that despite the variance in 
state private law, this did not hinder the single market in the United States.156  Legal 
                                                 
147
 Id., point 5.1.  
148
 Id., point 5.25. 
149
 Id., point 5.41 (subsequently published as C. von Bar, O. Lando and S. Swann, “Communication on 
European Contract Law: Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code”, 10 European Review of Private Law 183 (2002)).   
150
 Though the Commission made clear that it was “the Commission services’ understanding of the 
contributions” and “may not reflect everything that has been said in the contributions”:  Annex to the 2003 
Action Plan, supra note 2, point 1, fifth para. 
151
 Id., point 4.5.1, second para.  Interestingly, although the fields of family law, the law of succession and 
the law of immovable property seemed to lie outside the scope of the 2001 Communication, the Austrian 
Government, the Belgian Ministry of Finance, and the German Länder nonetheless explicitly opposed the 
inclusion of such fields. Id. 
152
 Id., point 4.5.2. 
153
 Id., point 4.5.4, third and fifth paras. 
154
 Id., point 3.1.1, first para. 
155
 E.g., the Portuguese Government and the German Länder:  see id., point 3.1.1, second para. Compare 
the responses of the Danish and UK Governments, which could not confirm that differences between 
national contract laws hindered the internal market:  id., point 3.1.1., third para.   
156
 See, e.g., Response of the Danish Government, point 3, fourth para.; Response of the UK Government,, 
point 14. 
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practitioners echoed this sentiment, with certain contributions stressing that the lack of 
harmonisation of contract laws was not an obstacle to the development of an integrated 
market, thereby referring to the United States and the United Kingdom where no unified 
system of private law existed.157  Among scholars, there was also reference made to the 
United States which indicated that “legal diversity cannot be a decisive barrier”158, but 
many asserted that differences in national laws did give rise to problems, providing 
examples from several areas of patrimonial law.159 Other stakeholders focused on specific 
types of contracts, such as consumer contracts and services contracts, as well as problems 
stemming from fields of law other than contract, namely tort and property law.160  In all, 
the lukewarm responses to this issue dovetailed with arguments opposing far-reaching 
Community action in contract law, which leads to the next point. 
 
 Finally, as for the proposed options, Option I (no EC action) generally merited 
opposition from all stakeholder groups.161  The responses also exhibited a strong linkage 
between the remaining three options, often drawing on models from the American 
setting. For example, as for Option II (common contract law principles), many responses 
considered this solution as the gateway towards Option IV (new comprehensive EC 
legislation) or the further approximation of national laws at European level.162  From the 
perspective of legal practitioners and academic scholars, some contributions suggested 
that Option II could lead to the adoption of a “model law” following American 
practice163, and several academic contributions considered it tantamount to a 
“Restatement” although it was not stated whether this was meant to parallel the 
Restatements of the United States.164 In any event, peppered through some of the 
individual responses were allusions to the creation of European bodies akin to the 
American Law Institute and the elaboration of something similar to the Uniform 
Commercial Code.165 This linkage between options was also evident for Option III 
(improvement of the Community acquis), which evoked virtually unanimous support from 
all stakeholder groups.166 A few Member States viewed this option as “a potential step 
towards option IV”167, and several academic contributions advocated “the development 
of a European Consumer Code, covering all existing directives, and possibly other codes 
for public procurement law and intellectual property licensing law”.168  
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 Annex to the 2003 Action Plan, supra note 2, point 3.1.4, third para. 
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 Id., point 3.1.5, fifth para. 
159
 Id., point 3.1.5, first, second and fourth paras. 
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 Id., point 3.1.1, second, third and fifth paras; point 3.1.2, first-third paras; point 3.1.3. 
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 Id., point 4.1.1, first para.; point 4.1.2; point 4.1.3; point 4.1.4; point 4.1.5, first para. 
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 Id., point 4.2.1, first para.; point 4.2.2, third para.; point 4.2.3; point 4.2.5. 
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 Id. point 4.2.4, first para.; point 4.2.4, third para. Presumably, this meant a “uniform law” in the 
American sense, particularly if one compares the reference to the UCC as a “model” code:  id., point 3.1.4.   
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 Id., point 4.2.5, first para.   
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 See, e.g., Response of Professor C.U. Schmid, 4, 13-15 (dovetailing with his publication, C.U. Schmid, 
“Legitimacy Conditions for a European Civil Code”, 8 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 277 (2001)); Response of the International Chamber of Commerce, at 4.  
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 Id., point 4.3.1, first para.; point 4.3.2 (albeit diversity in the opinions of the media sector); point 4.3.3; 
point 4.3.4; point 4.3.5, first para. 
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 Id., point 4.3.1, first para. (citing the Italian, Portuguese, and Polish Governments). 
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 Id., point 4.3.5, fourth para. 
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But it was Option IV (new comprehensive EC legislation), which provoked the 
most striking feedback as regards the Community’s competence, or not, to adopt such 
legislation.  The Member States were divided on this solution, with several challenging it 
on constitutional grounds.169 For instance, the German Länder and the Polish 
Government stated that while this option could be appropriate in the medium or long-
term, at present a proper legal basis did not exist in the Treaty.170 Austria, too, stressed 
the need to examine the question of competence171, whereas the UK raised potential 
conflict with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.172 The business sector was 
also split on this option, with some emphasising that the need for EU  legislation should 
be tested on the basis of, inter alia, proportionality173, and others favouring 
comprehensive legislation only as an opt-out solution, as exemplified by the CISG and 
the American Uniform Commercial Code.174  Among consumer organisations, some 
stated a lack of sufficient evidence to justify Community action175, and as for legal 
practitioners, English practitioners considered it would be disproportionate to impose a 
mandatory European contract law instrument on the Member States.176 Other 
practitioners, however, registered their approval of a European civil code, though 
preferring an opt-in system.177  As for academics, several argued that the Community did 
not have sufficient competence for the general approximation of contract law178, whereas 
others were in favour of ultimately replacing national law with a uniform European 
contract law or a European civil code, though a considerable number preferred an 
optional (opt-in or opt-out) solution.179  In particular, there was a strong preference 
among academic scholars for a directly binding instrument, such as a regulation or an ad 
hoc treaty, rather than a directive or recommendation180, although no mention of the 
constitutionality of any of these instruments was raised.  Standing above the fray, the 
discussion of constitutionality, whether positive or negative, was a seminal point running 
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through the responses that stimulated the need to confront this matter at the European 
level, something which did not occur in the 2003 Action Plan.  
 
6.3.2 Content of the 2003 Action Plan 
 The content of the 2003 Action Plan dealt with two main topics:  first, the 
problems stemming from both the Community contract law acquis and divergences 
among national contract laws in relation to the internal market; and second, the 
Commission’s proposed solutions as to how to solve these problems.   As regards the first 
topic, the Commission set forth “a brief typology of the problems” in relation to the 
uniform application of Community law and the implications for the internal market so as 
to “give the reader a general idea of the challenges that are to be faced and to stimulate 
debate” on the matter.181  The section on the uniform application of Community law 
underlined several categories of inconsistencies in Community legislation in the field of 
contracts and their impact on the Member States, e.g. diverging requirements prescribed 
in the directives and the lack of common definitions for abstract terms that led to 
fragmentation in the national regimes in the process of transposition.182  The section on 
the internal market was framed carefully by the Commission as concerning “obstacles 
and disincentives to cross-border transactions deriving directly or indirectly from 
divergent national contract laws or from the legal complexity of these divergences, which 
are liable to prohibit, impede or otherwise render less advantageous such 
transactions”.183  The Commission tackled the matter in five parts, grappling first with 
the general problem of the distinction between mandatory rules and non-mandatory (or 
default) contract law rules184, and then with four specific problems having to do with 
fundamental contract law rules185; standard contract terms186; contractual liability 
terms187; and special sectors both inside and outside contract law including rules on the 
transfer of property and securities concerning movable goods, insurance contracts, 
financial services contracts, transport contracts, and consumer contracts188.  Importantly, 
this section of the 2003 Action Plan confirmed the existence of manifold problems 
caused by divergences among national contract laws for the internal market and in fact 
stood as one of the most elaborate discussions of such problems in institutional 
documents concerning European contract law to date. 
 
First, the distinction between mandatory and default rules essentially amounted to 
arguments explaining why EU private international law rules were not a panacea for 
cross-border contracts.  The choice of applicable law did not help as regards mandatory 
rules which varied among the Member States but which nonetheless applied even if not 
chosen by the parties.189 Added to this was the fact that the distinction between 
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mandatory and non-mandatory rules was not altogether clear in practice.190  The choice of 
applicable law was also not “always commercially realistic or desirable” under 
circumstances where a party did not have sufficient bargaining power to impose its 
choice of law and where legal advice on foreign law involved considerable legal costs 
and commercial risks, as for consumers and SMEs.191  As regards the four specific 
problem areas, the 2003 Action Plan was replete with various ways in which divergences 
among contract laws created obstacles to the conclusion of cross-border contracts and 
higher transaction costs for businesses and consumers.  For general contract law, this 
included, for example, different rules on the formation of contracts192, the admissibility of 
standard contract terms193 and clauses limiting the parties’ contractual liability194.  This 
was also the case for specific types of contracts, e.g., for consumer contracts, obstacles to 
cross-border transactions were attributed to minimum harmonisation195 and for insurance 
contracts, the wording of a single policy marketed on the same terms in different Member 
States was deemed impossible in practice.196  Beyond contract law, differing rules in 
movable property law meant, for example, that the security foreseen in the contract 
vanished when the goods were transferred across borders.197  
 
Following this, the second part of the 2003 Action Plan set forth several proposed 
solutions.  The Commission suggested that “a mix of non-regulatory and regulatory 
measures” be used to tackle some of these problems.198  “Regulatory measures” meant 
the standard legal instruments of regulations, directives and recommendations, whereas 
“non-regulatory measures” denoted “other tools available which, in specific 
circumstances, can be used to achieve the objectives of the Treaty while simplifying 
lawmaking activities and legislation itself (coregulation, self-regulation, voluntary 
sectoral agreements, open method of coordination, financial interventions, information 
campaign)”.199 This signalled that the Commission was thinking “outside the box”, so to 
speak, in terms of entertaining recourse to so-called “new modes of governance” such as 
the Open Method of Coordination (the OMC), which would gain prominence in the 
literature in the years to come.200  With that overlay, the Commission’s proposed the 
following three measures as solutions to the problems identified: 
 
(1) Measure I: Improve the quality of the Community acquis in the area of 
contract law, which encompassed the creation of a Common Frame of 
Reference (CFR) in the area of European contract law; 
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(2) Measure II: Promote the elaboration of EU-wide standard contract terms; 
and 
 
(3) Measure III:  Further reflection on the opportuneness of non-sector specific 
measures such as an optional instrument in the area of European contract 
law201. 
 
Most of these solutions found their origins in the options previously presented in 
the 2001 Communication.  Noticeably, however, Option I (No EC action) was dropped.  
As explained by the Commission, this was due to the responses it received from 
stakeholders, in which “only a small minority” was in favour of it.202  Yet,  to recall, this 
option had essentially amounted to the Community taking a “hands off” approach to 
further intervention in contract law. With the steady calls for leaving contract law to the 
Member States – many of which have been voiced in the name of subsidiarity – it is quite 
striking that the one option that would have allowed this to occur was deleted, thereby 
signifying that action by the Member States alone was not enough to resolve the 
problems spotlighted in the debate about European contract law. 
 
Measure I concerned measures to improve the quality of the Community acquis. 
This was to some extent a reshaping of Option III (Improve the quality of legislation 
already in place). As with the 2001 Communication, the objective here too was to 
achieve utmost consistency and high quality in the Community acquis in contract law203, 
e.g., eliminating inconsistencies between provisions of directives, clarifying existing 
legislation and adapting existing legislation to “economic, commercial and other 
developments which were not foreseen at the time of adoption”.204  Much of the 
Commission’s remarks were framed in terms of fitting this solution within the 
Community’s “better regulation” agenda.205  The Commission also stressed that this 
solution fell within the Commission’s objectives to review the Community consumer 
contract law acquis to remove inconsistencies, to fill gaps and to simplify legislation.206 
This solution was targeted at both existing and future Community measures, but the 
Commission gave its assurance that it would only “deal with areas already, at least 
partially, covered by Community legislation”.207    
 
 As part of Measure I, the Commission introduced the Common Frame of 
Reference (the CFR). The CFR greatly resembled the previous Option II (common 
contract principles) in the 2001 Communication, since the CFR was envisaged many of 
its aims in terms of establishing common principles and terminology in European 
contract law.208  Technically, however, the CFR was reshuffled in the 2003 Action Plan 
under the first solution, rather than constituting a separate solution in its own right, since 
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it was considered an important step towards the improvement of the Community contract 
acquis.209  The framing of the CFR as part of the Commission’s plan for improving the 
Community acquis was important, since this was the way that it would be “packaged” to 
the European institutions and various stakeholders in the consultation process. The CFR 
had three main objectives.  First, the Commission could use the CFR in the context of 
reviewing the present acquis and proposing future measures because it would “provide 
for best solutions in terms of common terminology and rules, i.e., the definition of 
fundamental concepts and abstract terms such as ‘contract’ or ‘damage’ and of the rules 
which apply, for example, in the case of the non-performance of contracts”.210  The 
intention was to obtain “as far as possible, a coherent acquis in the area of European 
contract law based on common basic rules and terminology”.211  Second, the CFR could 
become an instrument for achieving “a higher degree of convergence” between the 
contract laws of the Member States and possibly certain third countries.212  Third, the 
Commission would use the CFR as the basis for its reflections on the need for Measure 
III, i.e., non-sector-specific measures such as an optional instrument in European contract 
law.213   
 
 As far as the scope of the CFR was concerned, the Commission carved out a box 
in the Action Plan to underscore the “content areas” of the CFR and its “basic sources”. 
The content areas of the CFR would be decided on the basis of research and input from 
economic operators, but it would be expected to “deal essentially with contract law, 
above all the relevant cross-border types of contract such as sale contracts and service 
contracts”.214  However, in the very next line, the Commission invited inquiry into related 
fields:  “General rules on the conclusion, validity and interpretation of contracts, as well 
as performance, non-performance and remedies should be covered as well as rules on 
credit securities on movable goods and the law of unjust enrichment”.215   There were 
three “basic sources” of the CFR that emanated from the national, EU, and international 
levels.  Particular emphasis was placed on the national level, which involved national 
contract law rules, as well as case law of the national courts and established contractual 
practices.216 The existing Community acquis and relevant binding international 
instruments such as the CISG were also cited.217 Following this, the Commission 
explained that it did not intend “to ‘reinvent the wheel’ in terms of research activities” for 
the CFR, finding that “it is remarkable that never before in the area of European contract 
law has there been such a concentration of ongoing research activities”.218  What was 
more, these research activities were not limited to contract law:  “the abovementioned 
areas to be covered do not preclude ongoing research projects from going beyond these 
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areas, as they might have necessary links with other areas like property law or tort 
law”.219   As a result, the scope of the CFR as regards the relationship between contract 
law and outerlying fields of private law remained unclear.  In turn, this injected further 
anxieties in the discussion of Measure III concerning “non-sector specific measures” 
such as the optional instrument for which the CFR would lay the groundwork. 
 
 Before proceeding to this proposed solution, however, there was another solution 
that also emanated from Option II (common contract principles) of the 2001 
Communication and was now reframed in the 2003 Action Plan as Measure II concerning 
the promotion of EU-wide standard contract terms.  The subject of standard contract 
terms was carved out as a solution in its own right, which could ease the need for EU-
wide unification of contract law.220  Yet, it was relatively muted compared to the other 
measures proposed in the 2003 Action Plan.  It centered on two strategies.  First, the 
Commission would facilitate the exchange of information regarding standard contracts, 
e.g. setting up a website about existing initiatives at national and Community level albeit 
making clear that the information posted would be the sole responsibility of the 
participants, not the Commission221.  Second, the Commission would offer guidelines on 
the use of standard contract terms to ensure compliance with the relevant rules of 
Community law, but strongly noting that this should not be interpreted as “blanket 
approval”.222  As a result, the Commission’s approach largely amounted to “an ‘external 
hands-off’ involvement” not going beyond the level of information exchange.223  Indeed, 
the promotion of standard contract terms paled when seen in the light of the major 
evolution heralded by the CFR and Measure III involving the optional instrument. 
 
 By the evasive, even tortuous, language used to describe it, Measure III 
concerning “further reflection on the opportuneness of non-sector specific measures such 
as an optional instrument in the area of European contract law” belied both caution and 
ambiguity. This solution was a reconfiguration of Option IV (new comprehensive 
legislation at EC level) of the 2001 Communication.  The phrase, “non-sector specific 
measures” could be interpreted as comprehensive measures, only this time the words 
“such as an optional instrument” seemed to direct the discussion towards an instrument of 
optional character, though still giving the Commission some room for maneouvre. 
Despite the commitment to engage in “further reflection” on the “opportuneness” of such 
measures, the Commission nevertheless seemed to direct the discussion towards an 
instrument of an “optional”, as opposed to mandatory, character.224 As for the possible 
form, it opined that “one could think of EU wide contract law rules in the form of a 
regulation or a recommendation, which would exist in parallel with, rather than instead 
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of, national contract laws”.225  Moreover, the Commission repeatedly espoused the 
benefits of an opt-in instrument as one which would give the parties a greater degree of 
contractual freedom, which was “one of the guiding principles of such a contract law 
instrument”.226 In this way, the parties would only choose the new instrument if it suited 
their economic or legal needs better than the national law that was otherwise 
applicable.227  
 
 There was an important link between the optional instrument and the CFR.  As 
noted above, the Commission had posited that the CFR would serve as the basis for 
further reflection on “non-sector specific” measures in European contract law as a general 
matter.228  This was so, even though the Commission repeatedly considered the CFR as a 
basis for the development of the optional instrument in contract law specifically.229  
While it is unclear the extent to which the Commission may have used the words “non-
sector specific measures” and “optional instrument” interchangeably230,  the relationship 
to the CFR created further ambiguities. Given that the CFR was envisaged to go beyond 
contract law, it was unclear how far such an optional instrument would go. The 
Commission merely acknowledged:  “Whether the new instrument would cover the 
whole scope of the [CFR] or only parts thereof, or whether it would cover only general 
contract law rules or also specific contracts, is at present left open”.231  In the very least, 
the Commission’s statements seemed to preference an optional instrument falling 
alongside, rather than replacing, the national contract law regimes and potentially other 
related fields of private law, thereby raising crucial questions about the Community’s 
competence to enact such an instrument. 
 
 As with the 2001 Communication, the Commission did not discuss the legal basis 
for any of its three proposed solutions in the 2003 Action Plan.  In fact, it stated its 
intention to launch specific reflection on the legal basis, as well as the opportuneness, the 
possible form, and the contents, of non-sector specific measures such as an optional 
instrument under Measure III.232  Notably, it did not make the same mistake twice of 
mentioning the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality while ignoring legal basis. 
Yet, this is not to say that there were no implicit references to the Community’s 
competence permeating the 2003 Action Plan. With the Commission’s documentation of 
the various problems caused by divergences among national contract laws for the internal 
market, this was again seen by commentators as signifying the Commission’s implicit 
engagement with the potential use of Article 95 EC.233 Added to this was the 
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Commission’s express statement immediately following the description of such 
problems:  “In some cases, the Community Treaty may already provide the legal base to 
solve the problems identified, although the present action plan does not take a position on 
the compatibility of the barriers identified with Community law”.234  In the next line, the 
Commission explained that for other cases, “non-regulatory as well as regulatory 
solutions may be required”.235  In this way, the 2003 Action Plan continued the linkage 
between European contract law and the Community’s internal market objectives, but 
given the questions raised in the responses of the European institutions and other 
stakeholders about the Community’s competence in this setting, this made the 
Commission’s failure to confront the constitutional dimensions of European contract law 
more apparent, a practice that continued with the 2004 Communication. 
 
6.4 The 2004 Communication 
On 11 October 2004, the Commission adopted its third Communication entitled 
“European Contract Law and the revision of the acquis:  the way forward” (the 2004 
Communication).236 Looking back in hindsight, the title’s equation of the European 
contract law project with the revision of the acquis was telling in terms of the 
Commission’s focus in this next crucial step in the debate. The 2004 Communication 
solidified the Commission’s proposed solutions based on the responses it received from 
various stakeholders to the 2003 Action Plan.  In turn, the 2004 Communication fed into 
subsequent institutional activities, especially the European Council’s proclamation of the 
Hague Programme on the AFSJ and the EESC’s Opinion on European insurance contract 
law.   Thus, the discussion of the 2004 Communication is divided into three parts so as to 
examine, first, the responses of the European institutions and other interested parties to 
the 2003 Action Plan; second, the content of the 2004 Communication; and finally, its 
aftermath.  
 
6.4.1 Responses to the 2003 Action Plan 
This time, the Commission prepared a separate summary of the responses to the 
2003 Action Plan, rather than including it as an Annex to the 2004 Communication itself 
as had been done previously.237  This summary contained a description of the responses 
                                                                                                                                                 
on European Contract Law”, supra note 57, at 126 (citing Articles 95 and 308 EC as the most relevant legal 
bases in relation to the Commission’s proposed solutions). 
234
 2003 Action Plan, supra note 2, point 52 (emphasis added). 
235
 Id. 
236
 2004 Communication, supra note 3. In truth, much of the literature on this Communication is 
interspersed with the general discourse on European contract law.  But see, e.g., J. Karsten and G. Petri, 
“Towards a Handbook on European Contract Law and Beyond: The Commission’s 2004 Communication 
‘European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward’”, 28 Journal of Consumer 
Policy 31 (2005); M. Kenny, “The 2004 Communication on European Contract Law: those magnificent 
men in their unifying machines”, 30 European Law Review 724 (2005); D. Staudenmayer, “The Way 
Forward in European Contract Law”, 13 European Review of Private Law 95 (2004); “Editorial Comments: 
European Contract Law: Quo Vadis?”, 42 Common Market Law Review 1 (2005). 
237
 Reaction to the Action Plan – A More Coherent European Contract Law (hereinafter Summary). On the 
Commission’s website, the individual responses of the various stakeholders were posted: see 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/stakeholders_en.htm.  
 Chapter 6:  The Debate Solidifies 
 
 234 
of the European institutions238 – i.e., the European Parliament, the Council, and the 
European Central Bank – and other interested parties, as well as a list of the names of the 
contributors and an analysis of the source of the various contributions per Member 
State.239  As before, the contributions served to enliven salient points concerning the 
constitutional dimensions of European contract law.  Thus, the responses of the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, and various stakeholders are each 
analysed in turn. 
 
6.4.1.1 The European Parliament’s 2003 Resolution 
On 2 September 2003, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the 2003 
Action Plan (the 2003 Resolution).240  As a harbinger for what was to come, the 
European Parliament commenced the Resolution by declaring that “the diversity of rules 
between the Member States hampers the proper operation of the internal market” and that 
“only concrete measures organised in accordance with a detailed timetable, with 
consistent use of a common terminology, can lead to a coherent system of European 
contract law”.241  From there, the Parliament launched into a critique of the 2003 Action 
Plan. While praising the Commission’s plans for the Common Frame of Reference 
(CFR), most of its comments were filled with disappointment at the Commission’s 
failure, inter alia, to: 
 
 consider the CFR a priority, thereby asking it to complete it by the end of 
2006 and then start to introduce it242; 
 
 consult adequately with all stakeholders, finding the contributions were not 
representative of all Member States and that the Commission had not taken 
notice of the “users of law” such as judges, lawyers, notaries, undertakings 
and consumers in the elaboration of the CFR243; and 
 
 take early action to produce optional instruments in certain sectors such as 
consumer transactions and insurance.244 
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Accordingly, “as a matter of priority”, the Commission should produce an optional 
instrument in the areas of consumer contracts and insurance contracts.245  The Parliament 
also called for the elaboration of a body of rules based on the CFR that should initially be 
offered to the parties on an “opt-in” basis, but later could become binding and used on an 
“opt-out” basis.246 In doing so, it stressed the practical application of the CFR in 
conciliation proceedings among parties.247 Finally, it reiterated the need to be kept 
regularly informed on the Commission’s progress and called for a dialogue between the 
European institutions under each successive Council presidency.248  Noticeably absent 
was the Parliament’s explicit discussion of the constitutionality of the Commission’s 
proposed options, though its reference to problems caused by divergences in national 
laws for the internal market at least implicitly ingrained the Community instruments 
envisaged to the internal market. 
 
6.4.1.2 The Council’s 2003 Resolution 
A few weeks later, on 22 September 2003, the Council adopted a Resolution on 
the 2003 Action Plan (the 2003 Council Resolution).249 As compared to the 2001 
Communication, it was the Competitiveness Council dealing with the internal market, 
industry and research, rather than the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which prepared 
the Council’s response to the 2003 Action Plan.250  As such, while evincing a somewhat 
cautious approach, the Council’s Resolution generally supported the Commission’s plans 
outlined in the 2003 Action Plan251, and references to the internal market were apparent 
throughout. As regards the CFR, the Council’s Resolution was peppered with statements 
affirming that it would not be a legally binding instrument252 and that it would take 
account of “all the different legal traditions of the Member States”253, as well as “the 
principle of subsidiarity, the practical needs of economic operators and consumers and 
the established structures and legal cultures in Member States”.254  More generally, it 
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emphasised that “it would be useful to take appropriate and proportionate measures” for 
ensuring that all economic operators and consumers could make full use of the internal 
market, and that any measure including the CFR should therefore correspond to the 
realities of the internal market and the needs of such operators and consumers.255 
 
As regards the other options mentioned in the 2003 Action Plan, the Council 
approved of the Commission’s plans to improve, consolidate, and codify the existing 
Community acquis in contract law.256  It found the Commission’s plans for promoting 
EU-wide standard contract terms “useful”, although it stressed that such terms should be 
made by the parties themselves and that publication on the envisaged website should not 
be interpreted as approval for such initiatives.257  As for plans for non-sector specific 
measures such as the optional instrument, the Council emphasised that further reflection 
was needed and should be pursued in close collaboration with the Member States and 
with due account for the principle of contractual freedom.258  Like the European 
Parliament, no explicit mention was made in the Council’s Resolution to the 
Community’s competence to adopt such measures, aside from the references to 
subsidiarity and proportionality noted above.  In a previous document, however, it was 
noted that given the scepticism of the Member States as regards the proposal for an 
optional instrument, the Commission had given its assurance that any concern on the 
issue of legal basis for such a proposal would be dealt with after 2007/2008 in the light of 
future institutional arrangements in the EU.259   
 
6.4.1.3 The European Central Bank’s 2003 Letter 
By letter dated 21 July 2003, the Directorate General Legal Services submitted 
the  response of the European Central Bank (the ECB) to the 2003 Action Plan (the 
ECB’s 2003 Letter).260  This letter was a noteworthy event, since it was the first time (and 
only time to date) that the ECB submitted a formal response to one of the Commission’s 
Communications on European contract law. In this letter, the ECB wholeheartedly 
supported the Action Plan261, stating that, “the aim of harmonising substantive contract 
law in Europe is to be praised”262.  In its view, possible distortions stemming from the 
existence of sometimes widely different national contract laws was a “key concern”, 
especially in view of the singleness of the monetary policy of the euro zone and the level 
playing field that must be achieved263, and that the choice of applicable law was not 
                                                 
255
 Id., point II.2. 
256
 Id., point IV.1. 
257
 Id., point IV.2.  
258
 Id., point IV.3.  
259DOC 9479/03 COMPET 30, dated 23 May 2003, point 7. This seemingly referred to the institutional 
developments surrounding the Draft Constitutional Treaty, which would be signed by the Member States a 
few months later in July 2003.  See further Chapter 8, § 8.3. 
260
 Letter submitted by Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, General Council, on behalf of the European Central Bank, 
The Commission’s Action Plan on European Contract Law, dated 21 July 2003 (hereinafter 2003 ECB 
Letter). 
261
 Id., point 9. 
262
 Id., point 4. 
263
 Id., point 2. 
 Chapter 6:  The Debate Solidifies 
 
 237 
always an appropriate solution.264  In fact, the most interesting parts of this letter were the 
ECB’s discussion of the ways in which it attempted to overcome the existing divergences 
in national contract laws265 and the extent to which harmonisation of certain issues and 
concepts of contract law would be of special interest to the ECB.266   
 
 Consequently, the ECB favoured all three options proposed in the 2003 Action 
Plan. First, the improvement of the Community acquis would enhance the uniform 
application of Community law and facilitate the smooth functioning of cross-border 
transactions.267  In particular, it found that the CFR would be “an important step towards 
the completion of the Internal Market” and be of particular assistance to the legal 
framework of the Eurosystem by ensuring the consistent interpretation and application of 
abstract terms found in Community and Eurosystem measures.268 Second, as for the 
promotion of standard contract terms, this was considered an “interesting alternative” for 
use in monetary policy operations, although the ECB stressed that such terms should not 
compromise freedom of contract, e.g., by imposing too stringent principles on market 
actors.269 Third, as regards non-sector specific measures such as an optional instrument, 
the ECB stated that having an optional body of European contract law that parties could 
freely use to facilitate cross-border contracts would help to reduce transaction costs and 
improve the competitiveness of the EU market in the international context, as parties 
investing in Europe would take advantage of common set of contract rules.270 The ECB 
premised its findings on the fact that this type of instrument would not replace national 
contract laws but would exist in parallel thereto, thereby adding an optional tool for 
market participants and upholding the parties’ contractual freedom.271  The ECB 
concluded by recognising that although the Commission’s plans were ambitious, “the 
potential benefits both for the Community and the players in the Single Market would be 
considerable”.272 
 
5.4.1.4 Stakeholder Responses to the 2003 Action Plan 
In general, the representativeness of the 122 responses to the 2003 Action Plan 
that the Commission received from Member State Governments, businesses, consumer 
organisation, legal practitioners, and academic scholars was a little sparse as compared to 
the 2001 Communication. As for the Member States, only seven out of the then fifteen 
Member States submitted contributions273, although a few soon-to-become new Member 
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States responded.274 Thus, whereas the responses of five Member States were absent in 
the case of the 2001 Communication, here the number climbed to eight. The number of 
contributions from consumer organisations and legal practitioners was comparable, but 
the decrease in those coming from businesses and academics was markedly apparent.275 
Nonetheless, for academics, there were responses submitted by academic projects, such 
as the Acquis Group276, the Association Henri Capitant277, and the Walter van Gerven Ius 
Commune Casebook Project278, among others279, along with the contributions of 
individual scholars.  
 
 The Commission’s summary of the contributions focused on the three proposed 
measures in the 2003 Action Plan.280 As for Measure I, there was widespread approval 
among all stakeholder groups for measures to improve the Community acquis281, 
although the prospect of the CFR stimulated questions and concerns. Several Member 
States, businesses, legal practitioners, and academics raised a host of issues concerning 
the form and scope of the CFR282, many of which opined that it should go beyond the 
confines of contract law.283  Contributions from these stakeholder groups also emphasised 
that the work on the CFR should not forestall measures to reform the acquis284 and that 
its preparation should involve a wider spectrum of stakeholder participation including the 
Member States, businesses, and legal practitioners.285 Only a few contributions raised the 
issue of the constitutionality of the CFR, with one finding the Community’s competence 
questionable in this regard and another stressing that the principles of subsidiarity and 
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proportionality must be considered in devising the CFR.286 Measure II concerning the 
promotion of standard contract terms generally evoked mixed, if not skeptical reactions, 
from all stakeholder groups287.  This was so, although a few Member States and 
consumer organisations evinced some willingness to support this solution if certain 
conditions were satisfied.288 For the most part, the responses from academic scholars 
apparently indicated disinterest in the matter.289   
 
Measure III concerning the prospect of non-sectoral specific measures such as an 
optional instrument took up the most discussion of the three solutions in the 
Commission’s summary. Despite the diverse reactions, three distinct themes emerged 
across the stakeholder groups.  First, many contributions, save for those from scholars, 
took a cautious approach as to the need for an optional instrument290, many outrightly 
questioning its constitutionality291 or at least contemplating the issue.292  For scholars, by 
contrast, many reactions went even further in advocating the promulgation of a European 
contract code or a European civil code.293 Second, there was a wide-range of opinions on 
the scope, the form, and the application (i.e., opt-in, opt-out or a combination of both) of 
an optional instrument.294  In particular, while not as apparent in the Commission’s 
summary, various individual responses raised the question of the interplay between the 
optional instrument and the other measures contemplated by the Action Plan.  For 
example, some contributions highlighted that the prospect of the CFR took away the need 
for an optional instrument somewhat.295  Third, concerns about the operation of the 
optional instrument in relation to both EU private international law rules and international 
conventions were strongly voiced.296  Noticeably, in comparison to the 2001 
Communication, the discussion of American techniques was not as apparent in the 
responses to the 2003 Action Plan, although a few references to the American Law 
Institute and the Uniform Commercial Code could be found.297  Taken together, these 
contributions raised further questions about the CFR and the constitutional dimensions of 
the envisaged activities for European contract law.  While they fed into the Commission’s 
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next steps planned for the European contract law as outlined in the body of the 2004 
Communication, these questions largely went unaddressed. 
 
6.4.2 Content of the 2004 Communication 
The 2004 Communication constituted the Commission’s follow-up to the three 
distinct measures set out in the 2003 Action Plan. Unlike the two previous 
Communications, however, this Communication did not seek further responses from the 
European institutions and other interested parties.  Its purpose was to outline the 
Commission’s plans for future action in connection with each of the proposed measures. 
As exemplified by the number of pages dedicated to each measure and the two respective 
annexes, the 2004 Communication was mainly preoccupied with the CFR, and to a 
somewhat lesser extent, the optional instrument.298  By comparison, as far as Measure II 
(the promotion of EU-wide standard contract terms) was concerned, the Commission 
gave it short shrift.  It quickly summarised the responses that it had received and 
announced that it would host a website to promote their use299 and organise a survey to 
identify the existence of any legislative obstacles to the use of EU-wide standard terms in 
the Member States, with a view to eliminating them where needed and appropriate.300 
Yet, it did not intend to publish guidelines on the relationship between standard terms and 
the relevant Community law rules301 or to define itself a set of “best practices”.302  On the 
whole, the viability of this measure faded from view. 
 
As regards Measure I (improving the present and future Community acquis)303, 
the CFR was the center of attention.  The Commission declared that in light of the 
significant support of the stakeholders, it would pursue the elaboration of the CFR.304 The 
Commission identified four main problems plaguing the Community acquis as brought to 
light by the 2003 Action Plan:  (1) use of abstract legal terms in directives which are not 
defined or defined too broadly; (2) areas where the application of directives do not solve 
the problems in practice; (3) differences between the national implementing laws 
stemming from the use of minimum harmonisation clauses in consumer protection 
directives; and (4) inconsistencies in Community contract law legislation.305  
Consequently, the “main role” of the CFR would be to remedy these problems.306 Hence 
the famous nickname for the CFR as a “toolbox” for the Commission when presenting 
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proposals to improve the quality and coherence of the existing and future acquis in the 
area of contract law.307 
   
In a special box carved out from the rest of the Communication, the Commission 
highlighted an “example” of the role that could be played by the CFR in this regard in 
relation to its plans for the revision of the Community consumer acquis.308  The 
Commission explained that it was going to review eight consumer directives to determine 
whether they met the Commission’s goals of enhancing consumer and business 
confidence in the internal market through a high level of consumer protection and the 
elimination of internal market barriers.309  Curiously, the Commission did not mention 
the CFR in much detail, save for the very last line in which it stated that any subsequent 
proposal would take into account the work on the draft CFR as appropriate.310  Rather, 
this one and a half page box segregated from the rest of the Communication asked 
pointed questions concerning consumer contract law, such as “Is the level of consumer 
protection required by the directives high enough to ensure consumer confidence?” and 
“Does consumer contract law need to be further harmonised?”.311  The Commission then 
set down a number of actions planned for this area, including the development of a public 
database of the acquis, the establishment of a group of Member State experts, and the 
issuance of implementation reports on some of these directives.312   
 
Following this, the Commission launched back into contemplating five additional 
roles to be played by the CFR, making clear that it was not just to be used by the 
Commission alone.313 First, at the European level, the European Parliament and the 
Council could use the CFR when tabling amendments to the Commission’s proposals for 
improving the acquis, which would further promote simplicity, clarity and consistency of 
EU legislation.314  Second, the CFR could “inspire” the European Court of Justice when 
interpreting the Community contract law acquis.315  Third, at the Member State level, the 
CFR could be used by national legislators when transposing directives or enacting other 
contract law legislation and by arbitrators as had been suggested by the European 
Parliament.316 Fourth, the Commission stated that it was considering integrating the CFR 
into Community contracts and would encourage other institutions and bodies to do the 
same.317  Finally, it reiterated that the CFR would be used to develop other measures 
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identified in the Action Plan, such as the optional instrument318, albeit without providing 
further insight on the interplay between these two measures as mentioned in the 
stakeholder responses.  Above all, given the fact that just below this, the Commission 
declared that, at least at this stage of the consultation process, the CFR would be a non-
binding instrument319, it was not clear how all of these possible roles of the CFR would 
be achieved in practice.   
 
 As regards the Commission’s specific section of the 2004 Communication 
devoted to the preparation of the CFR, much could be seen as an attempt to rectify the 
criticisms lodged by the European Parliament as regards the adequate involvement of all 
relevant stakeholders and the establishment of stringent timelines.  The idea was that by 
2007, academic researchers would produce a draft CFR, i.e., a first academic version of 
the CFR.320  Then, the draft CFR would undergo a period of review321, which would 
result in a Commission CFR, i.e., the final version of the CFR, submitted to the European 
institutions, the Member States, and stakeholders for their final consultation.322 The 
Commission would adopt this final CFR in 2009, at which point mechanisms for 
updating the CFR would be identified, and it would be widely published and reviewed as 
needed.323  In short, there would be two versions of the CFR:  first, an academic or draft 
CFR; and then second, a Commission or political CFR.324 As part of this process,  the 
Commission elaborated a quite extensive framework for stakeholder participation.325  
There were two “strands” of input for the CFR.  First, the “technical input strand” 
included the appointment of a network of stakeholder experts to make ongoing 
contributions to the researchers’ work.  This also involved holding regular workshops on 
research subjects and setting up an internet website for the posting of drafts and 
stakeholder comments.326  Second, the “political consideration and review strand” 
outlined the involvement of the European institutions and the Member States.  This 
involved, for instance, providing regular updates to the European Parliament and the 
Council, and the establishment of a group of Member State experts in order to keep the 
Member States informed about progress and to receive feedback.327  These two strands 
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could be brought together periodically in the form of a “discussion form” to facilitate 
broader discussion.328 
 
As regards the researchers’ elaboration of the CFR, the Commission stated that 
the CFR would contain common fundamental principles of contract law, definitions of 
key concepts, and model rules.329  Two specific types of contracts, consumer and 
insurance contracts, were singled out, since the Commission expected the CFR to “pay 
specific attention to these areas”.330  Yet, the CFR could cover other areas such as sale 
contracts, services contacts and clauses relating to the retention of title and the transfer of 
title of goods.331  In this regard, the Commission referred to the conclusions of the Study 
conducted on the relationship between contract law and the fields of tort and property law 
as had been requested by the Council’s 2001 Report332 and concluded: 
 
 [T]here are no appreciable problems arising from differences in the  
interaction between contract law and tort law in the different Member  
States. More significant problems appear to arise from the different 
transactions between contract and property law in Member States.  
The preparation of the CFR will need to consider how to resolve these  
problems, as far as necessary for improving the present and future acquis.333 
 
The Commission’s conclusion was surprising, at least for those scholars who had 
prepared the Study since their conclusions had called attention to the crucial linkages 
between tort and contract law and discussed various problems associated with taking 
action in contract law without consideration of tort law.334  In addition, glancing through 
the accompanying Annex setting forth the possible structure of the CFR in outline form, 
there were several topics that went beyond the confines of contract law strictly speaking, 
such as rules concerning the plurality of parties, the assignment of claims, and 
prescription periods.335 The Commission attempted to provide some explanation as to the 
scope of the CFR by stating that the primary criterion for determining which areas would 
be covered should be “the usefulness in terms of increasing the coherence of the acquis”; 
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however, it was not clear whether this statement was limited to contract or other fields of 
private law.336   
 
Ambiguities were also evident as regards Measure III (further reflection on non-
sector specific measures such as an optional instrument). The Commission was cautious 
to preface its remarks with the recognition that this proposal was still subject to further 
reflection, particularly in light of the development of the CFR.337  At this point, the 
Commission focused on the prospect of an optional instrument, as opposed to other 
conceivable types of non-sector specific measures. The Commission lost no time in 
attempting to diffuse constitutional tensions underlying the optional instrument by 
explicitly affirming that it was not tantamount to a European civil code:   
 
Although it is premature to speculate about the possible outcome of the 
reflection, it is important to explain that it is neither the Commission’s 
intention to propose a ‘European civil code’ which would harmonise 
contract laws of Member States, nor should the reflections be seen in 
any way calling into question the current approaches to promoting free 
circulation on the basis of flexible and efficient solutions.338 
 
This passage became one of the most well-cited points of the 2004 Communication.  It 
did not completely silence the controversy, however.  In particular, scholars were quick 
to point out that the express disavowal of a European civil code came within the context 
of the optional instrument, not the CFR, which was considered by many just as likely to 
“sow the seeds of a code”339.  Moreover, while the prospect of far-reaching 
approximation of contract law, let alone other fields of private law, seemed to be ruled 
out, this did not necessarily speak to the adoption of optional instruments falling outside 
the ambit of approximation. 
 
 Following this statement, the Commission explored several parameters for further 
reflection on the optional instrument on the basis of the stakeholder contributions and its 
own considerations.340 While some aspects were hinted at in the body of the 2004 
Communication341, the Commission preferred to place its discussion of the main points of 
the optional instrument – its binding nature, content, legal form, scope and legal basis – at 
the very end of the Communication in an accompanying annex.342 There, the Commission 
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stressed upfront that before any decision would be taken on the adoption of an optional 
instrument, an extended impact assessment would be conducted to address a number of 
questions, including how the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality would be taken 
into account.343  The Commission did not completely ignore the issue of legal basis, even 
if the discussion was quite slim and relegated to the very last point of the Annex.344 It 
claimed that very few stakeholders had expressed their view on the matter, with one 
Member State proposing Article 308 EC for an “opt-in” instrument and Article 95 EC for 
an “opt-out” instrument, and a group of academic scholars preferring Article 65 EC.345   
It then disposed of the matter by explaining that since the question of legal basis was 
linked to the legal form, the content, and the scope of the optional instrument, further 
discussion would be needed within the larger debate about the parameters of the optional 
instrument.346  
 
At the same time, however, the Commission’s discussion of the other four points 
concerning the optional instrument seemed at least implicitly to turn the constitutional 
attention to legal bases related to the internal market.  First, as to content, the 
Commission declared that the optional instrument “should only contain those areas of 
contract law, whether general or specific to certain contracts, which clearly contribute to 
addressing identified problems, such as barriers to the smooth functioning of the internal 
market”.347 Second, as for scope, in response to the question whether the optional 
instrument should cover solely business-to-business contracts or also business-to-
consumer contracts, the Commission answered that, “it is important to remember the 
main goal of the optional instrument, namely the smoother functioning of the internal 
market”.348 It found that the inclusion of both types of contracts would ensure that goal, 
and as for consumer contracts, national mandatory rules concerning consumer protection 
can increase transaction costs and constitute obstacles to cross-border contracts.349  As 
such, the inclusion of mandatory provisions in the optional instrument would provide 
parties with greater legal certainty in cross-border transactions and allow providers of 
goods and services to engage in transactions throughout the European Union on the basis 
of one single contract.350   
 
Third, as regards the binding nature of the optional instrument, the Commission 
stressed that most stakeholders preferred a purely optional, i.e., “opt-in”, model of 
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contract rules chosen by the parties through a choice of law clause.351 The Commission 
also share this sentiment by its emphasis on the parties’ contractual freedom and the fact 
that the use of an “opt-out” instrument in relation to the application of the CISG would 
prove problematic in the case of business-to-business international sale of goods 
transactions.352 Finally, as far as legal form, for both the “opt-in” and “opt-out” models, 
the choice of a regulation was considered most appropriate.353 In this way, the 2004 
Communication signified a large step in the path towards the CFR and generated 
substantial commentary regarding each of the proposed solutions.  At the same time, with 
its further elaboration of the shape of the CFR and the optional instrument, it made the 
question of competence in connection with both of these activities loom even larger in the 
debate about European contract law. 
 
6.4.3 Aftermath of the 2004 Communication 
 To recall, the nature of the 2004 Communication was such that the Commission 
did not request further feedback from the European institutions or other stakeholders in 
the debate though it did eventually beckon responses of the European Parliament and the 
Council in combination with the Commission’s First Progress Report on European 
Contract Law354, as discussed in the next chapter.  In the meantime, the 2004 
Communication, as well as the Commission’s previous Communications filtered into 
institutional developments concerning the European Council’s Hague Programme on the 
AFSJ and the EESC’s Opinion on a European insurance contract instrument, both of 
which added to the constitutional fervor surrounding European contract law. 
 
6.4.3.1 The Hague Programme  
By way of background, with the Tampere Programme coming to a close in 2004, 
the Commission issued its last six-month progress report in the form of a Communication 
regarding the assessment of the Tampere Programme and future orientations.355 Under 
the heading, “Establish a judicial area in civil and commercial maters to facilitate 
cooperation and access to justice”, the Commission turned to the matter of European 
contract law.356  It explained that it was “already engaged in drafting a Common 
Reference Framework to ensure greater consistency in the acquis communautaire and 
improve its quality in the field of contract law”, which would be completed in 2008.357 In 
an accompanying footnote, the Commission added that the “Common Reference 
Framework” (i.e., the CFR) could serve as the basis for an optional instrument on 
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contract law in the long-term, which the parties could freely choose as the law applicable 
to their contract, thereby enhancing certainty as to the law in cross-border transactions.358 
Yet, the linkage between European contract law and the building of an “European area of 
justice” went unaddressed. 
 
Thereafter, then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder published a statement in 
the Wall Street Journal concerning his intention to submit at the forthcoming November 
2004 European Council meeting a program called “Seven Chances for the Internal 
Market”.359 Situated within the context of the Lisbon Strategy360, this program focused on 
measures to be taken in certain specific sectors to improve the internal market, one of 
which concerned the European contract law project. Chancellor Schröder explained: 
 
 [W]e need a European contract law. Companies who operate Europe- 
 wide currently have to deal with 25 different legal systems. To make 
 the internal market more efficient, the German [G]overnment supports 
 the European Commission’s action for “a coherent European Contract 
 Law”.361 
 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s support for “a European contract law” instrument was not 
missed by those involved with the European contract law project.362  Not long thereafter, 
on 4-5 November 2004, the European Council’s meeting in Brussels was held.363  The 
European Council discussed the Lisbon Strategy but without specific mention of 
Chancellor Schröder’s program.364  The European Council did, however, mention 
European contract law. 
 
 The European Council’s meeting in Brussels on 4-5 November 2004 was most 
remembered for the declaration of the Hague Programme.365 As the successor to the 
Tampere Programme, the Hague Programme constituted the second multiannual 
programme establishing the priorities for the AFSJ for the next five years (2004-2009).366 
In the Hague Programme, European contract law was mentioned as part of measures to 
ensure a European area of “justice” in the context of judicial cooperation in civil matters. 
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Under the heading, “Ensuring coherence and upgrading the quality of EU  legislation”, 
the European Council stated:   
 
In matters of contract law, the quality of existing and future Community law 
should be improved by measures of consolidation, codification and rationali- 
sation of legal instruments in force and by developing a common frame of 
reference.367   
 
It also requested that a framework should be set up to explore the possibility of 
developing EU-wide standard contract terms that could be used by companies and trade 
associations in the European Union.368  These statements indicated the European 
Council’s support, in quite a high-level political document, for two of the proposed 
measures identified in the 2003 Action Plan and elaborated further in the 2004 
Communication: the CFR and the promotion of standard contract terms. The optional 
instrument was not mentioned, possibly because the prospect of such an instrument may 
have been too controversial or in any event too indefinite at that stage of the consultation 
process compared to the abovementioned initiatives.   
 
Nevertheless, the heading and the description of these two measures were telling. 
The CFR was linked to the improvement of the Community acquis. It sat alongside the 
European Council’s other suggestion for ensuring that the Council was able to scrutinise 
the quality and coherence of all Community instruments relating to judicial cooperation 
in civil matters.369 Thus, it seemed to be viewed largely through the lens of “better 
lawmaking” policy, although the promotion of standard contract terms paid heed to the 
relevance of the European contract law project to economic operators in the EU.  And by 
virtue of the introductory clause (“In matters of contract law”), the CFR was situated 
within contract law, with no mention of other fields of private law.  There was no 
reference made to the lineage of the European contract law in point 39 of the Tampere 
Conclusions, much less why European contract law was mentioned here in the context of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters.   
 
Similar sentiments carried through to documents implementing the Hague 
Programme.  For example, in the Commission’s Action Plan outlining the priorities for 
the Hague Programme370, the CFR was framed as follows:  “Regarding the EU 
substantive contract law, a Common Frame of Reference (CFR), to be used as a toolbox 
to improve coherence and quality of EU legislation, will be adopted in 2009 at the 
latest”.371   When this Action Plan was approved by the Council, the adoption of the CFR 
was placed under the measures for “ensuring consistency” within the field of judicial 
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cooperation in civil matters.372  Again, the CFR was conjoined with the improvement of 
the acquis and delimited to contract law.373  Again, there was no explanation as to the 
relationship between European contract law and the EU’s objectives related to the AFSJ. 
 
6.4.3.2 The EESC’s Opinion on European insurance contract law 
About a month after the European Council’s proclamation of the Hague 
Programme, on 15 December 2004, the EESC adopted an Opinion on “The European 
Insurance Contract”.374  The purpose of the Opinion was to alert both national and 
Community authorities to the problems for consumers and the internal market caused by 
the diversity of national laws concerning insurance contracts and to propose possible 
solutions to secure more suitable legislation at the European level on this subject.375  As 
the title implied, the EESC advocated the promulgation of a European insurance contract 
law instrument, which expressly built on the Commission’s previous Communications on 
European contract law376.   At the same time, the Opinion’s conflation of approximation 
and the use of optional instruments beckoned clarification of the constitutional 
dimensions of European contract law within which insurance contract law was situated. 
 
After an extensive presentation of the background prompting the Opinion, which 
included documentation of the various problems caused by divergences in national 
insurance contract laws for the internal market377 and the important role played by 
comparative research in this field378, the EESC discussed whether the harmonisation of 
insurance contract law warranted the harmonisation of general contract law.379  It 
concluded that while proceeding with both in tandem would be “easier”, it was not 
necessary and that the harmonisation of insurance contract law could proceed on its 
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own.380 The EESC also analogised the Commission’s proposal for EU-wide standard 
contract terms to the insurance sphere, finding that the elaboration of EU-wide general 
terms of insurance was not helpful because, among other things, they disadvantaged 
mobile European citizens and had adverse effects on competition.381 
 
The EESC then weighed the advantages and the disadvantages of harmonisation 
as opposed to the use of an optional instrument running parallel to the national legal 
orders along the lines of the Commission’s proposed solution382, finding that either one 
was preferable to the status quo and the choice between them was “ultimately a matter of 
policy not of principle”.383 It considered that a degree of harmonisation of the mandatory 
rules of the so-called “general part” of insurance contract law could contribute decisively 
to removing obstacles and difficulties facing undertakings and consumers in carrying out 
cross-border insurance transactions.384 It then recommended that “a gradual approach to 
harmonisation should be taken, aiming initially at the possible adoption of an optional 
model insurance contract act all of whose terms and components would be 
mandatory”.385 In this regard, the Community instrument to be used should be a 
regulation, taking Article 95 EC as the legal basis.386 
 
Given the EESC’s recognition of the distinction between harmonisation and 
optional instruments above, the juxtaposition of an optional instrument and Article 95 EC 
called into play crucial issues plaguing the constitutionality of European contract law 
generally, i.e., the limits of what can be considered “approximation” for the purposes of 
Article 95 EC and the relationship between Articles 95 and 308 EC. Moreover, the 
EESC’s Opinion tied Community action in the field of insurance contract law to the 
functioning of the internal market and thus called attention to the interplay between 
general and specific fields of contract law in the wake of the Commission’s 
Communications. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
No matter how much time passes or where the endpoint of the European contract 
law project will eventually rest, the Commission’s three Communications on European 
contract law will never lose their place as fundamental components in the debate about 
European contract law and European private law generally.  They are the cornerstone for 
the evolution, the scope, and the constitutionality of the European contract law project 
through the present day.   At the same time,  they reopened themes concerning the 
Community’s involvement with European contract law and European private law 
generally, which had been apparent since the beginnings of the debate. 
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First, each Communication made an indelible imprint in steering the evolution of 
the European contract law project. Looking back over the course of the three years and 
three months in which they were issued, these three Communications heralded a process 
by which to identify the extent of the problems underlying Community contract law and 
to put forth both a targeted set of solutions to remedy these problems and the framework 
in which to put them into action orchestrated from the European level.  In other words, by 
virtue of these Communications, the Commission shouldered a sui generis process that 
had never before occurred in the European Union, and in doing so, transfixed this process 
within the European institutional framework.  
 
Second, the scope of the European contract law project vis-à-vis related fields of 
private law was an incessant theme underpinning both the Communications and 
responses of the European institutions and other stakeholders.  On the whole, the 
Communications were situated primarily in contract law, but other fields of private law 
were not left out.  The failure to clarify the relationship between European contract law 
and European private law generally enlivened tensions about the breadth of the 
Community’s involvement in European contract law, which gradually crept into ongoing 
discussion of the CFR and the optional instrument and hence the Community’s 
competence to undertake such initiatives, which leads to the final point. 
 
Third, despite the fact that none of the Communications undertook detailed 
assessment of the constitutionality of the envisaged initiatives, all three Communications 
and the responses of the other European institutions and bodies along the way 
strengthened, implicitly or explicitly, the linkage between the European contract law 
project and the Community’s objectives related to the internal market, thereby bringing 
provisions such as Article 95 EC to the fore.  At the same time, each Communication and 
the solutions proposed augmented questions bearing on the Community’s competence in 
this setting.  Starting with the 2001 Communication, issues concerning the existence, or 
not, of a sufficient legal basis under the Treaty for the adoption of a comprehensive 
contract law instrument, the roles played by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, and the possible recourse to other forms of action such as an 
intergovernmental treaty, the Open Method of Coordination, and American models came 
into view.  With the 2003 Action Plan, the emergence of the CFR and the optional 
instrument stimulated discussion as regards the Community’s competence to adopt such 
measures. Finally, with the 2004 Communication, the envisaged usage of the CFR in the 
context of the revision of the consumer acquis and the place of the European contract law 
project within the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters beckoned clarification as 
regards the linkage between European contract law and the Community’s objectives 
related to consumer protection policy and the AFSJ, respectively.  In this way, the three 
Communications augmented the need to confront the constitutionality of European 
contract law head-on.  This would escalate further in the present path of European 
contract law as examined in the next chapter. 
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The Debate Continues 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In the wake of the Commission’s 2004 Communication, the Commission issued 
the First Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review in 20051, 
which outlined further progress on each of the proposed solutions and brought the work 
on the Common Frame of Reference (the CFR) and the review of the consumer acquis to 
the forefront.  This document paved the way to the Commission’s Second Progress 
Report on The CFR in 20072, the publication of the academic or draft version of the CFR 
by the Network of Excellence, and an increasing number of documents issued by the 
European Parliament and the Council on the CFR project. At the same time, it set into 
motion the publication of the EC Consumer Law Compendium and the Commission’s 
2007 Green Paper on the review of the consumer acquis, which prompted its own set of 
responses from the European institutions and various stakeholders, culminating in the 
Commission’s recent proposal for a Directive on consumer rights.  Recently, it filtered 
into institutional developments concerning the progression to the Stockholm Programme, 
the successor to the Hague Programme, within the context of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (the AFSJ), which placed renewed emphasis on an optional 
instrument in contract law and the promotion of EU-wide standard contract terms, both of 
which had remained in the background of the ongoing activities concerning the CFR and 
the revision of the consumer acquis.  Together, these components constitute an important 
turning point in the direction of the debate about European contract law, and importantly, 
each enlivened issues concerning the Community’s competences related to the internal 
market, consumer protection, and judicial cooperation in civil matters, i.e., Articles 95, 
153, and 65 EC, respectively, in this setting. 
 
 The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine these components and their 
bearing on the constitutionality of  European contract law.  This will be done in three 
main parts.  The first part analyses the ongoing activities of the European contract law 
project with a focus on the path of the CFR project, thereby comprising discussion of the 
Commission’s 2005 and 2007 Progress Reports, the publication of the DCFR, and the 
steady stream of European Parliament resolutions and Council reports on the CFR 
project. The second part explores the path of the review of the consumer acquis, which 
includes discussion of the EC Consumer Law Compendium, the Commission’s 2007 
Green Paper, and the recent proposal for a Directive on consumer rights.  The third part 
delves into recent developments concerning the prospect of an optional instrument in 
contract law and the promotion of EU-wide standard contract terms in the context of 
institutional activities laying the groundwork for the forthcoming Stockholm Programme 
concerning the AFSJ.   
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As will be seen, the discussion of the CFR, the optional instrument, and the 
revision of the consumer acquis are tightly interwoven in the institutional record of the 
debate about European contract law, which makes it virtually impossible to draw a clear 
dividing line between them, much less to avoid some overlap in the timeframe. Indeed, 
this situation emanates from the Commission’s 2003 and 2004 Communications on 
European contract law, which envisaged the CFR as a fulcrum for the improvement of 
the Community contract law acquis and one or more optional instruments in contract law. 
Admittedly, for the reader, this makes for a somewhat cumbersome presentation in which 
the discussion twists and turns through a dizzying array of institutional documents that 
intersect with each other to varying degrees and seem to defy a clear organisational 
structure. Nevertheless, the three-part structure of this chapter is purposeful, so as to 
highlight the extent to which the discussion of the Community’s competence, both 
implicitly and explicitly, has figured into the ongoing course of events taking place in 
European contract law.   
 
7.2. The European contract law project and the path towards the CFR  
7.2.1 The 2005 Progress Report 
On 23 September 2005, the Commission issued the First Annual Progress Report 
onEuropean Contract Law and the Acquis Review (the 2005 Progress Report).3  As 
framed by the Commission, the purpose of the 2005 Progress Report was to summarise 
the progress of the “European Contract Law (ECL) Initiative” since the 2004 
Communication and to outline the main policy issues.4  The 2005 Progress Report was 
divided into three parts concerning: (1) the preparation of the CFR; (2) the review of the 
consumer acquis; and (3) the other two proposed solutions identified in the 2003 Action 
Plan and elaborated further in the 2004 Communication, that of the promotion of EU-
wide standard contract terms and the optional instrument.  While framed in terms of a 
“progress report”, this document went far beyond a mere update and reconfigured the 
course of the activities envisaged for European contract law, thereby placing the CFR and 
the revision of the consumer acquis center stage.  Nevertheless, the 2005 Progress Report 
was devoid of any discussion of the constitutionality of these envisaged initiatives. 
 
The first part of the 2005 Progress Report was devoted to the preparation of the 
CFR.5  Building on the framework for stakeholder participation set forth in the 2004 
Communication, the Commission set forth the three main groups involved in the work on 
the CFR: (1) the Research Network, which was composed of a selected group of 
academic researchers engaged in the drafting of the CFR6; (2) the CFR-Net, which was a 
network of selected stakeholder experts representing business, the legal professions, and 
consumer organisations that would provide input to the academic researchers7; and (3) 
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the group of Member States experts, which was composed of persons nominated by their 
respective Member State to contribute to the consultation process on the CFR.8  The 
Commission then outlined certain issues arising in the first phase of CFR preparation.9  
While this was mainly segregated between “procedural issues” and “horizontal 
substantive issues”10, two common themes were apparent:  the interplay between the CFR 
and the revision of the Community acquis, and participatory issues related to the input 
and output of the drafting process for the CFR.  On the one hand, the Commission 
declared that it intended to “prioritise issues that are relevant to the consumer contract 
law acquis and other contract law related acquis”.11 This led to the Commission’s 
insistence that “[a]ppropriate differentiation between B2B and B2C contracts is 
paramount” and its advocacy of a case-by-case approach identifying where specific 
consumer rules were necessary and suggesting deviations from the general rules.12 The 
interdependence between general and specific contract law also needed to be clarified.13 
On the other hand, the Commission executed a number of changes designed to improve 
the participative nature of the CFR process. For example, it extended the time that the 
CFR-Net members were given to examine the researchers’ drafts14 and invited the 
researchers to provide comprehensive outlines of the key features of each draft in 
advance of the workshops.15   
 
 In the second part of the 2005 Progress Report, the Commission set forth its 
detailed plans for the review of the eight directives within the Community consumer 
acquis following from the 2004 Communication.16 The discussion centered on three 
points, each of which contained the embryo for the activities to come. First, the 
Commission explained that a comprehensive comparative analysis of these directives was 
currently being undertaken by a network of academics and legal practitioners on behalf of 
the Commission so as to examine the application of the directives in the Member States.17   
This would later be known as the EC Consumer Law Compendium. Second, the 
Commission made clear its intention to disseminate a comprehensive communication on 
the review of the consumer acquis in the following year.18 While published a bit later 
than initially foreseen, this would be the 2007 Green Paper on the review of the consumer 
acquis. Third, the Commission presented its preliminary findings on the review of four 
consumer directives so far19, surmising that there were two possible options if there was 
                                                 
8
 2005 Progress Report, supra note 1, point 2.3. A list of Member State experts and various workshops is 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/contract_law _en.htm. 
9
  2005 Progress Report, supra note 1, point 2.6. 
10
 Id., compare point 2.6.2 with point 2.6.3, respectively. 
11
 Id., point 2.6.1.  See also id., point 2.6.2, second para., first bullet point.   
12
 Id., point 2.6.3, first para., sixth bullet point.  
13
 Id., point 2.6.3, first para., third bullet point. 
14
 Id., point 2.6.2, first para. 
15
 Id., point 2.6.2, second para., fifth bullet point.  For further discussion of the various workshops, see H. 
Beale, “The European Commission’s Common Frame of Reference Project”, 2 European Review of 
Contract Law 303 (2006).  
16
  2005 Progress Report, supra note 1, point 3. 
17
 Id., point 3.1, second para. 
18
 Id., point 3.1, third para.   
19
 See id., points 3.2.1-3.2.4. This included the Price Indication, the Injunctions, the Timeshare, and the 
Distance Selling Directives. 
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evidence that the needed to be revised (which was pretty much a foregone conclusion at 
this point):  first, a vertical approach consisting of the individual revision of the existing 
directives; or second, a horizontal approach signifying the adoption of one or more 
framework instruments providing common definitions and regulating the main consumer 
contractual rights and remedies.20  As an example of this horizontal approach, the 
Commission opined that there could be a horizontal directive on business-to-consumer 
contracts for the sale of goods, which would regulate the contractual aspects of sale 
currently scattered across the Consumer Sales, Unfair Contract Terms, Distance Selling, 
and Doorstep Selling Directives.21  Although presented in a somewhat understated 
fashion, this laid the seeds for the eventual proposal for a Directive on consumer rights. 
 
 Finally, the third part of the 2005 Progress Report comprised brief, albeit 
important, discussion of the other two measures identified in the 2003 Action Plan and 
solidified in the 2004 Communication.  First, as regards the promotion of EU-wide 
standard contract terms (Measure II), the Commission decided for various reasons that it 
was not appropriate to host a website on which market participants could exchange 
information about the use of such terms.22  Given that most of the other activities planned 
for this area had been cancelled in the 2004 Communication23, this option seemed to be 
pretty much dead for the time being.24  Second, as regards further reflection on non-sector 
specific measures such as an optional instrument (Measure III), the Commission focused 
on the optional instrument.  It confirmed its character as a parallel “26th regime” sitting 
alongside, but without replacing, the Member States’ contract laws, thereby available as 
an additional option to contracting parties and leaving the then 25 Member States’ 
contract laws untouched.25  The Commission concentrated on the use of such an 
instrument in specific fields concerning financial services, insurance, and mortgage 
credit.26  This seemed to suggest that more than one optional instrument could be 
foreseen.  With the emphasis placed on the CFR and the review of the consumer acquis, 
however, the prospect of an optional instrument in contract law faded a bit from the 
Commission’s short-term view. 
 
7.2.1.1 The Council’s 2005 Conclusions 
At the 2694th meeting of the Competitiveness Council (Internal Market, Industry 
and Research) in Brussels on 28-29 November 2005, the Council adopted its conclusions 
                                                 
20
 Id., point 3.3, first para. 
21
 Id., point 3.3, second para.  The Commission further noted that the parts of existing directives covering 
marketing techniques, e.g., restrictions on the use of certain means of distance communication and services, 
could also be regulated by one or more separate framework instruments.  Id. 
22
 Id., point 4.1, second para. 
23
 See Chapter 6, § 6.4.2. 
24
 But not completely: see infra section § 7.4. For further discussion, see S. Whittaker, “On the 
Development of European Standard Contract Terms”, in Standard Contract Terms in Europe: A Basis for 
and a Challenge to European Contract Law 141 (H. Collins ed., Kluwer, 2008). 
25
 2005 Progress Report, supra note 1, point 4.2.  Technically speaking, it should have been a “28th regime” 
to account for the fact that the UK encompasses more than one legal system. Still, this implied an 
additional regime alongside the regimes of the then twenty-five Member States.  With the subsequent 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania, this would be increased by two. 
26
 Id., point 4.2. 
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concerning the 2005 Progress Report as well as the 2004 Communication (the Council’s 
2005 Conclusions).27  This configuration of the Council was not to be overlooked, since 
the Council framed its remarks within the Community’s internal market objectives. 
 
On the whole, the Council praised the Commission’s ongoing work on the 
revision of the consumer acquis and welcomed its prioritisation, such that the parts of the 
CFR directly relevant to this review would be rescheduled and treated at an earlier stage 
than previously envisioned.28  In particular, it emphasised the need for the consumer 
acquis to be “fit for purpose”, meaning that it was able “to protect the legal and economic 
interests and rights of consumers, to enhance the confidence of the EU’s citizens in the 
Internal Market, and to promote the cross-border provision of goods and services, thus 
guaranteeing a high level of consumer protection”.29 It also favoured the Commission’s 
efforts concerning the consultation process of the CFR30 and underlined the need to 
distinguish between B2C and B2B contracts so as to deliver “real benefits” for both 
consumers and businesses.31  At the same time, however, the Council paid heed to the 
Commission’s “repeated reassurance that it does not intend to propose a ‘European civil 
code’ which would harmonise contract laws of Member States” and that the “Member 
States’ differing legal traditions will be fully taken into account”.32   
 
7.2.1.2 The European Parliament’s 2006 Resolutions 
In response to the 2004 Communication and the 2005 Progress Report, the 
Parliament adopted not one, but two Resolutions.  In contrast to the subtlety of the 
Council’s Conclusions, these Resolutions went far in explicitly situating the ongoing 
activities of the European contract law within the Community’s internal market and 
consumer protection objectives. In particular, hidden beneath the first Resolution was 
explicit reference to both Articles 95 and 153 EC.   
 
On 23 March 2006, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on “European 
contract law and revision of the acquis: the way forward” (the first 2006 Resolution).33 Its 
title was drawn from that of the 2004 Communication, but this Resolution also included 
comments on the 2005 Progress Report.  In essence, what then Commissioner Kyprianou 
had termed mere “teething problems” at the start of a big project34 were considered of 
much greater concern in the Parliament’s view.  Starting with the Preamble, the 
Parliament declared that while it “seems” as though the European contract law project 
                                                 
27
 2694th Council Meeting – Competitiveness / Internal Market / Industry / Research, Brussels 28-29 Nov. 
2005, DOC 15322/05 LIMIT CONSOM 52/JUSTCIV 225, dated 2 Dec. 2005 (hereinafter 2005 
Conclusions). 
28
 Id., points 7, 8, 11, 14, 17. 
29
 Id., point 14. 
30
 Id., points 9, 12, 18. 
31
 Id., point 13. 
32
 Id., point 10. 
33
 Resolution of the European Parliament on European contract law and revision of the acquis, [2006] OJ C 
292E/109 (hereinafter first 2006 Resolution). 
34
 Opening Address of Markos Kyprianou, Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, Conference 
on “European Contract Law: Better Lawmaking to the Common Frame of Reference” hosted by the UK 
Council Presidency and the European Commission, held in London, 26 Sept. 2005, at 4. 
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should be seen as an exercise in better law-making at European level, “it is by no means 
clear what it will lead to in terms of practical outcomes or on what legal basis any 
binding instrument or instruments will be adopted”.35  The Parliament continued: “even 
though the Commission denies that this is its objective, it is clear that many of the 
researchers and stakeholders working on the project believe that the ultimate long-term 
outcome will be a European code of obligations or even a full-blown European Civil 
Code, and that in any event the project is by far the most important initiative under way 
in the civil law field”.36 This led the Parliament to emphasise the importance of the 
oversight of the European institutions, whether in relation to the adoption of such a Code 
or the final product of any initiative within the European contract law project.37  It also 
stressed the project went beyond just the consumer acquis to encompass “contract law as 
a whole”, but that this should not lead to a diminution of the values lying at the heart of 
the acquis.38  Taken together, these introductory comments embodied the three main 
themes permeating this Resolution, which the Parliament conveniently organised under 
three headings concerning: (1) the underlying principles and objectives, (2) substantive 
law issues, and (3) procedural issues related to the European contract law project. 
 
 First, as far as the underlying principles and objectives of the European contract 
law project were concerned, the Parliament essentially sought to “return to its roots” 
enshrined in its early resolutions. Citing its previous 1989, 1994, 2001 and 2003 
Resolutions, it reiterated that “a uniform internal market cannot be fully functional 
without further steps towards the harmonisation of civil law”.39 It then requested the 
Commission to “exploit straightaway” the results of the work of academic researchers 
and the CFR-Net towards the revision of the acquis in the field of civil law and 
eventually the development of “a system of Community civil law”.40  It was not exactly 
clear whether this denoted a code of European private law.41 Suffice to say, the 
Parliament continued its longstanding advocacy for farther-reaching Community action 
beyond contract law grounded in the functioning of the internal market.42   
                                                 
35
 First 2006 Resolution, supra note 33, recital A (emphasis added). 
36
 Id., recital B (emphasis added).   
37
 Id., recitals C-D, F. 
38
 Id., recital G. 
39
 Id., point 1.   
40
 Id., point 2. 
41
 The phrase “a system of Community civil law” was subject to quite interesting amendments.  Initially, it 
read “a Community civil law”.  See Draft Report on European contract law and the revision of the acquis: 
the way forward, dated 1 June 2005, 2005/2022(INI), point 2; Draft Report on European contract law and 
the revision of the acquis: the way forward, dated 25 Jan. 2006, 2005/2022(INI), point 2. In the Final 
Report preceding the Resolution, “a common civil law” was used.  Report on European contract law and 
the revision of the acquis: the way forward, dated 2 March 2006, A6-0055/2006 FINAL (hereinafter 2006 
Final Report), point 2.  It was then subsequently altered to its present form.  While the Parliamentary 
debates do not specifically answer this question, the remarks of Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Rapporteur, do shed 
some light.  See Remarks of Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Parliamentary Debates of 22 March 2006-Brussels, 
(“This House has, for many years, been monitoring the efforts of the European Commission with regard to 
a code of European civil law and has expressed its approval and lent its support in numerous resolutions 
since 1989. That is also our intention in this proposal for a resolution.”). 
42
 In the Parliamentary Debates of 22 March 2006-Brussels, see, e.g., Remarks of Klaus-Heiner Lehne 
(finding that the European contract law project will “play an important part in determining whether the 
single European market continues to converge for the benefit of everyone – consumers and traders alike”); 
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 Second, the Parliament highlighted a number of substantive law issues relating to 
the ongoing preparation of the CFR as well as other measures to be taken in the field of 
contract (and civil) law.43  In particular, there had not yet been a systematic distinction 
between rules applicable to business-to-business transactions and those applicable to 
business-to-consumer transactions.44 It was also important to take into account the 
European social model when harmonising contract law and to respect different legal 
systems and traditions.45  The Parliament also requested the Commission to define 
precisely how its future proposals would interact with both Community private 
international law rules and  the national legal systems.46 
 
 Finally, the Parliament devoted substantial attention to procedural (or more aptly 
participatory) issue relating to the European contract law project.  While it expressed its 
support for the 2005 Progress Report47,  it called for the Commission “as a whole” to 
manage the work on the project, under the responsibility of the Justice, Freedom and 
Security Directorate General (DG), rather than the Health and Consumer Protection DC 
that had assumed the position so far.48 It then set forth a number of requests in connection 
with the preparation of the CFR.49 It asked the Commission to keep it informed of 
progress on the CFR by way of quarterly reports containing specific information about 
the results of the scheduled workshops, the reactions of the research groups, and a 
statement by the Commission as to how it intends to take account of these results for 
subsequent work.50 In that regard, it called on the Commission to provide it with a 
diagram of the various groups involved with the CFR, indicating their respective roles 
and positions in the process.51  It also made clear that it should be consulted not only on 
the final version of the CFR, but also on its draft structure and on each title or section as 
it is finalised.52 In particular, the work done by the academic researchers must follow 
clear guidelines adopted by the European legislator and the CFR could only be adopted 
following the political approval of the Parliament and the Council.53   
 
On its face, the Resolution contained no discussion of the legal form of the CFR 
or its legal basis.  What is not commonly known, however, is that both of these issues had 
initially been mentioned, but ultimately excluded from the final text of the Resolution.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Remarks of Diana Wallis (emphasising that the European contract law project “is of practical importance 
for the internal market”); Remarks of Giuseppe Gargani (finding that “civil law and contractual law are 
there to strengthen European citizenship and economic and civil exchanges in Europe”); Remarks of 
Manuel Medina Ortega (“I do not believe that a unified market, a European Union internal market, is 
possible without a contract law”).   
43
 First 2006 Resolution, supra note 33, points 3-11; compare point 12 (referring to “all legislative 
measures concerning civil law”). 
44
 Id., points 4-6. 
45
 Id., points 8-9. 
46
 Id., point 10. 
47
 Id., point 13. 
48
 Id., point 14. 
49
 Id., points 15-28. 
50
 Id., points 21-22. 
51
 Id., point 19. 
52
 Id., point 23. 
53
 Id., points 18, 20. 
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By way of background, in the Report accompanying the Resolution, one of the most 
prominent criticisms was the Commission’s failure to set out a clear legislative plan as 
regards what legal form the CFR should take.54  This Report had been prepared under the 
auspices of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs but included the Opinion of 
the Parliamentary Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection.55  This 
Opinion was an important component because most of its provisions found their way into 
the final version of the Parliament’s Resolution.  Yet, there was one paragraph of this 
Opinion concerning the CFR that was left out.  This paragraph called on the Commission 
“to submit to Parliament a formal plan for the incremental consultation of Parliament as 
the work progresses, and for the ultimate implementation of the results of the work of the 
researchers and CFR-Net to be adopted in the form of a binding legal instrument (or 
instruments) on the basis of Articles 95 and/or 153 of the Treaty”.56  The use of the 
“and/or” suggested the Community’s competences related to internal market and 
consumer protection policy, respectively, could presumably be used together as well as 
alone in the adoption of the envisaged instruments, thereby begging questions concerning 
the relationship between these two provisions. It was also never spelled out whether such 
a binding instrument or instruments were envisioned primarily for the contract law field 
or for other fields of private law.57 Nevertheless, while the express references to Articles 
95 and 153 EC were not incorporated into the text of the Resolution itself, this omitted 
passage heightened attention on these provisions.  Regrettably, this was not elaborated 
further in the Parliament’s second 2006 Resolution issued about six months later, 
although the Community’s internal market objectives would remain an implicit theme. 
 
On 7 September 2006, the European Parliament adopted another Resolution on 
European contract law (the second 2006 Resolution).58  The impetus for this Resolution 
stemmed from an oral question on this subject submitted by Giuseppe Gargani on behalf 
of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs to the Commission in June 2006.59  On 
the basis of the 2004 Communication and the 2005 Progress Report60, Mr. Gargani 
addressed five questions to the Commission concerning ambiguities surrounding the 
scope, the legal form and the purpose of the CFR.61  Much of the substance of these 
                                                 
54
 2006 Final Report, supra note 41, at 7-8.   
55
 Id, at 10.  As a member of the Committee on Legal Affairs, Klaus-Heiner Lehne was appointed 
Rapporteur but pursuant to the collaboration with the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection, Diana Wallis served as Draftswoman.   
56
 Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, dated 25 Jan. 2006, annexed 
to the 2006 Final Report, supra note 41, point 5. 
57
 Compare id., recitals A-C with 2006 Resolution, supra note 33, recitals A-C. 
58
 Resolution of the European Parliament on European contract law, [2006] OJ C 305E/247 (hereinafter 
second 2006 Resolution). 
59
 Oral Question With Debate by Giuseppe Gargani, on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs to the 
Commission, dated 27 June 2006, O-0074/06 (B6-0326/2006). 
60
 Id., first-fourth indents. 
61
 These five questions are listed as follows: 
(1) Does the Commission intend and if so, to what to extent, to include other contract law issues 
than consumer issues in a wider CFR?; 
(2) What are the intentions of the Commission as regards the purpose and the legal form of the 
CFR? Should the CFR be a binding instrument and what would be the legal basis for such an 
instrument? Or should the CFR only serve as a toolbox for the Commission for further 
legislative proposals?; 
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questions was then incorporated into a motion for a resolution on the subject.62  As 
explained by Mr. Klaus-Heiner Lehne, who spoke in place of Mr. Gargani in the 
parliamentary debates on this Resolution, the reason why the Parliament deliberately put 
this oral question and the corresponding resolution on the agenda was “to emphasise 
clearly once more the strength of the Parliament’s support for this project” and to provide 
guidelines to the Commission in its future work on the CFR.63 
 
 As a consequence, the second 2006 Resolution sought to build on certain points 
stated in the first 2006 Resolution.  First and foremost, the Parliament restated its position 
that “a uniform internal market cannot be fully functional without further steps towards 
the harmonisation of civil law” and that the European contract law initiative was “the 
most important initiative under way in the field of civil law”.64  It then advocated a 
“wider CFR” on general contract  law issues that went beyond the consumer protection 
field and that the work on the “wider CFR” should proceed in parallel with the work on 
the revision of the consumer acquis.65  Finally, it underlined that even though the purpose 
and legal form of the CFR were still unclear, the final outcome could be a binding legal 
instrument and therefore all possible options should be kept open.66   
 
7.2.1.3 The Commission’s 2006 Note to the Council 
 While one cannot be sure of the exact impact of the responses of the European 
Parliament and the Council to the 2004 Communication and 2005 Progress Report, not 
long afterwards the Commission submitted a special Note to the Member State 
delegations of the Council on 1 December 2006 in view of the forthcoming meeting of 
the Competitiveness Council (Internal Market, Industry and Research) on 4-5 December 
2006.67  Though directed at the Council, it directly addressed comments made by the 
European Parliament as well.  In particular, the Commission declared that the CFR “was 
not conceived to be a legislative instrument applicable to legal transactions and is not a 
European civil code”.68  The Commission also indicated that it will decide “whether to 
                                                                                                                                                 
(3) Does the Commission consider that the purpose of a wider CFR should be clear before 
presenting any further legislative proposals related to contract law issues?; 
(4) How does the Commission plan to bring the results of the work of the research groups and the 
CFR Net into use in legal transactions? What future legal instruments connected with contract 
law issues does the Commission plan to propose?; and 
(5) How will the Commission involve the Parliament in considering the various possible options 
with regard to the CFR?. 
Id., fifth indent. 
62
 Motion for a Resolution further to Question for Oral Answer B6-0326/06 by Giuseppe Gargani on behalf 
of the Committee on Legal Affairs on European contract law, B6-0464/06, dated 4 Sept. 2006. 
63
 Remarks of Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Parliamentary Debates of 5 Sept. 2006-Strasbourg. 
64
 Second 2006 Resolution, supra note 58, points 1-2. 
65
 Id., points 3-4. 
66
 Id., point 5.  See also id., recital A.   
67
 Council Secretariat, Competitive Council (Internal Market, Industry and Research) Meeting on 4-5 Dec. 
2006, Common Frame of Reference–Information from the Commission, DOC 16086/06 LIMITE 
CONSOM 137/JUSTCIV 271, dated 1 Dec. 2006, Annex (“Written Information from the Commission to 
the Competitiveness Council 4-5 December 2006”) (hereinafter 2006 Annex). 
68
 Id., first heading (“The CFR”) (emphasis added).  This had been underscored during the Parliamentary 
debates on the second 2006 Resolution, whereby Commissioner Markos Kyprianou stated that pursuant to 
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continue the CFR project beyond consumer contract law so as to include other areas of 
the EU contract law acquis and directly relevant issues of general contract law”.69  The 
Note concluded with the reminder that the Commission would be following up on these 
matters in several ways which included the Second Progress Report on the CFR.70   
 
7.2.2 The 2007 Progress Report 
On 25 July 2007, the Commission issued the Second Progress Report on the 
Common Frame of Reference (the 2007 Progress Report).71 The objective of the 2007 
Progress Report was to summarise the progress on the CFR since the first 2005 Progress 
Report.72  As indicated by its title, the central focus of the 2007 Progress Report was the 
CFR.  Aside from certain references to the revision of the consumer acquis, there was no 
discussion of other proposed measures, such as the optional instrument.  Even so, the 
2007 Progress Report contained no discussion of the constitutionality of the CFR. 
 
 First, the Second Progress Report drove home measures taken to ensure the 
prioritisation of consumer contract law issues in the CFR.73  Academic researchers had 
agreed to divide their work into three distinct categories so as to ensure that matters 
relating to the Community consumer acquis were discussed as a priority at the CFR 
workshops.74  By contrast, topics concerning general contract law that were directly 
relevant to the consumer acquis were only discussed if there was time, and topics of 
general contract law providing essential background for the acquis were mainly 
informative.75  Second, the Commission discussed the various substantive law issues 
arising as part of the various workshops on the CFR, devoting the majority of the 
attention on the workshops on EU consumer contract law, as opposed to those concerning 
non-consumer contract law acquis matters and general contract law.76 Still, the 
Commission noted that it would take the issues concerning general contract law into 
consideration during the process of elaborating the CFR.77  This seemed to beg the 
omnipresent question about the structure of the CFR which the Commission proceeded to 
next.   
 
In two short paragraphs, the Commission summarised the results of two 
workshops, one with the stakeholder experts (CFR-Net) and the other with the Member 
State experts, on the subject of the structure of the CFR.78  Despite some differences in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the 2004 Communication, the CFR “was not primarily meant to be a legislative instrument applicable 
directly to legal transactions but a toolbox to facilitate better lawmaking for legislators”:  Remarks of 
Markos Kyprianou, Member of the Commission, Parliamentary Debates, 5 Sept. 2006-Strasbourg.   
69
 2006 Annex, supra note 67, second heading (“State of Play), fourth para. 
70
 Id., third and fifth paras. 
71
 2007 Progress Report, supra note 2. 
72
 Id., point 1. 
73
 See further Answer given by Mr. Kyprianou on behalf of the Commission, dated 25 Aug. 2006, to 
Written Question by Ms. Diana Wallis dated 20 July 2006 (“European contract law”), P-3512/2006. 
74
 2007 Progress Report, supra note 2, point 2, fifth, eighth paras. 
75
 Id., point 2, sixth-eighth paras. 
76
 Compare id., point 3.1 with points 3.2-3.3.   
77
 Id., point 3.3, first para. 
78
 Id., point 4, first para. 
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the preferences of these two groups, there seemed to be agreement that the CFR should 
go beyond consumer contract law and encompass at least some issues of general contract 
law.79  In other words, there seemed to be consensus for a “wider CFR” as depicted in the 
Parliament’s second 2006 Resolution.  The Commission then highlighted the input in the 
preparation of the CFR from stakeholders and the European institutions.  Among other 
things, it briefly described the responses received from the Council and the European 
Parliament, albeit devoid of any mention of the Parliament’s critical remarks especially in 
its first 2006 Resolution.80 It also responded to the Parliament’s request for a diagram of 
the CFR process by attaching a flow chart identifying the various actors involved.81   
 
In its final conclusions, the Commission stated that as far as Community 
consumer contract law was concerned, the relevant CFR findings would be incorporated, 
where appropriate, into the revision of the consumer acquis.82  As regards scope of the 
CFR more generally, the Commission noted that this topic needed to be decided upon in 
order to steer the future work, bearing in mind how far such work should cover topics 
concerning other areas of the Community contract law acquis and directly relevant issue 
of general contract law in addition to consumer contract law.83 For now, the Commission 
reiterated that its scope was “not a large scale harmonisation of private law or a European 
civil code”84.  It also sought the position of both the European Parliament and the Council 
on this matter, and while the Parliament had already done so by virtue of its 2006 
Resolutions, it awaited the Council’s remarks on the remainder of the work to be done on 
the CFR.85 
 
7.2.3 The publication of the Draft Common Frame of Reference  
 On 28 December 2007, the Study Group and the Acquis Group submitted to the 
Commission an initial version of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (the DCFR).86. 
Formally entitled “Draft Common Frame of Reference - Principles, Definitions and 
Model Rules of European Private Law”, the DCFR was published initially in 2008 in the 
form of an interim outline edition, meaning that certain substantive parts still needed to 
be added and there was not yet any comments or notes accompanying the model rules.87  
                                                 
79
 Compare id., point 4, first para. with second para.  See also id., point 6, fourth para. 
80
 Id., point 5.2, particularly point 5.2.2.   
81
 Id., point 5.2.2, fourth para.  Although not formally labeled as an Annex, this flow chart was the last page 
of the 2007 Progress Report.  Frankly speaking, it may be wondered whether this flow chart adequately 
responded to the Parliament’s demand, given its quite elementary descriptions of the general roles of the 
European institutions (Commission, European Parliament and Council), the academic researchers, the 
CFR-Net, and the Member State experts, without any specific information as to the names or positions of 
the persons involved for each component. As a result, several months later, this beckoned Written Question 
(P-5266/2007) by Ms. Diana Wallis (“Further information on the ‘network of Member State Experts’ 
detailed in the Second Progress Report on the Common Frame of Reference”), dated 19 Oct. 2007. 
82
 2007 Progress Report, supra note 2, point 6, first para.   
83
 Id., point 6, third para. 
84
 Id., point 6, sixth para. (emphasis added). 
85
 Id., point 6, seventh para. 
86
 See the website of the Joint Network on European Private Law (Co-PECL), http://www.copecl.org/. 
87
 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law – Draft Common Frame of Reference  
(DCFR) (Interim Outline Edition) (C. von Bar et al. eds, Sellier, 2008), point 2.  As noted therein, one of 
the purposes of publishing an interim outline edition was to receive feedback from the legal community: 
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In early 2009, the full outline edition of the DCFR was published, though still without 
comments and notes.88  Recently, the full version of the DCFR was published in October 
2009, which is basically identical to the outline edition save for the inclusion of 
comments and comparative notes for most of the model rules and certain minor editorial 
corrections.89  Importantly, three points stand out as regard its purpose, its scope, and its 
content, which have direct bearing on the continuing debate about European contract law. 
 
First, as envisaged by its drafters, the DCFR has a three-fold purpose: first, it can 
serve as a possible model for the final or political version of the CFR; second, it stands on 
its own as an independent text for European legal science, research, and education; and 
third, outside the academic world, it may serve as a source of inspiration for various 
national authorities, thereby contributing to “a harmonious and informal Europeanisation 
of private law”.90 As emphasised therein, the academic DCFR and the political CFR are 
wholly separate; the DCFR constitutes the product of the academic researchers and is not 
the product of any political decision-making body at national or European level.91 In fact, 
the DCFR contains substantial discussion as to how it may be used as preparatory work 
for the CFR, with particular regard to the improvement of the existing and future 
Community acquis.92  Moreover, the authors emphasised that while it is as yet unclear 
whether the CFR, or parts of it, may be used as the basis for one or more optional 
instruments, it is their view that “such an optional instrument would open attractive 
perspectives, not least for consumer transactions”.93 As such, the publication of the 
DCFR has prompted an onslaught on scholarly literature on its content as well as its 
relationship to what will become the final CFR.94  This leads to the next point. 
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Second, as signified by the reference to “European private law” in the title, the 
scope of the DCFR goes well beyond contract law and covers various fields of 
patrimonial law that largely parallel the work of the Study Group, one of its principal 
drafters.95  Specifically, there are Ten “Books”, which encompass, apart from a general 
section, contract law, five types of specific contracts96, tort law, benevolent intervention 
in another’s affairs (negotiorum gestio), unjust enrichment, acquisition and loss of 
ownership in movables, property security rights in movable assets, and trusts.97 As 
explained by the drafters, the wide scope of the DCFR was due to the link between 
contract law with other areas which justified treating the whole of the law of obligations 
as “an organic entity or unit”.98  Consequently, its structure, seen by many to resemble 
national codifications, and its structure, enveloping various fields of private law, beckon 
considerable questions surrounding the use that will made of it in the process of 
compiling the final CFR and the extent to which the DCFR carries the seeds for far-
reaching Community action harkening back to the early days of the debate.   
 
 Third, as also indicated by its title, the content of the DCFR is made up of 
“principles, definitions and model rules”.  The bulk of the DCFR is comprised of model 
or “soft law” rules, which have no normative force and are envisaged to be accompanied 
by both comments and notes.99 The function of the comments is to provide illustrations of 
the application of the rule concerned and to indicate the policy issues at stake, whereas 
the function of the notes is to indicate the present legal position of the particular rule in 
the Member States, as well as in the European Community and international instruments 
where relevant.100  As for the content of the rules themselves, the drafters devoted an 
explicit section to the relationship between the DCFR, on the one hand, and the PECL, 
the Study Group’s Principles of European Law series and the Acquis Principles, on the 
other, explaining that while many model rules were based on these previous works, 
deviations and improvements have been made.101 As for definitions, these were 
developed in tandem with the model rules and seek to develop a uniform European 
terminology for concepts of private law.102  They do not appear in the body of the text but 
rather are placed in an Annex to the DCFR so as to keep the first chapter short and to 
allow the list of definitions to be extended or updated without much editorial effort.103   
 
Finally, the principles category generated significant discussion among the groups 
involved in the preparation of the DCFR, since it was not clear from the Commission’s 
Communications what was intended, i.e., whether this was meant as a synonym for rules 
without the force of law; rules of a more general nature, such as those on freedom of 
contract or good faith; or “fundamental” principles in the sense of abstract basic values 
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underlying the model rules.104 In the end, the drafters proposed two categories of 
principles as part of the DCFR.  First, “underlying principles” furnish grounds for 
arguments about the merits of a particular model rule and thus are placed under specific 
headings of freedom, security, justice, and efficiency as defined in a special section 
preceding the model rules.105   Second, “overriding principles” are of a high political 
nature, such as the protection of human rights, the promotion of solidarity and social 
responsibility, and the promotion of the internal market.106  This also includes the 
underlying principles of freedom, security, justice and efficiency, which are considered to 
have a “double role” to play as part of both categories.107  As regards the promotion of 
the internal market, it was explained that that the “most obvious way in which the welfare 
of citizens and businesses of Europe can be promoted by the DCFR is by the promotion 
of the smooth functioning of the internal market”, though whether this was just by way of 
improving the present and future EU legislation or developing one or more optional 
instruments were political decisions.108  Likewise, as regards the role played by freedom, 
security, and justice as overriding political principles, “reference may also be made to the 
EU specific aims of establishing an area of freedom, security and justice and promoting 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between the Member States” 
for which the DCFR could make a contribution if the political will is there.109 Though not 
speaking directly to constitutionality, the reference to the Community’s objectives related 
to the internal market and the AFSJ in this context nonetheless augmented the linkage 
between these objectives and the ongoing activities taking place within the European 
contract law project. 
 
7.2.4 Ongoing reflection about the CFR project  
7.2.4.1 The European Parliament’s 2007 Resolution on European contract law 
With the expected publication of the initial version of the DCFR, on 12 December 
2007, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on European contract law (the 2007 
Resolution)110, which was primarily focused on the CFR project.  By way of background, 
on 4 September 2007, the Parliament adopted a Resolution on the use of “soft law” 
instruments111.  In this Resolution, the Parliament criticised the use of “soft law” in the 
European Union, and in doing so, paid particular heed to its application in the European 
contract law project.112  This was because there was much concern that the use of soft law 
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in connection with the CFR would bypass the normal decision-making process and hence 
the participation of the European Parliament.113 As such, “in areas such as the [European] 
contract-law project, a point must come where the Commission decides whether or not to 
use its right of initiative and on what legal basis”.114  
 
A few months later, on 21 November 2007, this Resolution on “soft law” 
instruments filtered into an oral question concerning the CFR submitted to the 
Commission by Giuseppe Gargani on behalf of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal 
Affairs.115  Mr. Gargani explained that while the CFR was presently not intended to have 
any binding legal effects and thus remain in the nature of “soft law”, it would nonetheless 
have “indirect legal and practical effects” and determine future legislative measures to be 
taken in the field of contract law.116 He also stressed that decisions on which parts of the 
DCFR would be incorporated into the final CFR were highly political in nature and that it 
was essential to ensure that the parts of the DCFR selected for the final CFR were 
coherent with each other, with the Commission’s plans on the revision of the consumer 
acquis and with other Community legislation on contract law.117 This led to five pointed 
questions concerning the selection process and the scope of the CFR as well as the 
involvement of the Parliament and the various Commission DGs in the CFR project 
generally.118 A few weeks later, these comments and questions were incorporated into a 
motion for a resolution on European contract law, which culminated in the Parliament’s 
2007 Resolution.119   
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In the 2007 Resolution, the Parliament reiterated much of what was said above in 
Mr. Gargani’s oral question120 and in its previous Resolution on soft law121.  It added that 
although the CFR was intended to be a “better regulation” instrument for ensuring the 
consistency and quality of Community legislation in contract law, the aim of better 
regulation was “not to limit the room for manoeuvre of the European Union co-
legislators”.122   On that note, it repeated its support for a “wider CFR” including both 
general and consumer contract law123 and requested the Commission to keep all options 
open as regards the purpose and legal form of a future CFR instrument, which included  
an optional instrument.124  While matters of Community competence were not mentioned 
in the text of the Resolution itself, several MEPs stressed during the Parliamentary debate 
the need for the future approximation of private law, as well as the use of an optional 
instrument, for solving practical problems faced by European citizens in the internal 
market125, with one even advocating the model of the American Uniform Commercial 
Code.126  Commissioner Kuneva responded by clarifying once again that the CFR “will 
not be a large-scale harmonisation of private law or a European civil code”.127  She also 
stated that the Commission intended to take a decision on the scope, content, and form of 
the CFR sometime in 2008.128   
 
7.2.4.2 The Council’s 2008 Report on four fundamental aspects of the CFR 
On 18 April 2008, at the 2863rd Justice and Home Affairs meeting, the Council 
adopted a Report containing its position on four fundamental aspects of the CFR, i.e., its 
purpose, scope, content, and legal effects (the 2008 Report).129 The 2008 Report was the 
culmination of several months of consultation with the Member State delegations and of 
various documents disseminated by successive Council Presidencies130, within which 
issues concerning Community competence arose. Starting on 20 December 2006, the then 
incoming German Council Presidency circulated a document in expectation of the 
                                                 
120
 2007 Resolution, supra note 110, recitals A-D; points 2-7. 
121
 Id., recital F. 
122
 Id., recital E. 
123
 Id., points 7-8. 
124
 Id., point 9. 
125
 See Parliamentary Debates, 10 Dec. 2007-Strasbourg, particularly Remarks of Rainer Wieland; and 
Remarks of Klaus-Heiner Lehne. 
126
 Remarks of Manuel Medina Ortega, in Parliamentary Debates,  10 Dec. 2007-Strasbourg. 
127
 First Set of Remarks of Meglena Kuneva, Member of the Commission, Parliamentary Debates, 10 Dec. 
2007-Strasbourg. 
128
 Second Set of Remarks of Meglena Kuneva, Member of the Commission, Parliamentary Debates, 10 
Dec. 2007-Strasbourg. 
129
 2863rd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 18 April 2008, DOC 8622/08 PV 
CONS 26/JAI 188, dated 12 June 2008, point 12.  As cited therein, the Council approved the 2008 Report, 
DOC 8268/08 LIMITE JUSTCIV 68/CONSOM 39, dated 11 April 2008 (hereinafter 2008 Report).  
130
 It should be noted that various documents disseminated by the Council and Member State delegations in 
connection with this Report (as well as others Council documents relating to the CFR and the European 
contract law project generally) have not been disclosed to the public, despite requests submitted by the 
present author. Thus, the discussion proceeds from the relevant documents that have been made available to 
the public at the time of writing. 
Chapter 7:  The Debate Continues 
 
 268 
Commission’s 2007 Progress Report.131  In this document, it was noted that in contrast to 
the European Parliament which had continually dealt with the matter of European 
contract law, so far the Council had done so only sporadically.132 Thus, the Council was 
urged to develop its own position and to that end several questions concerning the CFR 
project were posed for further discussion.133 To flesh out matters in more concrete detail, 
in February 2007, the German Presidency circulated a document to the Member State 
delegations identifying four key aspects to be examined in relation to the Council’s 
forthcoming position on the CFR.134  These aspects concerned the purpose, the content, 
the scope, and the binding effect of the CFR, and for each, the Presidency set forth 
certain observations.135 This document was revised in line with comments submitted by 
Member State delegations.136 Before long, the proposed approach set forth in the final 
text of this document was confirmed at the 2794th  Justice and Home Affairs Council 
meeting on 19-20 April 2007, whereby the Council agreed to define its position on these 
four fundamental aspects of the CFR and instructed the Committee on Civil Law Matters 
to examine this matter on the basis of a forthcoming document submitted by the Council 
Presidency.137  
 
To this end, on 7 June 2007, the German Council Presidency circulated a 
discussion paper on the CFR.138 In its preliminary remarks, it proposed that a European 
civil code should not be envisaged as a possible solution, since this was not a “working 
option” for many Member State delegations.139  It also explained that this exercise should 
be carried out in the context of “civil law” but that it should exclude all aspects relating to 
judicial cooperation in civil matters.140  Therefore, any envisaged instrument in this 
context should not be based on the legal basis of Article 65 EC.141  Even though the 
German Presidency framed this as something it wished to “recall”, this seemed to be one 
of the rare instances, at least by way of Council documents available to the public142, that 
Article 65 EC was explicitly cited, much less excluded, by the Council in relation to the 
European contract law project.  
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The core of the German Presidency’s discussion paper concerned the four aspects 
of the CFR:  its purpose, scope, content, and binding effect.143  For each, the Presidency 
set forth three possible options.  Truth be told, the discussion paper somewhat resembled 
the English children’s story, “Goldilocks and the three bears”, in the sense that of the 
three options presented, it was often the case that one was too small, the other too big, 
and the remaining one just right.  First, as regards the purpose of the CFR, the Presidency 
suggested three options. First, the CFR could be rejected altogether as unnecessary at this 
stage, but this would put the Council in the position of rejecting its previous resolutions 
and opposing the guidelines defined by the Hague Programme.144 Second, the CFR could 
be shaped as a “toolbox” only for the European legislator, which would serve the purpose 
of “better lawmaking” in the European Union because it would make it possible to give 
more coherent and systematic shape to Community legislation within its scope and 
achieve greater harmony with the national legal systems.145 Third, the CFR could be 
defined as “a complete set of rules on a certain degree of harmonisation of the law of 
contracts”, which would be used directly by contracting parties in the internal market 
either on an “opt-in” or “opt-out” basis;  however, this would mean that “better 
lawmaking” would become a secondary purpose of the CFR.146 
 
 Second, the scope of the CFR implicated the relationship between general and 
consumer contract law, and again, three options were proposed.  First, the CFR could be 
restricted to consumer contract law, thereby excluding provisions on general contract 
law.147 This was because, for example, the Community did not possess the competence to 
adopt more extensive rules in the area of contract law.148 Second, the CFR could be 
limited to general contract law; consumer contract law would remain a special matter and 
be regulated separately in the comprehensive “horizontal instrument” proposed by the 
Commission.149 Yet, this could be difficult given  the nature of most Community contract 
law measures as governing very specific situations, such as distance selling or doorstep 
selling, and therefore, for every single provision of the CFR, it would have be considered 
whether the principle concerned was in fact a general contract law principle capable of 
generalisation.150  Third, the CFR could cover the whole of contract law, meaning both 
general and consumer contract law151.  This would make the CFR an “effective 
instrument for better lawmaking in the field of civil law”, since it would ensure that 
solutions to problems arising under consumer contract law would not be solved in 
isolation from the fundamental principles of Community law and from the contract law 
regimes of the Member States.152  
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Third, as for the content of the CFR, this issue largely depended on the outcome 
of the other issues.153  For now, on the basis of the three-part structure of the CFR 
comprising principles, definitions, and model rules set forth in the 2004 Communication, 
three options were presented. 154 First, the CFR could be a systematic collection and 
compilation of national legal principles and legislation, taking due account of the 
Member States’ differing legal traditions.155  Second, the CFR could be a systematic 
collection and compilation of the Community contract law developed so far, which would 
contribute to the goal of “better regulation”, but would exclude matters not yet regulated 
by Community law and may not take due account of national legal traditions.156  Third, 
the CFR could be a systematic collection and compilation of both of the above.157 
 
 Finally, as for the CFR’s binding effect, there were again three options floated. 
First, the entire CFR would be non-binding, which could mean that it would take the 
form of a recommendation addressed to the European legislator, which would use the 
CFR merely as “a guide” for adopting new measures or amending existing ones.158 
Second, only some parts of the CFR could have binding effect, e.g., its principles and 
definitions, which would mean that the European legislator would have to take the 
principles and definitions into account when drafting new legislation but the other 
elements, such as the model rules, would be non-binding.159  Third, the entire CFR would 
be binding, which would mean that it would take the form of a legal instrument or an 
interinstitutional agreement, on the one hand, and that the European legislator would not 
be able to derogate from it or that reasons would have to be given in the case of any such 
derogation, on the other.160   
 
 This discussion paper was subject to deliberation by the Committee on Civil Law 
Matters pursuant to the Council Presidency’s invitation.161 Reactions to the discussion 
paper were collected by the Portuguese Council Presidency in a summary document 
distributed to the Member State delegations at the end of November 2007.162  Several 
Member State delegations also issued separate written remarks. Overall, the Member 
States rejected the possibility of a contract law instrument, let alone the whole-scale 
approximation of private law, at the European level163, but at least one Member State 
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stressed the importance of an optional instrument for the internal market.164  There was 
support for a CFR of a more limited nature, as a “tool-box”, rather than a binding 
instrument165, but as regards its content and scope, the Member States’ views were more 
divided.166 Even so, there seemed to be general agreement that the CFR should include 
both consumer and general contract law, and that it should constitute a systematic 
compilation of both national and Community legislation.167  As  brought to light by the 
French delegation’s comments, while there some ambiguity in the relationship between 
the CFR and the revision of the consumer acquis in the wake of the Commission’s 2007 
Progress Report168 the two were wholly separate projects, with different goals, different 
legal bases and different applications of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.169   
 
Several months later, on 28 January 2008, the Slovenian Council Presidency 
disseminated a draft report of the Council’s position on the CFR, which summarised the 
preferences for each of the four aspects of the CFR in line with the foregoing 
discussions.170 This draft report then went through a process of revision as a result of 
further discussions among the Member State delegations.  Amidst such discussions, some 
Member States sought to make the purported lack of Community competence in the field 
of contract law explicit in the text of the report.  In particular, the French delegation 
sought to insert language in the section on the legal effects of the CFR in order to 
acknowledge that the rejection of the options making the CFR a binding instrument was 
based on “the lack of legal basis of any binding instrument in the field of contract 
law”.171 The Portuguese delegation sought to insert similar language in the section on the 
purpose of the CFR, so as to clarify that using the CFR to harmonise the contract laws of 
the Member States was rejected on account of “the absence of legal basis for a binding 
instrument containing substantive provisions in the field of contract law”.172 The 
Portuguese delegation also proposed replacing the references to “civil law” with 
“contract law”.173  This was seconded by the Irish and the UK delegations174, which along 
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with the Czech and Belgian delegations, wanted to ensure the purely voluntary, non-
binding, character of the CFR.175    
 
On 17 March 2008, the Council Presidency distributed a revised version of the 
draft report on the CFR.176  Among the noticeable changes, the references to “civil law” 
were replaced by “contract law” in relation to the content and scope of the CFR.177  The 
section on the legal effect of the CFR was amended to make explicit that the CFR would 
be used on a “voluntary basis” by the European lawmakers.178As for the matter of legal 
basis, no provisions were added regarding the lack of Community competence to adopt a 
contract law instrument as suggested by the French and Portuguese delegations, but a 
new provision was inserted at the very end of the report, which stated that the Council’s 
position did not “in any way prejudge a discussion on the need or the possibility of a 
legal basis for the Common Frame of Reference”.179  Initially, this provision had also 
stated that the issue of legal basis could be considered once a draft was submitted180, but 
this language was subsequently deleted.181  The rest of the changes were maintained as 
the draft report proceeded to its final form.182   
 
The final version of the draft report was presented to the Council at its 2863rd 
Justice and Home Affairs Meeting in Luxembourg on 18 April 2008, at which time the 
Council endorsed the report and summarised the Council’s position on the purpose, 
content, scope and legal effect of the CFR as follows: 
 
(a) Purpose of the Common Frame of Reference: a tool for better lawmaking 
targeted at Community lawmakers 
 
(b) Content of the Common Frame of Reference:  a set of definitions, general 
principles and model rules in the area of contract law to be derived from a 
variety of sources 
 
(c) Scope of the Common Frame of Reference:  general contract law including 
consumer contract law 
 
(d) Legal effect of the Common Frame of Reference:  a set of non-binding 
guidelines to be used by the lawmakers at Community level on a voluntary 
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basis as a common source of inspiration or reference in the lawmaking 
process.183 
 
Noticeably, as for the matter of legal basis, neither the German Presidency’s remarks 
about Article 65 EC nor the French and Portuguese delegation’s proposed amendments 
concerning the lack of Community competence to adopt a contract law instrument made 
it into the final text of the Council’s Report and thus remained in the shadows. The 
Council essentially bypassed this matter, with even its futile attempt to put a definitive 
timeline on consideration of legal basis deleted.  In this way, the constitutionality of the 
CFR and the related activities of the European contract law project remained simmering 
below the surface. 
 
7.2.4.3 The European Parliament’s 2008 Resolution on the CFR 
 Several months later, on 3 September 2008, the European Parliament adopted a 
Resolution on the common frame of reference for European contract law (the 2008 
Resolution).184 The Parliament began by welcoming the presentation of the DCFR and 
noting that the Commission had launched an internal selection process with the aim of 
identifying which parts of the DCFR will be integrated into the CFR.185  Seeing that the 
selection process was a “highly political exercise”, it requested that the Commission 
present a “precise and transparent plan” as to how this selection process will be 
coordinated, with particular regard to the involvement of all Directorate Generates186, and 
that the Parliament should be fully consulted and involved throughout.187   
 
 Importantly, this Commission document would be the basis for the decision to be 
made on the future purpose, content, and legal effects of the CFR, which could range 
from a non-binding legislative tool to the foundation for an optional instrument in 
European contract law.188 Taking heed of the Council’s April 2008 Report, the 
Parliament stated that if the CFR should be a set of non-binding guidelines for lawmakers 
at the European level, then it should be as wide-ranging as possible and there may be no 
need to exclude any content or materials at this stage.189  In such a case, the relevant parts 
of the CFR could be appended to any future legislative proposals or communications 
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made by the Commission touching on contract law, so as to ensure that they were 
considered by the European legislator.190  Yet, if the CFR goes beyond a mere legislative 
tool and results in an optional instrument, then the CFR should be confined to those areas 
where the European legislator has been active (or is likely to be active in the near future) 
or which are closely linked to contract law.191 Moreover, since any optional instrument 
should be based on the DCFR, care should be taken to ensure that the overall coherence 
of the optional instrument is not jeopardised by the selection process.192  While perhaps 
not evident in the text of the Resolution itself, in the Parliamentary debates on this 
Resolution, the need for an optional instrument for the purposes of the internal market 
was expressed.193 
 
7.2.4.4 The Council’s forthcoming Report on further aspects of the CFR 
 In the aftermath of the 2008 Report setting forth the Council’s position on the 
purpose, scope, content, and legal effect of the CFR, the Council is in the process of 
defining its position on further aspects of the CFR in a forthcoming report that is 
expected to be adopted in the near future.194 Events began with a working document 
submitted by the French Council Presidency on 28 July 2008195, which focused on four 
points concerning: (1) the three-part structure of the CFR and the relationship between 
principles, model rules, and definitions196; (2) the scope of the CFR, i.e., whether the 
CFR ought to include not only general and consumer contract law, but also rules on 
specific contracts, such as those concerning the sale of goods and credit197; (3) the order 
of the CFR, in terms of the advisability of presenting the components of the CFR in order 
from the formation of contracts to their performance or non-performance198; and (4) the 
CFR’s “respect for diversity”  in the sense that in addition to the materials produced by 
the researchers and stakeholders involved, account should also be taken of other 
important academic work with particular regard to the analysis of the Member States’ 
laws and legal traditions199.  The Presidency sought written remarks from the Member 
State delegations on the basis of which it planned to draw up draft conclusions which 
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would then be submitted for approval at the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting in 
November 2008.200 
 
On the basis of further discussions and a set of draft conclusions201, the Council 
adopted a set of conclusions at its meeting on 28 November 2008, which set out some 
basic guidelines of the CFR concerning its structure, its scope, its respect for diversity, 
and the involvement of Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission.202  First, 
as for structure, the three parts of the CFR (definitions, principles and models rules) 
should be seen as an “indissoluble whole”, since no part can be fully understood except in 
relation to the others, and in any event, the CFR should be clear, concise and easy to 
understand.203 Second, as for scope, the CFR should envelop the general law of contracts  
 (i.e. rules common to all contracts) and consumer contract law, but not special contracts 
outside the area of consumer contracts, although the possibility of including special 
contracts falling within the Community acquis at a later stage should not be ruled out.204  
Third, respect for diversity meant that all legal traditions of the Member States should be 
fully respected in setting up the CFR, with the result that the draft CFR could present 
alternative solutions on certain subjects.205 Fourth, to ensure optimum use of the CFR, all 
three European institutions – i.e., European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission 
– must be involved in setting it up; if the CFR were adopted by only one of the 
institutions, its significance would be reduced.206 
 
Thereafter, to clarify these guidelines, the Czech Republic Presidency circulated a 
questionnaire on the setting up of the CFR to Member State delegations in January 2009 
and invited them to reply in writing.207 Among other things, the Presidency took note of 
the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights which had been 
submitted in October 2008 and thus invited comments as to the relationship between the 
future CFR and the future Directive.208  It posed several questions concerning the 
composition of the CFR, e.g., which general principles and definitions should be 
included209, and whether it was appropriate to initiate discussion on the legal form of the 
future CFR and if so, to specify which instrument(s) were acceptable.210   
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In light of further comments, on 15 May 2009, the Committee on Civil Law 
issued a Draft Report setting forth the Council’s position on certain aspects of the CFR 
(the Draft Report), which is currently before the Council for approval.211 The Draft 
Report is divided into five points concerning: (1) fundamental principles; (2) definitions; 
(3) model rules; (4) the CFR’s relationship with the proposed Directive on consumer 
rights; and (5) the form of the CFR.  First, it was advisable to lay down now certain 
fundamental principles to appear in the CFR, which should reflect values underpinning 
the CFR and apply to all stages of the contractual relationship, with a list of examples 
provided.212 Second, it was considered too early to determine precisely what definitions 
the CFR should include, but at any rate, they should relate directly to general contract law 
and give particular attention to consumer contract law, since the latter area constituted an 
important part of the acquis.213 Third, it was underlined, among other things, that model 
rules should drafted in broad terms so that they can apply to all contracts and can be 
easily adaptable to all contractual situations, and in fact,  the CFR could under certain 
conditions offer alternative solutions for situations where a substitute model rule may 
prove useful.214  Fourth, while there should be consistency between the  CFR and the 
proposed Directive on consumer rights, the two projects were separate and intended to 
pursue objectives that may not always coincide.215 Finally, as for the form of the CFR, it 
was deemed too early to decide on this issue, but nonetheless, “the form must be such as 
to allow a non-binding instrument to be drawn up comprising a set of guidelines which 
the Community legislators would use at the level of the Council, European Parliament 
and the Commission as a common source of inspiration or reference in the legislative 
process”.216 In other words, a binding instrument seemed to be off the table. 
 
7.3 The review of the consumer acquis and the path towards a Directive on 
consumer rights 
 
To recall, as envisaged by the 2005 Progress Report, the Commission’s plans for 
the review of the consumer acquis were grounded in three components:  first, the 
comparative analysis of the Community acquis, which took the form of the EC Consumer 
Law Compendium; second, the wide-ranging consultation document on this subject, 
which took the form of the Commission’s 2007 Green Paper on the review of the 
consumer acquis; and third, a horizontal consumer contract law instrument, which took 
the form of the proposed Directive on consumer rights.  Each are taken in turn, and as 
seen below, each drove home the relationship between Community consumer contract 
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law and the Community’s dual objectives concerning the internal market and consumer 
protection policy rooted in Article 95 EC. 
 
7.3.1 The EC Consumer Law Compendium 
 As stated in the 2005 Progress Report, the comparative analysis of the Member 
States’ implementation of eight consumer (mostly contract) law directives was an 
important component of the Commission’s plans for the revision of the consumer 
acquis.217   This comparative analysis in fact comprised two parts.  First, there was the 
EC Consumer Law Compendium, which contained extensive comparative study of the 
transposition of those eight directives in the Member States and the problems resulting 
therefrom.218  Second, there was the EU Consumer Law Acquis Database, which linked 
the eight directives under review to a database comprising the national implementing 
measures and related legislation, relevant case law of the Court of Justice and of national 
courts, and bibliographical information on each directive.219 The work on the 
Compendium and the Database was awarded by the Commission to the University of 
Bielefeld and was carried out by international research group coordinated by Professor 
Hans Schulte-Nölke, chairman of the Acquis Group.220  The Compendium was edited by 
him in cooperation with Professor Christian Twigg-Flesner and Professor Martin Ebers, 
also both members of the Acquis Group.221  The first edition of the Compendium was 
submitted to the Commission in December 2006.222 This Compendium then underwent a 
series of revisions.223   At the time of writing, the most recent version of the Compendium 
was completed in February 2008 and took into account the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007, thereby covering all twenty-seven Member States.224   
 
The Compendium is a hefty document, totalling about 845 pages in present form. 
Apart from its introductory sections and three accompanying annexes, the body of the 
Compendium was divided into four main parts.  Part One provided an overview of the 
Member States’ legislative techniques, or “transposition culture”225, in relation to the 
eight directives concerned.  Part Two examined the Member States’ transposition of the 
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eight directives under review.  Part Three highlighted the commonalities among the eight 
directives concerning the notions of “consumer” and “business”, the right of withdrawal, 
and information duties.  Part Four presented the researchers’ final conclusions and 
recommendations to solve some of the problems highlighted in the study.  While matters 
of space preclude a detailed account of each part226, three important findings of this study 
can be singled out, which concern the discussion of potential or existing barriers to the 
functioning of the internal market caused by divergences in national consumer (contract) 
laws, the shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation, and the adoption of one or 
more horizontal instruments for consumer contract law.  Indeed, it was these points that 
reverberated strongly in the Commission’s subsequent activities in this setting. 
 
 First, a notable component of the Compendium was the study of possible barriers 
to trade or distortions of competition resulting from the differences among the national 
measures transposing the directives concerned.227  In Part Two, there was a specific 
section devoted to this point for each of the directives concerned.  The extent of the 
barriers and distortions was not the same for each directive:  for several, there were 
various examples that were likely, in varying degrees, to result in barriers to trade228, 
whereas for others, “obvious” barriers were found.229  Nevertheless, the study confirmed 
the impact of such divergences for the internal market, and in the final recommendations, 
the authors of the Compendium advanced certain proposals in order to overcome the 
barriers to trade caused by divergences in the national laws concerned230, which leads to 
the next two points.  
 
 Second, the authors of the Compendium supported a selective shift from 
minimum to maximum harmonisation for certain areas covered by the directives.231 The 
Member States’ use of minimum harmonisation clauses was envisaged by the 
Commission as an important part of the Compendium232, and indeed, the Compendium 
both began and ended with statements to the effect that the various divergences in the 
national laws were caused by, among other things, the use of minimum harmonisation 
clauses contained in the various directives.233  Accordingly, among the recommendations, 
the authors advocated a selective shift to maximum  harmonisation for those areas in 
which the use of minimum clauses by the Member States “clearly” caused barriers to 
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trade in the internal market without substantially strengthening consumer protection.234  It 
was foreseen, however, that this shift would be “controversial” for Member States in 
cases where it would force them to reduce the established level of consumer protection.235  
This was somewhat of an understatement.  As documented in the Compendium itself, for 
all but one of the directives, most, if not all, Member States had made extensive use of 
the minimum harmonisation clause in the directives concerned.236 The sole exception was 
the Price Indication Directive, whereby the Member States had made “practically no use” 
of such a clause.237 Thus, as a possible solution, the authors contemplated the 
introduction of a special “safeguard procedure” allowing the Member States to adopt 
urgent, short-term measures under certain circumstances, with the special procedure set 
down in Article 95 EC serving merely as a model, since it did not include consumer 
protection within its scope.238   
 
 Third, one of the most noteworthy outcomes of the Compendium was the support 
for the adoption of one or more horizontal instruments of consumer contract law.  One of 
its final recommendations was a proposal for restructuring the consumer acquis through 
the adoption of a horizontal measure comprising a set of uniform definitions and key 
general rules applicable to all business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts generally 
comprising information duties, withdrawal rights, and unfair terms, which were mainly 
found in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the Doorstep Selling Directive and the 
Distance Selling Directive.239 Beyond that, consideration was given to the possibility of 
adopting a Community measure dealing with cross-border consumer transactions across 
the board.240 This would “give a boost” to consumers’ use of the internal market 
particularly once the CFR project had been finalised, though a number of questions 
would have to be addressed if this option was pursued, such as its mandatory character, 
the possibility for consumers to opt-out, and the interplay with  national consumer law.241  
On the whole, these three points emanating from the Compendium provided an important 
platform for the Commission’s 2007 Green Paper on the review of the consumer acquis. 
 
7.3.2 The 2007 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis 
 On 8 February 2007, the Commission published the Green Paper on the Review 
of the Consumer Acquis (the 2007 Green Paper).242  As envisaged by the 2005 Progress 
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Report, the 2007 Green Paper summarised the Commission’s  initial findings on the 
review of the consumer acquis and sought contributions from the European institutions, 
the Member States, and the various stakeholders on the possible policy options for this 
review.243  Quite memorably, the Commission summed up the idea behind the 2007 
Green Paper by stating that at the end of this exercise, “it should, ideally, be possible to 
say to EU consumers ‘wherever you are in the EU or wherever you buy from it makes no 
difference: your essential rights are the same’.”244 This may explain why the Green 
Paper’s proposal for a horizontal instrument in consumer contract law started to be called 
a “consumer rights directive” even before the Commission’s formal proposal for such.245   
 
The Commission underlined that the overarching aim of this review was “to 
achieve a real consumer internal market striking the right balance between a high level of 
consumer protection and the competitiveness of enterprises, while ensuring the strict 
respect of the principle of subsidiarity”.246  That said, the Green Paper was devoid of any 
substantive discussion of the principle of subsidiarity, not to mention other principles 
guiding the exercise of the Community’s competence and possible legal bases in relation 
to the envisaged initiatives. The core of the 2007 Green Paper comprised three aspects:  
(1) the problems plaguing the consumer acquis247; (2) the general policy options to be 
taken to resolve these problems248; and (3) issues for further consultation with the various 
stakeholders.249  First, the Commission took up the main problems with the consumer 
acquis.  In particular, it pointed to the fragmentation caused by minimum harmonisation 
clauses and inconsistencies and gaps in the directives themselves.250 This fragmentation 
triggered extra compliance costs for businesses, such as having to acquire the relevant 
legal advice, and was one of the reasons why businesses purportedly chose not to conduct 
cross-border transactions in the internal market.251  The Commission cited further 
problems in the internal market stemming from the lack of consumer confidence.252 
Specifically, it reasoned that on account of differing rules resulting from the minimum 
harmonisation clauses in the directives, consumers were reluctant to engage in cross-
border transactions because they could not be sure that the level of consumer protection 
in their home Member State applied cross-border.253   
 
Second, the Commission focused on the general policy options for future work. 
This implicated the general legislative approach to be taken, the scope of a horizontal 
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instrument if it was chosen, and the degree of harmonisation involved, the latter of which 
dovetailed with the problems relating to minimum harmonisation discussed above.  As 
far as the general legislative approach as concerned, the Commission presented three 
options:  first, a vertical approach, whereby the directives would be amended 
separately254; second, a horizontal approach, now termed the “mixed approach” so as to 
underscore that it involved the combination of a horizontal instrument with the necessary 
vertical measures255; and third, no legislative action, though this would mean that the 
existing fragmentation would remain, or even increase256, which essentially took it out of 
the running.  Despite the consultative nature of the Green Paper, it was not difficult to 
recognise which approach the Commission preferred. It found that there were a number 
of disadvantages to the vertical approach, e.g., it would take longer; it would not be able 
to achieving the “simplifying effect” of the horizontal approach; and it gave rise to a 
fragmented regulatory environment.257 In contrast, the adoption of a horizontal 
instrument consisting of two parts – a general part covering a number of issues which 
would be applicable to all consumer contracts258 and a specific part regulating the sales 
contract – would greatly simplify the acquis and reduce its volume by repealing the 
existing directives, either in full or in part.259  
 
If the horizontal approach was taken, the Commission set forth three possible 
options as regards the scope of the horizontal instrument, which again conveyed the 
Commission’s preferences.260  First, the horizontal instrument could apply to domestic 
and cross-border transactions, which would simplify the regulatory environment 
considerably for both consumers and businesses.261  Second, such an instrument could 
apply only to cross-border transactions, but this would require delineating the notion of 
cross-border contract and invariably increase legal fragmentation, since consumers and 
businesses would be subject to different sets of rules depending on whether the 
transaction was deemed cross-border or domestic.262 Third, such an instrument could 
apply only to distance shopping transactions, whether cross-border or domestic, but this 
would also result in legal fragmentation on account of the fact that different conditions 
would apply to distance, as opposed to face-to-face, transactions.263   
 
Whatever approach was ultimately chosen, the last policy option surveyed by the 
Commission concerned the degree of harmonisation, which was essentially the “hot 
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the existing directives and regulated in the horizontal instrument together with provisions of the Unfair 
Terms Directive:  id., point 4.2. 
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 Id., point 4.4. 
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 Id., point 4.4, first para. 
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 Id., point 4.4, second para. (further stating that this option would reduce the “better regulation value” of 
the horizontal instrument). 
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 Id., point 4.4, third para. (further stating that this option, too, would reduce the “better regulation value” 
of the horizontal instrument). 
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button” issue of the Green Paper. The Commission started off by explaining that the 
directives concerned were all based on minimum harmonisation, which had the effect of 
deterring both consumers and businesses from engaging in cross-border transactions.264 
On that basis, the Commission floated three options to remedy this. The first was full (or 
maximum) harmonisation combined with the use of mutual recognition on a case-by-case 
basis for certain aspects where it would be difficult to achieve full harmonisation.265  The 
second was minimum harmonisation in conjunction with a mutual recognition clause, 
with the result that a Member State would retain the possibility of imposing stricter 
consumer protection rules in its national law but it would be generally precluded from 
imposing such rules on businesses established in other Member States.266 The third was 
minimum harmonisation and a country of origin approach, which would allow a Member 
State to retain the possibility of imposing stricter consumer protection rules in its national 
law but undertakings established in other Member States would only have to comply with 
rules applicable in their home country.267 As regards the latter two options, the 
Commission stressed their disadvantages, e.g., they would not remedy regulatory 
fragmentation and its negative effects on consumers’ confidence in the internal market 
and they would not provide for a solution ensuring a high common level of consumer 
protection as required by the Treaty.268 As a result, this implicitly left the first option, that 
of full (or maximum) harmonisation with limited mutual recognition, remaining.   
 
Finally, more than half of the Green Paper was devoted to the list of specific 
questions, numbering thirty in all, put to the various stakeholders.  Apart from the three 
questions concerning general policy issues discussed above and a catch-all question for 
additional remarks269, the twenty-six questions remaining were grouped into two 
categories:  those dealing with horizontal issues common to the whole of the acquis or to 
more than one directive; and those dealing specifically with the sales contract.270  Many 
of the questions was premised on the assumption that a horizontal instrument would be 
adopted.271 Moreover, several questions were remarkably extensive, extending beyond 
the scope of the directives concerned.  For example, in the “horizontal issues” category, 
there were questions as to whether the horizontal instrument should include an 
overarching obligation on professionals to act in accordance with the principles of good 
faith and fair dealing that exceeded what was presently found in the Unfair Terms 
Directive272. Likewise, as for specific rules on sales contracts, several questions pertained 
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 Id., point 4.5, second and third paras. 
265
 Id., point 4.5, fourth, sixth paras. 
266
 Id., point 4.5, seventh para.   
267
 Id., point 4.5, eighth para.  As regards the choice of origin approach as opposed to mutual recognition, 
see Chapter 2, § 2.2.3, at 16 n.62. 
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 2007 Green Paper, supra note 242, point 4.5, ninth and tenth paras (incidentally, not specifying which 
provision of the Treaty, i.e. Article 153(1) EC and/or Article 95(3) EC, it was referring to). 
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 Id., Annex, points 1-3, 6. 
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427 (2008). 
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to matters lying at the heart of black-letter contract law rules, in this case for consumer 
contracts, such as how delivery should be defined273, how the passing of the risk should 
be regulated274, and who should bear the burden of proof that defects existed at the time 
of delivery.275 In short, the Green Paper was subtly aimed at the prospect a far-reaching 
horizontal instrument regulating consumer contract transactions and contained quite 
pointed questions asking the participating stakeholders to decide major, and often 
controversial, points of consumer contract law, which begged questions concerning the 
relationship between the review of the consumer acquis and other activities taking place 
within the European contract law project.  
 
7.3.2.1 Responses to the 2007 Green Paper  
 The 2007 Green Paper was addressed to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), but only the latter two 
replied.  The Council has not (as of yet) registered a formal response, which was 
somewhat surprising considering that the Commission sent a special note ahead of time 
to the Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry and Research) Council meeting on 4-5 
December 2006 to signal the importance of the forthcoming 2007 Green Paper.276 The 
Green Paper also prompted an extensive collection of responses from various 
stakeholders from across the EU.   Each are briefly evaluated in turn. 
 
7.3.2.2 The EESC’s 2007 Opinion 
 On the whole, the EESC’s Opinion on the 2007 Green Paper277 was finely 
balanced. On the one hand, the EESC approved of the Commission’s plans to provide a 
common framework for consumer rights in the European Union, so as to eliminate 
barriers to the internal market while maintaining a high level of consumer protection, 
albeit requesting the Commission to extend its review to a broader array of consumer 
directives.278  On the other hand, it acknowledged the difficulties associated with the 
Commission’s approach, foreseeing that the shift from minimum to maximum 
harmonisation – in its view, the “pivotal issue” in the Green Paper – would encounter 
resistance in the Member States, but for cases where the completion of the internal 
market was the primary concern, there was reason to have recourse to maximum 
harmonisation.279 
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 Id., point 5.3 (question I1). 
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 Council Secretariat, Competitiveness Council (Internal Market, Industry and Research) Meeting on 4-5 
Dec. 2006 – Review of the Consumer Acquis – Information from the Commission, DOC 16077/06 
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 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the “Green Paper on the Review of the 
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7.3.2.3 The European Parliament’s 2007 Resolution 
 A few months later, on 6 September 2007, the European Parliament adopted a 
Resolution on the 2007 Green Paper.280  The Parliament welcomed the Green Paper as 
crucial for facilitating cross-border trade in the internal market and strengthening 
consumer confidence.281  In particular, it cited several surveys indicating that retailers 
considered that cross-border sales would increase if the laws concerning consumer 
transactions were the same throughout the European Union and that the majority of 
consumers were wary of engaging in cross-border, as opposed to domestic, 
transactions.282 It also stressed that minimum harmonisation did not achieve the aim of 
harmonisation and that the past twenty years of consumer law had not created a truly 
integrated internal market.283  It was therefore determined to complete the internal market 
by removing “the remaining restrictions on competition in contract and commercial law” 
and enhancing legal certainty and European citizens’ confidence in the market.284   
 
As for the key issues concerning the general approach and degree of 
harmonisation, the Parliament’s opinion generally coincided with the Commission’s 
veiled preferences.  It supported the “mixed approach”, involving a horizontal instrument 
containing cross-cutting issues common to all the directives applicable to all consumer 
contracts, both domestic and cross-border transactions, based on maximum 
harmonisation.285 Yet, on a more general note, the Resolution confronted the relationship 
between the Green Paper and the European contract law project, urging that the review of 
the consumer acquis should be coherently integrated with the work on contract law in 
general within the context of the CFR, though achieving this coherence should not 
impede or delay the current process for reviewing the consumer acquis.286 It also called 
attention to the overlap between several of the questions raised in the 2007 Green Paper 
and the ongoing work on the CFR287, thereby voicing its disapproval for including 
matters outside the ambit of consumer contract law. For example, the Parliament opposed 
both the inclusion of a general clause on good faith and fair dealing and the introduction 
of general remedies in the horizontal instrument.288 Initially, there had been explicit 
language in the text of the resolution explaining that such concepts instead fell within the 
broader context of European contract law.289 While such language was later deleted, there 
still remained recognition that these matters related to general contract law and went 
beyond the confines of consumer contract law.290  
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7.3.2.4 Stakeholder Responses to the 2007 Green Paper 
The Commission received contributions from various stakeholders, which 
comprised the Member State Governments, national public authorities (at the national, 
regional or local level), businesses, consumer organisations, legal practitioners, 
academics, and other interested parties.291 In an effort to collate these responses, an 
independent analytical report was issued by the Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium, 
an external group of consulting companies, on behalf of the Commission on 6 November 
2007, which  set forth a detailed analysis of the 307 stakeholder responses received.292 
Taking this analytical report into account293, the Commission then published its own Staff 
Working Paper294, which identified, “as objectively as possible”, the main trends, 
viewpoints, and concerns of the various stakeholders in response to the questions posed 
by the Green Paper.295    
 
While space precludes detailed inquiry into the responses for each question posed 
by the Green Paper, there seemed to be general consensus on the key issues concerning 
the legislative approach, the scope of the horizontal instrument, and degree of 
harmonisation involved, although certain sensitivities concerning the constitutionality of 
the horizontal instrument and its relationship to the CFR were evident.  As documented 
by the Commission, the “great majority” of stakeholders favoured the adoption of a 
horizontal legislative instrument, flanked by the necessary vertical measures, applicable 
to both domestic and cross-border transactions.296  That said, constitutional concerns 
relating to the legal basis of the horizontal instrument and compliance with the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality were prevalent.297 In fact, a common issue among all 
the stakeholder groups was the need for more evidence to underpin the Commission’s 
proposals.298  Still, there was a “strong message” in favour of further Community action, 
                                                                                                                                                 
postponing the review to take into account the far-from-precise timetable for drawing up European contract 
law. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that certain concepts do relate to general contract law (good 
faith, remedies, etc.).”) (emphasis added). 
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 The Commission’s website used to provide the individual responses of the various stakeholders; 
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Consumer Acquis submitted by the Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium”, dated 6 Nov. 2007 
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297
 See Analytical Report, supra note 292, point 5.2.1, at 41, 42, 44. 
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as opposed to maintaining the status quo.299  Likewise, as for the degree of 
harmonisation, the Commission reported that a majority of the stakeholders favoured a 
horizontal instrument based on maximum (or full targeted) harmonisation, as opposed to 
minimum harmonisation.300  That said, issues concerning a proper legal basis and 
compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were used as 
arguments opposing the shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation.301 
 
Finally, various stakeholders highlighted the ambiguous relationship between the 
review of the consumer acquis and the activities taking place within the European 
contract law project.  In fact, a specific issue common to all the stakeholder groups 
related to the need for clarification about the interplay between the review of the 
consumer acquis and the CFR.302  This was particularly apparent in relation to certain 
questions that touched upon more general matters of contract law, which echoed the 
Parliament’s Resolution above.  For example, as far as introducing a general concept of 
good faith and fair dealing was concerned, scholars noted that comprehensive answers to 
this question could only be formulated on the basis of the CFR.303 Similarly, as for the 
inclusion of a set of general contract remedies in the horizontal instrument, national 
authorities and businesses considered this subject to be reserved to the Member States, 
whereas at least some academics pointed out that it was at least preferable to deal with it 
in the more comprehensive framework of the CFR.304  Such issues thereby enlivened 
issues regarding not only the relationship between consumer and general contract law 
already plaguing the CFR, but also the scope of the Community’s competence in this 
setting. 
 
7.3.3 The proposal for the Directive on Consumer Rights 
 In the aftermath of the Commission’s 2007 Green Paper, the Commission 
announced its forthcoming plans to take a legislative initiative.305  On 8 October 2008, 
the Commission formally submitted its proposal for a Directive on consumer rights (the 
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proposal or proposed Directive).306  It is currently in its first reading by the European 
Parliament and the Council307. The proposed Directive merges four of the eight directives 
under review – i.e., the Doorstep Directive, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the 
Distance Selling Directive, and the Sale of Consumer Goods Directive – into a single 
horizontal instrument that aims to regulate their common aspects in a systematic fashion, 
simplify and update the existing rules, and eliminate inconsistencies and gaps.308  It is 
divided into six Chapters, which establish a set of common rules according to the types of 
contracts and contractual situations concerned.309 The proposal cites Article 95 EC as the 
legal basis.  Not to be confused, Article 153 EC appears as part of the recitals of the 
proposal to underscore the contribution to the attainment of a high level of consumer 
protection by measures adopted under Article 95 EC.310 
 
Generally speaking, there is a growing volume of literature on this proposal, 
which provides detailed analysis of its provisions.311 For the purposes of this discussion, 
three points stand out because they harken back to the constitutional themes underlying 
the “hard core” of Community contract law.312 First, as regards the matter of competence, 
the proposed Directive is based on the Community’s internal market competence of 
Article 95 EC and espouses the dual aim to contribute to the proper functioning of the 
internal market and to achieve a high common level of consumer protection by fully 
harmonising the key aspects of consumer contract law relevant to the internal market.313  
Unlike previous directives, there is specific justification made of its application to both 
cross-border and purely domestic transactions on the grounds that this avoids a “dual 
regime” that would result in further fragmentation and distortions of competition between 
businesses trading only domestically and those trading both domestically and cross-
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border.314  The proposed Directive states that the laws of the Member States on consumer 
contracts showed marked differences that “can generate appreciable distortions of 
competition and obstacles to the smooth functioning of the internal market” on account of 
the use of minimum harmonisation clauses allowing the Member States to adopt more 
stringent consumer protection standards and the inconsistencies and gaps in the directives 
concerned.315 These disparities “create significant internal market barriers affecting 
businesses and consumers” because they increase compliance costs to businesses wishing 
to engage in cross-border transactions.316 This also undermines consumer confidence in 
the internal market.317   As such, the proposed Directive contains express reference to the 
so-called consumer confidence rationale, though as with previous measures, such a 
rationale stands alongside, not in place, of the arguments concerning existing and 
potential barriers to trade and appreciable distortions of competition.  
 
Interwoven with the justification for the use of Article 95 EC is the proposed shift 
from minimum to maximum (or so-called “full targeted”318) harmonisation for the areas 
covered by the Directive.319 In the Explanatory Memorandum, there is a specific section 
devoted to the Commission’s consultation with interested parties and the impact 
assessment conducted in order to highlight the recourse to maximum harmonisation in 
light of the objectives to be attained by the Directive.320 The shift from minimum to 
maximum harmonisation has been a major source of criticism of the proposed  Directive 
in academic circles321. This casts an eye to the potential viability of Article 153 EC so as 
to preserve the Member States’ recourse to minimum  harmonisation under the Treaty.  
 
 Furthermore, the shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation dovetailed with 
issues concerning the coverage of the Directive. The proposal states that it regulates 
“only the key aspects” of consumer contract law and does not interfere with more general 
contract law concepts such as the capacity to contract or the award of damages.322 This 
squarely implicates the interplay between the common rules established by the proposed 
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Directive and the contract law regimes of the Member States.  To paraphrase the remarks 
of Commissioner Meglena Kuneva at a recent conference, this proposed Directive is 
viewed as a well-conceived island in the sea of national consumer contract law.323  As a 
result, the proposed Directive perpetuates issues concerning the “fit” of the special set of 
Community consumer contract law rules within the coherent framework of the national 
contract laws, which is heightened by the shift to maximum harmonisation and by the 
criticism of the Commission’s failure to make much use of the DCFR in its formulation.  
 
Finally, by its very name, the proposed Directive on consumer rights concerns 
consumer contract law, meaning business to consumer (B2C) transactions and not 
business to business (B2B) transactions.  As such, it brings back the familiar interplay 
between consumer contract law and general contract law in the context of the debate 
about European contract law.  In any event, it did not speak the problems emanating from 
divergences in general contract law rules that stimulate further attention on the prospect 
of a comprehensive contract law instrument for B2B transactions in the internal market.  
In all, the proposed Directive on consumer rights constitutes a solution in the debate 
about European contract law in its own right, at the same time that it enlivens, rather than 
silences, questions concerning the Community’s competence in European contract law. 
By virtue of its justification on internal market grounds and its emphasis on the consumer 
confidence rationale, it provokes questions concerning the scope of Article 95 EC in 
relation to the adoption of a horizontal consumer contract law instrument as well as the 
adoption of its commercial contract law counterpart. By virtue of its shift to maximum 
harmonisation, it raises the potential recourse to Article 153 EC in place of Article 95 EC 
and hence the relationship between these two provisions.   
 
7.4 The forthcoming Stockholm Programme and prospects for an optional 
instrument and the promotion of standard contract terms 
 
While immediate focus has been placed on the CFR and the review of the 
consumer acquis, the other proposed solutions emanating from the Commission’s 
Communications on European contract law, namely, the optional instrument and the 
promotion of standard contract terms, have not been completely foregone. Recently, these 
solutions were emphasised as part of institutional developments laying the groundwork 
for the Stockholm Programme, which is envisaged to succeed the Hague Programme as 
the next multiannual programme on the AFSJ for the years 2009-2013.  Certainly, this is 
not to exclude the fact that Presidency Conclusions of European Council meetings 
continue to be peppered with references to the CFR and its linkage to the improvement of 
the acquis.324  Yet, the Commission’s documents disseminated in the follow-up of the 
Hague Programme suggest that the use of one or more optional instruments and the 
promotion of standard contract terms may become viable in the future path of European 
contract law. 
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On 10 June 2009, as part of its final assessment of the Hague Programme325, the 
Commission issued a Communication entitled “An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
serving the citizen”326.  This Communication set forth the list of the priorities for the 
forthcoming Stockholm programme.327  One of these priorities was “Making life easier – 
a Europe of justice”, which meant that as far as “contracts and commerce are concerned, 
this should give those involved in economic life the tools they need to take full advantage 
of the opportunities offered by the single market”.328 The Commission explained this 
point as follows: 
 
Contractual relations must be put on a more secure footing, as differences 
between Member States’ legislation in the contract law field can prevent traders 
from reaping the full benefits of the single market. Standard contracts between 
individuals or small businesses should be drawn up, building on the groundwork 
already carried out. Use of these contracts would be voluntary, but they would 
be translated into the different languages and serve as a model for the business 
 world. As an additional step, consideration could be given to an optional,  
 specifically European system of rules open to companies (a ‘twenty-eighth’  
 system). This system would be similar to those devised for other areas of the 
 internal market, e.g., the European company, the European economic interest 
 grouping or the Community trademark, and would encourage the development 
 of intra-Community trade and establish a single, directly applicable legal 
 framework.329  
 
This Communication was welcomed by the European Parliament, which called on the 
Commission to boost its work on the CFR and that the eventual adoption of a political 
CFR “should result in an optional and directly applicable instrument enabling parties to a 
contract, inter alia, companies and consumers, freely to choose European contract law as 
the law governing their transaction”.330   
 
 Regrettably, however, the Commission’s references to the optional instrument and 
the promotion of standard contract terms in European contract law did not make it into 
the draft Stockholm Programme entitled, “An open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizen”, issued by the Swedish Council Presidency on 2 December 
2009.331  Within the section of the Programme concerning the “benefits for citizens of a 
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Programme, B7-0155/2009, dated 25 Nov. 2009, point 99.  
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European judicial area”332, there is a specific heading entitled “Supporting economic 
activity”.333  There, it is envisaged that, “[t]he European judicial area should serve to 
support economic activity in the single market.”334 Among the measures to be taken, the 
European Council referred to the CFR as follows:   
 
 The European Council reaffirms that the common frame of reference  
 for European contract law should be a non-binding set of fundamental  
principles, definitions and model rules to be used by the lawmakers at  
Union level to ensure greater coherence and quality in the lawmaking  
process. The Commission is invited to submit a proposal on a common  
frame of reference.335 
 
As with the Hague Programme, the Stockholm Programme seems to depict the CFR as a 
“better lawmaking” tool in the sense of improving the coherence and the quality of 
Community legislation specifically in the field of contract law.  Yet, this time, the 
European Council’s framing of the CFR as part of “supporting economic activity” drew 
explicit reference to the place of the European contract law project as part of the 
Community’s internal market objectives, whilst leaving in place certain ambiguities as 
regards its role for the activities taking place within the field of judicial cooperation in 
civil matters and the AFSJ generally. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
In view of the foregoing discussion, the debate about European contract law, very 
much like a meandering stream, continues to ebb and flow through the Community’s 
(now Union’s) activities traversing the internal market, consumer protection, and the 
AFSJ. While the Commission’s 2005 and 2007 Progress Reports and its plans for the 
revision of the consumer acquis may have narrowed the focus on the CFR and the 
proposed Directive on consumer rights for now, institutional documents indicate that one 
or more optional instruments in contract law and the promotion of standard contract 
terms may be viable in the long-term.  In short, “all bets are off” as to the endpoint of 
European contract law and the prospect of a comprehensive contract law instrument, 
optional or otherwise, in the European Union.  Yet, at least for now, these documents 
attest to the ongoing themes concerning the evolution, the scope, and the constitutionality 
of European contract law. 
 
 First, the evolution of the debate about European contract law continues to be 
orchestrated within the EU institutional framework.  Despite the different positions taken, 
the ongoing activities taking place within the European contract law project, such as the 
CFR or the proposed Directive on consumer rights, have been directed from the European 
level within which the participation of various actors, such as scholars, national 
                                                                                                                                                 
Programme). At the time of writing, the final text has not yet been adopted; the European Council is 
expected to do so sometime in Dec. 2009. 
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authorities, and other stakeholders take part. As such, the need for Community action and 
the failure of the Member States to “go it alone” has been firm. 
 
 Second, the scope of the European contract law project remains ambiguous. As 
far as the interplay between contract law and other fields of private law are concerned, 
this is aptly illustrated by the ongoing discussion of the content of the final CFR in light 
of the DCFR’s coverage of European private law.  Likewise, continuing developments 
concerning the proposed Directive on consumer rights  and the possibility of an optional 
instrument provoke further questions concerning Community action in relation to general 
contract law vis-à-vis special fields such as consumer contract law.  In this way, while 
European contract law remains the focus, questions concerning its breadth and its depth 
remain. 
 
Finally, the constitutional dimensions of European contract law continue to 
remain on the sidelines of the ongoing activities taking place at the European level, 
particularly as regards the preparations of the CFR and the prospect of one or more 
optional instruments in contract law.  The Commission’s 2005 and 2007 Progress Reports 
failed to confront constitutionality head-on, and the occasions on which the other 
European institutions have expressly alluded to this subject, e.g., the Parliament’s 
reference to “Articles 95 and/or 153 EC” for the adoption of one or more binding 
instruments in contract law in the context of its first 2006 Resolution or the exclusion of 
Article 65 EC, not to mention the rejection of the Community’s competence altogether, 
underlying the Council’s 2008 Report on the CFR, add further impetus for the need for 
thorough constitutional assessment.  Nevertheless, whether implicitly or explicitly, the 
progressive array of institutional documents discussed throughout this chapter illustrate 
the extent to which issues concerning the Community’s competence lay beneath the 
scenes and the Community’s objectives related to the internal market, consumer 
protection, and judicial cooperation in civil matters within the AFSJ became further 
ingrained in the debate about European contract law.  This sets the stage for delving into 
the European Union’s competence in these three policy fields in Part Three. 
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8 
 
The Constitutional Parameters of European Contract Law 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As illustrated in Part Two,  the discussion of the European Union’s competence in  
contract law (and other fields of private law) has steadily made its way, both explicitly 
and implicitly, into the institutional record of the debate on European contract law.  Yet, 
for the most part, this has occurred on an ad hoc basis, with no coherent approach or 
detailed engagement with this topic so far at the European level.  It is therefore the 
objective of this chapter to examine why this is so and to provide a clear understanding of 
the constitutional parameters of European contract law in order to lay the groundwork for 
the forthcoming chapters.  This will be done in three parts.  First, attention is placed on 
several reasons commonly put forward to explain why the constitutionality of European 
contract law has remained neglected in the ongoing developments taking place at the 
European level.  Second, the overarching Treaty framework establishing the 
constitutional parameters for European contract law is presented, so as to underline 
certain institutional developments concerning the European Convention, the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty. Third, the constitutional parameters 
governing the existence and the exercise of the European Union’s competence in 
European contract are examined, with primary focus placed on illuminating the roles 
played by the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality, and sincere 
cooperation in the debate about European contract law and the relationship between 
them.   
 
The ordering of these three parts is purposeful. As will be seen, some of the 
reasons to justify the Commission’s reticence to delve into the constitutional dimensions 
of European contract law discussed in the first part implicate the prospect of Treaty 
amendment and the complexities underlying the European Union’s competence in this 
setting. This begs inquiry into the chronological events paving the way for the Lisbon 
Treaty, as detailed in the second part.  This also casts an eye to the numerous difficulties 
underlying the constitutional assessment of European contract law highlighted in the third 
part.  Indeed, while in principle, the meanings of the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, 
proportionality, and sincere cooperation may be clear cut, in practice these principles do 
not operate in a single, standardised way and are inextricably intertwined, which may to 
some extent lead to misperceptions regarding their application in the debate about 
European contract law.  Consequently, this chapter seeks to place the constitutional 
assessment of European contract law on firm ground by clarifying the meanings of and 
the linkages between these four principles and taking certain “comparative leaps” to the 
American constitutional framework where relevant, so as to readjust the expectations 
placed on these principles and to reveal their varied operation in the debate about 
European contract law. 
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8.2 Reasons for the neglect of constitutionality at the European level 
Through the course of the debate about European contract law, various reasons 
can be found to explain why constitutionality has generally remained on the sidelines of 
the debate about European contract law at the European level.  So far, such reasons 
largely emanate from four main arguments, which can be organised under the following 
headings:  first, the “political will” argument; second, the “too early” argument; third, the 
“no need” (or “no competence”) argument; and finally, three specific arguments linked to 
the Commission’s Communications on European contract law pertaining to the 
consultative nature of the Communications, the prospect of Treaty amendment, and the 
complexity of the subject-matter. Each are evaluated in turn. 
 
First, the “political will” argument generally posits that if there is the requisite 
political will on the part of the Member States for Union action in contract law (or other 
fields of private law for that matter), then a legal basis will be found.1  For the most part, 
this argument was voiced as the debate about European private law was starting up, but 
recently, it has been used in conjunction with assumptions made about constitutionality in 
the sense that the political will of the Member States can play an important role to make 
up for the purported lack of Union competence in this setting.2  Certainly, it is 
undoubtedly correct that the political will of the Member States is an important 
component in the debate, and that the Member States’ advocacy of a particular course of 
action would have a great impact in propelling the momentum of particular initiatives 
envisaged for European contract law forward.3  Yet, this argument has the potential to 
downgrade the importance of a solid constitutional grounding for the eventual success of 
whatever course of action is undertaken.4  In fact, the “political will” argument seems to 
assume that the political will of the Member States is something divorced from 
constitutionality when instead the two are directly related, i.e., the political will of the 
Member States can be changed in view of discussions concerning the constitutionality of 
Community action.  Thus, the “political will” argument can to some extent provide 
further momentum for the constitutional assessment of European contract law, instead of 
detracting from it. 
 
Second, the “too early” argument has been used to mean that only when 
definitive proposal is on the table can the constitutional inquiry then be undertaken, since 
doing so before such a time would be premature. This arose in certain past publications 
concerning a European civil code5, but may have further salience in the context of more 
recent activities, such as the Common Frame of Reference (the CFR) or the prospect of 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., C. Hertel, “Preventive Consumer Protection in an Optional Instrument – A Practitioner’s View”, 
4 ERA-Forum 70, 73 (2003). 
2
 See, e.g., W.H. van Boom, “European Tort Law: An Integrated or Comparmentalized Approach?”,  in 
European Private Law Beyond the Common Frame of Reference: Essays in Honour of Reinhard 
Zimmermann 131, 135 n.11 (A. Vaquer ed., Europa, 2008). 
3
 See, e.g., R.C. van Caenegem, European Law in the Past and the Future: Unity and Diversity over Two 
Millennia 36-37 (2002). 
4
 See J. Basedow, “Codification of Private Law in the European Union: the making of a Hybrid”, 9 
European Review of Private Law 35, 43 (2001). 
5
 See, e.g., C. von Bar, “From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private Law”, 8 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 379, 387-388 (2002). 
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one or more optional instruments.  For the CFR project, the Commission so far seems to 
have postponed delving into constitutional questions until after the process of going from 
the academic or draft version of the CFR (the DCFR) to the final or political version of 
the CFR has been completed.   Similarly, given the fact that the CFR is envisaged to lay 
the basis for one or more optional instruments in contract law, this can explain why the 
legal basis of the optional instrument was not explored in the Commission’s 2004 
Communication. This argument has merit, particularly given the fact that the debate 
about European contract law is still ongoing.  Yet, again, this does not mean that 
constitutionality cannot be aired along the way given its impact on shaping the course of 
the activities envisaged.   
 
Third, the “no need” argument is a more recent argument largely connected to the 
CFR project.  It has been considered by some that if the CFR remains a “soft”, non-
binding instrument, especially one that would be used by the European institutions, then 
there may be less impetus to delve into issues of constitutionality.6  Conversely, scholars 
have surmised that the Commission’s plans for a non-binding CFR were prompted in part 
by the alleged lack of Union competence in the field.7 These arguments threaten to 
misdirect or shortchange the activities of European contract law project. They may also 
discount the distinction between the CFR as a non-binding instrument for lawmaking, on 
the one hand, and the CFR as the basis for an optional instrument in contract law, on the 
other, which merit different constitutional inquiries.8 
 
Finally,  as regards the Commission’s Communications on European contract law, 
there have been specific reasons advanced by scholars9  and at least one Commission 
official involved with the European contract law project (albeit in his private capacity)10 
to explain the Commission’s reticence to confront the constitutional dimensions of 
European contract law. These reasons generally concern the consultative nature of the 
Communications, the complexity of the issues involved, and the prospect of Treaty 
revision. First, as regards the consultative nature of Communications, the idea seems to 
be that since it was the Commission’s intention is to receive feedback from the European 
institutions and other interested parties on the issues raised in the Communications, the 
Commission held back its own preferences.11  On the one hand, with regard to the 2001 
Communication and even the 2003 Action Plan, this argument has great weight, given the 
fact that much was open-ended and fluid at the time.  On the other hand, with the 
Commission’s 2004 Communication and its 2005 and 2007 Progress Reports whereby 
                                                 
6
 See D. Wallis, “Expectations for the Final Common Frame of Reference”, 9 ERA-Forum S7, S10 (2008). 
7
 See, e.g., B. Fauvarque-Cosson, “The Contribution of European Jurists in the Field of Contract Law”, in 
Liber Amicorum Guido Alpa – Private Law Beyond the National Systems 363, 372 (M. Andenas et al. eds, 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2007); W. van Gerven, “Bringing (Private) Laws 
Closer at the European Level”, in The Institutional Framework of European Private Law 37, 75 ( (F. 
Cafaggi ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2006). 
8
 See further Chapter 12, § 12.4.4. 
9
 See, e.g., S. Weatherill, “Constitutional Issues–How Much is Best Left Unsaid?”, in The Harmonisation 
of European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice 89, 97-
103 (S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill eds, Hart, 2006). 
10
 See, e.g., D. Staudenmayer, “The Commission Action Plan on European Contract Law”, 11 European 
Review of Private Law 113, 116-117 (2003). 
11
 This also dovetails with the “too early” argument discussed above. 
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the outlines of some of the proposed solutions became definitive, namely the preparation 
of the CFR and its link to the prospect of one or more optional instruments in contract 
law that would run alongside the national legal orders, the argument for holding back for 
the purposes of consultation gives way. As seen by the steady progression of documents 
on the CFR, the failure of the Commission to entertain or at least broach the subject of 
constitutionality of the measures envisaged, especially the CFR and the optional 
instrument, served to exacerbate tensions relating to the scope of the intended action. 
 
Second, as regards the complexity of the constitutional inquiry, the idea seems to 
be that given the complex issues at stake, especially as regards the Community’s 
competence under provisions such as Article 95 EC, the Commission preferred to leave 
constitutionality aside.  In truth, this is one of the most underestimated arguments of all.  
Indeed, as will be seen in the forthcoming chapters, it is striking how many issues left 
unclarified by the Treaties and not yet settled by the Court of Justice arise as part of the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law.  Be that as it may, as one scholar 
surmised, this has certainly not stopped the Commission so far from relying on such 
provisions in its proposals.12   
 
Third, there was the likelihood of Treaty revision, thereby making the assessment  
of constitutionality subject to change. This was highly credible in relation to the 
Commission’s  2001 Communication and 2003 Action Plan, which were issued while 
institutional developments leading to the Draft Constitutional Treaty were underway.  As 
documented in Chapter 11, such developments could have changed matters drastically 
since there were a few proposals advocating the introduction of a specific legal basis 
providing for the approximation of contract law (and other fields of private law) during 
the European Convention, but they did not succeed.13  At present, however, given the 
near decade that it has taken for the completion of the institutional reforms starting from 
the European Convention and the Draft Constitutional Treaty and culminating with the 
Lisbon Treaty, there does not seem to be much impetus for amending the Treaty further 
at least for the foreseeable future.14   
 
Taken together, while most of the reasons used to explain the neglect of the 
constitutionality of European contract law at the European level may have been credible 
early on, they have lost much of their salience at this stage of the debate, and in fact, 
underline  the importance of not putting this matter off any longer.  The common theme 
underlying these arguments is that they minimise the role that constitutionality can play, 
and has played, in shaping the debate about European contract law and affecting both the 
decisions taken by the European institutions and the opinions of the Member States and 
the various stakeholders as part of the process. In this regard, it is somewhat remarkable 
that in the present constitutional climate of greater sensitivity to Union competence by 
building boundaries and categories to “fence” it in first under the Draft Constitutional 
                                                 
12
 See W. van Gerven, “Codifying European private law? Yes, if . . . !”, 27 European Law Review 156, 168 
n.61 (2002). 
13
 See Chapter 11, § 11.2.2. 
14
 But this is not necessarily ruled out. See Declaration (No. 18) in relation to the delimitation of 
competences annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, [2008] OJ C 115/344. 
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Treaty and now under the Lisbon Treaty, perhaps one of the greatest issues to provoke 
such sensitivity in the relationship between the European Union and the Member States is 
left unaddressed.  This in turn warrants inquiry into the significance of the institutional 
events surrounding the failed Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty for the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law. 
 
8.3 Overarching Treaty framework 
 The Treaty framework of the European Union establishes the overarching 
foundations for the constitutional assessment of European contract law.  As mentioned in 
the Introduction, at the time of writing, the Treaty framework comprising the EU and EC 
Treaties15 was recently replaced by the present Treaty framework composed of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009.16  In between, there lies a 
complex set of activities involving the European Convention and the failed Draft 
Constitutional Treaty, which do not as a formal matter constitute binding primary Union 
law, but have nonetheless left an indelible “constitutional imprint” on the debate about 
European contract law that argues for their inclusion in this discussion. This merits brief 
explanation. 
 
 As prompted by the Nice Treaty17, on 15 December 2001, the European Council 
adopted a landmark Declaration on the Future of the European Union at its meeting in 
Laeken (the Laeken Declaration)18, which posed several targeted questions centered 
around four main themes:  a better definition and division of competence in the European 
Union; the simplification of legal instruments; more democracy, transparency, and 
efficiency in the European Union; and moving towards a Constitution for European 
citizens19.  It foresaw that a Convention would be convened to examine these questions 
with a view to the drafting of a Constitution for Europe.20  As a result, the Laeken 
Declaration heralded the European Convention (also known as the Convention on the 
Future of Europe) with a view to hammering out a Treaty on a Constitution for Europe.21   
The Convention was comprised of representatives of the European institutions and 
bodies, the Member State Governments, and the national parliaments of the then fifteen 
Member States as well as several candidate countries slated for eventual accession to the 
                                                 
15
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, [2006] OJ C 321E/5 (hereinafter EU Treaty); 
Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, [2006] OJ C 321E/37 
(hereinafter EC Treaty). 
16
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, [2007] OJ C 306/1; consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, [2008] C 115/1 (hereinafter Lisbon Treaty). 
17
  Declaration (No. 23) on the future of the Union annexed to the Nice Treaty, [2001] OJ C 80/85. 
18
 Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14-15 Dec. 2001, Annex I:  Laeken 
Declaration on the Future of the European Union, [2001] 12 EU Bulletin, point I.27 (hereinafter Laeken 
Declaration). 
19
 Id., Part II. 
20
 Id., Part III. 
21
 See generally K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union § 4-001–§ 4-
011, at 67-75 (R. Bray ed., 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005).  For an “inside” account, see A. Lamassoure, 
Histoire secrète de la convention européenne (Albin Michel, 2004). 
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European Union.22 The work of the European Convention started on 28 February 2002, 
the date of its first inaugural meeting, and concluded on 10 July 2003, after reaching 
agreement on a proposed Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.23  This 
Draft Treaty was then submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome on 18 
July 2003 (the 2003 version of the Draft Constitutional Treaty).24  The 2003 version of 
the Draft Constitutional Treaty underwent further revision and was subsequently 
approved by the Member States at the 2004 IGC (the 2004 version of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty).25  This Draft Treaty then underwent ratification in the Member 
States.  As is now well-known, in 2005, France and the Netherlands rejected the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty, which led other Member States to postpone ratification of this 
Treaty, ultimately resulting in its demise.26 A few years later, in June 2007, the European 
Council put forth a detailed mandate on the revision of the Treaty framework27, which 
gave way to the Draft Reform Treaty.28  Final agreement was reached on this Treaty at 
the informal European Council meeting convened by the Portuguese Presidency in 
October 200729, and ultimately, on 13 December 2007, the EU Heads of State of the 
twenty-seven Member States signed the so-called Lisbon Treaty.30   
 
 In light of this chronology, there are four key sets of documents relevant to this 
study.  First, there is the past or previous Treaty framework comprised of the EU and EC 
Treaties.  It serves as the reference point for the debate about European contract law and 
provides the basis upon which the changes to the brought by the Lisbon Treaty can be 
gleaned.  Second, there are the documents emanating from the European Convention, 
especially by the various Working Groups appointed to examine certain subjects in 
                                                 
22
 See the European Convention website, http://european-convention.eu.int/.  Of the candidate countries, 
this included the twelve Member States that acceded to the Union in 2004 and 2007, as well as Turkey. 
23
 This was several months after the 2003 Action Plan (infra note 121), which was issued on 12 Feb. 2003.  
See Chapter 6, § 6.3. 
24
 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, dated 18 July 2003 (hereinafter 2003 
Draft Constitutional Treaty).  The literature on the 2003 version is massive.  See generally A Constitution 
for the European Union: First Comments on the 2003-Draft of the European Convention (I. Pernice and M. 
Poiares Maduro eds, Nomos, 2004); Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty (B. de Witte ed., EUI, 
2003); The Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Enlargement and Constitutional Reform (M. Andenas and J.A. 
Usher eds, Hart, 2003), Part I; Une Constitution pour l’Europe: Réflexions sur les transformations du droit 
de l’Union europénne (O. De Schutter and P. Nihoul eds, Larcier, 2004). 
25
 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] OJ C 310/1 (hereinafter 2004 Draft 
Constitutional Treaty).  As with the 2003 version, the literature on the 2004 version is vast.  See generally 
Genèse et destinée de la Constitution européenne / Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution (G. 
Amato et al. eds, Bruylant, 2007);  J-C. Piris, The Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis (Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2006); D.N. Triantafyllou, La Constitution de l’Union européenne selon le Traité de Rome de 
2004 (2nd ed., Bruylant, 2005). 
26
 See further Genèse et destinée de la Constitution européenne, supra note 25, partie II; Piris, supra note 
25, at 5-37.  
27
 IGC 2007 Mandate, CONV 11218/07 POLGEN 74, dated 26 June 2007.   
28
 Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, CIG 4/07, dated 24 July 2007 (hereinafter Draft Reform Treaty).   
29
 See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 14 Dec. 2007, DOC 16616/1/07 REV 1 CONCL 3, dated 14 Feb. 
2008, point 3. 
30
 See supra note 16. 
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greater detail.31  Surprisingly, given the Laeken Declaration’s emphasis on the need for a 
better definition and division of competence in the European Union, there was no 
Working Group devoted to this subject. Instead, there was a Working Group on 
“complementary competencies”, whose title was somewhat misleading in the sense that 
its focus was on this specific type of competence but it delved into other provisions, such 
as Articles 95 and 308 EC, beyond this limited category.  Likewise, there was a Working 
Group devoted to “subsidiarity”, although to some extent the principle of proportionality 
came into play.  The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (the AFSJ) had its own 
Working Group, which constituted the funnel for discussion and proposed amendment of 
Article 65 EC. The documents from these three Working Groups – complementary 
competencies, subsidiarity, and the AFSJ – are the source of much of the discussion 
concerning the various Treaty provisions relevant to the constitutionality of European 
contract law.32 
 
Third, there are the texts of the 2003 and 2004 versions of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty. As noted, the recommendations of the Working Groups filtered 
into the 2003 version of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, which was then further amended 
by the 2004 version of the Draft Constitutional Treaty.  In large part, the substance of the 
two versions is the same, but there are differences between them, as highlighted in the 
analysis of some of the Treaty provisions under discussion. Thus, the distinction between 
the two versions is important under the relevant circumstances. 
 
Finally, there is the text of the Lisbon Treaty, which having entered into force on 
1 December 2009 now constitutes the present Treaty framework.  The Lisbon Treaty took 
up much, though not all, of the proposed changes advanced by the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty.  It is comprised of two Treaties, the EU Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (the TFEU), which effectively replaced the present EU and EC 
Treaties, respectively, and as such, supplanted the three-pillar structure of the European 
Union with one overarching framework governing the Union. Consequently, the changes 
that it brings to the relevant Treaty provisions and the overarching principles governing 
Community, now Union, competence are important for the constitutional assessment of 
European contract law.   
 
 Importantly, the foregoing components comprising the former EU and EC 
Treaties, the work of the European Convention, the 2003 and 2004 versions of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty are all taken into account as part of the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law where relevant, although particular 
emphasis is placed on the past and present Treaty framework. This explains why the 
analysis of the European Union’s competence in connection with European contract law 
is rooted in the discussion of the former EU and EC Treaties, so as to understand the 
                                                 
31
 The list is as follows:  Working Group I Subsidiarity; Working Group II Charter/ECHR; Working Group 
III Legal personality; Working Group IV National Parliaments; Working Group V Complementary 
Competencies; Working Group VI Economic Governance; Working Group VII External Action; Working 
Group VIII Defence; Working Group XI Simplification; Working Group X Freedom, Security and Justice; 
and Working Group XI Social Europe.   
32
  This is so, although the work of other Working Groups is taken into account on occasion, as for example 
with regard to the discussion of the Open Method of Coordination (the OMC) in Chapter 12. 
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changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.  This is so, even though technically speaking 
the provisions of the previous EU and EC Treaties no longer constitute primary Union 
law and references to the European Community have been replaced by the European 
Union or Union.  Furthermore, the European Convention and the failed Draft 
Constitutional Treaty shed significant light on the perceptions of the Treaty framers and 
of various institutional actors as regards the interpretation of the Treaty provisions and 
principles under discussion, which paved the way to the Lisbon Treaty.  Together, these 
four components constitute the overarching Treaty framework guiding this discussion. 
 
8.4 Constitutional parameters of European contract law 
8.4.1 General overview 
To recall, in Chapter 2, constitutionality was generally defined as denoting the 
existence and the exercise of the Community’s competence in the field of contract law, 
thereby encompassing the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality and sincere 
cooperation, with the caveat that these principles would be explored in greater detail in 
this chapter since they raised complex questions concerning their relationship, as well as 
differences with the American constitutional framework, which were more appropriate to 
be dealt with together here.33  Therefore, as indicated by the definition of constitutionality 
itself, the constitutional parameters of European contract law center on the main role to 
be played by these four principles, which can be referred to as the constitutional 
parameters of European contract law.   
 
 Importantly, as highlighted by the debate about European contract law, there are 
certain secondary elements or components that feed into the constitutional parameters of 
European contract law.  As a general matter, they comprise the following six elements:  
(1) the potential forms of Union and/or Member State action inside and outside the Treaty 
framework, ranging from approximation and optional legal instruments pursuant to a 
particular provision of the Treaty to voluntary harmonisation à la américaine (e.g., 
uniform laws) and intergovernmental cooperation among the Member States (e.g., an 
intergovernmental treaty entered into by the Member States); (2) the substantive scope of 
the particular form of action, denoting the fields or sub-fields of contract law concerned 
(and though outside the scope of this discussion, other fields of private law related to 
contract law as part of the debate about European contract law);  (3) the legal 
instrument(s) used, which can include those falling inside or outside the framework of the 
Treaties, e.g., a regulation or an intergovernmental treaty;  (4) the method of application 
denoting the compulsory and/or optional (opt-in and/or opt-out) character of the 
instrument(s) or other form of action taken; (5) the territorial scope of application of the 
particular instrument in terms of covering cross-border and/or purely domestic 
transactions among the Member States; conceivably, with the use of an 
intergovernmental treaty, this could include application to third States (i.e., non-EU 
Member States), though so far this has not been a major point of discussion at the 
European level; and (6) the personal scope of application of the particular instrument, 
which is commonly assumed to apply to the Member States in terms of transactions 
involving private and/or public parties taking place within the Member States; however, 
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 See Chapter 2, § 2.2.1. 
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this could likewise include the European institutions in their contractual dealings, and 
with the ongoing discussion of the CFR as an instrument for lawmaking purposes, this 
could predicate its application to the European institutions alone.  While additional 
elements could certainly be postulated, it is mainly these six elements that provide the 
contours for potential action contemplated on the part of the European Union and/or the 
Member States so far in the debate about European contract law. 
 
 These secondary elements are emphasised here because they amplify the 
application of the constitutional parameters in various ways.  For instance, this is readily 
seen by the interplay between the principle of conferral (i.e., the legal basis requirement) 
and the scope of application of a European contract law instrument to interstate as well as 
intrastate transactions, or that between the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
and the choice of legal instruments or the forms of Union and Member State action 
resorted to.  Overall, the constitutional parameters can be said to encompass the inquiry 
into these various elements, and hence they will be incorporated within the discussion 
concerning the scope of the Union’s competence pursuant to the particular Treaty 
provisions and certain alternative or complementary forms of Member State action in the 
forthcoming chapters.  Nevertheless, these secondary elements are highlighted at the 
outset for two reasons.  The first reason is that they illustrate that the constitutional 
assessment of European contract law takes place on several levels simultaneously, in 
which the constitutional parameters and these secondary elements are interrelated and 
interdependent.  This has the result that decisions taken for one component implicate, 
even dictate, the choices made for the others.  The classic example concerns the use of 
Article 95 EC for the adoption of a contract law instrument:  recourse to this Treaty 
provision, among other things, automatically precludes the recourse to an optional 
contract law instrument to the extent that it exceeds the scope of approximation as 
discussed further in Chapter 9. The second reason is that these components make 
apparent the entangled relationship among the principles comprising the constitutional 
parameters of European contract law.  Noticeably, the majority of these elements 
implicate issues that bear as much on the existence of Community competence as its 
exercise.  For example, the choice of what fields of contract law (or other fields of private 
law for that matter) should be covered, the legal instrument used, the method of 
application (i.e., opt-in, opt-out and/or compulsory) and the scope (i.e., cross-border 
and/or purely domestic contract transactions) speak to the legal basis requirement as well 
as to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.  As such, these elements 
demonstrate the difficulties in parsing out these principles governing the Union’s 
competence and hence identifying the roles to be played by each. 
 
Altogether, the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality and sincere 
cooperation share a somewhat different lineage, but either originally34 or eventually35, 
                                                 
34
 The principle of sincere (or loyal) cooperation was an original fixture of the EEC Treaty inscribed in 
Article 5 EEC, now Article 10 EC.  
35
 The principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality as constitutional principles governing the 
division of competence between the EU and the Member States were first introduced together by way of 
Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty, now Article 5 EC.  As regards subsidiarity’s earlier appearance in the 
Single European Act, see infra note 124. 
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came to be explicitly inscribed in the Part One of the EC Treaty housing several 
“principles” underpinning the Community legal order.36 In theory, these principles are 
considered to bear out their chronological order in the Treaties.  The first three principles 
are presented in “cascading” form in the three paragraphs of Article 5 EC, the idea being 
that conferral regulates the existence of Community competence; subsidiarity regulates 
whether the competence so conferred should be exercised by the Community or left to the 
Member States; and proportionality regulates the extent to which the competence so 
conferred should be exercised by the Community in terms of the intensity of the action.37 
Then, depending on the choices made as regards to whether the Member States or the 
Community should take the action envisaged pursuant to the conferral-subsidiarity-
proportionality calculus, this is followed up by the principle of sincere cooperation 
lodged a few provisions down in Article 10 EC, which among other things makes clear 
that the Member States are under an obligation to cooperate amongst themselves and with 
the European institutions in achieving the objectives of the particular action. 
 
When it comes to the setting of European contract law, however, the relationship 
between these principles becomes far less fixed.  Depending on the way they are viewed, 
conferral starts to bleed into subsidiarity and proportionality; subsidiarity and 
proportionality become very difficult to distinguish; and the principle of sincere 
cooperation transcends its role as a mere “follow-up” provision.  Certainly, this could 
arise in other settings as well, but it is the constitutional dimensions of European contract 
law that uniquely bear this out. On the negative side, this makes pinning down their 
meaning and their operation particularly challenging.  Yet, on the positive side, exploring 
how these principles operate in relation to European contract law exposes provocative 
issues that have laid dormant for some time and may to some extent release the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality from being either over- or underestimated in the 
debate.   
 
To be clear, taken by themselves these four principles warrant a volume of 
literature that rivals or even surpasses that concerning European contract law (and 
European private law generally), and it is not the object here to replicate such work or to 
set forth an exhaustive study.  Instead, as presented in the following four sections, the aim 
is to pinpoint the definitions of these four principles, their linkages, and notable changes 
brought by the Lisbon Treaty.  Along the way, certain comparative “leaps” to the United 
States are made in order to highlight salient differences in approach in relation to these 
four principles.  In this way, this chapter seeks to highlight issues that have not been 
                                                 
36
 As highlighted in the literature, some of these so-called “principles” are different in nature.  See General 
Principles of European Community Law (U. Bernitz and J. Nergelius eds, Kluwer, 2000), particularly G. de 
Búrca, “Proportionality and Subsidiarity as General Principles of Law”, 95; B. de Witte, “Institutional 
Principles: A Special Category of General Principles of EC Law”, 143; T. Schilling, “A New Dimension of 
Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle”, 14 Yearbook of European Law 203 (1994). While that 
may be, the use of “principles” parallels the express nomenclature of both the previous Treaty framework 
and the Lisbon Treaty. 
37
 This is vividly captured in the Presidency Conclusions, Edinburgh European Council, 11-12 Dec. 1992, 
Annex 1 to Part A (“Overall Approach to the Application by the Council of the Subsidiarity Principle and 
Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union”) (hereinafter Edinburgh Conclusions), point I(1)-(2).  As 
regards their significance, see infra note 159. 
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mentioned much, if at all, in the discourse so far in order to be of functional value in 
assessing the application of these principles in relation to European contract law. 
 
8.4.2 The principle of conferral 
8.4.2.1 The definition of the principle of conferral and the functional approach 
Although not (then38) titled as such, the principle of conferral is enshrined in the 
first paragraph of Article 5 of the EC Treaty:  “The Community shall act within the limits 
of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it 
therein”.39  Over the years, the principle of conferral has been called a variety of names, 
such as the principle of attribution or the principle of conferred or attributed competences 
or powers40.  They are all meant to denote the same thing:  that the Community (or the 
Union) can only act pursuant to the competences conferred or attributed to it, either 
explicitly or implicitly, under the Treaties.  Community action taken outside of these 
confines is ultra vires, i.e., it exceeds the competences conferred upon it under the 
Treaties and can be declared unconstitutional by the Court of Justice.   
 
In practical terms, there is a bit of a “slant” when it comes to the principle of 
conferral.  In principle, it can be used in a purely neutral way as regards the relationship 
between the Community or the Member States or even on the side of the Union in the 
sense of guarding its competences from repatriation on the part of the Member States, 
which as the framers of the Treaties is not a completely far-flung idea.  Yet, the principle 
of conferral has far more often been equated with guarding the competences of the 
Member States against potential encroachment on the part of the Community.41 In this 
way, the principle of conferral may said to be the “first line of defense” in the division of 
competences between the European Community and the Member States in terms of 
safeguarding the regulatory autonomy of the Member States from potential encroachment 
by the Community.  Framed another way, the principle of conferral stands for the fact 
that the bulk of regulatory competence lies with the Member States, with the Community 
given only those competences that have been conferred upon it under the Treaties.42   
 
In line with the principle of conferral prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 5 
EC, the Community’s competences are conferred upon it in a functional manner, meaning 
that the principle of conferral links the competence of the Community to the achievement 
                                                 
38
  Compare the Lisbon Treaty, infra § 8.4.2.3. 
39
 Article 5, first para. EC (emphasis added).  For the institutions themselves, this is echoed in Article 7(1), 
second para. EC.  The appellation of conferral parallels that of the Lisbon Treaty discussed below.   
40
 See also A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, “The Vertical Order of Competences” in Principles of European 
Constitutional Law 335, 340 (A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast eds, Hart, 2006) (referring to the principle of 
“positive legality”). 
41
 See, e.g., J.T. Lang, “What Powers Should the European Community Have?”, 1 European Public Law 
97, 99 (referring to it as “safeguard” for curbing excessive Community action); A. von Bogdandy, 
“Constitutional Principles”, in Principles of European Constitutional Law, supra note 40, 3, at 43-44 
(considering the principle of conferral within the category of “principles protecting diversity”).   
42
 See K. Lenaerts, “The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the 
Balance of Federalism”, 17 Fordham International Law Journal 846, 848-849 (1994).  See also Edinburgh 
Conclusions, supra note 37, point 2(i) (“implying that national powers are the rule and the Community’s 
the exception”). 
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of specific “objectives” or “tasks” under Article 2 EC and specific “activities” listed 
under Article 3 EC which are to be carried out via the relevant legal basis in the Treaty.43 
This means that Community competence is not merely divided up according to subject-
matter in a list of enumerated fields, but instead is functionally limited to what is required 
by the objectives and tasks of the Community.44  As such, the principle of conferral in the 
European Union cannot be strictly equated with the principle of “enumerated powers” as 
is associated with the United States, whereby the particular powers accorded to the 
federal level are listed or “enumerated” in the US Constitution, since this may be seen as 
implying some sort of catalogue that is in fact missing in the Treaties.45 In effect, the 
principle of conferral in the European Union necessitates a functional inquiry different 
from that in the United States, since in evaluating the extent of Community competence, 
the relevant legal basis is always tied to and informed by the objectives and tasks set out 
for the EC in Articles 2 and 3 EC, even though such objectives and tasks do not 
themselves serve as the actual legal basis for the Community measure concerned.   
 
Nevertheless, similar to the American constitutional framework, tensions 
underpin the principle of conferral on account of the fact that it is perceived as framing 
the scope of Community competence through a so-called “dualist” lens of strict boundary 
lines between areas of Community and Member State competence, which in practice has 
been eroded to a great extent.46  In the United States, this is often exemplified by the 
jurisprudence concerning the Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution47, which belie the 
failed attempts to shield off certain domains of the Member States from action taken at 
the federal level.48 Likewise, for the European Union, in the famous words of one well-
known scholar, [t]here is simply no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can 
invoke, as such, against the Community.”49   
 
                                                 
43
 Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, supra note 21, § 5-002, at 80. 
Article 4 EC set forth further tasks in relation to economic, monetary and exchange rate policies, which are 
not relevant here.  
44
 Id.   
45
 See Von Bogdandy and Bast, supra note 40, at 340 n.30.  That being said, this is not to imply that there 
is a list or “catalogue” of competences in the United States that strictly carves out the competences 
attributed to the federal level as opposed to that of the states.  Indeed, similar to the EU, much of the 
breadth of federal power (or at least where much of the tensions emanate) is grounded not so much in the 
subjects that are explicitly elaborated in the text of the US Constitution but rather from the purported link 
or relationship to such subjects. See G.A. Bermann, “The Role of Law in the Functioning of Federal 
Systems”, in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the 
European Union 191, 199 (K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse eds, Oxford Univ. Press, 2001). 
46
 See particularly J.H.H. Weiler, “The Division of Competences in the European Union”, External study 
commissioned by the Directorate General for Research of the European Parliament, POLI W-26 (1997), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu (underscoring fundamental contradiction between “essentialist” 
or dualist approach of conferral as opposed to “functionalist” or cooperative approach of subsidiarity, 
which is played out, not coincidentally, in a case study concerning the first Tobacco Advertising Directive). 
47
 The Tenth Amendment provides:  “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  
48
 See L.H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 5-11 –§ 5-12, at 860-908 (3rd ed., Foundation Press, 
2000). 
49
 K. Lenaerts, “Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism”, 38 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 205, 220 (1990). 
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While perhaps all well and good in theory, on account of the functional approach, 
the principle of conferral has given way to tensions under circumstances where the 
Community is perceived to trespass into areas that have not (yet) been explicitly or 
implicitly conferred on the Community within the context of achieving the objectives that 
have been set down in the Treaties pursuant to the competences that have been conferred 
upon the Community.50 In other words, the limits placed on the Community’s 
competence under the Treaties are feared to be eroded by virtue of the Community’s 
indirect reach into various areas that in principle remain within the competences of the 
Member States.  This has become increasingly apparent in various areas touched by 
European law, but is particularly borne out by European contract law. 
 
To date, there has not been any explicit competence set down in the Treaties 
concerning matters of contract law per se.51  There is no title in the Treaty, for example, 
labeled “contract law” (or any other field of private law for that matter).  Rather, as far as 
contract law is concerned, Community action has generally proceeded via indirect routes 
to achieve the objectives set down in the Treaties, whether for the purposes of the internal 
market, competition policy, public procurement, transport policy, etc.  This is illustrated 
by the Community contract law acquis, which has been centered on the Community’s 
objectives related to the internal market and consumer protection. Thus, for those 
claiming that the Community has no explicit competence over contract law (or other 
fields of private law), this is by all means true.  Yet, it does not answer the question as to 
the scope of the Community’s competences related to the achievement of the various 
objectives listed in the Treaty, which encompass action to be taken in the field of contract 
law corresponding to the legal basis concerned. 
 
8.4.2.2 The legal basis requirement and renewed inquiry into multiple legal bases 
It follows from the above that the principle of conferral is equated with the need 
for a legal basis.  This is because in principle for the adoption of a particular Community 
measure, there must be a legal basis in the Treaty providing the Community with the 
requisite competence to take such action.  The legal basis constitutes the particular 
provision (or provisions as discussed below) of the Treaty that sets forth the 
Community’s sphere of action in the area concerned and includes the relevant legal 
instruments and decision-making procedure to be followed.52 This may seem 
rudimentary, but in the context of European contract law, legal basis often gets confused 
with the objectives and values that exist or should be considered or developed within the 
framework of the European contract law project. For example, given the infusion of 
consumer protection in the Community contract law acquis, it is sometimes surmised that 
Article 153 EC constitutes a legal basis for some of the measures comprising the “hard 
                                                 
50
 This was already mentioned with specific regard to the tensions placed on the Court of Justice associated 
with its lawmaking role and European “federal common law”:  see Chapter 3. 
51
 Nor would this change with the Lisbon Treaty, despite proposals submitted during the European 
Convention:  see Chapter 11. 
52
 Indeed, the legal basis requirement is related to the obligation to state reasons under Article 253 EC, and 
in principle, the legal basis is explicitly specified in the measure concerned.  See, recently, Case C-370/07 
Commission v. Council, judgment of 1 Oct. 2009, not yet reported. 
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core” of the Community contract law acquis53, when as already discussed, it is primarily 
Article 95 EC (and to some extent Article 94 EC) that constituted the legal basis for these 
measures.54  This is certainly not to say that Article 153 EC could not serve as the legal 
basis for Community action in European contract law, which is further explored in 
Chapter 10.  It is only to make clear the difference between the legal basis upon which 
Community competence to adopt a particular measure hinges and particular objectives 
underpinning the Community measure concerned.   
 
Likewise, it may seem rudimentary to emphasise that the legal basis requirement 
does not necessarily implicate only one Treaty provision by itself, but given recent case 
law, this begs a much more nuanced inquiry.  By now, it is vested case law of the Court 
of Justice emanating from the landmark Titanium Dioxide judgment55 that the legal basis 
of a Community measure can be based on one or more Treaty provisions depending upon 
the principal objectives of the measure concerned, except where such provisions are 
incompatible with one another as regards differences in the decision-making procedures 
to be followed.56  Yet, this has not been viewed as precluding a practical approach taken 
by the European institutions whereby two seemingly incompatible legal bases are 
combined and “leveled up” by way of choosing the procedure that affords the greatest 
involvement to the European institutions involved, namely the European Parliament.   
 
For example, in the Rotterdam Convention case57, the Court annulled a 
Regulation implementing the Rotterdam Convention on the grounds that it should have 
been adopted on the dual legal basis of Articles 133 and 175 EC, and not just Article 175 
EC alone. Article 133 EC concerns Community action in the field of Common 
Commercial Policy and stipulates qualified majority voting in the Council with at most 
optional consultation of the European Parliament. Article 175 EC concerns Community 
action in the field of environmental protection and requires qualified majority voting in 
the Council and the co-decision procedure involving the Council and the Parliament as 
co-legislators.  Notwithstanding the Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott concluding 
that the two legal bases were incompatible and could not be combined58, the Court found 
that the they were in fact compatible because the Council votes in both cases by qualified 
majority voting and the Parliament would be involved by way of co-decision, thereby not 
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 See, e.g., M.W. Hesselink, “European Contract Law: A Matter of Consumer Protection, Citizenship, or 
Justice?”, 15 European Review of Private Law 323, 335 n.37 (2007). 
54
 Sometimes, reference to Article 153 EC is made in recitals of the preamble of particular Community 
consumer contract law measures. See Chapter 2, § 2.3.8. Again, however, this is not the same thing as 
serving as the legal basis of the Community measure concerned. 
55
 Case C-300/89 Commission v. Council (“Titanium Dioxide”) [1991] ECR I-2867.  
56
 See, e.g., Case C-155/07 European Parliament v. Council [2008] ECR I-8103, paras 34-37 (and further 
citations therein).  In recent case law, it has been specifically stated that this is where the use of two or 
more legal bases is liable to undermine the rights of the European Parliament:  see, e.g., Case C-178/03 
Commission v. European Parliament and Council (“Rotterdam Convention”) [2006] ECR I-107, para. 57. 
57
 Case C-178/03 Rotterdam Convention [2006] ECR I-107, paras 56-60. There was a companion case 
decided on the same day concerning a related measure in which the Court made similar findings:  Case C-
94/03 Commission v. Council [2006] ECR I-1, paras 51-56. 
58
 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-178/03 Rotterdam Convention, paras 56-65. 
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undermining its rights.59  This position has been affirmed in more recent jurisprudence 
concerning these provisions and others.60    
 
Recently, European Parliament v. Council (“International Fund for Ireland”)61 
presented a more challenging case.62 This dispute concerned the legal basis of a 
Regulation concerning the Community’s financial contributions to the International Fund 
for Ireland, which had been adopted under Article 308 EC.63  The European Parliament 
argued that it should have been adopted under the third paragraph of Article 159 EC on 
economic and social cohesion, which required qualified majority voting in the Council 
and the co-decision procedure, as opposed to Article 308 EC requiring unanimous voting 
in the Council and consultation of the European Parliament.64 In his Opinion, Advocate 
General Bot concluded that the Regulation should have been adopted solely under Article 
159 EC.65 The Court disagreed and found that the third paragraph of Article 159 EC did 
not by itself confer on the Community the necessary competence to adopt the measure 
concerned.66 Instead, the European legislator should have had recourse to both the third 
paragraph of Article 159 EC and Article 308 EC, “while complying with the legislative 
procedures laid down therein, that is to say, both the ‘co-decision’ procedure referred to 
in Article 251 EC and the requirement that the Council act unanimously”.67  While not 
said as much, the Court essentially pulled the co-decision procedure of Article 159 EC, 
thereby affording the Parliament with the greatest involvement in the legislative 
procedure, with the unanimous voting requirement of Article 308 EC, thereby knocking 
out the qualified majority voting and the consultation requirements that had been 
stipulated for each provision, respectively.   
 
At first glance, International Fund for Ireland seems to constitute a reversal of the 
Court’s position taken in Titanium Dioxide, whereby the Court had considered the 
combination of Article 175 EC (then Article 130s EEC) stipulating unanimous voting in 
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 Case C-178/03 Rotterdam Convention, paras 57-59. 
60
 See, e.g., Case C-411/06 Commission v. European Parliament and Council, judgment of 8 Sept. 2009, 
not yet reported, paras 73-76 (albeit distinguishing it from the instant case); Case C-155/07 European 
Parliament v. Council [2008] ECR I-8103, paras 75-83 (concerning Articles 179 and 181a EC). See also 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-370/07 Commission v. Council, judgment of 1 Oct. 2009, 
not yet reported, para.79 n.36 (and citations therein). 
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 Case C-166/07 European Parliament v. Council (“International Fund for Ireland”) , judgment of 3 Sept. 
2009, not yet reported. 
62
 Notably, this issue had been percolating below the surface of the Kadi and Yusuf cases involving a 
measure based on the combination of Articles 60, 301, and 308 EC, the first two provisions requiring 
qualified majority voting in the Council and the third requiring unanimous voting in  the Council and 
consultation of the Parliament.  While the legal basis of the measure was challenged, the Court did not 
delve into the matter of the compatibility of these three legal bases used together, and it was not a plea 
raised by the parties. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. For further discussion of this case, see 
Chapter 9, § 9.4. 
63
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1968/2006 of 21 Dec. 2006 concerning Community financial contributions 
to the International Fund for Ireland (2007 to 2010), [2006] OJ L 409/86. 
64
 Case C-166/07 International Fund for Ireland, paras 21-22. 
65
 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-166/07 International Fund for Ireland, paras 83-98. 
66
 Case C-166/07 International Fund for Ireland, para. 65. 
67
 Id., para. 69. 
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the Council and consultation of the Parliament to be incompatible with Article 95 EC 
(then Article 100a EEC) specifying qualified majority voting in the Council and the 
cooperation procedure involving the Parliament.68  With a closer look, however, the 
Court’s ruling in this case may be attributed to a preference for ensuring due respect for 
the vertical division of competence between the European Union and the Member States 
under the Treaty, albeit at the expense of the horizontal division of competence among 
the European institutions laid down in the legal bases concerned.  The case signified that 
Article 308 EC is needed when the particular Community measure contains even minor 
elements that fall outside the more specific legal basis concerned, with the result that the 
choice is either to split the measure concerned or to combine the relevant Treaty 
provisions serving as the legal basis, whatever be the practical effects on decision-
making.  In the instant case, the Court tacked on Article 308 EC for those elements of the 
measure that fell outside the more specific legal basis of the third paragraph of Article 
159 EC, thereby ensuring that the latter was not unduly “stretched” to encompass 
elements that exceeded the Community’s competence under that provision.   The Court’s 
designation of the co-decision procedure and unanimous voting in the Council in this 
case was not exactly a standard combination of decision-making procedures, but still, it 
was not altogether novel under the Treaty framework.69    
 
As far as the debate about European contract law is concerned, the Court’s 
judgment in International Fund for Ireland is of great importance. It signalled the 
combination of Article 308 EC with a Treaty provision stipulating qualified majority 
voting and co-decision, which is characteristic of several Treaty provisions implicated in 
the debate about European contract law (i.e., Articles 95, 153, and 65 EC)70.  This is so, 
even though as a formal matter, the Court has not (yet) confronted the combination of 
Article 308 EC with these particular provisions, especially Article 95 EC. In the 
discourse on European contract law so far, the approach has usually been to assess the 
scope of the relevant Treaty provisions individually, and if anything, to discount their 
potential combination in light of the Titanium Dioxide jurisprudence.  As a result of this 
case law, however, the potential combination of some of these provisions must be looked 
into, even if for the time being, certain issues must await further jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice.  
 
8.4.2.3 The Lisbon Treaty and the categorisation of competences 
On the whole, the Lisbon Treaty did not alter the meaning of the principle of 
conferral but instead sought to make certain points more explicit. Article 5(2) EU 
provides:   
 
Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits  
                                                 
68
 Case C-300/89 Titanium Dioxide [1991] ECR I-2867. Since the case was decided, these Treaty 
provisions were amended, and both Articles 175 and 95 EC provide for qualified majority voting in the 
Council and the co-decision procedure involving the European Parliament. 
69
 See, e.g., Articles 42, 47(2) EC. 
70
 The exception is Article 94 EC, which stipulates unanimous voting in the Council and consultation of the 
European Parliament, as well as the European Economic and Social Committee, thereby resembling the 
decision-making procedures set down in Article 308 EC itself. 
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of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties  
to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the  
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.71   
 
While this sentence is not altogether novel, its explicit inclusion in the Treaty could be 
considered to ingrain even further the limited nature of competences conferred on the 
Union, as well as casting an implicit glance to the language of the Tenth Amendment 
enshrined in the US Constitution.72 
 
Notably, the list of “objectives” of Article 2 EC and “activities” of Article 3 EC is 
reconfigured in the Lisbon Treaty.  Article 2 EC is replaced in substance by Article 3 
EU73, which streamlines, and to some extent augments, the objectives to be achieved by 
the Union, with the caveat that the Union will pursue its objectives “by appropriate 
measures commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the 
Treaties”.74  The long list of “activities” in Article 3 EC has been taken over by a set of 
new provisions (Articles 2-6 TFEU), which elaborate and organise the distribution of 
competence between the Union and the Member States by carving out certain categories 
and areas of Union competence within which the various activities are placed. Generally, 
there are three main categories of Union competence, that of “exclusive”, “shared”, and 
“complementary” competence, which are flanked by specific policy fields deserving 
special consideration.75  
 
As defined in the Lisbon Treaty, an “exclusive competence” of the Union is one 
in which “only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States 
being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the 
implementation of Union acts”.76 By contrast, a “shared competence” under the Lisbon 
Treaty is one in which both the Union and the Member States can legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts in a specific area; however, the caveat is that the Member States are 
only able to “exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence”, but the Member States are able to exercise their competence in such field 
again “to the extent that the Union decided to cease exercising its competence”.77  The 
“shared competence” category pertains to most policy fields in the Treaty and thus 
embodies somewhat of a “catchall” category.78  Finally, the “complementary 
competence” category denotes those areas in which “the Union shall have competence to 
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carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, 
without thereby superseding their competence in these areas.”79  Harmonisation of 
national laws is explicitly excluded in the areas falling within this category80, which are 
expressly listed in seriatim in the Treaty.81   
 
As regards European contract law, most of the competences relevant for European 
contract law – i.e., those relating to the Community’s objectives in the internal market, 
consumer protection and the AFSJ – are explicitly labeled in the Lisbon Treaty as falling 
within the ambit of “shared competences”, which to some extent filter into the 
examination of the corresponding Treaty provisions examined in the forthcoming 
chapters.82 Despite this classification, however, many issues were left unaddressed by the 
Lisbon Treaty in this regard. In particular, the categorisation of competences set forth in 
the Lisbon Treaty does not by itself indicate the scope of Community competence in the 
particular field, as in the case of the internal market, consumer protection, the AFSJ, and 
so on. 83  One is still required to look to the relevant provision of the Treaty to determine 
the exact ambit of the Union’s action allowed in the relevant field.  Likewise, the Lisbon 
Treaty did not provide any typology of the kinds of Treaty provisions housed within each 
category of competence especially as regards the mainstay of most Community action in 
the  “shared competence” category.   In this way, it left out a crucial distinction between 
the Community’s “functional competences in a particular policy field” and its “functional 
competences of a cross-sectoral character,” also referred to as horizontal or general 
competences, among other things84, which comes into play in European contract law.   
 
The Community’s functional competences in a particular policy field are those 
that delineate the extent of the Community’s competence within a particular subject-
matter ratione materiae.  As far as European contract law is concerned, Article 153 EC is 
a good example, since this Treaty provision delineates the scope of Community action 
which may be taken within a particular policy field, that of consumer protection.   
Scholars also include Article 65 EC in this category.85 Admittedly, Article 65 EC has a 
somewhat chameleonic character, since it does not exhaustively delimit the kinds of 
Community measures that can be taken on the basis of this provision and it cuts across 
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various areas of national law relating to, for example, civil procedure, private 
international law, and litigation matters.  Yet, its substantive scope is nonetheless limited 
to measures falling within the purview of “judicial cooperation in civil matters” under the 
Treaty.86  
 
By comparison, the Community’s functional or horizontal competences of a 
cross-sectoral character are those that are not merely limited to a policy field limited by 
its subject-matter, but instead cut across various areas or policy fields in order to achieve 
certain “pre-set” objectives as provided in the Treaties.87 The most well-known 
provisions are undoubtedly Articles 94, 95, and 308 EC, among others88.  Articles 94 and 
95 EC are linked to the Community’s objective to ensure the establishment and 
functioning of the common or internal market, respectively, and thus, rather than being 
incased within a single subject-matter, can cover a wide expanse extending across vast 
domains of the Member States in relation to the pursuit of this objective.  Article 308 EC 
goes one step further, since it bestows “supplementary competence” on the Community 
to take action that although not as yet foreseen in the Treaties is nonetheless deemed 
necessary for the achievement of the Community’s objectives set down therein.89  While 
these three provisions are subject to detailed discussion in Chapter 9, suffice to say that 
given their potential expanse, it is not coincidental that these provisions lie at the 
forefront of the controversy concerning the constitutionality of European contract law. 
While not found in the Lisbon Treaty, the distinction between these types of competences 
is directly linked to the operation of the principle of subsidiarity in the context of 
European contract law, as seen below. 
 
8.4.3 The principle of subsidiarity 
8.4.3.1 The definition(s) of the principle of subsidiarity and the distinction between  
its supra-constitutional and constitutional forms 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is notoriously elusive. Despite the fact that it has 
been considered to have been part of the Treaties since the early days of European 
integration90, there is no single universal definition of subsidiarity in the European Union.  
Rather, the principle of subsidiarity embodies a wide variety of values91 and can be 
viewed in a multitude of ways92, all of which serve to illuminate the varying and nuanced 
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roles it plays in the European Union and on a broader scale.  As one scholar put it, “there 
is a general agreement that there is no agreement on the definition of this concept”.93  
This is evidenced by the standard “mantra” of many publications on subsidiarity, which 
begin with a few lines espousing the difficulties of defining this term and the lack of 
agreement as to its meaning.  That being said, in the context of European contract law, 
subsidiarity assumes two main forms as identified in the literature:  first, as a supra-
constitutional principle overseeing the division of competence in the European Union; 
and second, in its more well-known form as a constitutional principle governing the 
exercise of Community competence.94  As illustrated below, both of these forms of 
subsidiarity have an important impact on the scope of Community competence under the 
Treaty provisions at issue in the debate about European contract law. 
 
First, subsidiarity as a supra-constitutional principle denotes the conception of 
subsidiarity as guiding the way in which the competences are organised in the Treaties 
and divided between the European Union and the Member States.95  In this form, 
subsidiarity oversees the choices as to what competences are given to the Community  (or 
Union), to what extent, and how they are framed.  There are no explicit legal 
requirements attached to this form of subsidiarity and the Court of Justice do not play any 
role in enforcing it.  As such, subsidiarity is not an operational principle in this sense, but 
instead it hovers above the Treaties, feeding into and informing the constitutional fabric 
of the European Union itself.  To be clear, although it concerns the division, as opposed 
to the exercise, of competence, this conception of subsidiarity is not the same thing as the 
principle of conferral. Rather, supra-constitutional subsidiarity precedes it.  It filters into 
the way in which competences of the EU are formulated in the Treaties, which then gives 
way to the principle of conferral and the various legal bases found in the Treaties.   
 
This form of subsidiarity is not usually mentioned, if at all, in the commentary 
concerning European contract law, but in fact it is readily borne out in the framing of the 
Treaty provisions relevant to the debate.  Article 153 EC is perhaps the most glaring 
example by virtue of the inscription of the Community’s “supporting” role in the field of 
consumer protection and the course to minimum harmonisation in the text of this 
provision.96 Moreover, Article 65 EC concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters 
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bears the imprint of supra-constitutional subsidiarity, not only in the way its text is 
grounded in “promoting the capability” and “improving and simplifying” Member State 
laws in certain areas generally associated with matters of private international law, civil 
procedural law, and transnational litigation (with no explicit mention of substantive civil 
law), but also by virtue of the limitations placed on Community action having “cross-
border implications” and “in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market”.97 And although perhaps not obvious at first sight, tenets of supra-constitutional 
subsidiarity have been considered to infuse the Community’s functional competences.  
Article 94 EC has been deemed “an implicit illustration of subsidiarity”, since in 
principle the Member States’ competences continue to operate in full in the relevant 
areas, and the Community only steps in when their exercise hinders the common market, 
i.e., the Community occupies only a “subsidiary” role which is triggered in specific 
instances.98  Presumably a similar logic can be applied to Articles 95 and 308 EC. In this 
way, Community action in these areas can be seen to take a somewhat “subsidiary” role 
and even if the debate about European contract law questions that assumption, it is the 
way in which these provisions have been depicted in the Treaties that evidences the 
handiwork of subsidiarity in its supra-constitutional form.   
 
Interestingly, subsidiarity as a supra-constitutional principle has been viewed by 
scholars as neutral in relation to the division of competence between the European Union 
and the Member States, since while it affects issues relative to the EU-Member State 
relationship via the framing and organisation of the Treaties, it does not seek protect the 
Member States against the Community as compared to the constitutional form of 
subsidiarity described below.99 Supra-constitutional subsidiarity still carries the potential 
to colour the assessment of the relevant Treaty provisions lying at the heart of the debate 
about European contract law in various ways.   With Article 153 EC, as will be seen, the 
considerable restraint on the part of Community in adopting consumer protection 
measures has been attributed at least in part to supra-constitutional subsidiarity, which 
influences the consideration of the scope of the Community’s competence under this 
provision.100  Moreover, supra-constitutional subsidiarity may even go so far as 
influencing the operation of the more traditional subsidiarity calculus in certain instances.  
For instance, as regards Article 65 EC, the fact that its field of application has already 
been framed as having “cross-border implications” relevant to the “proper functioning of 
the internal market” by and large predicates Community measures that by their very 
nature are unlikely to be achieved by the Member States, thereby making it easier to 
satisfy the requirements of constitutional subsidiarity.101  This sets the scene for delving 
into subsidiarity’s other meaning. 
 
Second, subsidiarity as a constitutional principle governs the exercise of 
Community competence as inscribed in the second paragraph of Article 5 EC: 
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In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
 shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if  
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently  
 achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or 
 effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.102    
 
This meaning of subsidiarity is the predominant one in the discourse, as evidenced by its 
references as its “legal hard core”103 or subsidiarity in its “strict sense”.104  It is generally 
termed a constitutional or legal principle because it is this meaning of subsidiarity that 
sets limits on the exercise of Community competence as set forth in the Treaty.   
 
Formally speaking, the requirements set down in the Treaty, the so-called 
subsidiarity calculus, determine whether the competence conferred on the Community 
should in fact be exercised by it. The basic idea is that if the Member States can 
“sufficiently” achieve the objectives of the action concerned, such action should be left 
there at the lower level of the constituent entities and should not be undertaken at the 
central Community level.  As noted above, this conception of subsidiarity is often 
considered to carry a bias or presumption in favour of the Member States, since as 
dictated by the second paragraph of Article 5 EC, it is only under circumstances where 
the Member States are unable to “do the job”, so to speak, that the Community steps in.  
Subsidiarity can therefore be considered the “second level of defense” in the division of 
competence between the European Union and the Member States by setting (along with 
proportionality) limits, intra vires, on the exercise of Community competence105, and 
thereby serving to safeguard the competences of the Member States in areas where even 
though the Community has been given the requisite competence, the objectives of the 
proposed action can be accomplished at the Member State level.106  
 
Viewed in this light, subsidiarity is a quite unique and extraordinary feature of the 
European Union, as compared to the United States.  Neither the principle of subsidiarity 
nor the principles of proportionality and sincere cooperation for that matter are inscribed 
as an explicit requirement in the text of the US Constitution, although as a practical 
matter, it has been noted that there are various ways in which subsidiarity could be said to 
infuse the American constitutional framework.107  Yet, as emphasised by Professor 
George A. Bermann in his definitive publication: “In a seasoned federalism like that the 
United States, accustomed to taking [a] variety of considerations into account, the notion 
of subsidiarity may, in the end, have a somewhat hollow, even foolish, ring to it.”108  
Indeed, as demonstrated by the discussion of the American private law framework, it is 
remains unknown to what degree the numerous attempts to federalise areas of state 
commercial and contract law failed on account of Congress’s deference to the states in 
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matters of private law that may run along the lines of subsidiarity, as opposed to or in 
conjunction with other considerations.109   
 
As far as European contract law is concerned, the principle of subsidiarity casts a 
long shadow over the debate. To a great extent, subsidiarity (sometimes accompanied by 
proportionality) appears as an argument for preserving the bulk of regulatory action in the 
field of contract law (and other fields of private law) with the Member States and hence 
as a defensive argument opposing far-reaching Community action in this setting.110  To 
be clear, since subsidiarity (in its constitutional form) is concerned with the exercise, not 
the existence, of Community competence, it cannot be applied abstractly, but rather in 
relation to the previous identification and confirmation of sufficient Community 
competence in the first place.  In other words, those attempting to use subsidiarity by 
itself as an argument precluding Community action in contract law may inadvertently 
imply the assumption that the existence of Community competence (i.e., the principle of 
conferral) has been fulfilled.  This explains why the Commission’s discussion of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, and not legal basis, caused such a stir in the 2001 
Communication.111  Moreover, as a related point, there seems to be a glaring paradox 
underlying the principle of subsidiarity in relation to European contract law.  On the one 
hand, as just mentioned, subsidiarity is commonly touted as a barrier to far-reaching 
Community action in the field of contract law (and private law generally) by way of the 
adoption of a comprehensive contract law instrument.  On the other hand, however, there 
is growing recognition of the ineffectiveness of the principle of subsidiarity in relation to 
Community action taken on the basis of the Treaty provisions relevant to the debate about 
European contract law, particularly Article 95 EC.112  This brings into play the distinction 
between material and procedural subsidiarity, which illuminates the roles that subsidiarity 
plays in the debate about European contract law and may to some extent lessen some of 
the tensions associated with the operation of subsidiarity. 
 
8.4.3.2 The distinction between material and procedural subsidiarity:  Guiding the 
exercise of Union competence inside and outside the lawmaking process 
 
As a constitutional principle guiding the exercise of Union competence under the  
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Treaty, subsidiarity can be divided into two categories or subsets, which are often 
referred to in the literature by the labels, “material” and “procedural” subsidiarity.113 
Material subsidiarity is equated with the requirements set down in the second paragraph 
of Article 5 EC cited above and fleshed out further in the Amsterdam Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (hereinafter Amsterdam 
Protocol)114, compliance of which is subject to enforcement before the Court of Justice.  
Procedural subsidiarity is equated with the more political and institutional processes that 
allow material subsidiarity to function, meaning the ways in which the European 
institutions ensure compliance with material subsidiarity as part of the lawmaking 
process. It does not appear as such in the Treaty, but tenets are found in the Amsterdam 
Protocol. 
 
Admittedly, the terms, “material” and “procedural” subsidiarity are not perfect.  
For example, by using the word “procedural”, this may serve to stress the procedural 
context surrounding the reasoned justification for subsidiarity at the risk of neglecting the 
more “substantive” elements of the subsidiarity assessment at the input stage that feeds 
into the proposed initiative and the lawmaking process itself, e.g., by virtue of the 
consultation and information disseminated and gathered by the Commission. The terms 
“legal” and “political” subsidiarity could be surmised to be ready substitutes, but they 
may invite even more terminological problems given the mixture of legal and political 
components on both sides of the material and procedural line.  This may explain the 
reason why one scholar has resorted to the distinction between “subsidiairity from 
within” to lay claim to various ways in which notions of subsidiarity infuse the 
institutional and organisational processes, on the one hand, as opposed to subsidiarity’s 
standard conception regulating the exercise of Community competence under the Treaty 
denoted by “subsidiarity from without”.115  This is extremely useful for demonstrating the 
role of subsidiarity “inside” the lawmaking process, as opposed to “outside”  this process 
once the particular measure has been adopted.  As such, it will be used in tandem with the 
notions of “material” and “procedural” subsidiarity. In any event, the classification of 
subsidiarity into these two categories should not be taken to mean that the two are 
mutually exclusive.  As one scholar put it, the terms are merely heuristic devices for the 
purposes of parsing out the various requirements within each category, so that the various 
aspects of subsidiarity can be fully grasped.116  
 
Starting with the requirements for procedural subsidiarity, they do not appear as 
such in the Treaties, but are elaborated in the Amsterdam Protocol mainly with regard to 
the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council, e.g., as regards the 
Commission’s duties of consultation and reasoned justification with regard to legislative 
proposals and the Community legislator’s obligation to ensure compliance with 
                                                 
113
 See, e.g., A. Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique 105 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2002); 
H. Bribosia, “De la subsidiarité à la coopération renforcée”, in Le traité Amsterdam: espoirs et déceptions 
23 (Y. Lejeune ed., Bruylant, 1998);  
114
 Protocol (No. 30) on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the EC Treaty (1997), 
[2006] OJ C 321E/308 (hereinafter Amsterdam Protocol). 
115
 See H-W. Micklitz, “The Maastricht Treaty, the Principle of Subsidiarity and the Theory of Integration”, 
Lakimies 4/1993 508 (1993). 
116
 Estella, supra note 113, at 105-106. 
Chapter 8:  The Constitutional Parameters of European Contract Law 
 317 
subsidiarity within the context of the decision-making process.117  Among other things, 
the Commission is required to “consult widely before proposing legislation and, wherever 
appropriate, publish consultation documents”118. Albeit blurring somewhat with 
proportionality, it is further specified that as far as the forms of Community action go, 
this should be as “simple as possible” in line with the fact that the Community should 
legislate only to the extent necessary.119  This explains why subsidiarity has become 
infused with notions of “better lawmaking” in the European Union, as demonstrated by 
the steady conflation of the two in the Commission’s annual reports on subsidiarity as 
stipulated by the Amsterdam Protocol.120 In this way, procedural subsidiarity  focuses on 
the ways in which the EU system of governance is responsive to the citizens and the way 
in which subsidiarity informs the choices made by the European institutions within the 
decision-making process.   
 
When viewed in this sense, procedural subsidiarity and European contract law go 
hand-in-hand.  This demonstrated in various ways as the debate has progressed at the 
European level, as in the way in which the European contract law project and the related 
work on the revision of the Community consumer contract acquis are part of the 
simplification and improvement of Community lawmaking121 and the depiction of the 
Common Frame of Reference (the CFR) as a “better lawmaking device” in documents 
issued by various European institutions and bodies, including the European Council. This 
is also shown by the extent to which the Commission “consults widely” with the 
European institutions, the Member States, and various stakeholders by way of its 
numerous Communications and Progress Reports on European contract law in order to 
gauge the choices as to the type of the action to be taken at the European level in the field 
of contract law, which have gradually directed the process away from full-scale 
approximation (as evidenced by the Commission’s repeated assertions that it is not going 
to adopt a European civil code) and towards the CFR and optional instruments, 
mechanisms that display a “softer touch” on the national legal orders.  The CFR has 
presently been envisaged as lawmaking tool to help ensure a “smooth fit” between 
Community measures in contract law and the national contract law regimes, and the 
optional instrument is framed as lying alongside the national legal orders, thereby not 
requiring adjustment or replacement of the national contract laws.  Consequently, it can 
be said that procedural subsidiarity is ingrained in the debate about European contract 
law itself.  Of course, this is not to dismiss the ongoing sensitivities in this regard, 
whether it is the lack of clarity surrounding the aims and the scope of the CFR project or 
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the fact that there is not always a complete “track record” of the various choices that have 
been balanced and weighed by the European institutions in the solutions proposed.  
Nonetheless, it is particularly by virtue of the consultation process in relation to European 
contract law that important decisions regarding action to be taken, or not, by the 
Community in this area have been identified and progressively streamlined to target areas 
where the Member States fall short. 
 
 Moving to the requirements for material subsidiarity, they denote the 
requirements set forth in the second paragraph of Article 5 EC that must be satisfied in 
order to justify the exercise of Community competence as dictated by the Treaty.  Further 
guidance on these requirements is fleshed out in the Amsterdam Protocol.  Truthfully, 
neither the Treaty nor the Amsterdam Protocol are models of absolute clarity.  The Treaty 
bears the imprint of considerable political negotiation that merged different tests for 
subsidiarity into one provision122, and the Amsterdam Protocol is notorious for blurring 
the principles of subsidiarity and  proportionality as detailed below. Still, the 
requirements prescribed by the Treaty and elaborated further in the Amsterdam Protocol 
are vital for applying the principle of subsidiarity in its material form. Following from the 
text of the second paragraph of Article 5 EC, there are several requirements which must 
be satisfied.  Scholars tally them in various ways, but the subsidiarity test or calculus 
boils down to three main requirements: 
 
(1) whether the proposed action falls within an exclusive competence of the 
Community (i.e., “areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence”) 
 
(2) whether the objectives of the proposed action cannot be “sufficiently 
achieved” by the Member States and can therefore be “better achieved” by the 
Community; and 
 
(3) whether the proposed action complies with a specific application of the 
principle of proportionality (i.e., “only if and in so far as” the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore be better achieved by the Community).123 
 
By and large, the heart of the subsidiarity calculus centers on the second requirement, but 
the other two necessitate some explanation given their interplay with the principles of 
conferral and proportionality. 
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 See, e.g., Emiliou, supra note 93, at 401 (finding four different tests embodied in this provision).  For 
further discussion of the Treaty negotiations concerning the formulation of this principle, see, e.g., J. Cloos 
et al., Le traité de Maastricht: genèse, analyse, commentaires 141-151 (Bruylant, 1994); R. Corbett, The 
Treaty of Maastricht – From Conception to Ratification: A Comprehensive Reference Guide 53 (Longman, 
1993). 
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As regards the first requirement, it generated much debate when the principle of 
subsidiarity first emerged as a general constitutional principle in the Maastricht Treaty.124 
This was because the notion of exclusive competence was not defined in the Treaty, 
which harkened back to the principle of conferral in terms of the types of competence 
wielded by the Community (or Union).  Thus, some scholars, no doubt helped along by 
the Commission’s thoughts on the matter125, initially surmised that various competences 
related to the internal market, particularly Articles 94 and 95 EC, were exclusive 
competences, thereby removing action taken pursuant to these provisions from the 
purview of the subsidiarity test under the Treaty.126  At present, however, as made clear 
by the Court’s case law on Article 95 EC, subsidiarity must be complied with in this 
context.127  In any event, it was not so much the application in theory that mattered, but 
the way in which the subsidiarity calculus came out in practice, which leads to the second 
requirement. 
 
The second requirement predicates that the Community exercises the relevant 
competence only if the proposed action “cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community”.128 The language of the Treaty is important here. In effect, 
there are two requirements that must be satisfied:  the first concerning the capabilities of 
the Member States, the so-called “effectiveness” requirement, and the second concerning 
the capabilities of the Community, the so-called “efficiency” requirement.129  Yet, by 
virtue of the words, “and therefore”, the two requirements must be read together and do 
not stand on equal ground. The first requirement, that of the Member States, takes 
precedence; it is only when it is determined that the Member States are not able to do the 
job “sufficiently” that the Community’s capabilities then come into play.130  Framed 
another way, just because the Community can do it “better” is not enough; the Member 
States must first be found not able to do the job themselves.   
 
There are some interesting tradeoffs here.  For one thing, this test evidences a bias 
in favour of the Member States. In other words, the Community and the Member States 
do not come to the table equally, but the Member States get the “upper  hand” in the 
sense that it is only if they cannot do the job “sufficiently” that the Community steps in. 
There are of course ways in which to counteract cases under circumstances where the 
Community’s action would yield much more efficient results by reassessing the 
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 As is well-known, the principle of subsidiarity was previously given expression in Article 130r(4) EEC 
of the Single European Act in the field of environmental policy, albeit its terms were different from the 
subsidiarity calculus of Article 5, second para. EC.  See further Lenaerts, supra note 42, at 858-865. 
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O’Keeffe and P.M. Twomey eds, Wiley Chancery Law, 1994).   
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 See Chapter 9, § 9.3.3.1. 
128
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objectives of the proposed action amidst the political decision-making process.131 Even 
so, this somewhat restrictive framing from the perspective of the Community is curtailed 
by the three guidelines set forth in the Amsterdam Protocol to be used in determining 
whether these two cumulative requirements are fulfilled in relation to the action pursued: 
 
(1) the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot 
be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States; 
 
(2) actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would 
conflict with the requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to 
correct distortions of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on 
trade or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise 
significantly damage Member States’ interests; 
 
(3) action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of 
its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member 
States.132 
 
Much has been made of the repetitive and potentially even conflicting nature of these 
guidelines. Nonetheless, the common theme running through them is that they veer on the 
side of the Community in the sense of elaborating circumstances, such as “transnational 
aspects”, “distortions of competition” and “clear benefits”, in which action at the 
Community level is called for.  Conceivably, there could have guidelines to provide 
instances that would have ruled out Community action, but these are not framed as such. 
Rather, they emphasise those circumstances where the balance falls on the side of the 
Community.  This is particularly evident in circumstances implicating the Community’s 
objectives relating to the internal market. By the explicit emphasis on the transnational 
aspects of the action concerned, the need to correct distortions of competition and 
restrictions on trade, the guidelines are essentially a siren call to Article 95 EC, among 
other provisions, suggesting the outcome of the subsidiarity calculus in its favour. 
 
 This is where the distinction between procedural and material subsidiarity comes 
into play.  In the literature, scholars have submitted that there is a pivotal distinction in 
the application of subsidiarity that depends on whether the Community’s competence 
concerns a particular subject-matter ratione materiae or is of horizontal or cross-sectoral 
nature:  for the former, subsidiarity operates in the “material” sense of regulating the 
exercise of Community competence in line with the subsidiarity calculus set down in the 
Treaty, whereas for the latter, subsidiarity operates as at earlier stage, in the “procedural” 
sense, of influencing the way in which the action proposed for the Community is 
defined.133 As illustrated by this study, however, this distinction can be taken one step 
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 Id., at 877. 
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 Amsterdam Protocol, supra note 114, point 5 (emphasis added).  In the Edinburgh Conclusions, supra 
note 37, an “and/or” was placed after the second guideline, but this was left out in the Amsterdam Protocol: 
see point ii, at 20. 
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 N. Bernard, “The Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity”, 33 
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further.  While the foregoing remarks are readily borne out in relation to functional 
competences such as Articles 95 and 308 EC, it seems that the Community’s 
competences in certain policy fields ratione materiae, especially Article 65 EC, may also 
have the potential to manifest similar operation of subsidiarity in terms of its role “inside” 
as well as “outside” the decision-making process, as illustrated by the recourse to 
optional legal instruments in relation to this provision.134 The bottom line is that the 
infusion of procedural subsidiarity may help to offset some of the tensions stemming 
from material subsidiarity, since it can accommodate a broader range of power-sharing 
between the Community and the Member States, as opposed to an “either-or” choice 
between the Community or the Member States levels presented by material subsidiarity 
that often plays out in favour of the Community in relation to prominent provisions at 
issue in the debate about European contract law.  
 
It also bears emphasis that the second guideline of the Amsterdam Protocol pays 
heed to the Member States acting “alone”.135  Going back to the text of Article 5 EC, it is 
aimed at the assessment of the capabilities of the Member States to achieve the proposed 
action, since if they can do so, this removes any excuse for such action to be exercised at 
Community level.  For a long time, this begged the question whether this is limited to 
action taken by each Member State acting individually or whether action taken by the 
Member States together, either in all or in part, could also be included in the subsidiarity 
calculus.  There is no explicit answer to this question in the text of the Treaties.136  Yet, 
as discussed in Chapter 9,  the case law on the Court of Justice has given an answer to 
this question in the context of Article 95 EC in its express reference to the Member States 
acting individually and its negation of the potential for an international treaty involving 
the Member States outside the Treaty framework to offset Community harmonisation in 
the area concerned.137  Moreover, in the literature, there seems to be some agreement that 
the subsidiarity test can include either individual action on the part of each Member State 
acting alone or cooperation between a certain number of Member States concerned, but it 
cannot include all Member States acting together, since the prospect of intergovernmental 
cooperation would make the “subsidiarity test” illogical and would forestall, even 
jeopardise, the Community method and the objectives to be achieved.138 As such, action 
via an intergovernmental treaty involving all the Member States may be an alternative 
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solution contemplated in the debate about European contract law, but it does not offset 
Community action pursuant to the subsidiarity calculus under the Treaty.139 
 
Finally, the third requirement envelops the principle of proportionality.  To recall, 
it requires that action can be taken by the Community “only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore be better achieved by the Community.140  By virtue of the references to 
“in so far as” of the proposed measure, this has been considered by scholars to embody a 
specific application of the principle of proportionality apart from the principle of 
proportionality found in the third paragraph of Article 5 EC.141  Thus, the two 
applications of the principle of proportionality are saved for treatment together below.  
Yet, for now, it should be clear that by virtue of the Treaty, proportionality is inscribed in 
subsidiarity itself, thereby making it impossible to separate the two. 
 
8.4.3.3 The Lisbon Treaty  
The Lisbon Treaty did not change the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity (in 
its constitutional guise) but in fact sought to make certain aspects more explicit. It 
clarified that while the principle of conferral governs the “limits” of Union competences, 
the principle of subsidiarity, as well as the principle of proportionality, governs the “use” 
of such competences.142 As for the subsidiarity test under the Treaty, the requirements 
would remain the same, save for additional language providing that the Union can act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, “either at central level or at regional and local level”.143  
While certainly emboldening the Union’s respect for the varying levels of governance 
within a Member State for the purposes of assessing its capabilities, in the end, what 
matters is the determination as to whether the Member States can, at whatever level, 
achieve the proposed objectives sufficiently for the purposes of triggering Community 
action.144   
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Most of the attention regarding the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty centers 
on the enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity 
under the Treaty.  Following from the Draft Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty 
introduces a new ex ante procedure allowing the national parliaments’ scrutiny of 
proposals’ compliance with subsidiarity as part of the lawmaking process145, which is 
elaborated in the new Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality annexed to the Lisbon Treaty (hereinafter Lisbon Protocol).146 The Lisbon 
Treaty would also make certain changes in an effort to strengthen the ex post enforcement 
of subsidiarity before the Court of Justice.147  While the implications of these new 
additions remain to be seen148, they essentially embody elements of both procedural and 
material subsidiarity, in terms of placing renewed emphasis on subsidiarity “inside” the 
lawmaking process by virtue of the introduction of this new ex ante procedure involving 
the national parliaments, as well as bolstering to some extent subsidiarity “outside” the 
lawmaking process in terms of ensuring compliance with the subsidiarity test under the 
Treaty.  It should be added, however, that with the emphasis placed on these new 
enforcement mechanisms, the Lisbon Protocol would eliminate much of the language 
found in the previous Amsterdam Protocol concerning the application of procedural 
subsidiarity and material subsidiarity as discussed above.  As a practical matter, the 
language of the Amsterdam Protocol will not be completely erased from the legal and 
political landscape, but this Protocol would no longer have the status of primary 
Community law.  
 
8.4.4 The principle of proportionality 
8.4.4.1 The definition(s) of the principle of proportionality 
Alongside subsidiarity, the principle of proportionality also governs the exercise 
of Community competence as set forth in the third paragraph of Article 5 EC:  “Any 
action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of the Treaty”.149 This definition of proportionality as a constitutional principle governing 
the exercise of Community competence sets it apart from its other roles as a general 
principle of Community law, which come into play in the assessment of the legality of 
Community measures, on the one hand, and the compatibility of national measures with 
Community law, on the other. While there is certainly overlap, proportionality as a 
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constitutional principle is primarily concerned with the establishment of limits on the 
exercise of Community competence so as to ensure that it does not “go too far” and exert 
a “disproportionate” impact on Member State competence, as opposed to the regulation 
of public power, whether at the Community or national level, vis-à-vis individuals.150   
 
One of the major challenges presented by proportionality is distinguishing it from 
subsidiarity.  Indeed, scholars have commonly noted their blurring151, and in many 
instances, proportionality is treated as a part of subsidiarity or vice versa.152 In principle, 
proportionality and subsidiarity are often presented as answering distinct, albeit related, 
questions regarding the exercise of Community competence:  proportionality regulates 
the nature and the intensity of the exercise of Community competence153, whereas 
subsidiarity determines whether there is a need for the exercise of Community 
competence in the first place.  This suggests that proportionality essentially takes up 
where subsidiarity leaves off.   Yet, in practice, it is not so simple to separate the two 
principles, and in fact, the two are entangled both by virtue of the incorporation of 
proportionality as part of the subsidiarity test enshrined in the second paragraph of 
Article 5 EC and the requirements for the principle of proportionality standing alone 
under third paragraph of Article 5 EC. 
 
8.4.4.2  Proportionality’s requirements inside and outside subsidiarity 
 First, as regards the requirements set forth in the third paragraph of Article 5 EC,   
in contrast to the arduous language of subsidiarity situated above it in the Treaty, the 
principle of proportionality amounts to only one sentence, albeit a powerful one.  It 
ensures that “any action” taken by the Community pursuant to its competences under the 
Treaty does “not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty”.154 
The stipulation of “any action” means that proportionality, unlike subsidiarity, must be 
complied with regardless if the Community is acting within the scope of its exclusive or 
non-exclusive competence.155   
 
Under the case law of the Court of Justice, the principle of proportionality 
generally mandates compliance with two requirements:  first, that Community action is 
“appropriate” (also referred to as the suitability test); and second, that such action is 
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“indispensable” (referred to as the necessity test).156 Under the first requirement, 
Community action is “appropriate” where it is capable of achieving the intended 
objectives.157  Under the second requirement, Community action is “indispensable” 
where it cannot be replaced by another form of action that would equally capable of 
achieving the proposed objectives but would exert a less onerous impact to another 
interest protected by Community law.158   
 
In light of these two requirements, the principle of proportionality is essentially 
concerned with gauging the intensity of Community action to ensure that it is properly 
attuned to achieve the objectives proposed without exerting an excessive impact on the 
competences of the Member States.  As such, aspects hinging on the nature and the form 
of Community action are the bastion of proportionality under the third paragraph of 
Article 5 EC.  At the same time, however, such matters seem to invite aspects of 
subsidiarity, and thus, it becomes difficult to draw  line between the two.   This is aptly 
demonstrated by the Amsterdam Protocol. In particular, points 6 and 7 are often 
considered as falling within the rubric of proportionality, though there is no heading to 
indicate this, as was the case with the previous 1992 Edinburgh Conclusions159, but 
nonetheless serve to interweave components of subsidiarity into the equation.   Point 6 
devotes attention to the matter of legal instruments, making clear that: “Other things 
being equal, directives should be preferred to regulations and framework decisions to 
detailed measures”.160 In doing so, it reiterates the salient features of directives as defined 
in Article 249 EC in terms of leaving the choice of form and methods of the result to be 
achieved to the Member States, which explain their association with the principle of 
subsidiarity.161 This point indicates that the form and choice of instrument both bear upon 
the intensity of the action as well as the way in which such action is formulated, thereby 
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laying claim to both proportionality and subsidiarity. Point 7 continues with the 
discussion of the nature and the extent of Community action as follows: 
 
Community measures should leave as much scope for national decision as  
possible, consistent with securing the aim of the measure and observing 
the requirements of the Treaty. While respecting Community law, care 
should be taken to respect well established national arrangements and the 
organisation and working of Member States’ legal systems. Where 
appropriate and subject to the need for proper enforcement, Community 
measures should provide Member States with alternative ways to achieve 
the objectives of the measures.162 
 
These various aspects  – respecting national regimes, providing the Member States with 
alternative means of action, and leaving as much scope for Member State action as 
possible – touch just as much on the proportionality inquiry in terms of how far the 
Community should go as on the subsidiarity inquiry in terms of the extent to which the 
Community should act.   
 
 Noticeably, many of the “juicy tidbits” regarding proportionality in the 1992 
Edinburgh Conclusions were dropped in the Amsterdam Protocol. In particular, gone 
were the references to non-binding or “soft law” measures, such as recommendations and 
voluntary codes of conduct163; choosing the type of Community action with a view to 
“encouraging cooperation between Member States, coordination national action or to 
complementing, supplementing or supporting such action”164; and where it was necessary 
to set standards at Community level, “consideration should be given to setting minimum 
standards, with freedom for Member States to set higher national standards” in all areas 
where appropriate, not just where mandated by the Treaty165. Such matters equally called 
attention to subsidiarity.   
 
The blurring between proportionality and subsidiarity is further apparent when it 
comes to the specific application of the proportionality as part of the requirements for 
subsidiarity set down in the second paragraph of Article 5 EC.166 Here, proportionality is 
incorporated as part of the subsidiarity test itself.  In other words, as part of ensuring 
compliance with subsidiarity, it must be determined whether the proposed action is both 
“appropriate” and “indispensable” in line with the two basic requirements for 
proportionality elaborated above.167 The idea is that this allows the principle of 
subsidiarity, infused with proportionality, to temper or to gauge the scope of Community 
action to only that part of the proposed action where the Member States fall short and 
thus seeks to preserve the action of the Member States for that part of the proposed action 
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which they are capable of achieving.168 In short, proportionality under the second 
paragraph of Article 5 EC is an ingenious element of the subsidiarity test that ensures that 
Community action only “fills the gaps” and does not go intrude into areas that the 
Member States are capable of acting themselves.    
 
 So far, the exact relationship between proportionality in the second as opposed to 
third paragraph of Article 5 EC has not garnered much attention in the literature, and 
indeed, this is a subject in which further research is warranted.  Formally, proportionality 
under the third paragraph of Article 5 EC comes into play in all instances of Community 
action, not just under circumstances relating to non-exclusive Community competence 
under the second paragraph of Article 5 EC.  Yet, practically speaking, it is often difficult 
to distinguish the impact of proportionality in the second paragraph as opposed to the 
third paragraph of Article 5 EC.  The bottom line for this study is that subsidiarity and 
proportionality are inextricably intertwined. While the requirements of the proportionality 
test under the third paragraph of Article 5 EC are formally distinct from those set down in 
the second paragraph of Article 5 EC, both pay tribute to the intimate connection between 
proportionality and subsidiarity.  This means that for the purposes of the constitutional 
assessment of European contract law, very often a distinct line between the two cannot be 
drawn and thus the two must be referred to together.   This also means that for those 
seeking to find refuge in the principle of proportionality to offset subsidiarity’s apparent 
ineffectiveness in relation to provisions such as Article 95 EC169, questions remain open 
in this regard given the bond between the two.  At the same time, however, the 
combination of subsidiarity and proportionality make for a powerful pair in terms of 
amplifying the roles that can be played by these principles “inside” as well as “outside” 
the lawmaking process when it comes to European contract law.   While the principle of 
subsidiarity has been criticised for its inability for expressing the nuances of the 
relationship between the powers wielded by the Community and the Member States170, it 
is submitted here that this viewpoint discounts the viable role that it can play alongside 
proportionality in relation to provisions at issue in European contract law. Specifically, in 
line with the distinction between material and procedural subsidiarity elaborated above, 
proportionality can further contribute to the more nuanced role that subsidiarity can play 
inside the lawmaking process vis-à-vis provisions such as Articles 95 and 308 EC 
relevant to the debate. 
 
8.4.4.3  The Lisbon Treaty  
As with the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, the Lisbon Treaty does not 
fundamentally change the meaning and operation of the principle of proportionality (in its 
constitutional form), but makes certain aspects more explicit.  Article 5(4) EU provides:  
“Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”171 As seen above, that 
was made clear in the Amsterdam Protocol but not so much in the third paragraph of 
                                                 
168
  Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, supra note 21, § 5-042, at 112-
113.  
169
 See Davies, supra note 112, at 81-84. 
170
 See, e.g., Estella, supra note 113, at 134-136. 
171
 Article 5(4), first para. TFEU. 
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Article 5 EC itself.  This may to some extent compensate for the fact that the Lisbon 
Protocol eliminates much of the language concerning proportionality’s application, 
including points 6 and 7 discussed above. Nonetheless, by leaving intact the definition of 
subsidiarity, the Lisbon Treaty retains the specific form of proportionality incorporated as 
part of the subsidiarity calculus, and in fact, by laying claim to both the “content” and the 
“form” of Union action, it would seem to draw proportionality and subsidiarity closer 
together.  Yet, unlike the principle of subsidiarity, the principle of proportionality is not 
subject to the ex ante procedure involving the national parliament.  Given the relationship 
between the two, difficulties in checking compliance with subsidiarity, and not 
proportionality, have been spotlighted in the commentary.172   
 
 Perhaps one of the most provocative points about proportionality is that which 
never made it into the Lisbon Treaty itself. This concerns the Commission’s unsuccessful 
proposal to put forward a scheme concerning the classification of Union powers based on 
the scale of intensity of Union action as part of the European Convention.173  The impetus 
of this proposal stemmed from the Commission’s view that categorising Union 
competences (based on the distinction between exclusive, shared and complementary 
competences) would not sufficiently clarify the division of competences between the 
Union and the Member States, since in most areas, both the Community and the Member 
States could in principle take action and the nature and arrangements for their interaction 
were extremely variable.174  As such, the Commission advocated another approach based 
on a typology of Union action, classified on a sliding scale of the intensity of Union 
action in both the legislative and non-legislative spheres.175  For the legislative sphere, 
this category was composed of four types of action, proceeding from uniform regulation, 
harmonisation, minimum harmonisation and finally mutual recognition and 
“interconnection” of the Member State’ legal systems.176  For the non-legislative sphere, 
this ranged from joint action, compulsory coordination of national policies, financial 
support programmes, and non-binding coordination of national policies.177 This proposal 
was ultimately passed over in favor of the categorisation of competences inserted initially 
in the Draft Constitutional Treaty and ultimately in the Lisbon Treaty as elaborated 
above.178 As a formal matter, the Commission’s proposal was framed within the context 
of the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States, as 
opposed to the principle of proportionality as such. Nonetheless, it had potential to 
breathe new life into the principle of proportionality in the sense of expressly matching 
up forms of Union action based on their intensity in relation to the national legal orders. 
That said, from the vantage point of European contract law, viable forms of Union action 
contemplated in the debate, such as optional legal forms, were not mentioned. 
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 See supra note 148. 
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 Note from the European Commission on “Delimitation of powers: a matter of scale of intervention”,  
supra note 87. 
174
 Id., at 5-7.  
175
 Id., at 7-8. 
176
 Id., at 9-10. 
177
 Id., at 10-11. 
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 The proposal was mentioned in the Final Report of Working Group V “Complementary Competencies”, 
though not as an explicit recommendation:  see CONV 375/1/02 REV 1 WGV 14, dated 4 Nov. 2002, at 
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8.4.5 The principle of sincere cooperation 
8.4.5.1 The definition of the principle of sincere cooperation 
The principle of sincere cooperation has garnered several labels, such as the 
principle of loyal cooperation or the principle of loyalty179, but they generally point to the 
requirements enshrined in Article 10 EC.  Article 10 EC contains two key paragraphs.  
The first paragraph is concerned with the “positive” obligations placed on the Member 
States, providing that: “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether 
general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Community’s tasks”.180 The second paragraph places “negative” 
obligations on the Member States to “abstain from any measure which could jeopardise 
the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty”.181  On their face, both paragraphs seem to 
be limited to obligations placed on the Member States; however, this principle has been 
interpreted as concerning, on the one hand, the duties owed by the Member States to the 
European institutions and among themselves, and on the other hand, the duties owed by 
the European institutions to the Member States and to each other.182  Compared to the 
principles of conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality, the principle of sincere 
cooperation transcends matters of Community competence and is concerned with the 
relationship between the European institutions and the Member States on a much wider 
scale.183  Nonetheless, this principle has an important role to play in the debate about 
European contract law, despite its low profile so far.  Indeed, the principle is somewhat 
underestimated in the debate about European contract law, as has been said for the EU 
institutional framework generally.184  
 
8.4.5.2 The role(s) of the principle of sincere cooperation in European contract law 
As far as matters of Community competence are concerned, the operation of the 
principle of sincere cooperation generally follows that of the principles of conferral, 
subsidiarity, and proportionality.  By and large, it is a “follow-up” provision, which 
comes after the decision has been made as to what level and to what extent the proposed 
action should be exercised by the Community or by the Member States.  But importantly, 
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 Although Article 10 EC contained no heading, the principle of “loyal” cooperation has been cited in the 
case law. See, e.g., Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285, para. 42.  The reference to the principle of 
“sincere” cooperation is chosen to parallel its appellation in the Lisbon Treaty as discussed further below. 
180
 Article 10, first para. EC. 
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 Article 10, second para. EC. 
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 See Declaration (No. 3) on Article 10 of the Treaty establishing the European Community annexed to 
the Nice Treaty, [2001] OJ C 80/77; Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 
supra note 21, § 5-048, at 116 (and citations therein).   
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 See, e.g., L.W. Gormley, “The Development of General Principles of Law Within Article 10 (ex Article 
5) EC”, in General Principles of European Community Law, supra note 36, 113; R. Widdershoven, “The 
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Review 645, 647 (1990). See also S. Weatherill, “Beyond Preemption? Shared Competence and 
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126, 13, at 31 (finding the role played by Article 10 EC in developing shared competence “brimming with 
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it is triggered in either case.  As recognised in the Amsterdam Protocol, “where the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality lead to no action being 
taken by the Community, Member States are required in their action to comply with the 
general rules laid down in Article 10 EC”, that is to say with both the positive and 
negative obligations cited above.185 Likewise, where application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality lead to action being taken by the Community, the 
principle of sincere cooperation places the Member States  under various duties related to 
ensuring that the objectives of the Community measure concerned is fully achieved, such 
as ensuring it is properly and timely implemented and that it receives their full 
effectiveness in the national legal orders.  The European institutions too are under various 
duties, such as cooperating with the Member States and with each other within the 
context of ensuring the objectives of the particular measure are achieved.  It is often 
overlooked, however, that the principle of sincere cooperation has another role to play in 
the constitutional assessment of European contract law. As will be seen, this is in 
connection with the potential recourse to an intergovernmental treaty among the Member 
States outside the Treaty framework as a potential alternative route to far-reaching Union 
action in contract law.186   
 
8.4.5.3 The Lisbon Treaty 
By and large, similar to the principles above, the Lisbon Treaty further ingrains 
the overriding importance of this principle and makes certain aspects more explicit. The 
principle of sincere cooperation is placed at the forefront of the EU Treaty before the 
principles of conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality in Article 4 EU.187 A new 
paragraph has been inserted so as to confirm in the text of the Treaties that pursuant to 
the principle of sincere cooperation, both “the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties”.188  
In short, the role played by the principle of sincere cooperation in connection with 
European contract law is not substantially altered by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter illustrates that while most of the reasons used to explain 
the neglect of the constitutionality of European contract law at the European level were 
viable as the debate about European contract law was gearing up, they have lost much of 
their salience as far as the activities contemplated within the European contract law are 
concerned, and in fact, merely serve to make the need to confront the constitutional 
dimensions of European contract law more apparent.  Moreover, with the changes to the 
Treaty framework brought by the Lisbon Treaty, paved by the European Convention, the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty, the constitutional climate surrounding the division of 
competence between the European Union and the Member States adds to this momentum, 
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and as will be seen, has great significance to the interpretation of the Treaty provisions 
and other forms of Member State action contemplated in the debate.  
 
That being said, the difficulties surrounding the constitutionality of European 
contract law should not be underestimated.  While in principle the constitutional 
parameters of European contract law may be clear cut, in practice, they are mired in an 
entangled web that makes it especially challenging to distinguish the principles of 
conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality, and to parse out the nuanced roles that each of 
these principles play in this setting.   For the principle of conferral, the type of legal basis 
in terms of distinction between cross-sectoral competences as opposed to those in a 
particular policy field has an important impact on the role that subsidiarity and 
proportionality can play, and the possible combination of legal bases in light of current 
case law places new focus on the possible use of more than one Treaty provision to 
support Union action in contract law. For the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, while it is difficult to find the boundary line between them, their 
combination contributes to a more multi-dimensional inquiry as regards their potential 
role “inside” as well as “outside” the EU decision-making process, despite the fact that 
either alone or together there are tensions associated with their perceived ineffectiveness 
in relation to functional provisions such as Article 95 EC. For the principle of sincere 
cooperation, it plays an important role not only as a “follow up” to the principles of the 
subsidiarity and proportionality but also in connection with the potential recourse to 
forms of intergovernmental cooperation among the Member States, which have been 
contemplated as part of the debate.  Together, the examination of the principles of 
conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality, and sincere cooperation sets the scene for delving 
into the Union’s competence in particularly policy fields, starting with the internal market 
examined in the next chapter. 
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9 
 
European Contract Law and the Internal Market 
 
9.1 Introduction 
As illustrated in Part Two of this study, the Community’s objectives rooted in the 
internal market have stood at the forefront of the debate about European contract law, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, from the European Parliament’s 1989 Resolution through 
the Commission’s three Communications on European contract law and recent 
Parliament resolutions on the CFR. As things stand at present, there has been 
considerable movement away from the prospect of far-reaching approximation of 
national contract law, but approximation in certain areas of contract law is not completely 
off the political agenda, as highlighted by discussions concerning the Common Frame of 
Reference (the CFR).1  Moreover, the adoption of one or more optional instruments in the 
field of contract law may be likely in the foreseeable future or at least given renewed 
inquiry as the preparation of the CFR nears completion. As such, the assessment of the 
full extent of the Union’s internal market competences to adopt a European contract law 
instrument, optional or otherwise, remains as viable as ever.  
 
This brings Articles 94, 95, and 308 EC to the forefront.  Article 95 EC has 
attracted much of the attention and the controversy in the debate about European contract 
law as regards its scope, its interaction with the free movement provisions of the Treaty, 
especially those concerning the free movement of goods (Articles 28-30 EC), and its 
interplay with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Yet, Articles 94 and 308 
EC have also made their way into the discussion, each attracting diverse opinions as to 
the extent to which they may be considered to play a residual or complementary role vis-
à-vis Article 95 EC to support Union action in contract law, with Article 308 EC given 
pride of place in the case of an optional instrument falling alongside the laws of the 
Member States.   
 
In view of the foregoing remarks, the aim of this chapter is to examine the 
European Union’s competence to adopt a comprehensive contract law instrument, 
optional or otherwise, on the basis of Articles 94, 95, and/or 308 EC (and their 
counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty).  The chapter is divided into three main parts, in line 
with the key issues surrounding the use of these provisions in the debate about European 
contract law. The first part explores the relationship between Articles 94 and 95 EC so as 
to determine the extent to which Article 94 EC (now Article 115 TFEU) can play a 
complementary or residual role vis-à-vis Article 95 EC in this setting.  The second part 
analyses the scope of the Union’s competence under Article 95 EC (now Article 114 
TFEU), with particular regard to clarifying the relationship between Article 95 EC and 
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 See, e.g., Testimony of Mr. Jonathan Faull, Director General, Justice, Freedom and Security, European 
Commission, in House of Lords European Union Committee, “European Contract Law:  the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference”, Twelfth Report of Session 2008-09, H.L. 95, Q144-145 (The Stationary Office 
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the free movement rules (namely, Articles 28-30 EC concerning the free movement of 
goods, which were reframed, without substantive change, in the Lisbon Treaty as Articles 
34-36 TFEU) and the interplay between this provision and the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality.  The third part evaluates the relationship between Articles 95 and 
308 EC, thereby evaluating the extent to which Article 308 EC (now Article 352 TFEU) 
can play a complementary or residual role vis-à-vis Article 95 EC as regards the 
approximation of national contract law, on the one hand, and displaces Article 95 EC as 
far as the adoption of an optional instrument is concerned.   
 
The ordering of these three parts is purposeful.  The relationship between Articles 
94 and 95 EC not only determines the potential role, or not, to be played by Article 94 EC 
in relation to Article 95 EC, but also exposes aspects concerning Article 95 EC itself, 
which sets the stage for the subsequent analysis of that provision. The case law 
concerning the scope of Article 95 EC paves the way for delving into the relationship 
between Articles 95 and 308 EC, especially when it comes to the use of optional legal 
forms.  In all, as will be seen, the case law on Article 95 EC serves as the template or 
“springboard” for evaluating the breadth of this provision and its relationship to Articles 
94 and 308 EC in this setting (as well as other Treaty provisions and alternative solutions 
put forward in the debate as seen in the coming chapters), much like the center wheel and 
the outerlying spokes.   
 
9.2 The relationship between Articles 94 and 95 EC 
9.2.1 Overview of approximation in the Treaties and the three-level hierarchy  
 To understand why prominent focus is placed on Articles 94 and 95 EC, as 
opposed to other provisions conferring competence on the Community to approximate 
national laws, the discussion begins with an overview of approximation in the Treaty 
framework and the three-level hierarchy within which the various provisions allowing for 
approximation of national laws are situated.  As stressed time and time again both inside 
and outside the debate about European contract law, the approximation of national laws is 
not an objective in and of itself in the system of the Treaties.  Rather, in line with the 
principal of conferral, approximation constitutes a tool at the disposal of the Community, 
alongside others, to help it achieve various objectives set forth in the Treaties.  Still, there 
is good reason why approximation is intimately associated with the internal market, since 
it is particularly in that context that approximation plays a crucial role as dictated by 
Articles 2 and 3 EC.     
 
From the founding of the European (Economic) Community, the objective to 
establish a common market has been inscribed upfront in Article 2 E(E)C, which at the 
same time framed the common market as an instrument to achieve larger goals in the 
European integration process.2  This is augmented by Article 3 EC, which lists among the 
various activities for the Community “an internal market characterised by the abolition, 
as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement for persons, services and 
                                                 
2
 See Article 2 EC.  Through successive Treaty amendments following the EEC Treaty, this provision was 
modified and expanded, but the first introductory clause concerning the common market was not altered. In 
the Lisbon Treaty, however, this provision was replaced, in substance, by Article 3 EU. 
Chapter 9:  European Contract Law and the Internal Market 
 334 
capital” in Article 3(1)(c) EC3, “a system ensuring that competition in the internal market 
is not distorted” in Article 3(1)(g) EC4 and “the approximation of the laws of Member 
States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common market” in Article 
3(1)(h) EC5.  These provisions are complemented by Article 14 EC, which expressly 
defines the internal market as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty”6 and set forth various provisions of the Treaty that were 
designed to carry out this objective, which included among others Article 95 EC.7   
Leaving aside the nuances between the internal and common market for the moment8, 
what is important to grasp for now is that in line with Articles 2 and 3 EC, the 
Community has been given the task to create an integrated market among the Member 
States, which would be carried out via various provisions in the Treaty.  Framed 
differently, there is not just one “go to” provision that governs the Community’s 
competence to approximate national laws for the purposes of the common or internal 
market.  
 
In this regard, there is a hierarchy in the system of the Treaties with respect to the 
recourse to the various approximation provisions.  It generally comprises three levels:  
first, specific approximation provisions; second, general approximation provisions 
including Articles 94 and 95 EC; and finally, the “catchall” provision of Article 308 EC. 
This hierarchy is not explicitly elaborated in the Treaty as such, but emerged on account 
of the text of certain provisions of the Treaty as interpreted by the Court of Justice.  
Specifically, in view of the clause “save where otherwise provided in this Treaty” 
inscribed in Article 95 EC, this predicates that if there is a provision that provides a more 
specific approximation competence in the area concerned, then this takes priority over 
general approximation provisions found on the second level, namely Articles 94 and 
Article 95 EC.9  This is essentially an expression of the relationship between general and 
specific legal bases in the Treaty within the context of the principle of conferral, in the 
sense that if the Treaty contains a more specific legal basis that is applicable to achieve 
the objectives of the measure concerned, then it takes precedence over the more general 
legal basis (“lex specialis derogat legi generali”).10  This hierarchy demonstrates that 
there is no “cherry picking” between the various provisions; rather, there are rules laid 
down in the Treaty as regards the choice between certain provisions.  In other words, as 
far as European contract law is concerned, there is no “free choice” as between Articles 
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 Article 3(1)(c) EC.   
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Commission v. Council [2004] ECR I-4829, para. 59; Case C-271/94 European Parliament v. Council 
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94 and 95 EC, or even Article 308 EC depending on subjective preferences concerning 
the relevant decision-making procedures, legal instruments, etc. This hierarchy is 
therefore beneficial for singling out Articles 94 and 95 EC, as opposed to others in the 
internal market setting, with Article 308 EC playing a “backup” role. 
 
The first level concerns specific approximation provisions that confer competence 
on the Community to approximate national laws in particular policy fields ratione 
materiae. As already noted in Chapter 8, there are no specific approximation provisions 
concerning contract law. Thus, as far as the Community’s objectives rooted in the 
internal market are concerned, specific approximation provisions do not play a key role in 
the discussion of the constitutionality of European contract law.   
 
The second level concerns general approximation provisions, which denote the 
Community’s functional competences of a cross-sectoral character.11 So far, it has been 
primarily Articles 94 and 95 EC that lie at the crux of the debate about European contract 
law in the internal market setting, as opposed to other approximation provisions found 
within this level.  For example, Articles 96 and 97 EC sit side by side with Articles 94 
and 95 EC in the chapter of the Treaty on the “Approximation of Laws”.  Generally 
speaking, Article 96 EC deals with situations involving existing distortions of 
competition in the common market12, whereas Article 97 EC is concerned with the risk of 
future distortions in this regard.13 As original fixtures of the EEC Treaty, they were 
intended to serve as a “lex specialis” in relation to Article 94 EC (then Article 100 EEC) 
because they were aimed at remedying specific cases of distortions of competition in the 
common market involving one or more Member States.14 Thus, they are not generally 
viewed as having much relevance as far as the adoption of a European contract law 
instrument is concerned.15  Furthermore, Articles 47 and 55 EC have been considered, 
like Article 95 EC, as horizontal competences, albeit with a more limited reach since they 
pertain specifically to the right of establishment and the free movement of services, 
respectively.16 One might have expected them to merit some attention in the debate about 
European contract law, but so far this has not generally been the case.  It may very well 
be the case that these provisions would at most be used in conjunction with Article 95 
EC, and therefore, they are not considered the sole or even main peg upon which to hang 
                                                 
11
 See Chapter 8, § 8.4.2.3.   
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 See Article 96 EC (now Article 116 TFEU). 
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 See Article 97 EC (now Article 117 TFEU). 
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 See PJ.G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities: From Maastricht To Amsterdam 802-810 (L.W. Gormley ed., 3rd ed., Kluwer, 1998) 
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VerLoren van Themaat, The Law of the European Union and the European Communities 785, 872-874 
(P.J.G. Kapteyn et al. eds, 4th ed., Kluwer, 2008)). See also Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case 
C-308/01 GIL Insurance Ltd and Others [2004] ECR I-4777, paras 58-67.   
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 See, e.g., J. Ziller, “The Legitimacy of the Codification of Contract Law in View of the Allocation of 
Competences between the European Union and its Member States”, in The Politics of a European Civil 
Code 89, 97-98 (M.W. Hesselink ed., Kluwer, 2006). 
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 See Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and 
Council (“Tobacco Advertising I”) and Case C-74/99 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health and 
Others, ex parte: Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Others (“Imperial Tobacco”) [2000] ECR I-8419, para. 63. 
Articles 47 and 55 EC have been reframed as Articles 53 and 63 TFEU, respectively, in the Lisbon Treaty. 
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the adoption of a European contract law instrument.  In any case, as made clear by 
Tobacco Advertising I17, the Court interprets the scope of these provisions akin to that of 
Article 95 EC.18  Consequently, their viability may increase, likely in combination with 
Article 95 EC, and as such, the examination of Article 95 EC has relevance for the 
potential recourse to these provisions.   
 
Finally, the third level of the hierarchy concerns the catchall provision of Article 
308 EC. Article 308 EC comes into play under circumstances where Community action 
proves “necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of 
the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers”.19  In other words, Article 308 EC can only be used under circumstances where a 
more specific legal basis cannot be found under the Treaty to confer competence on the 
Community to adopt the measure concerned, whether concerning the achievement of the 
Community’s internal market objectives or otherwise.  As such, Article 308 EC’s 
potential to serve as legal basis in the debate about European contract law follows from 
the determination of the Community’s competence under Articles 94 and 95 EC. 
 
9.2.2 Text of Articles 94 and 95 EC compared and the order of preference 
Articles 94 and 95 EC sit side-by-side in the specific chapter of the EC Treaty 
devoted to the “Approximation of Laws”.20  In this regard, it is quite remarkable that the 
Treaty provides for not one, but two distinct provisions that embody startlingly similar, 
though not exactly identical, language.21 This is no coincidence, but the product of the 
chronological development of the Treaties brought about by the Single European Act, 
which introduced Article 95 EC (then Article 100a EEC) amidst institutional activities 
placing renewed stimulus on the creation of the internal market whilst attempting to 
overcome the limitations of Article 94 EC (then Article 100 EEC).22  Article 94 EC 
comprises the following single sentence: 
 
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission  
and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations  
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 Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council (“Tobacco Advertising I”) [2000] ECR I-
8419. 
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 See infra note 94. 
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 Article 308 EC.  Compare Article 352 TFEU (“necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in 
the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the 
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 Chapter 3 (“Approximation of Law”) of Title VI, which covers more generally “Common Rules on 
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 This was highlighted by the European Convention, whereby there were proposals to merge the two into 
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22
 The rich discourse on this course of events transcends this study. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, “The 
Transformation of Europe”, 100 Yale Law Journal 2403 (1991) (reprinted in J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Constitution of Europe – “Do The New Clothes Have An Emperor?” and Other Essays on European 
Integration 10 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999)). 
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or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market.23  
 
In contrast, the first paragraph of Article 95 EC provides:  
 
 By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in 
this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the 
objectives set out in Article 14.  The Council shall, acting in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.24 
 
This is immediately followed by Article 95(2) EC, which sets forth an explicit proviso 
that Article 95 EC cannot be used in relation to the adoption of measures relating to (1) 
fiscal provisions; (2) the free movement of persons; and (3) the rights and interests of 
employed persons.25 
 
As indicated by the italicised language above, there are several differences 
between Articles 94 and 95 EC in terms of their decision-making procedures, legal 
instruments, and substantive scope that manifest considerable tradeoffs between the two.  
As for decision-making procedures, Article 94 EC provides for unanimous voting in the 
Council with consultation of the European Parliament (and the European Economic and 
Social Committee), whereas Article 95 EC provides for qualified majority voting in the 
Council and the co-decision procedure (also with consultation of the European Economic 
and Social Committee). As such, Article 95 EC embodies greater involvement of the 
Parliament as a co-legislator alongside the Council by way of the co-decision procedure, 
as opposed to mere consultation under Article 94 EC. Conversely, Article 94 EC requires 
a stronger role for the Council via unanimous voting, as opposed to qualified majority 
voting under Article 95 EC.  Furthermore, as for the choice of legal instruments, Article 
94 EC is limited to the use of directives, whereas Article 95 EC authorises “measures”, 
which includes but is not limited to directives. As is well-known, the use of directives 
under Article 95 EC is encouraged by a special Declaration attached to the Single 
European Act on this provision.26 Nonetheless, it is a crucial point in the debate about 
European contract law that only Article 95 EC, and not Article 94 EC, allows for a 
broader array of legal instruments such as regulations, which have been contemplated in 
the context of discussions concerning the optional instrument.27 As for the substantive 
scope of the two provisions, there are three glaring differences in the wording of Articles 
94 and 95 EC.  These concern the respective references to directives or measures that (1) 
“directly affect” versus have as their “object” the (2) establishment “or” versus “and” 
                                                 
23
 Article 94 EC (emphasis added). 
24
 Article 95(1) EC (emphasis added). 
25
 Article 95(2) EC. 
26
 Declaration on Article 100a of the EEC Treaty, [1987] OJ L 169/24, provides: “In its proposals pursuant 
to Article 100a(1) the Commission shall given precedence to the use of the instrument of a directive if 
harmonization involves the amendment of legislative provisions in one or more Member States.”  
27
 See Chapter 6, § 6.4.2. 
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functioning of the (3) “common market” versus “internal market”.28   Notably, some of 
these differences have led commentators to contemplate the merits of both provisions for 
the purposes of their potential use in connection with European contract law.  Yet, there 
is in fact a specific order of preference between the two provisions dictated by the Treaty, 
which prioritises the use of Article 95 EC. 
 
By virtue of the first sentence of Article 95(1) EC – “By way of derogation from 
Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the following provisions 
shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14” – this has been 
taken to mean that Article 95 EC is a “lex specialis” in relation to Article 94 EC when it 
comes to the achievement of the objectives relating to the internal market.29 The language 
of Article 95 EC can be considered somewhat deceptive because it states that Article 95 
EC is merely a “derogating” provision from Article 94 EC, when in fact the breadth of 
the objectives related to the internal market indicate a wide expanse for the scope of 
Article 95 EC, with the result that Article 95 EC has effectively overtaken Article 94 EC 
as the primary source of Community approximation competence between the two.30  
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that the European legislator must have recourse to Article 
95 EC first.31 Article 94 EC occupies a residual role vis-à-vis Article 95 EC for the three 
fields fenced off from Article 95 EC (i.e., those concerning fiscal provisions, free 
movement of persons and the rights and interests of employed persons) to the extent that 
more specific approximation provisions are not applicable.32   
 
 The primary role assumed by Article 95 EC is further enhanced by the Lisbon 
Treaty.  Articles 94 and 95 EC still remain side-by-side, with their substantive content 
left virtually untouched.  Yet, their order is now reversed so that Article 95 EC comes 
before Article 94 EC as the first provision of the Chapter devoted to the Approximation 
of Laws.33 This explains the alterations to the first sentence of each provision.  The first 
paragraph of Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95(1) EC) reads:  “Save where otherwise 
provided by the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the 
objectives set out in Article 26” (the equivalent of Article 14 EC).34  The introductory 
clause in Article 95(1) EC – “By way of derogation from Article 94” –is removed, and 
Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 94 EC) begins, “Without prejudice to Article 114”.35 As a 
                                                 
28
 As a related point, Article 95 EC contains an explicit proviso in Article 95(3) EC and a special procedure 
inscribed in Articles 95(3)-(10) EC, which relate only to measures adopted under Article 95 EC, not Article 
94 EC. These aspects of Article 95 EC come into play particularly as regards the relationship between 
Articles 95 and 153 EC. See Chapter 10. 
29
 See, e.g., K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union § 5-209, at 272 (R. 
Bray ed., 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005). 
30
 J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 22, at 2459. 
31
 See, e.g., C.D. Ehlermann, “The Internal Market Following the Single European Act”, 24 Common 
Market Law Review 361, 382 (1987). 
32
 The classic example is with regard to the first category of fiscal provisions, in which Article 94 EC 
serves as the legal basis to approximate national laws in the field of direct taxation since Article 93 EC only 
provides for such competence in the field of indirect taxation. See, e.g., Case C-533/03 Commission v. 
Council [2006] ECR I-1025; Case C-338/01 Commission v. Council [2004] ECR I-4829. 
33
 See Articles 114-115 TFEU. 
34
 Article 114(1) TFEU.   
35
 Article 115 TFEU. 
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result, the Lisbon Treaty expressly recognises Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 EC) as 
the preeminent approximation provision of the two, with Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 94 
EC) literally taking a “backseat” role, as had already come to be considered under the 
previous Treaty framework. 
 
9.2.3 Lingering ambiguities concerning Articles 94 and 95 EC 
Despite the order of preference between Articles 94 and 95 EC dictated by the 
Treaty, ambiguities still surround the relationship between Articles 94 and 95 EC (and 
their counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty).  By virtue of the substantive differences in the 
text of these two provisions elaborated above, especially the “directly affect” and 
“object” language, this continues to provoke controversy in the literature as regards 
whether the scope of Article 94 EC extends further than that of Article 95 EC or vice 
versa and hence whether there exists a residual role for Article 94 EC under 
circumstances where Article 95 EC would be deemed to be an insufficient legal basis to 
support Community action in contract law (or other fields of private law as the case may 
be).36   
 
These are issues that neither the Treaties (whether in their present or future form) 
nor the case law of the Court of Justice (yet) provide explicit answers.  There have been a 
few cases that had the potential to place such issues before the Court of Justice (the 
Court), but they generally amounted to missed opportunities. For example, in Spain v. 
Council37, Spain argued that either Article 94 EC or Article 308 EC should have been 
used instead of Article 95 EC as the legal basis for a Regulation creating a supplementary 
certificate for medicinal products38, since these two provisions required unanimity in the 
Council and thus did not “trespass on national sovereignty” as compared to Article 95 
                                                 
36
 For arguments that Article 94 EC’s “directly affect” language is more restrictive than Article 95 EC’s 
“object” language, see, e.g., Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities: From Maastricht To Amsterdam, supra note 14, at 780 (reiterated in B. de Witte et al., 
“Legal Instruments, Decision-Making and EU Finances”, in PJ.G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, 
The Law of the European Union and the European Communities, supra note 14, 273, at 309); R. Barents, 
“The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community Legislation, 30 
Common Market Law Review 85, 105 (1993); X. Debroux, “Le choix de la base juridique dans l’action 
environnementale de l’Union européenne”, 31 Cahiers de droit européen 383, 386 n.8 (1995); Ehlermann, 
supra note 31, at 370; K.D. Kerameus, “Procedural Harmonization in Europe”, 43 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 401, 409-410 (1995); W. Sauter, “The Economic Constitution of the European Union”, 4 
Columbia Journal of European Law 27, 52 n.93 (Winter/Spring 1998); D. Vignes, “The Harmonisation of 
National Legislation and the EEC”, 15 European Law Review 358, 360 (1990).  For arguments that Article 
95 EC’s “object” language is more restrictive than Article 94 EC’s “directly affect” language, see, e.g., 
A.A.M. Schrauwen, Marché interieur: recherches sur une notion 148 (Academisch Proefschrift, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1997); P. Nebbia, “Internal Market and the Harmonisation of European 
Contract Law”, in 2 European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century: Rethinking the new legal order 89, 
91 (T. Tridimas and P. Nebbia eds, Hart, 2004); W. van Gerven, “Coherence of Community and national 
laws. Is there a legal basis for a European civil code?”, 5 European Review of Private Law 465, 467 n.16 
(1997); J. Ziller, “The Legitimacy of the Codification of Contract Law in View of the Allocation of 
Competences between the European Union and its Member States”, in The Politics of a European Civil 
Code 89, 98 (M.W. Hesselink, Kluwer, 2006). 
37
 Case C-350/92 Spain v. Council [1995] ECR 1985. 
38
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate for medicinal products, [1992] OJ L 182/1. 
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EC.39  Not surprisingly, this argument did not find sympathy with the Court for the 
purposes of challenging the legal basis of a Community measure.  The Court ultimately 
upheld the use of Article 95 EC and dismissed Spain’s action in full.  As far as Article 94 
EC was concerned, the Court merely stated that Spain had not put forward any valid 
argument that this provision constituted the proper legal basis for the measure.40 
Curiously, though, in the process of substantiating the use of Article 95 EC, the Court 
relied on the sixth recital of the Regulation that espoused the aim of the measure “to 
prevent the heterogeneous development of national laws leading to further disparities 
which would be likely to create obstacles to the free movement of medicinal products 
within the Community and thus directly affect the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market”.41 No mention was made, however, to the use of Article 94 EC’s 
language in a measure based on Article 95 EC.  Furthermore, the Court ruled that since 
the Regulation was validly adopted under Article 95 EC, it “did not therefore have to be 
adopted on the basis of Article 100 [now Article 94] or Article 235 [now Article 308]”.42  
This seemed to imply that if Article 95 EC was insufficient, then Article 94 EC or Article 
308 EC could be used, but this was left unclear.    
 
While the Court has not yet dealt with this matter explicitly, the case law 
concerning Article 95 EC can nevertheless be read to have at least implicitly moved in 
the direction of merging the three salient differences in substantive scope between 
Articles 94 and 95 EC – i.e., “common market” versus “internal market”; “directly 
affect” versus “object”; and establishment “and” versus “or” functioning –  thereby doing 
much to silence arguments that Article 94 EC has a residual position vis-à-vis Article 95 
EC in European contract law.  While this case law is analysed in greater detail in the next 
section, brief mention of certain cases is made here for the purposes of fleshing out the 
Court’s approach in this regard.  Each are taken in turn in the order listed above. 
 
9.2.3.1 “Common market” versus “internal market” 
There seems to be agreement among most scholars that in theory the notion of the 
common market may be broader than that of the internal market, but in practice such a 
distinction has not been recognised in the case law of the Court of Justice.43  To explain, 
by virtue of the definition of the internal market set forth in Article 14 EC as introduced 
by the Single European Act – “an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty” – this could be taken to mean that the internal market was 
limited to the elimination of obstacles to the fundamental freedoms.44 In contrast, while 
                                                 
39
 Case C-350/92 Spain v. Council, para. 25.  
40
 Id., para. 28. 
41
 Id., para. 35 (quoting sixth recital of the Regulation) (emphasis added).  
42
 Id., para. 40.    
43
 See, e.g., L.W.  Gormley, “The internal market: history and evolution”, in Regulating the Internal Market 
14, 14 (N.N. Shuibhne ed., Elgar, 2006); M. Radeideh, Fair Trading in EC Law: Information and 
Consumer Choice in the Internal Market 78 (Europa, 2005). 
44
 Although this was certainly not unanimous. Compare, e.g., P. Pescatore, “Some Critical Remarks on the 
‘Single European Act’”, 24 Common Market Law Review 9, 11 (1987), with Ehlermann, supra note 31, at 
369-370. This definition of the internal market was not substantively changed by the Lisbon Treaty:  see 
Article 26(2) TFEU. 
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the notion of “common market” was never defined in the original EEC Treaty, it was 
viewed as having a much broader expanse in line with the Community’s objectives 
inscribed in Articles 2 and 3 E(E)C, thereby going beyond rules on free movement to 
encompass various other Community policies (e.g., trade, agriculture, and transport) and 
the elimination of distortions of competition.45   
 
At the same time, while perhaps economically speaking, the scope of the internal 
market could be deemed narrower than that of the common market, politically speaking, 
the converse seemed to be true.  In light of its definition espousing an “area without 
internal frontiers”, the concept of the internal market was perceived to take a holistic 
view of wider political and social objectives going beyond the economic objectives 
generally associated with the common market.46  The term “single market”, which rose in 
prominence at the same time, has also been viewed in similar fashion, which helps to 
explain why the two terms are often used interchangeably.47 Thus, the aura around the 
internal market (and single market) emanates a richer conception in depth, even if not 
matching the breadth of the common market.  Viewed in this way, the common market 
seems to stand largely as a relic linked to the early days of European economic 
integration, whereas the internal market and single market represent a broader 
embodiment of European integration post-Single European Act.  Indeed, as a matter of 
common usage, references to the internal market have become the rule and those to the 
common market the more archaic exception largely where citation to the Treaty is 
involved.   
 
In any event, both before and after the Single European Act, the case law of the 
Court of Justice treated the two terms the same way.  Famously, in the 1982 Schul case48, 
for example, the Court conflated the three terms – common market, internal market, and 
single market – all in one sentence: 
 
 The concept of a common market as defined by the Court in a consistent line 
 of decisions involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra-Community trade 
in order to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about 
conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market.49 
                                                 
45
 See, e.g., A. Dashwood, “Article 308 EC as the Outer Limit of Expressly Conferred Community 
Competence”, in The Outer Limits of European Union Law 35, 36-37 (C. Barnard and O. Odudu eds, Hart, 
2009); L.W. Gormley, “Competition and Free Movement: Is the Internal Market the Same as a Common 
Market?”, 13 European Business Law Review 517 (2002). 
46
 See Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, supra note 29, § 5-079 – § 5-
081, at 143-147 (and citations therein). For a broader perspective, see J.M. Broekman, A Philosophy of 
European Union Law 355-368 (Peeters, 1999).  See also Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-
293/02 Jersey Produce Marketing Organisation Ltd [2005] ECR I-9543, para. 135. 
47
 See, e.g, C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU:  The Four Freedoms 11-13, particularly 12 n.27 
(2nd ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2007); K.A. Armstrong, “Governance and the Single European Market”, in 
The Evolution of EU Law 745, 747-748 (P. Craig and G. de Búrca eds, Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); K. 
Mortelmans, “The Common Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market, What’s in a Market?”, 35 
Common Market Law Review 101, 107-108 (1998).  
48
 Case 15/81 Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV [1982] ECR 1409. 
49
 Id., para. 33 (emphasis added).  Admittedly, in some cases, the Court seemed to refer less often to 
“internal market” as compared to “common market” and “single market”. See, e.g., Case 270/80 Polydor 
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Yet, it was Titanium Dioxide50, which strongly cemented the two. This was the first case 
to come before the Court concerning Article 95 EC (then Article 100a EEC).51  On the 
basis of the definition of internal market set forth in Article 14 EC (then Article 8a EEC) 
as well as Articles 2 and 3 E(E)C, the Court held that “a precondition” for the internal 
market was the existence of conditions of competition which were not distorted.52 On this 
basis, it affirmed that Article 95 EC encompassed measures that could be used to 
eliminate distortions of competition in the internal market, as had been the case for the 
measure at issue in the case.53  While the Court did not confront the terminological 
distinction between the common market and the internal market directly in relation to 
Articles 94 and 95 EC, it was the accompanying Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro 
that dealt with the issue head-on: 
 
[N]o difference – from the present standpoint, needless to say – can exist 
between the concept of “common market” and that of “internal market”; 
the two concepts differ in breadth, in that the “common market” extends to 
areas which are not part of the “internal market” , but not in depth, in that 
both concepts relate to the same level of integration. . . . [T]o conclude that 
the harmonization of conditions of competition falls outside Article 100a,  
even though it is common ground that such harmonization previously fell 
within the scope of Article 100, would be equivalent to concluding that the 
concept of “internal market” in Article 100a involved a less advanced level  
of integration than that of “common market” within the meaning of Article  
100. And that, in the absence of textual confirmation in the Single [European] 
Act, seems to me to be quite unacceptable . . . .54 
 
While the Advocate General’s rationale did not figure expressly in the Court’s findings, 
at least implicitly the Court’s judgment in Titanium Dioxide strengthened the reading of 
the two terms together.    
 
Noticeably, the Court’s approach echoed by the changes brought by the Lisbon 
Treaty. All references to the common market are now replaced with the internal market, 
including those found in Article 94 EC’s counterpart, Article 115 TFEU.55 This has the 
effect of bringing the text of Article 94 EC in line with current practice regarding the 
conflation of the common market and the internal market for the purposes of interpreting 
this provision vis-à-vis Article 95 EC, recast as Article 114 TFEU. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Limited and RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Records Shops Limited and Simons Records Limited [1982] 
ECR 329, para. 16.  Given the linkage between the conceptions of “single market” and “internal market”, 
this would not seem to alter the discussion here. 
50
 Case C-300/89 Commission v. Council (“Titanium Dioxide”) [1991] ECR I-2867. 
51
 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-300/89 Titanium Dioxide , para. 1 n.1. 
52
 Case C-300/89 Titanium Dioxide, para. 14. 
53
 Id., paras 15, 23.   
54
 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-300/89 Titanium Dioxide, para. 10. 
55
 Lisbon Treaty, Horizontal Amendments to the EC Treaty, point 2(g), [2007] OJ C 306/42.  
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9.2.3.2 “Directly affect” versus “object” 
Long before the Single European Act, there had already been extensive discussion 
as to what was meant by “directly affect” inscribed in Article 94 EC.56 With the 
introduction of Article 95 EC, the matter took on renewed importance, and as already 
mentioned, there continues to be divergent opinion among commentators as to whether 
the use of “object” as opposed to “directly affect” was meant to embody a less restrictive 
or more restrictive scope for Article 95 EC vis-à-vis Article 94 EC.57  From the text of the 
two provisions, it is impossible to get a clear sense of the relative meaning of the 
“directly affect” as opposed to “object”.  As far as can be seen, there is no explanation in 
the travaux préparatoires as to what the framers of the Treaties had in mind in relation to 
the juxtaposition of the two.58 There had been several cases concerning Article 95 EC 
within the context of various legal basis disputes, in which the Court had declared that the 
use of Article 95 EC could not be used for measures with merely an “incidental effect” on 
the internal market.59  While approaching the “directly affect” language of Article 94 EC 
in the sense of ensuring that Article 95 EC must be used for measures that veered on the 
side of a more direct, as opposed to tangential, link to the internal market, this did not 
truly settle the matter. 
 
Recently, however, the incorporation of Article 94 EC’s “directly affect” 
language into the interpretation of Article 95 EC was introduced by the Court itself in the 
two companion cases of Swedish Match60 and Arnold André61.  In seemingly rehearsing 
the requirements for recourse to Article 95 EC, the Court proclaimed: 
 
In this respect, it should be recalled that, while a mere finding of disparities 
between national rules is not sufficient to justify having recourse to Article 
95 EC, it is otherwise where there are differences between the laws,  
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States which are  
such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect 
on the functioning of the internal market.62 
 
Lest one think this a mere slight of hand or translation error, the same language was used 
in the French version of the judgment, which as the Court’s working language made 
                                                 
56
 See particularly House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, “Approximation of 
Laws under Article 100 of the EEC Treaty”, Twenty-second Report, Session 1977-78, H.L. 131 (HMSO, 
1978), including Appendix 3(b) (C.D. Ehlermann, Director General, Legal Service of the European 
Commission, “Community Policy with regard to the Approximation of Laws”). 
57
 See supra note 36. 
58
 As far as the Single European Act is concerned, see, e.g., J. De Ruyt, L’acte unique européen (Editions 
de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1987); Ehlermann, supra note 31 (though noting that there had been support 
to amend then Article 100 EEC, as opposed to inserting then Article 100a EEC into the Treaty:  id., at 381). 
59
 See, e.g., Case C-209/97 Commission v. Council (“CIS”) [1999] ECR I-8067, paras 35-37 (and further 
citations therein). 
60
 Case C-210/03 Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match AB U.K. Ltd (“Swedish Match”) [2004] ECR I-
11893. 
61
 Case C-434/02 Arnold André GmbH & Co. KG (“Arnold André”) [2004] ECR I-11825.   
62
 Case C-210/03 Swedish Match, para. 29 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Case C-434/02 Arnold 
André, para. 30 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
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reference to “une incidence directe”, thereby paralleling the exact language found in 
Article 94 EC itself.63 No attention was drawn to this linkage between Articles 94 and 95 
EC by the Court, and it does not seem to have been noticed so far in the commentary.   
Nonetheless, such language has been continually repeated by the Court in the 
jurisprudence concerning Article 95 EC.64   While it is not entirely clear that this was the 
Court’s intention, this approach has minimised the differences between “directly affect” 
and “object” in the text of Articles 94 and 95 EC, respectively. 
 
9.2.3.3 Establishment “or” versus “and” functioning 
Compared to the others, there has not been much attention paid to Article 94 EC’s 
coverage of approximation measures that directly affect the establishment “or” 
functioning of the common market, as compared to Article 95 EC’s approximation 
measures that have as their object the establishment “and” functioning of the internal 
market.65  Read literally, this could possibly indicate that measures based on Article 94 
EC could be targeted at either the establishment or the functioning of the market, whereas 
those based on Article 95 EC must be targeted at both.  Yet, in practice, the Court’s case 
law on Article 95 EC has not made a distinction as regards measures gauged at the 
establishment as opposed to the functioning of the internal market, nor it seems has the 
European legislator.66  What counts is that a particular Community measure is aimed at 
least one or the other.  This is borne out by the Lisbon Treaty. In its replacement of 
Article 14 EC with Article 26 TFEU, the first paragraph is changed as follows:  “The 
Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of 
the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties”.67  At any 
rate, the differences between “or” and “and” in the text of Articles 94 and 95 EC have not 
played much, if any, of a role in differentiating the scope of these provisions as far as the 
case law is concerned and at most could be read as drawing the two provisions closer 
together. 
 
At the end of the day, attempts to discern the relative meanings of these so-called 
“Byzantine” differences between Articles 94 and 95 EC do not seem productive.68  They 
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 Id. (French version).  In relevant part, the French version of Article 94 EC reads:  “le rapprochement des 
dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives des États membres qui ont une incidence directe 
sur l’éstablissement ou le fonctionnement du marché commun.” 
64
 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 The Queen, on the application of: Alliance for Natural 
Health and Others (“Alliance for Natural Health”) [2005] ECR I-6451, para. 28; Case C-380/03 Germany 
v. European Parliament and Council (“Tobacco Advertising II”) [2006] ECR I-11573, para. 37; Case C-
301/06 Ireland v. European Parliament and Council, judgment of 10 Feb. 2009, not yet reported, para. 63. 
65
 But see, e.g., Schrauwen, supra note 36, at 148. 
66
 See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-491/01 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health 
ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd (“BAT”) [2002] ECR I-
11453, para. 147 n.173. 
67
 Article 26(1) TFEU (emphasis added).  Interestingly, in  past versions of Article 95 EC in the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty, language versions differed as regards this issue.  For example, the French and 
German versions of the counterpart to Article 95 EC (then Article III-172 of the 2004 Draft Constitutional 
Treaty) read establishment “or” functioning, whereas the English version read establishment “and” 
functioning.  
68
 G. Dellis, “Le rapprochement des législation”, in Commentaire article par article des traités UE et CE 
896, 908 (P. Léger ed., Bruylant, 2000). 
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seem to manifest their own balancing with respect to the scope of the relevant provision 
at the time that each was formulated. Presumably, controversy will continue so long as 
the matter of the scope of Article 94 EC vis-à-vis Article 95 EC has not been definitively 
addressed by the Court of Justice.  Yet, the foregoing case law indicates that the Court is 
mindful not to create artificial distinctions between the substantive scope of the two 
provisions, which could undercut the means at the Community’s disposal to achieve its 
internal/common market objectives under the Treaty.  Therefore, although the Court has 
not yet pronounced on the matter explicitly, there is strong evidence from the case law so 
far that, aside from the matters reserved to Article 94 EC under the Treaty, if a measure 
falls outside the substantive scope of Article 95 EC, it most likely will not be able to seek 
refuge within the scope of Article 94 EC on the basis of the differences in text from 
Article 95 EC discussed above. Consequently, by virtue of the order of preference 
between these two provisions in the Treaty and the case law of the Court of Justice, it is 
Article 95 EC, not Article 94 EC, upon which the Community’s approximation 
competence hinges in the debate about European contract law. 
 
9.3 The scope of Article 95 EC 
9.3.1 General overview:  The “object” and “approximation” prongs of the case law 
The aim of this section is to examine the scope of the Community’s competence 
under Article 95 EC to adopt a European contract law instrument approximating the 
contract laws of the Member States.69  At the outset, it bears emphasis that the discussion 
of the scope of Article 95 EC encompasses an ever increasing body of case law and 
commentary, which could be a book unto itself.70 Indeed, the case law on Article 95 EC 
is inherently “unfinished business” because it is a crucial part of the overarching division 
of competence between the European Union and the Member States to which similar 
quotes about “federalism” attach.71 As such, this study draws upon the most salient 
aspects of the case law for the purposes of assessing the constitutionality of European 
contract law and does not claim to be comprehensive or exhaustive.   
 
 Nevertheless, it is the case law on Article 95 EC, which serves as the 
“centerpiece” guiding this discussion. It can be divided into two subsets or prongs, both 
of which follow from the text of Article 95 EC:  the “object” and the “approximation” 
prongs. The “object” prong emanates primarily (though not solely72) from the first 
Tobacco Advertising case and its progeny, which established and further refined the 
threshold conditions placed on the use of Article 95 EC for the adoption of measures 
“which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market” as 
                                                 
69
 As noted in the preceding section, Article 114 TFEU has left the substance of Article 95 EC intact; 
therefore, the analysis set forth below concerning Article 95 EC is applicable to its counterpart in the 
Lisbon Treaty.  Reference will be made to Article 95 EC only in the interests of clarity. 
70
 See, e.g., M. Ludwigs, Rechtsangleichung nach Art. 94, 95 EG-Vertrag (Nomos, 2004). 
71
 See, e.g., S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union 172 (Longman, 2002). 
72
 As will be seen, there have been cases that filtered into the first Tobacco Advertising judgment,  such as 
Titanium Dioxide and Spain v. Council, and cases decided afterwards, such as Leitner,  which are not 
generally considered part of the Tobacco Advertising jurisprudence, but must nevertheless be taken into 
account, particularly in connection with the evaluation of the parameters of appreciable distortions of 
competition under Article 95 EC.  See infra § 9.3.1.3. 
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inscribed in Article 95(1) EC.  In other words, the “object” prong pertains to the 
requirements for Article 95 EC radiating from the Tobacco Advertising case law 
pertaining to the elimination of obstacles to trade and appreciable distortions of 
competition in the internal market. By comparison, the “approximation” prong emanates 
from a more recent set of cases heralded by Smoke Flavourings73 and ENISA74, which 
were concerned with the scope of  “measures for the approximation” of national laws 
under Article 95(1) EC. In other words, the “approximation” prong pertains to the 
permissible methods or techniques that can be used by the European legislator to bring 
about the approximation of national laws under Article 95 EC. Admittedly, the Court has 
never labelled or categorised the case law as such, although it has taken pains to separate 
out the relevant requirements set down in the two sets of cases to ensure that each are 
fulfilled.75   
 
To be clear, both prongs have equal bearing on discerning the limits as well as the 
exercise of Community competence under Article 95 EC.  Alongside the requirements 
placed on the recourse to  measures based on Article 95 EC, the “object” prong dictates 
the Court’s approach to the compliance of measures based on Articles 95 EC with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and while the “approximation” prong was 
formally concerned with these principles, they nonetheless crept into the cases as a 
practical matter.  Therefore, it could be thought preferable to treat all the case law on 
Article 95 EC together “lump sum” in chronological order.  Yet, organising the case law 
into two distinct prongs has considerable functional utility for this study because it allows 
the various issues brewing under the surface of Article 95 EC in connection with the 
debate about European contract law to be parsed out.  On the one hand, honing in on the 
“object” prong allows for evaluation of both the obstacles to trade and appreciable 
distortions of competition requirements, which is a complex and controversial 
undertaking unto itself. On the other hand, while it is not disputed that the 
“approximation” prong places further limits on measures adopted under Article 95 EC, it 
is the dynamic interplay between both prongs of the case law that helps to illuminate the 
roles played by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in guiding the exercise 
of Community competence inside, as well as outside, the lawmaking process.  In turn, 
these points beckon fruitful reflection with the United States with respect to federal 
competence under the Interstate Commerce Clause in this setting. 
 
For this reason, the analysis of the scope of Article 95 EC is divided into three 
sections.  First, the limits of Article 95 EC competence are examined in light of the 
“object” prong of the case law, so as to concentrate on the breadth of the key 
requirements relating to obstacles to trade and appreciable distortions of competition and 
their application to European contract law. Second, the exercise of Article 95 EC 
                                                 
73
 Case C-66/04 UK v. European Parliament and Council (“Smoke Flavourings”) [2005] ECR I-10553. 
74
 Case C-217/04 UK v. European Parliament and Council (“ENISA”) [2006] ECR I-3771.  Notably, there 
was a companion case decided on the same day as ENISA, Case C-436/03 European Parliament v. Council 
(“European cooperative society”) [2006] ECR I-3733, which is equally intertwined with the limits of 
approximation and the use of optional legal forms, which explains why it is discussed in the forthcoming 
section on the relationship between Articles 95 and 308 EC.  See infra § 9.4.3. 
75
 See, e.g., Case C-380/03 Tobacco Advertising II [2006] ECR I-11573, para. 42; Case C-66/04 Smoke 
Flavourings, paras 41-44; Case C-217/04 ENISA, para. 42. 
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competence is analysed in light of both the “object” and “approximation” prongs of the 
case law, so as to take account of the roles played by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, and to some extent the principle of sincere cooperation, in relation to 
measures based on Article 95 EC and the potential implications for the adoption of a 
European contract law instrument.  Third, a “comparative leap” to the United States is 
made, with a view to highlighting salient parallels between the jurisprudence concerning 
Article 95 EC and the Interstate Commerce Clause as regards the approximation of 
contract law in the European and American settings. 
 
9.3.2 Limits of Article 95 EC competence and caveats of the analysis 
By and large, the discussion of Article 95 EC in the debate about European 
contract law has been focused on the key requirements stemming from the first Tobacco 
Advertising judgment as regards the elimination of obstacles to trade and appreciable 
distortions of competition in the internal market.  In fact, it is especially this judgment 
that led to considerable opinion that the adoption of a comprehensive instrument in the 
field of contract law (as well as other fields of private law) exceeded the scope of the 
Community’s competence under Article 95 EC. While perhaps understandable at the time 
that this judgment was delivered, arguably this may have overshot the mark a bit when 
placed alongside the steady stream of subsequent cases in which the Court further 
developed its approach to these requirements.  At the same time, both inside and outside 
the debate about European contract law, there is considerable controversy as regards the 
extent to which the obstacles to trade requirement under Article 95 EC is restricted by, or 
not, the “negative” prohibitions of the free movement rules, namely the provisions 
concerning the free movement of goods under Articles 28-30 EC. Therefore, the 
assessment of the limits of Article 95 EC competence in relation to European contract 
law entails, first, delineating the path of the “object” prong of the case law that has been 
considerably “refined” since the first Tobacco Advertising judgment; second, confronting 
the relationship between Article 95 and the free movement rules (particularly the linkage 
between Article 95 EC and Articles 28-30 EC on the free movement of goods) as part of 
evaluating the parameters of the obstacles to trade requirement; and third, evaluating 
Article 95 EC’s use in relation to eliminating existing and possibly even future 
appreciable distortions of competition in the internal market.  Each are evaluated in turn 
in the sections that follow. 
 
Before proceeding further, however, certain caveats must be placed on this 
analysis.  First, it is perhaps an understatement to say that there is considerable 
controversy permeating the debate about European contract law as to whether, or to what 
extent, divergences among national contract laws can be considered to constitute 
obstacles to trade and/or appreciable distortions of competition in the internal market, for 
which the lack of empirical proof is often noted.76  That said, a complete array of data 
                                                 
76
 See, e.g., J. Smits, “European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order”, in European 
Integration and Law: Four Contributions on the Interplay between European Integration and European 
and National Law to celebrate the 25th Anniversary of Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law 55, 71 
(Intersentia, 2006); T. Wilhelmsson, “The Design of an Optional (Re)statement of European Contract Law 
– Real Life Instead of Dead Concepts”, in An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law 353, 355-
356 (S. Grundmann and J. Stuyck eds, Kluwer, 2002); House of Lords European Union Committee, 
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that would satisfy all participants in the debate would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
come by, and the absence of it has certainly not foreclosed the discussion so far.77  Thus, 
this study takes as its base the institutional documents produced this far in the debate, 
with particular regard to the Commission’s Communications78, the relevant academic 
commentary, and the  recent Clifford Chance study that has become interwoven with 
such commentary on the use of Article 95 EC in European contract law.79  Moreover, the 
extent to which there can be said to be divergences among national contract laws itself 
remains ambiguous.80 Indeed, with the ongoing preparation of the CFR and the proposed 
Directive on consumer rights, it remains to be seen to what extent these measures will 
have an impact in closing gaps in this regard. Nonetheless, the steady stream of 
institutional documents thus far evidence that there do exist disparities among national 
contract laws, with particular regard to business to business (B2B) and business to 
consumer (B2C) or consumer transactions, which constitute the basis for the analysis 
here. Finally, there is a noticeable overlap as regards the obstacles to trade and 
appreciable distortions of competition requirements. As one scholar noted, for the 
purposes of Article 95 EC, “any obstacle to trade is also likely to distort competition”.81 
As illustrated by the debate about European contract law and the Community contract 
law acquis, the dividing line between these two categories is difficult to draw in many 
respects and very often they blur together. That said, this study undertakes separate 
assessment of the two categories because each highlights a distinct and complicated set of 
issues in relation to European contract law.   
 
9.3.2.1 The “object” prong:  Tobacco Advertising I and its evolving “refinement” 
To be sure, the Court’s seminal judgment in Germany v. European Parliament 
and Council (“Tobacco Advertising I”)82 was not the first to address the scope of Article 
95 EC, since cases such as Titanium Dioxide83 and Spain v. Council84 paved the way in 
this regard. Yet, it will forever remain a landmark in the jurisprudence on Article 95 EC 
because it constituted the first time that the Court annulled a Community measure in its 
entirety on the grounds that that the European legislator had acted ultra vires.85  This was 
                                                                                                                                                 
“European Contract Law: the Draft Common Frame of Reference”, Twelfth Report of Session 2008-09, 
supra note 1, point 83.   
77
 See, e.g., The Need for a European Contract Law: Empirical and Legal Perspectives (J. Smits ed., 
Europa, 2005);  G. Wagner, “The Economics of Harmonization: The Case of Contract Law”, 39 Common 
Market Law Review 995 (2002); E. McKendrick “Harmonisation of European Contract Law: The State We 
Are In”, in The Harmonisation of European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, 
Business and Legal Practice  5, 14-15 (S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill eds, Hart, 2006).  See further A. 
Schwartze, “Design for an Empirical Data Investigation into the Impact of Existing Contract Law 
Harmonisation under the White Paper of 1985”, in An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law, 
supra note 76, 59. 
78
 See Chapter 6. 
79
 See infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text. 
80
 See Chapter 2. 
81
 Barnard, supra note 47, at 575. 
82
 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I [2000] ECR I-8419. 
83
 Case C-300/89 Titanium Dioxide [1991] ECR I-2867. 
84
 Case C-350/92 Spain v. Council [1995] ECR I-1985. 
85
 This is in contrast to previous case law concerning the choice between Article 95 and another legal basis 
or the annulment of only portions of a Community measure, as opposed to the measure in its entirety.  See 
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not a complete surprise, since there had already been considerable commentary to that 
effect prior to the judgment.86  Still, the case was praised as establishing clear “outer 
limits” for the scope of Article 95 EC.87   
 
As is well-known, Germany had brought an action to annul Directive 98/43/EC88 
relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products.89  It was adopted under 
Articles 47(2), 55, and 95 (then Articles 57(2), 66, and 100a) EC. It sought to ban 
                                                                                                                                                 
G. de Búrca, “The Tobacco Advertising Saga: Political Aspirations and Constitutional Restraints”, 
University of Cambridge Centre for European Legal Studies, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2001, 5, at 7-8.  
While the judgment is not exactly clear on this point, it has been surmised that no other provision, 
especially Article 308 EC or Article 94 EC, would have been a viable backup to adopt the measure 
concerned.  See, e.g., H-P. Schneider, “Ultra Vires. The EU-Directive on Tobacco Advertising under the 
Searchlight of Legal Opinions”, in The European Ban on Tobacco Advertising 11, 19-20 (H-P. Schneider 
and T. Stein eds, Nomos, 1999) (see also the Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council attached as 
Appendix 5, at 365); de Búrca, supra, at 9; G. Tridimas and T. Tridimas, “The European Court of Justice 
and the Annulment of the Tobacco Advertising Directive: Friend of National Sovereignty or Foe of Public 
Health?”, 14 European Journal of Law and Economics 171, 175 (2002). 
86
 See, e.g., The European Ban on Tobacco Advertising, supra note 85 (some scholars have noted that this 
publication was sponsored by tobacco companies: see de Búrca, supra note 85, at 13-14; D. Khanna, “The 
Defeat of the European Tobacco Advertising Directive: A Blow for Health, 20 Yearbook of European Law 
113, 121 (2001); nevertheless, it contained contributions by many prominent scholars); A. Dashwood, “The 
Limits of European Community Powers”, 21 European Law Review 113, 121-122 (1996); J.H.H. Weiler, 
“The Division of Competences in the European Union”, External study commissioned by the Directorate 
General for Research of the European Parliament, POLI W-26 (1997), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu. See also Written Question No. 1379/93 by Lord Inglewood (“Tobacco 
advertising”), [1993] OJ C 264/66. 
87
 A. Knook, “Guns and Tobacco. The Effect of Interstate Trade Case Law on the Vertical Division of 
Powers”, 11 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 347, 358 (2004). For further 
discussion of the judgment, see, e.g., J.A. Usher, Case note, 38 Common Market Law Review 1519 (2001); 
R. Gosalbo Bono, Case note, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 790 (2001); de Búrca, supra note 85; 
E.I. Obergfell, “On Division of Competence in the EU: The  Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Directive 
Test Case, 3 European Legal Forum 153 (2000/1); D.A. Wyatt, “Constitutional Significance of the 
Tobacco Advertising Judgment of the European Court of Justice”, University of Cambridge Centre for 
European Legal Studies, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2001, 19. For specific discussion in the context of 
Community public health and tobacco policy, see, e.g., T.K. Hervey, “Community and National 
Competence in Health after Tobacco Advertising”, 38 Common Market Law Review 1421 (2001); T.K. 
Hervey, “Up in Smoke? Community (Anti-) Tobacco Law and Policy”, 26 European Law Review 101 
(2001); Khanna, supra note 86. 
88
 Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products, [1998] OJ L 213/9. 
89
 About the same time as Germany lodged its action (on 19 Oct. 1998) at the Court of Justice, an action 
was brought before the Court of First Instance by certain companies to challenge the Directive, but it was 
dismissed on grounds of the parties’ inadmissibility.  See Joined Cases T-172/98 and T-175 to T-177/98 
Salamander and Others v. European Parliament and Council  [2000] ECR II-2487 (appeals withdrawn, 
Case C-281/00 P, Order of 23 Oct. 2001, unpublished; Case C-313/00 P, Order of 23 Oct. 2001, 
unpublished). A few months after Germany brought its action, the Court received a request for a 
preliminary ruling from the UK High Court of Justice in the context of an action challenging the Directive 
by various tobacco companies: Case C-74/99 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health and Others ex 
parte: Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Others (“Imperial Tobacco”), [2000] ECR I-8599.  While the two cases 
were combined in Advocate General Fennelly’s Opinion, the Court disposed of this latter case by ruling 
that on the basis of Tobacco Advertising I, there was no need to answer the questions submitted. Id, para. 5. 
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virtually all forms of tobacco advertising and sponsorship within the EU.90 Ironically, this 
had not been the original plan.  In the early proposals, the Commission had advocated a 
measure of more limited scope, seeking to regulate, not ban, only tobacco advertising in 
the press and by means of bills and posters, based solely on Article 95 EC.91  Had such a 
measure been adopted, it may be wondered whether this momentous case would have 
come before the Court.  Yet, prompted by the European Parliament and certain Member 
States in the Council, the Commission eventually put forward a more comprehensive 
proposal constituting a near complete ban of advertising of tobacco products, still relying 
solely on Article 95 EC.92 Ultimately, by way of the political agreement reached in the 
Council, the measure also came to include the ban on tobacco sponsorship, and Articles 
47(2) and 55 EC were added alongside Article 95 EC as legal bases.93  Nevertheless, the 
key issue in the case was Germany’s claim that Article 95 EC did not constitute a proper 
legal basis for the Directive.94 This was primarily on the grounds that the Directive 
lacked the requisite link to the internal market and was essentially a measure concerning 
the protection of public health for which approximation measures were expressly 
precluded under Article 152(4) (then Article 129(4)) EC.95   
 
In its judgment, the Court addressed both points.  It began by dispensing with the 
argument concerning the use of Article 95 EC for measures based on public health.  
Despite the express exclusion of harmonisation under Article 152(4) EC, this did not 
mean that harmonisation measures adopted on the basis of other Treaty provisions could 
not have any impact on the protection of public health, though cautioning that other such 
provisions could not be used “in order to circumvent the express exclusion of 
harmonisation” set forth in this provision.96 Thus, so long as the conditions for recourse 
to Article 95 EC were satisfied, the European legislator could rely on Article 95 EC, even 
though public health protection was “a decisive factor” in the choices made with respect 
to the measure concerned.97  The Court then proceeded to elaborate these conditions.   
                                                 
90
 There were certain limited exceptions, but on the whole the Directive was considered to establish a 
comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising and sponsorship. See Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in 
Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I and C-74/99 Imperial Tobacco, paras 109-110. 
91
 This is indicated by the title of the initial proposal:  see Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
advertising of tobacco products in the press and by means of bills and posters, COM (89) 163 final/2, 
7.4.1989, which was reiterated in the amended proposal, COM (90) 147 final, 19.4.1990. 
92
 See Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I and Case C-74/99 
Imperial Tobacco, paras 14-19. Incidentally, in relation to the Commission’s revised proposal submitted in 
1991, there were some clamourings in the European Parliament for the use of Article 235 (now Article 308) 
EC as the legal basis, but this was not taken over.  See id., para. 17. 
93
 See id., paras 5-6, 19, 63. 
94
 In total, Germany put forward seven pleas:  see Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I, para. 9.  The 
parties agreed that their arguments concerning Article 95 EC also applied to Articles 47(2) and 55 EC.  Id., 
paras 10-11.   
95
  See id., paras 12-35.  Article 152(4)(c) (then Article 129(4)) EC provided in relevant part: “The Council  
. . . shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article through adopting . . . 
incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health, excluding any harmonisation of the laws 
and regulations of the Member States.”  As regards relevant changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, see 
infra note 168. 
96
 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I, paras 78-79.   
97
  Id., para. 88. 
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Distilled from the judgment, the Court established four key limits on the scope of 
Article 95 EC.98 First, in one of the most celebrated passages of the judgment, the Court 
declared: 
 
[A] measure adopted on the basis of Article 100a of the Treaty must genuinely 
have as its object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment  
and functioning of the internal market. If a mere finding of disparities between 
national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition liable to result therefrom 
were sufficient to justify the choice of Article 100a as a legal basis, judicial  
review of compliance with the proper legal basis might be rendered nugatory.99 
 
This requirement meant that the measure concerned must actually contribute to the 
elimination of obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms or to the elimination 
of distortions of competition in the internal market.100 Article 95 EC did not confer “a 
general power to regulate the internal market” on the European legislator.101 Second, a 
measure can be adopted under Article 95 EC if its “aim is to prevent the emergence of 
future obstacles to trade resulting from the multifarious development of national laws”, 
provided that “the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in 
question must be designed to prevent them.”102 Third, a measure adopted under Article 
95 EC can include provisions that do not contribute to the elimination of obstacles to 
trade, provided that such provisions are “necessary to ensure that certain prohibitions 
imposed in pursuit of that purpose are not circumvented”.103 Fourth, Article 95 EC can be 
used to eliminate distortions of competition  only if they are “appreciable”104.  Otherwise, 
the Community’s competence under Article 95 EC would be “practically unlimited” and 
hence allowing the elimination of “the smallest distortions of competition” would be 
incompatible with the principle of conferral.105 In light of these conditions, the Court 
concluded that the Directive concerned could not be adopted under Article 95 EC 
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 While scattered throughout the Court’s judgment, such requirements have been nicely summarised by 
several Advocates General in later cases.  See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-491/01 
BAT [2002] ECR I-11453, para. 18; Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-380/03 Tobacco 
Advertising II [2006] ECR I-11573, para. 90. 
99
 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I, para. 84. 
100
  Id., paras 95, 108. 
101
 Id., para. 83.   
102
 Id. para. 86 (citing Case C-350/92 Spain v. Council, para. 35). To be clear, this requirement did build 
upon the Court’s ruling in Spain v. Council, but the twofold requirements that such obstacles must be likely 
and the measure must be designed to prevent them were new. 
103
 Id., para. 100. 
104
 Id., para. 106 (citing Case C-300/89 Titanium Dioxide, para. 23). Though the Court relied upon Titanium 
Dioxide in this regard, technically speaking, the Court did not tack on the requirement of “appreciable” 
distortions until Tobacco Advertising I.   See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-380/03 
Tobacco Advertising II, para. 80. Moreover, the “appreciable” standard only applied to distortions of 
competition; it was not applied by the Court to obstacles to trade, despite Germany’s arguments to the 
contrary.  See Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I, paras 29, 31.  Notably, the use of the adjective 
“appreciable” in connection with distortions of competition had already appeared in early case law on 
Article 94 EC.  See Case 91/79 Commission v. Italy [1980] ECR 1099, para. 8; Case 92/79 Commission v. 
Italy [1980] ECR 1115, para. 8.  
105
 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I, para. 107. 
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because it did not, as a whole, actually contribute to the elimination of either obstacles to 
trade or appreciable distortions of competition and thus must be annulled in its entirety.106  
At the same time, however, it stated that a directive prohibiting only certain forms of 
tobacco advertising and sponsorship could have been adopted under Article 95 EC, but 
due to the general nature of the prohibition, it was unable to annul the Directive only 
partially.107 
 
On the whole, Tobacco Advertising I was a delicately balanced, indeed ingenious, 
judgment. On the one hand, it was truly a constitutional case par excellence because it 
signified the Court’s willingness to protect the competences of the Member States from 
Community overreaching under Article 95 EC.108 On the other hand, the Court went to 
some lengths to ensure that Article 95 EC was not unduly constricted.  In particular, it 
allowed Article 95 EC to be used for measures whose main aim was rooted in public 
health protection, provided that the threshold requirements for this provision were 
crossed. It also allowed Article 95 EC to be used for measures involving the elimination 
of potential future obstacles to trade, which in one Advocate General’s view was “less 
exacting” than the standard for appreciable distortions of competition.109  And, rather 
uniquely, it gave the European legislator a “gentle nudge” in terms of signalling the types 
of measures concerning tobacco advertising and sponsorship that could be covered by 
Article 95 EC.110  As such, while Tobacco Advertising I was considered to lay the 
groundwork for tightening the scope of Article 95 EC111, much depended on how the 
various requirements would play out in later cases.  
 
In 2001, the Court decided Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council 
(“Biotechnology”)112, which came fast on the heels of Tobacco Advertising113. At issue 
was the validity of Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions114, which was based on Article 95 (then Article 100a) EC.  The purpose of the 
Directive was to require the Member States to provide protection for biotechnological 
inventions under their national patent laws, without prejudice to their obligations relating 
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 Id., paras 116, 118. 
107
 Id., paras 98, 111, 117. 
108
 See N. Fennelly, “The Tobacco Judgment”, Documentation for ERA Conference, “The Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Community”, Luxembourg, 18-19 May 2001, on file with author; Tridimas and 
Tridimas, supra note 85, at 180. Notably, during the oral hearing, one of the parties submitted that the case 
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 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. European Parliament and 
Council (“Biotechnology”) [2001] ECR I-7079, para. 47. 
110
 See Tridimas and Tridimas, supra note 85, at 179. 
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 See, e.g., “Editorial Comments: Taking (the limits of) competences seriously”, 37 Common Market Law 
Review 1301, 1304 (2000). 
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113
 This is meant literally.  Not only was the case lodged on the same day as Tobacco Advertising I (19 Oct. 
1998), but also it was assigned the next subsequent case number, and the Directive at issue (Directive 
98/44/EC) followed the annulled Tobacco Advertising Directive (Directive 98/43/EC) in direct succession. 
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 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions, [1998] OJ L 213/13. 
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to the international conventions in the field.115  The Netherlands asserted, among other 
things116, that Article 95 EC was not a proper legal basis because differences in the laws 
of the Member States either did not exist or else had not been shown to result in barriers 
to trade in the internal market.117  It further argued that even assuming such problems 
were found to exist, they should have been removed by renegotiation of the relevant 
international convention, not by the Directive concerned.118   
 
 In its judgment, the Court rejected these contentions and upheld Article 95 EC as 
the legal basis for the Directive.119  Relying on the relevant passages of Tobacco 
Advertising I allowing recourse to Article 95 EC  to prevent the emergence of future 
obstacles to trade provided that such obstacles were likely and the measure was designed 
to prevent them, the Court found both conditions satisfied.120 First, there were differing 
national interpretations of the relevant international convention as regards the 
patentability of biotechnological inventions, which were “liable to give rise to 
divergences of practice and case-law prejudicial to the proper operation of the internal 
market.”121 Moreover, “marked differences with significant consequences were already 
apparent between certain national laws” at the time the Directive was adopted.122  
Second, by requiring the Member States to protect such inventions in their national patent 
law, the Directive “in fact aims to prevent damage to the unity of the internal market 
which might result from the Member States’ deciding unilaterally to grant or refuse such 
protection.”123  As regards the attempted reliance on the international route, the Court 
ruled that “there was nothing to prevent the Community legislature from having recourse 
to harmonisation by means of a directive in preference to the more indirect and 
unpredictable approach of seeking to amend the wording” of the international convention 
concerned.124 The purpose of harmonisation was “to reduce obstacles, whatever their 
origin, to the operation of the internal market which differences between the situations in 
the Member States represent”.125 Thus, “if divergences are the result of an interpretation 
which is contrary, or may prove contrary, to the terms of international legal instruments 
to which the Member States are parties, there is nothing in principle to prevent recourse 
to adoption of a Directive as a means of ensuring a uniform interpretation of such terms 
by the Member States”.126    
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In 2002, the British American Tobacco (“BAT”) case127, by way of a preliminary 
reference from an English court, the Court was confronted with the validity of another 
tobacco directive, Directive 2001/37/EC approximating the laws of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products.128  The Directive 
included a so-called export ban, meaning that it prohibited the manufacture of tobacco 
products within the European Community for export to third countries that did not 
comply with its requirements.129 This explains why it was enacted under Article 95 EC as 
well as Article 133 EC concerning the Common Commercial Policy.130  As framed by 
Advocate General Geelhoed, the case represented “the opportunity to examine in general 
the powers of the Community legislature under Article 95 EC”.131 This was particular so, 
since while perhaps not equivalent to the firestorm set off by the annulled Tobacco 
Advertising Directive, this Directive triggered criticism that the European legislator had 
exceeded the limits of its competence under Article 95 EC.132   
 
 The Court examined the Directive in light of the requirements set down in 
Tobacco Advertising I133 and held that it was properly adopted under Article 95 EC.134  
The Court began by emphasising that the market for tobacco products, especially 
cigarettes, constituted a large portion of cross-border trade and that national rules laying 
down requirements for such products were in themselves liable, in the absence of 
approximation at Community level, to constitute obstacles to the free movement of 
goods.135 From there, the Court found that differences among national laws on the 
manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products created obstacles to trade, which 
had “already emerged, or were likely to emerge, by the time the Directive was 
adopted”.136  It was therefore likely that obstacles to the free movement of tobacco 
products would arise as the result of the Member States’ adoption, or contemplation 
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thereof, of more restrictive legislation.137  Moreover, the Directive contained a “free 
movement clause” which, unlike the annulled Directive in Tobacco Advertising I, 
guaranteed the free movement of tobacco products that complied with its requirements 
throughout the Member States.138  As regards the export ban, it did not undermine the use 
of Article 95 EC, since it ensured, in line with Tobacco Advertising I, that the Directive’s 
provisions were not circumvented by unlawful reimports of products into the Community 
that did not meet the Directive’s requirements.139 While the Court did not deny that the 
amount of unlawful trade could not be quantified and was motivated by factors unrelated 
to circumventing the Directive,  the risk of unlawful trade must be assessed by taking into 
account not only the situation before the Directive was adopted, but also the foreseeable 
effects on the nature and the volume of unlawful trade that were liable to increase.140   
 
In 2004, the companion cases of Swedish Match141 and Arnold André142 revisited 
the use of Article 95 EC as the legal basis of Directive 2001/37/EC, the same Directive at 
issue in BAT.143 By way of preliminary references from an English and a German court, 
respectively, these cases concerned the validity of Article 8 of the Directive144, which 
prohibited the Member States from placing on the market tobacco products for oral use 
including the product known as “snus”145, save for an exception carved out for the sale of 
“snus” in Sweden in its Act of Accession.146 These cases turned on the issue whether a 
ban on the marketing of certain products in the EU could be based on Article 95 EC.147  
The Court answered in the affirmative, proclaiming: 
 
 [W]here there are obstacles to trade or it is likely that such obstacles 
 will emerge in the future because the Member States have taken 
 or are about to take divergent measures with respect to a product 
 or a class of products such as to ensure different levels of protection 
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 and thereby prevent the product or products concerned from moving 
 freely within the Community, Article 95 EC authorises the Community 
 legislature to intervene by adopting appropriate measures, in compliance 
 with Article 95(3) EC and with the legal principles mentioned in the 
 Treaty or identified in the case-law, in particular the principle of  
 proportionality. Depending on the circumstances, those appropriate 
measures may consist in requiring all the Member States to authorise 
the marketing of the product or products concerned, subjecting such an 
obligation of authorisation to certain conditions, or even provisionally 
or definitively prohibiting the marketing of a product or products.148 
 
On that basis, the Court found that the conditions for recourse to Article 95 EC were 
satisfied in relation to Article 8.149 At the time the Directive was adopted, differences 
existed among national laws concerning the marketing of tobacco products for oral use 
that contributed to the heterogeneous development of that market and thus constituted 
obstacles to the free movement of goods.150  It was also likely that further obstacles 
would arise in view of the Member States’ adoption of new rules to combat the 
consumption of tobacco products.151 Action on the basis of Article 95 EC was therefore 
justified, and the Court upheld the Directive in full.152   
 
In 2005, Alliance for Natural Health153 confronted the Court with a preliminary 
ruling request from an English court concerning the validity of three provisions of 
Directive 2002/46/EC approximating national laws relating to food supplements154, 
which had been adopted under Article 95 EC.  Among the Directive’s notable features, 
Article 3 provided that only food supplements in conformity with the Directive could be 
marketed within the Community. 155 This meant, pursuant to Article 4(1), that only the 
vitamins and minerals appearing in the positive lists annexed to the Directive156.  Under 
Article 15(b), as from a specified date, trade in products that did not comply with the 
Directive was prohibited.157 Several parties involved with the marketing of food 
supplements brought an action before the national court, alleging among other things that 
Article 95 EC was not a proper legal basis for these provisions because they did not 
improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market and 
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on the assumption that the prohibition was intended to protect public health, this 
contravened the explicit exclusion of harmonisation under Article 152(4)(c) EC.158  In 
essence, the case served to rehash familiar issues from the previous case law.   
 
The ECJ lost no time in upholding Article 95 EC as the legal basis of the 
Directive. According to the second recital of the Directive, food supplements were 
regulated by differing national rules that were liable to impede their free movement and 
therefore have a direct impact on the functioning of the internal market.159  As noted in 
the European Parliament and Council’s observations in the case, this was borne out by 
the fact that prior to the adoption of the Directive, there had been a number of cases 
brought before the Court relating to situations in which traders encountered obstacles 
when attempting to market food supplements in Member States other than their own.160  
Furthermore, the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposal for the Directive stated that 
the Commission had received several complaints from economic operators on account of 
differences between the national rules that the principle of mutual recognition had failed 
to overcome.161 As a result, the Community legislature was justified in taking action in 
this area, and Article 95 EC was “the only appropriate legal basis” for the provisions of 
the Directive concerned.162   
 
In 2006, the Court delivered its much-anticipated judgment in Germany v. 
European Parliament and Council (“Tobacco Advertising II”)163 concerning Directive 
2003/33/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products164, which was based on  Articles 47(2), 
55 and 95 EC, the same provisions used for the previously annulled Directive.  In truth, 
the Directive had Tobacco Advertising I written all over it, as illustrated by various 
provisions paying heed to its more limited scope and the inclusion of an explicit free 
movement clause.165  Nonetheless, Germany brought an action to annul Articles 3 and 4 
of the Directive primarily on the grounds that Article 95 EC was not a proper legal 
basis.166 Article 3 set forth a general prohibition on tobacco advertising in the press, and 
Article 4 did the same in relation to radio advertising and sponsorship of tobacco 
products.  
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This time, the Court upheld Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive as properly based on 
Article 95 EC and dismissed Germany’s action in full.167  This outcome was not all that 
surprising.  It had been predicted by commentators168, and it was in line with the 
conclusions of Advocate General Léger.169  Yet, it was the Court’s rationale that stood 
out.  In principle, the judgment paid heed to the spirit of Tobacco Advertising I:  the 
Court began by reciting the requirements set down in the previous cases170, and as 
Advocate General Léger had done, it divided its analysis into three parts to verify: (1) the 
existence of disparities in national laws; (2) the effect of those disparities in presenting 
obstacles to trade and/or appreciable distortions of competition; and (3) the actual 
contribution of Articles 3 and 4 to eliminating the identified obstacles or distortions.171  
Arguably, however, in affirming that these elements were fulfilled, the Court edged away 
Tobacco Advertising I in terms of the latitude given to measures adopted under Article 95 
EC. 
 
As regards the first point, the Court pointed to the context surrounding the 
annulled directive as well as the text of the Directive concerned, which indicated that 
there were differences among national laws on advertising and sponsorship, which 
justified intervention by the European legislator.172 In doing so, it stressed that the 
prospect of an international convention under the auspices of the World Health 
Organisation did not change this finding, since it did not enter into force until after the 
Directive was adopted, not all Member States had yet ratified it, and it would not rule out 
the risk of divergences in national laws.173   As for the second point, the Court started 
with tobacco advertising in the press, finding that the disparities in national laws were 
liable to impede the free movement of goods and services on several grounds.174 In 
particular, national measures prohibiting or restricting the advertising of tobacco products 
were liable to impede access to the market by products from other Member States more 
than domestic products.175  Such measures also restricted the ability of undertakings to 
offer advertising space in their publications to advertisers established in other Member 
                                                 
167
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States, which affected the cross-border supply of services.176  Furthermore, while in 
reality certain publications were not sold in other Member States, divergent laws of the 
Member States still create, or are likely to create, legal obstacles to trade in respect of 
press products, which also “exist for publications placed essentially on a local, regional 
or national market that are sold in other Member States, even if only by way of exception 
or in small quantities”.177   
 
For radio advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, the Court drew similar 
conclusions, finding that it was likely that new barriers would emerge on account of the 
Member States’ adoption or contemplation of more restrictive legislation, e.g., radio 
broadcasters in Member States prohibiting sponsorship would be denied the benefit of 
sponsorship from tobacco companies established in other Member States where such 
prohibitions did not exist.178  This led the Court to surmise: “As pointed out in the first 
and fifth recitals in the preamble to the Directive, those differences also meant that there 
was an appreciable risk of distortions of competition.”179  Yet, it declined to delve further 
into the matter, declaring that as already held in BAT, “when the existence of obstacles to 
trade has been established, it is not necessary also to prove distortions of competition in 
order to justify recourse to Article 95 EC”.180  
 
 As for the final point, the Court confirmed that Articles 3 and 4 were in fact 
designed to eliminate or to prevent obstacles to trade and thus had as their object the 
improvement of the conditions for the functioning of the internal market.181 In this 
regard, the Court underlined that its findings were not called into question by Germany’s 
argument that Articles 3 and 4 only concerned advertising media of a local nature and 
hence lacked cross-border effects.182 Relying on its previous rulings in Österreichischer 
Rundfunk183 and Lindqvist184, the Court declared that recourse to Article 95 EC did not 
presuppose the existence of an actual link with free movement in every situation covered 
by the measure; what mattered was that the measure must actually be intended to improve 
the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market as Articles 3 
and 4 had been shown to do.185   
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 In the near future, the Court is expected to issue its ruling in Vodafone.186  By way 
of a preliminary ruling request from an English court, the case involves a challenge to the 
validity of a Regulation on roaming of public mobile phone networks within in the 
Community187, on certain grounds including the alleged inadequacy of Article 95 EC as 
the legal basis.188 As explained in the Preamble, there was a series of Community 
measures comprising the regulatory framework for electronic communications, but the 
mechanism allowing for ex ante regulatory intervention by national authorities had not 
proven sufficient as regards the regulation of intra-Community roaming charges for 
mobile phones.189  This called for amending the framework by way of this Regulation, 
which departed from the rules that were otherwise applicable, i.e., that prices for services 
offerings should be determined by commercial agreement involving private actors, and 
established a common approach to the regulation of roaming charges to ensure that users 
of mobile phones were not charged excessive prices when travelling within the 
Community.190 This was done by setting a Community maximum average per-minute 
charge at the wholesale level and limiting charges at the retail level through the 
introduction of a Eurotariff.191 
 
In his Opinion, Advocate General Poiares Maduro concluded that Article 95 EC 
was a proper legal basis for the Regulation and that the measure should be upheld in 
full.192  On the one hand, he considered that the European legislator had not made a 
sufficient showing that differences in national price control measures were likely to 
create obstacles to trade in the internal market for the purposes of Article 95 EC.193 On 
the other hand, however, the European legislator was justified in regulating roaming 
charges under Article 95 EC for the purposes of removing restrictions to free movement 
arising from the behaviour of private parties that disfavours cross-border economic 
activity.194 In his view, the differences in price between calls made within one’s own 
Member State and those made while roaming could reasonably be regarded as 
discouraging the use of cross-border services such as roaming, and the imposition at 
Community level of a price cap on roaming charges could therefore legitimately be seen 
as serving the establishment of the internal market by removing obstacles to cross-border 
economic activity.195   
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 To summarise, in the battery of cases decide since Tobacco Advertising I, the 
Court has not yet again struck down a measure as exceeding the scope of the 
Community’s competence under Article 95 EC.  In all, the evolution of the case law so 
far indicates that the limits placed on this provision reach further than may have been 
initially apparent in Tobacco Advertising I.196  For example, in Biotechnology, the Court 
accepted that divergences among differing national interpretations of an international 
convention were liable to give rise to divergences “prejudicial to the internal market”, 
without engaging in the detailed analysis of the types of obstacles to trade as had been 
posited in Tobacco Advertising I.  The fact that the Court allowed Article 95 EC to be 
used merely to foreclose different national interpretations of the relevant convention led 
one scholar to conclude that as far as a European contract law instrument was concerned, 
Biotechnology only strengthened the case for Article 95 EC.197  BAT  was also viewed as 
signalling a retreat from Tobacco Advertising I because its reasoning relied heavily on the 
content of the Directive itself and hence constituted a less-rigorous check to determine 
whether the conditions for Article 95 EC had been satisfied.198 And then there was 
Tobacco Advertising II, which was perceived by some scholars as evidencing such a low 
standard for measures seeking to combat future obstacles to trade that it prompted 
concern that the Court  was coming frightfully close to being satisfied with a mere 
showing of disparities among national laws in contrast to Tobacco Advertising I.199  For 
tobacco advertising in the press, the Court was satisfied that divergences among national 
laws created, or were liable to create, obstacles to trade even for publications in domestic 
markets “if only by way of exception or in small quantities”.200 For radio sponsorship, the 
Court was content that disparities in national laws were liable to impede the free 
movement of services on the grounds that radio broadcasters would be denied the benefit 
of sponsorship.201  The Court also affirmed that Article 95 EC could be used for measures 
that covered situations bearing no direct relationship to cross-border trade in the internal 
market.  While it remains to be seen whether the Court’s forthcoming ruling in Vodafone 
may “clip the wings” of Article 95 EC, it can be argued that Tobacco Advertising I 
alongside its progeny has already mapped out a wider path for measures based on Article 
95 EC than on the face of that judgment alone, which cannot be totally undone. This sets 
the scene for the analysis of the obstacles to trade and appreciable distortions of 
competition requirements. 
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9.3.2.2 Parameters of obstacles to trade:  Distinguishing obstacles sensu lato and 
obstacles sensu stricto 
 
As illustrated by the foregoing case law, the Court has generally framed the 
requirements for Article 95 EC in two-dimensional terms:  the measure concerned must 
contribute to the elimination of obstacles to trade and/or appreciable distortions of 
competition in the internal market.  In other words, the Court has not as yet considered a 
measure’s potential for improving the conditions for the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market for the purposes of Article 95 EC apart from these two routes.  In the 
literature, there has been ongoing discussion as to what extent Article 95 EC leaves open 
an additional route for the adoption of measures that are not gauged at eliminating 
obstacles to the fundamental freedoms in the strict sense or appreciable distortions of 
competition, but nonetheless seek to encourage cross-border activities by remedying 
uncertainties or other risks resulting from differences in national laws that somehow deter 
economic actors from engaging in cross-border trade in the internal market.202 While not 
said in so many words, this in fact alludes to the discussion, and terminological problems 
associated therewith, of delineating the dimensions of obstacles to trade under Article 95 
EC and its relationship to the free movement rules of the Treaty. At least to some extent, 
it seems to be the case that it is not so much an additional route that is at issue, but rather 
unearthing the breadth of parameters of obstacles to trade within Article 95 EC itself, 
which highlights the importance of distinguishing between obstacles sensu stricto and 
obstacles sensu lato in connection with Article 95 EC. 
 
 On the one hand, Article 95 EC encompasses obstacles to trade resulting from a 
national rule of a Member State taken by itself that falls afoul of the free movement rules, 
which can be called obstacles sensu stricto.  On the other hand, Article 95 EC also 
encompasses obstacles to trade that result from the fact that there are differences among 
the national laws of the several Member States that must be approximated so as to 
achieve the  objectives to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market, which can 
be called obstacles sensu lato. To be clear, this is not to say that approximation under 
Article 95 EC can be justified merely on the basis of a finding of differences among the 
national laws, as prohibited by Tobacco Advertising I.  This is only to make clear that 
Article 95 EC covers obstacles to trade that result not from the effect of a particular 
national rule taken on its own, but rather from the impact on cross-border trade by virtue 
of the parallel differences among the laws of the Member States that renders such laws 
subject to approximation under Article 95 EC.   
 
By and large, the relationship between Article 95 EC and the free movement 
rules, especially those concerning the free movement of goods under Articles 28-30 EC, 
is one of the most controversial topics in European law.  It has attracted differing views 
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among scholars, with some arguing that approximation under Article 95 EC is limited by 
the reach of these provisions203;  others taking the converse view204; and still others who 
have not yet taken a firm position but do not foreclose the possibility that Article 95 EC 
may be broader.205  To date, the Court has not yet squarely addressed the parameters of 
obstacles to trade under Article 95 EC vis-à-vis the free movement rules.  The fact that 
the matter has not been decided expressly by the Court thus far is not altogether 
surprising, considering that the majority of cases – i.e., Tobacco Advertising I, BAT, 
Swedish Match, Arnold André, Alliance for Natural Health, and Tobacco Advertising II –
concerned measures laying down rules on the circulation of products and services in the 
Community, with the result that the Court could be expected to interweave its free 
movement case law on obstacles presented by the relevant national rules, such as the 
citation to Keck in BAT206 and to Gourmet International Products in Tobacco Advertising 
II207, in its findings regarding the existence of existing or potential obstacles to trade 
resulting from disparities among the national laws concerned.  Importantly, however, in 
those cases the Court did not to merge its consideration of a particular national rule’s 
compliance with the free movement rules with its inquiry into obstacles to trade for the 
purposes of Article 95 EC.  Moreover, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the key point 
in most of these cases was whether a prohibition placed on particular goods and/or 
services in the internal market could find refuge within a provision of the Treaty that is 
supposed to make the market work, not to eliminate the relevant market in those products 
and/or services.  As such, these cases did not concern measures that sought to promote or 
to facilitate cross-border transactions in the internal market in a “positive” way. 
 
By comparison, in cases outside these confines, the Court has taken a wide view 
of obstacles to trade without being tied to the free movement rules.  This was illustrated 
by Biotechnology, in which the Court ruled that approximation under Article 95 EC was 
directed at reducing “obstacles, whatever their origin, to the operation of the internal 
market which differences between the situations in the Member States represent”.208  
While not mentioned in the case, this echoed early case law on Article 94 EC in which 
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the Court sought to distinguish the scope of approximation under this provision from the 
more limited scope of the rules on free movement of goods.209 Likewise, in Tobacco 
Advertising II, Article 95 EC was found applicable to obstacles to trade that could not in 
principle fall within the ambit of free movement considering that, in the case of 
prohibition of tobacco advertising in the press, the obstacles to trade existed in relation to 
publications which, by the Court’s admission, were placed on essentially local markets 
with tenuous links to cross-border trade. Likewise, this case also confirmed that Article 
95 EC could extend to purely domestic (or intra-State) situations with no link to cross-
border trade, thereby going beyond the ambit of the free movement rules. At least 
implicitly, the case law evinces the notion that obstacles to trade for the purposes of free 
movement rules are encompassed within the inquiry into Article 95 EC, but they do not 
constitute by themselves the outer limit to the scope of Article 95 EC.   
 
Notably, the Court’s forthcoming judgment in Vodafone may constitute a premier 
occasion to address this matter.  To recall, this case concerns the adoption of a 
Community measure under Article 95 EC approximating rules on tariff setting for mobile 
phone roaming charges that had previously been set by commercial undertakings, as 
opposed to State bodies. In short, it is a measure gauged at regulating private, not State, 
action and arguably, it could be analogised to an example of a “selling arrangement” 
within the meaning of the Keck case law in terms of regulating the way that certain goods 
are sold.  In his Opinion, Advocate General Poiares Maduro drew attention to the 
relationship between the free movement rules and Article 95 EC in relation to the actions 
of private parties, though stopping short of advocating “strict parallelism” between the 
two.210  Whether the Court upholds this measure or not, it may be forced to confront the 
relationship between Article 95 EC and the free movement rules, which may finally put 
to rest much of the controversy surrounding  this issue.  In any event, admittedly, the 
Court’s case law on Article 95 EC has not been very forthcoming in fleshing out the 
relationship between Article 95 EC and the free movement rules, given the nature of the 
cases presented so far, and it is hoped that Vodafone or other cases may present the Court 
with an opportunity to do so.  Nevertheless, from the tenor of judgments such as 
Biotechnology and Tobacco Advertising II, there are indications that Article 95 EC 
encompasses obstacles to trade that go beyond those presented by the free movement 
rules.   
 
 As far as the debate about European contract law is concerned, the distinction 
between obstacles sensu lato and obstacles sensu stricto is pivotal.  As far as obstacles 
sensu stricto are concerned, there seems to be an assumption that the case law deeming 
contract law rules as falling outside the scope of the free movement rules forecloses the 
Community’s competence under Article 95 EC.  Specifically, it is often argued on the 
basis of cases in the realm of free movement of goods concerning Articles 28 and 29 EC, 
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such as CMC Motorradcenter211 and Alsthom Atlantique212, respectively, that contract 
law rules cannot be considered obstacles to trade, at least to the extent that parties can 
deviate from them by virtue of choice of law rules.213  Certainly, other scholars have 
cautioned not to generalise too much from these cases214, and there continues to be 
differing opinion as to the extent to which national contract law rules can fit within the 
“selling arrangements” within the meaning of the Keck case law or else be deemed to 
impede “market access”.215 Yet, these cases should be read against the Court’s more 
recent jurisprudence on the free movement rules that place considerable emphasis on the 
practical effects of particular national rules on free movement, whether in terms of 
acknowledging that a trader’s uncertainty causing him to abstain from cross-border trade 
may be caught by Article 29 EC on exports216 or in terms of making access to the market 
more difficult.217 As a result, there is much debate to be had as regards the extent to 
which a particular national contract law rule can under certain circumstances constitute 
an obstacle sensu stricto, and the assumption of a general exclusion of non-mandatory 
contract law rules from the Treaty provisions concerning free movement on the basis of 
earlier case law does not necessarily hold.  Importantly, however, the inquiry into the 
extent to which a particular national contract law rule constitutes a hindrance to cross-
border trade in either the same or other Member States (i.e., obstacles sensu stricto) must 
be distinguished from the inquiry as regards the extent to which differences among the 
                                                 
211
 Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter GmbH v. Baskiciogullari (“CMC Motorradcenter”) [1993] ECR I-
5009. 
212
 Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique SA v. Compagnie de construction mécanique Sulzer SA (“Alsthom 
Atlantique”) [1991] ECR I-107. 
213
 See, e.g., S. Leible, “Fundamental Freedoms and European Contract Law”, in Constitutional Values and 
European Contract Law 63, 68 (S. Grundmann ed., Kluwer, 2008); J.W. Rutgers, “The Rule of Reason and 
Private Law or the Limits of Harmonization”, in Rule of Reason: Rethinking another Classic of European 
Legal Doctrine 144 (A. Schrauwen ed., Europa, 2005); M.W. Hesselink et al., “The legal basis for an 
optional instrument on European contract law”, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working 
Paper Series No. 2007/04, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091119, at 53 (and further citations 
therein). 
214
 M. Fallon and J. Meeusen,  “Private International Law in the European Union and the Exception of 
Mutual Recognition”, IV Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 48-49 (2002). 
215
 See, e.g., M. Schillig, “The Interpretation of European Private Law in the Light of Market Freedoms and 
EU Fundamental Rights”, 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 285, 289-291 (2008).  
Compare Nebbia, supra note 36, at 92-101 (stressing linkage between the assessment of obstacles to trade 
under the free movement rules and the conception of the internal market). 
216
 See, e.g., Case C-205/07 Gysbrechts v. Santurel Inter BVBA (“Gybrechts”), judgment of 16 Dec. 2008, 
not yet reported, paras 40-44.  Yet, the Court found that certain of the rules concerned could be justified on 
the grounds of overriding public interest requirements, namely consumer protection.  Id., paras 47-63. 
Notably, Advocate General Trstenjak reached the same conclusion as the Court but by a different route 
based on a modified interpretation of Article 29 EC corresponding to that of Article 28 EC, which removed 
the national rules concerned from the confines of “selling arrangements” by virtue of the effects of such 
rules in deterring traders from engaging in distance selling; however, as the Court, she found certain rules 
could be justified. Compare Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-205/07 Gysbrechts, paras 
48-89. 
217
 See, e.g., Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy, judgment of 10 Feb. 2009, not yet reported.  Compare 
Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy, paras 107-136 (advocating a 
general criterion of market access for Article 28 EC in line with the other fundamental freedoms, which 
provided a “feasting ground” of case law demonstrating the Court’s “market access” approach concerning 
the other fundamental freedoms).  See further S. Enchelmaier, “The ECJ’s Recent Case Law on the Free 
Movement of Goods: Movement in All Sorts of Directions”, 26 Yearbook of European Law 115 (2007). 
Chapter 9:  European Contract Law and the Internal Market 
 366 
various national contract law rules result in obstacles hindering cross-border trade in the 
internal market (i.e., obstacles sensu lato).   
 
In this regard, European contract law is perhaps the quintessential example of the 
use of Article 95 EC to reach obstacles to trade in this wider sense.  In other words, by 
virtue of the very fact that there exist parallel national contract regimes in the Member 
States, each of which embodies different contract rules, this may be deemed to preclude 
parties from taking advantage of the internal market, despite the fact that a particular 
national contract law rule by itself does not run afoul of the free movement rules.  As 
ventilated in the institutional documents and scholarly literature, the majority of the 
attention centers on three interrelated problems relating to the insufficiency of choice of 
law rules, higher transaction costs, and so-called “psychological barriers”.  First, one of 
the key problems presented in the debate relates to the insufficiency of choice of law 
rules.   As already noted, several commentators have opined that while obstacles to trade 
can be found as regards mandatory rules of contract law, as in the case of consumer 
contract law in which the parties are not free to contract out of and thus require traders to 
comply with twenty-seven different legal regimes as predicated by the Rome I 
Regulation, as opposed to non-mandatory rules of contract law in which the parties are 
free to do so.218 Yet, as documented in the Commission’s 2003 Action Plan, problems 
arise in connection with both consumer and commercial transactions by virtue of the fact 
that the line between mandatory and non-mandatory contract law is itself unclear due to 
different approaches in the Member States and that the choice of law itself is not always 
viable for consumers and businesses, particularly Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs).219  In fact, one scholar has found that various non-mandatory rules are in fact 
mandatory, with the result that there is no reason to exclude non-mandatory rules as a 
category from unification efforts in relation to contract law.220 
 
Second, as further underscored in the 2003 Action Plan, divergences in national 
contract laws present obstacles in the form of higher transaction costs for obtaining 
information on foreign law, for engaging legal advice for consumers and businesses, and 
for having to undertake certain formalities that place financial burdens on such parties or 
otherwise dissuade them from engaging in transactions.221  While there is divergent 
opinion in the commentary as the extent to which such costs rise to the level of obstacles 
to trade222, proof of problems resulting from such costs and choice of law rules was given 
a boost by the 2005 study conducted under the auspices of the international law firm of 
Clifford Chance whose findings – comprising the responses of about 175 businesses, 
large and small, from eight representative Member States – were presented at an 
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academic conference on European contract law held at Oxford University.223 One of the 
most striking results of this study was that roughly two-thirds of companies experienced 
obstacles to cross-border trade as the result of certain factors including variations among 
national contract laws and the costs of obtaining foreign legal advice.224 This study  
prompted Professors Stefan Vogenauer and Stephen Weatherill to conclude that a case 
could be made for Community action in contract law on the basis of Article 95 EC.225 
 
Third, there are various arguments that can placed under the heading of so-called 
“psychological barriers”.  The general idea underlying this category seems to be that as a 
result of divergences among national contract laws, consumers and businesses are 
deterred from engaging in cross-border transactions on account of the perception of legal 
risks and/or legal uncertainties involving the use of non-domestic contract law, thereby 
having a detrimental impact on the free flow of goods and services in the internal market.  
Frankly speaking, the conjunction of the word, “psychological” with “barriers” may 
inadvertently impart a degree of fuzziness based on parties’ perceptions, which may 
result in sensitivities regarding the use and abuse of Article 95 EC.  Yet, removing 
“psychological” from the equation, such arguments highlight serious problems hindering 
consumers and traders from engaging in cross-border transactions.  In the 2003 Action 
Plan, this was emphasised in the case of contractual liability rules and the interaction 
between disparities in contract law and movable property law since they presented great 
commercial risks for operators, which impeded the conclusion of cross-border 
transactions.226   More generally, the fact that consumers and businesses must rely on 
foreign contract law has been depicted as a “jump in the dark”, which makes such parties 
wary of taking part in such transactions and thus stunting the growth of the internal 
market.227 The “psychological barrier” argument was further bolstered by a famous 
article authored by Professor Jürgen Basedow, in which he posited that Article 95 EC 
encompassed measures that helped to break down barriers on account of uncertainties and 
risks caused by differences in contract law.228 Likewise, while some have questioned the 
sufficiency of uncertainties rising to the level of obstacles to trade229, others have taken a 
middle ground in the sense of either finding that legal uncertainties can be regarded as a 
non-tariff barrier to trade, but dispute the method to go about remedying it230, or at least 
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acknowledging that while not an obstacle to trade per se, such legal uncertainties do act 
as a deterrent to the expansion of the internal market.231 
 
In this way, despite differing views in the commentary, the record of the 
Commission’s Communications and the study conducted by Clifford Chance at least 
provide a basis for arguing that the sheer parallel differences between national contract 
law rules -- the lack of familiarity with foreign law and the additional costs and risks that 
are imposed – can act as obstacles to trade hindering or precluding consumers and 
businesses from making the most of the internal market.  As such, the adoption of a 
European contract law instrument, establishing a common set of contract law rules by 
which to further cross-border transactions among parties from different Member States 
and thus surmounting the obstacles that exist, would make a definitive contribution to the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market in line with the requirements for 
Article 95 EC.  Moreover, while it is readily admitted that there are some areas of 
contract law that do not present obstacles to trade in the internal market and thus relate 
purely to domestic transactions, this is not fatal to the use of Article 95 EC in this setting. 
On the basis  of the Tobacco Advertising II, provided that the threshold requirements 
concerning obstacles to trade and/or appreciable distortions of competition have been 
crossed, recourse to Article 95 EC “does not presuppose the existence of an actual link 
with free movement between the Member States in every situation” covered by the 
measure concerned, as long as the measure is actually intended to improve the conditions 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.232  This provides grounds for 
arguing that certain national contract law rules that may not be considered to present 
obstacles to trade by themselves may nonetheless be included in a comprehensive 
European contract law instrument adopted under Article 95 EC so as to ensure that the 
objectives of such an instrument relating to the elimination of obstacles to trade in the 
internal market can be achieved. 
 
9.3.2.3 Parameters of existing (and future?) appreciable distortions of competition  
As illustrated by the “object” prong of the case law, the Court has yet to elaborate 
a definition for the concept of “appreciable distortions of competition” for the purposes 
of Article 95 EC, but instead has pointed to certain situations by which to show what 
does, or does not, rise to the level of “appreciable” or constitute a “distortion of 
competition” in the first place.  Tobacco Advertising I stands as the landmark case (and 
only case so far) in which the Court engaged in ample discussion of this subject.233  The 
Court’s reasoning in this case was instructive, since it highlighted four situations, two 
that did not meet the threshold requirements for appreciable distortions of competition 
and two that did. First, in the context of advertising agencies and producers of 
advertising media, the Court found that (1) undertakings in Member States that imposed 
less restrictions on tobacco advertising received advantages in terms of economies of 
scale and an increase in profits, but this was too “remote and indirect” to rise to the level 
of “appreciable” distortions, as compared to (2) distortions caused by differences in 
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production costs relating to environmental protection standards illustrated by the 
Directive at issue in the Titanium Dioxide case.234  Yet, (3) the Court singled out certain 
forms of tobacco sponsorship where their prohibition would give rise to the relocation of 
sports events, since this “gives rise to considerable repercussions on the conditions of 
competition for undertakings associated with such events” and thus could be based on 
Article 95 EC.235 Second, in the context of the market of tobacco products, this type of 
distortion was not mentioned in the Directive itself.236 Thus, the Court seemed intent on 
pointing out that (4) the fact that producers and sellers of tobacco products were required 
to resort to price competition to influence their market share in Member States with more 
restrictive legislation on tobacco advertising was not a distortion of competition at all, but 
rather a restriction on the form of competition that applied equally to all economic 
operators in those Member States.237   Together with the emphasis on ensuring that 
Article 95 EC could not be used to combat the “smallest distortions of competition”, the 
Court’s approach manifested the intention to ensure that the limits of Article 95 EC were 
not exceeded.  At the same time, however, the Court’s anecdotal examples invited some 
flexibility into the assessment, and much depended upon how the “appreciable” formula 
would be applied in later cases.238 
 
In the aftermath of Tobacco Advertising I, the Court was loathe to revisit the 
standard for appreciable distortions of competition.  This is aptly demonstrated by a 
comparison between the Court’s judgment and the Opinions of the Advocates General in 
Biotechnology239 and even more so in BAT240, the latter of which contained extensive 
discussion of this issue in connection with the export ban.  This was even more evident in 
Tobacco Advertising II, whereby the Court declared that there was no need to delve into 
the issue under circumstances where the requisite showing of obstacles to trade had been 
fulfilled. Certainly, this may have been purposeful in order to confirm explicitly that 
Article 95 EC did not require a showing of both the obstacles to trade and appreciable 
distortions of competition requirements, which the Court’s prior ruling in BAT had 
presented in somewhat understated fashion.  At the same time, however, the Court relied 
on the first and the fifth recitals of the Directive concerned to confirm that disparities in 
national laws relating to radio sponsorship gave rise to an “appreciable risk of distortions 
of competition” in the internal market.241  This language seemed to indicate that a 
measure based on Article 95 EC could be used to combat the mere risk of future 
appreciable distortions, as opposed to existing ones. 
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Notably, this issue had been lying dormant since Titanium Dioxide.242  There, the 
Court proclaimed that Article 95 EC could be used where disparities in national laws 
were “liable to create or maintain distorted competition”.243  This language was then 
incorporated into Spain v. Council244, in which the Court ruled that Article 95 EC could 
be used to deal with disparities in national laws that were not only “liable to create or 
maintain” distortions of competition”, but also “liable to hinder” the free movement of 
goods in the Community.245   In turn, the Court’s ruling in Spain v. Council found its way 
into Tobacco Advertising I as regards the use of Article 95 EC for preventing the 
emergence of future obstacles to trade246, but its counterpart in Titanium Dioxide did not.  
The Court only cited Titanium Dioxide in support of establishing the standard for 
“appreciable” distortions.247 It made no mention of its relevance in connection with the 
use of Article 95 EC for preventing future appreciable distortions from arising. Thus, it 
remained unclear whether the Court was shutting the door on this possibility. 
 
Subsequent case law enlivened the issue further.  In 2002, two years after 
Tobacco Advertising I, the Court delivered its judgment in Leitner.248 As discussed in 
Chapter 3249, this case concerned a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Package 
Travel Directive as regards whether the notion of “damage” included non-material 
damages.  To recall, the likelihood of distortions of competition was part of what 
prompted the Austrian court to make a preliminary reference in the first place, since 
differences between certain Member States as regards the extent of liability for tour 
operators were contemplated as incompatible with the objectives of the Directive to 
eliminate distortions of competition and provide for a uniform level of consumer 
protection in the internal market.250 In its judgment, the Court found that it was clear, on 
the basis of the second and third recitals of the Directive, that its aim was to eliminate 
disparities between national laws in the area of package holidays which were “liable to 
give rise to distortions of competition” between operators established in different 
Member States.251  Following this, the Court declared:  “It is not in dispute that, in the 
field of package holidays, the existence in some Member States but not in others of an 
obligation to provide compensation for non-material damage would cause significant 
distortions of competition, given that, as the Commission has pointed out, non-material 
damage is a frequent occurrence in that field”.252   
 
Admittedly, the use of Article 95 EC as the legal basis for the Package Travel 
Directive was not in dispute in Leitner, and therefore, the “appreciable” standard for 
distortions of competition in relation to this Directive was not directly before the Court to 
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decide.  Still, the Court’s judgment in this case manifested a less restrained approach to 
the “appreciable” requirement in relation to problems stemming from divergences in 
national  (consumer) contract laws.  As emphasised by one scholar, the Court’s approach 
in Leitner suggested that if the sole disparity between national laws is the possibility of 
securing certain kinds of damages in some Member States but not in others, that aspect of 
contract law could be subject to approximation under Article 95 EC, which was a “far 
cry” from the threshold of “appreciable” distortions elaborated in Tobacco Advertising 
I.253  Moreover, by basing its rationale on the recitals of the Directive cited above, the 
Court’s judgment imparted that Article 95 EC could be used to combat potential future 
appreciable distortions that were liable to arise as a result of the disparities in the national 
laws concerned. 
 
In Tobacco Advertising II, the Court reopened the matter with its substantiation, 
on the basis of the first and the fifth recitals of the Directive, that the differences in 
national laws as regards the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products in the press 
and radio meant that there was an “appreciable risk of distortions of competition”.254 Yet, 
in doing so, it left many questions open.  On the one hand, the Court was quoting from 
the fifth recital of the Directive255 and thus the reference to an “appreciable risk of 
distortions” was not entirely of the Court’s own making.  Indeed, the Directive’s 
Preamble seemed to have gone overboard in attempting to demonstrate the measure’s 
compliance with Tobacco Advertising I,  mentioning not only an “appreciable risk of 
distortions of competition”, but also an “appreciable risk of obstacles” to free movement 
in the fourth recital256, which was also cited by the Court in its judgment.257  Thus, it is 
not exactly clear whether the use of “appreciable” as an adjective for “risk” as opposed to 
“distortion” was intentional on the legislator’s part in transposing the requirements of 
Tobacco Advertising I into the Directive, which then inadvertently filtered into the 
Court’s judgment in Tobacco Advertising II.258  On the other hand, in referring to two 
recitals – the first and the fifth – of the Directive, the Court could have just as easily cited 
the first recital, which mentioned existing, as opposed to a risk of, appreciable distortions 
of competition.259 As such, this lends support for the view that the Court knew what it 
was doing when it chose to rest its finding on the wording of the fifth recital and hence to 
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inject the possibility of recourse to Article 95 EC on grounds of “appreciable risks of 
distortions”.   
 
While further case law on this issue would be welcomed, the jurisprudence so far, 
especially taking both Leitner and Tobacco Advertising II into account, seems to indicate 
that the use of Article 95 EC can be used to approximate national laws in order to 
eliminate existing appreciable distortions of competition resulting from differences in 
such laws and to prevent potential future appreciable distortions from arising.260  In the 
very least, as demonstrated by these two cases, the Court takes a more pragmatic or 
flexible approach to the standard for appreciable distortions of competition than may 
have been initially indicated in Tobacco Advertising I. Under Leitner, differences in 
liability rules among national consumer contract laws were viewed by the Court as 
presenting “significant” distortions justifying the use of Article 95 EC on the basis of the 
text of the measure concerned. Tobacco Advertising II seemed to have stepped further 
than Tobacco Advertising I in the sense of carving out leeway for finding a risk of 
appreciable distortions even in the case of radio sponsorship without delving into the 
exact nature of what such distortions would be.  This has critical implications for the 
debate about European contract law. 
 
Generally speaking, while the extent to which disparities among national contract 
laws can be deemed to constitute appreciable distortions of competition in the internal 
market remains controversial, it is perhaps one of the rare points of agreement in the 
commentary so far that this basis cannot be used to justify a comprehensive European 
contract law instrument on its own.  It is difficult to make a definitive judgment as to the 
extent to which rules concerning consumer and commercial contracts would be 
considered to constitute appreciable distortions of competition, since by and large, the 
problems presented by disparities in national contract laws for the purposes of identifying 
appreciable distortions of competition in many ways mirror or are intertwined with the 
problems identified above in connection with obstacles to trade.  Nevertheless, on the 
basis of the institutional documents and scholarly literature, the debate has largely 
centered on two key sets of problems, which may to some extent provide further 
“cushioning” for Union action in certain fields of contract law.   
 
 First, there seems to be a general set of problems concerning the competitive 
advantages or disadvantages placed on consumers and businesses in cross-border 
transactions in the form of information asymmetries and costs placed on businesses and 
consumers, resulting from disparities in contract law.   For example, one scholar singled 
out three situations:  first, information between competitors regarding the contract law 
rules is distributed unequally in the sense that some competitors are more familiar with 
such laws than others whether by their size or accessibility to legal expertise; second, the 
situation between domestic and foreign firms is different in the sense that foreign, as 
opposed to domestic, firms have the advantage of being able to escape from domestic 
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laws, but in cases where domestic law is more favourable, the domestic firm is placed in 
a competitive advantage by being more familiar with such law; and finally information is 
distributed differently between the parties, as in the case of consumer contracts whereby 
consumers do not conclude contracts on a daily basis compared with traders.261  
Moreover, disparities in contract law are also posited to distort competition by virtue of 
the different bargaining positions of parties, even under circumstances where such rules 
are only dispositive, since such bargaining is conducted “in the shadow of the law” and 
the knowledge of contract law by one party as opposed to another presents a decisive 
competitive advantage in its favour.262    
 
 In large part, these arguments seem to depend upon the “playing field” taken into 
consideration. The fact that foreign and domestic companies occupy different positions 
when it comes to the negotiation and the knowledge of contract law seems to fall on the 
line of applying equally to all foreign and domestic operators depending upon the setting 
and hence it remains uncertain whether this could be deemed to rise to the level of an 
appreciable distortion of competition.  The fact that parties are precluded from using 
standard form contracts throughout the Community, which would provide them with 
advantages in economies of scale and greater profits, would also seem to find analogy 
with the Court’s rationale in Tobacco Advertising I in the sense of being too tenuous to 
rise to the level of “appreciable”.  Yet, in comparison to the factual circumstances upon 
which the Court’s ruling was predicated in that case – i.e., that prohibitions on tobacco 
advertising would have a marginal impact on advertising agencies – here the fact that 
some companies as opposed to others are precluded from utilizing competitive devices 
relating to standard form contracts and other marketing techniques could be considered to 
have a much more serious impact in terms of creating an unlevel playing field. In the 
very least, it could be posited that that such arguments could fall within the ambit of 
presenting an “appreciable risk” of distortions of competition in line with what was said 
above. 
 
Second, there are particular types of contract rules that are associated with the 
likelihood of appreciable distortions of competition. Liability rules in contract law and 
the interface between contract law and movable property law are often mentioned in this 
regard.  As emphasised in the 2003 Action Plan, for example, differences in liability rules 
expose traders to differing costs and insurance fees and the fact that certain types of 
credit instruments are favoured in some Member States but greatly restricted or non-
existent in other Member States create distortions of competition among traders with 
respect to having recourse to such instruments for cross-border transactions.263 Such 
arguments present stronger arguments bolstering the use of Article 95 EC.  As confirmed 
by the Court itself in Leitner, differences in liability rules in consumer contracts give rise 
to “significant” distortions of competition in the sense of imposing on some traders, as 
opposed to others, the obligation to provide compensation to consumers on account of the 
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non-performance of such contracts. Along these lines, similar arguments could be made 
for commercial contracts since the impact on liability rules for companies, as opposed to 
consumers, could arguably be as significant in terms of effects.  This could also 
presumably fall within the category of eliminating “appreciable risks” of distortions of 
competition, which a European contract law instrument would eliminate by providing 
uniform set of contract rules applicable to all traders.  Likewise, as regards contract rules 
relating to movable property law, this constitutes one of the most convincing cases. Akin 
to Tobacco Advertising I and II, the differences in treatment, or even lack thereof, of 
various types of credit instruments among the Member States place undertakings at a 
competitive disadvantage depending upon the extent to which such instruments are 
recognised in a particular Member State, which a European contract law instrument 
would eliminate by providing a uniform set of rules allowing actors to engage in 
transactions across the Community without the potential for such arrangements to be 
jeopardised once the internal border of one Member State or another was crossed.   
 
Taking all of the foregoing into account, various questions remain open as regards 
the obstacles to trade and appreciable distortions of competition requirements of Article 
95 EC for which further case law is needed. Nonetheless, on the basis of the case law so 
far, it is submitted that a case can be made that the adoption of a comprehensive 
European contract law instrument goes beyond “a mere finding of disparities among 
national rules and of the abstract risks of obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms or of distortions of competition”264 and thus falls within the scope of the 
Community’s competence under Article 95 EC.  This is based upon the foregoing 
elements of three key elements concerning:  (1) the course of development of the 
Tobacco Advertising I case law, taking account of that judgment alongside its progeny; 
(2) Article 95 EC’s coverage of obstacles sensu lato as opposed to merely obstacles sensu 
stricto; and (3) Article 95 EC’s potential for combating existing as well as future 
appreciable distortions of competition.  This finding is likely to invigorate arguments as 
regards the roles played by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in this 
regard, which leads to the analysis of the exercise of Community’s competence under 
Article 95 EC. 
 
9.3.3 Exercise of Article 95 EC competence  
9.3.3.1 The “object” prong 
The “object” prong of the case law has been the source of much of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This is because in 
addition to arguments contesting the use of Article 95 EC as a proper legal basis, several 
cases involved challenges to the adoption of the measure concerned on grounds of its 
non-compliance with one or both of these principles.  On the whole, this case law has 
been noted for the lack of rigorous examination of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality in relation to the measures concerned.265  The Court’s approach to the 
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principle of subsidiarity has proven to be “a particular sensitive issue”, in the words of 
one jurist266, due to growing tensions about its ineffectiveness in relation to measures 
based on Article 95 EC.   Starting with Tobacco Advertising I, while the Court did not 
pronounce on the matter267 Advocate General Fennelly argued in his Opinion that Article 
95 EC was an exclusive Community competence, thereby rendering the principle of 
subsidiarity inapplicable.268 The character of approximation was such that the Member 
States simply could not approximate each other’s laws in fields falling within the Treaty:  
“Individual action is excluded as a matter of logic and collective action by the 15 
Member States (for example by way of a treaty concluded under public international law) 
is excluded, in my view, as a matter of law, having regard, in particular, to the terms of 
Article 5 [now Article 10] of the EC Treaty concerning the principle of sincere 
cooperation”.269  In Biotechnology, the Court finally had the opportunity to confront this 
issue.  There, the Netherlands fell back on the points it made in relation to legal basis, 
i.e., since national patent laws were almost entirely harmonised by the relevant 
international convention, any disparities arising thereunder should have been addressed 
by renegotiation of that convention, which the Member States were perfectly able to 
achieve on their own.270 In its judgment, the Court went through the subsidiarity calculus 
to find that the Directive complied with the principle of subsidiarity: 
 
The objective pursued by the Directive, to ensure smooth operation of the 
internal market by preventing or eliminating differences between the  
legislation and practice of the various Member States in the area of the 
protection of biotechnological inventions, could not be achieved by action 
taken by the Member States alone. As the scope of that protection has 
immediate effects on trade, and, accordingly, on intra-Community trade, 
it is clear that, given the scale and effects of the proposed action, the objective 
in question could be better achieved by the Community.271 
 
While not saying so explicitly, the Court implicitly rejected both that subsidiarity was 
inapplicable to Article 95 EC and that collective action by the Member States could be 
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used as a counterweight to Community action; the focus was placed on the Member 
States acting “alone”.   
 
 Thereafter, in BAT, the Court expressly declared that the Community’s 
competence under Article 95 EC was not exclusive and hence the principle of 
subsidiarity was applicable to this provision.272 At the same time, however, the Court 
concluded that the Directive concerned did not violate this principle since the objective of 
approximating national laws could not be “sufficiently achieved” by the Member States 
individually and called for action at the Community level.273  As such, the Court did not 
much to contradict the assertions of the Netherlands and the Commission that “where the 
conditions for the use of Article 95 EC have been satisfied, the conditions for Community 
action under the second paragraph of Article 5 EC are also satisfied”.274 Advocate 
General Geelhoed’s treatment of subsidiarity in this case was even shorter, amounting to 
one paragraph:  “As I have concluded that action by the Community legislature under 
Article 95 EC was necessary, no further significance attaches to the appraisal of 
subsidiarity”.275  
 
Although the issue of subsidiarity did not arise in Swedish Match and Arnold 
André, the Court’s judgment in Alliance for Natural Health further substantiated this 
remark.  Again, Advocate General Geelhoed recognised that he could be “very short on 
this point”, boiling down the analysis to the main question as to whether the objective of 
the Directive could be better achieved by the Community, which he found was 
satisfied.276  The Court proceeded by way of similar analysis, finding the objective 
pursued by the contested provisions could be best achieved at Community level.277 At 
present, while the Court’s decision in Vodafone is pending, Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro concluded in his Opinion that the Regulation concerned did not violate 
subsidiarity.  While he paid utmost vigilance to ensuring compliance with subsidiarity278, 
he found that it was the cross-border or transnational nature of the economic activity in 
question (here roaming) that put the Community in a better position than the national 
authorities to regulate that activity.279 Consequently, the commentary has increasingly 
acknowledged that the subsidiarity inquiry had become largely moot in relation to Article 
95 EC.280 In other words, given that no Member State could effect approximation for the 
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purposes of ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market on its own, the 
Community automatically seemed better suited to the task. 
 
 Along similar lines, the principle of proportionality has been given a “light touch” 
in various cases within the “object” prong of the case law.  For example, in BAT, the 
Court declared the Community legislator must be given “broad discretion” and therefore 
the legality of the measure would be affected only if it was “manifestly inappropriate 
having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue”, 
which was not the case here.281 In his Opinion, Advocate General Geelhoed came to the 
same conclusion, emphasising that on the whole the Community courts exercise a limited 
appraisal of this issue.282  The Court continued its approach in the subsequent cases of 
Swedish Match and Arnold André.283  Thereafter, in Alliance for Natural Health, despite 
Advocate General Geelhoed’s contention that that the Directive violated the principle of 
proportionality and should therefore be annulled on such grounds284, the Court swiftly 
concluded that it fully complied with this principle.285 In Tobacco Advertising II, the 
Court, echoing the conclusions of Advocate General Léger286, ruled that Articles 3 and 4 
of the Directive did not violate the principle of proportionality.287  With regard to Article 
3’s prohibition on tobacco advertising in the press, the Court emphasised that it was not 
possible to adopt as a less restrictive measure exempting publications intended for local 
markets, since this would have made the Directive’s field of application uncertain in line 
with Lindqvist.288  And as for Article 4’s prohibition on radio sponsorship, it was not 
apparent from the Preamble of the Directive, particularly the fifth recital, that the 
European legislator had exceeded the limits of its discretion by not limiting the measure 
to activities or events with cross-border effects.289 Interestingly, as regards the pending 
Vodafone case, it remains to be seen whether the Court will take up Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro’s view that the assessment of proportionality in light of the impact on 
Member State autonomy must also be considered290, though as regards the Regulation 
concerned, the Advocate General found that the European legislator’s approach was not 
manifestly erroneous but in fact a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem 
at hand.291   
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9.3.3.2 The “approximation” prong 
The “measures for the approximation” prong represents the more recent set of 
cases that dealt with the limits of “measures for the approximation” of the laws of the 
Member States under Article 95(1) EC.  While to some extent there had been some 
previous case law which had touched somewhat upon this issue292, it was by and large the 
Smoke Flavourings and ENISA cases that definitively addressed this aspect of the scope 
of Article 95 EC for the first time.293 UK v. European Parliament and Council (“Smoke 
Flavourings”)294 concerned the issue whether “multi-stage approximation” was permitted 
under Article 95 EC.  It involved an action for annulment brought by the UK against a 
Regulation concerning smoke flavourings used or intended for use in foods295,  which 
was adopted under Article 95 EC.  The Regulation provided for a procedure whereby the 
Commission would authorise the substances used for the production of smoke 
flavourings and then place such authorised substances on a positive list annexed to the 
Regulation.296  Only smoke flavourings included on the list could be marketed in the 
EC.297  As a result, the Regulation did not regulate directly which smoke flavourings 
could be authorised for use in the internal market; it was only with the Commission’s 
adoption of implementing legislation in the form of the positive list that approximation 
was achieved.  Or as framed by Advocate General Kokott, the Regulation “at most 
regulates an intermediate step on the way to an approximation of the laws of the Member 
States”.298  
 
The UK’s central argument was that this type of multi-stage approximation was 
not permitted under Article 95 EC, and Article 308 EC should have been used instead.299 
In its view, “measures for the approximation” of national laws under Article 95(1) EC 
were restricted to Community measures leading to a result that could have been achieved 
by the simultaneous enactment of identical legislation in each of the Member States, 
which was not the case here.300  Incidentally, the UK had submitted additional arguments 
during the course of the proceedings, asserting, among other things, the Regulation’s lack 
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of compliance with the principle of proportionality.301   In her Opinion, Advocate General 
Kokott considered that these claims were submitted too late in the procedure and thus 
only dealt with in the alternative.302  In any event, she boiled the matter of proportionality 
down to the issue whether the aims of the Regulation could have been achieved by 
equally effective provisions leaving more responsibility to the Member States.303 In her 
view, “everything suggests that the solution chosen is, of the various conceivable 
regulatory models, the most appropriate solution”, finding that alternatives, such as those 
relating to mutual recognition, a “coordinating solution” among national laws, or the 
inclusion of the positive list in the basic (legislative) act itself were unworkable.304  Her 
findings echoed some of the parties’ arguments in the case.  In particular, the Parliament 
stressed that in view of the fact that it was not possible to take a common approach to 
evaluating the safety of smoke flavourings, the European legislator was forced to provide 
for this type of procedure.305 The Commission seconded this view, stressing that the two-
stage process constituted “a proportionate and scientifically founded approach”, since it 
was necessary to draw up a list that was both detailed and open-ended given the 
circumstances involved.306  
 
In line with the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott307, the Court held that 
Article 95 EC could be used to adopt multi-stage approximation measures as in the case 
of the Regulation. By virtue of the term, “measures for the approximation”, set down in 
Article 95(1) EC, “the authors of the Treaty intended to confer on the Community 
legislature a discretion, depending on the general context and the specific circumstances 
of the matter to be harmonised, as regards the harmonisation technique most appropriate 
for achieving the desired result, in particular in fields which are characterised by complex 
technical features.”308 Such discretion should be used especially when choosing the most 
appropriate harmonisation technique under circumstances where the proposed 
approximation required physical, chemical, or biological analyses to be made and 
scientific developments in the field concerned must be taken into account.309 Importantly, 
however, the Court attached two conditions for cases involving “multi-stage 
approximation”:  first, the legislature must determine in the basic (legislative) act the 
“essential elements” of the harmonisation measure concerned; and second, the 
mechanism for implementing these elements must be designed in such a way that it leads 
to harmonisation within the meaning of Article 95 EC.310  The Court then applied these 
two conditions to the Regulation and found both to be fulfilled.311  As such, the 
Regulation was properly based on Article 95 EC, and the UK’s action was dismissed.312 
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Thereafter, in UK v. European Parliament and Council (“ENISA”)313, the Court 
was confronted with the issue whether the establishment of a Community body fell 
within the scope of “measures for the approximation” of national laws under Article 
95(1) EC.  The case was another action for annulment brought by the UK, this time 
against Regulation establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(“ENISA”)314, based on  Article 95 EC. As explained in the Preamble, “[t]he technical 
complexity of networks and information systems, the variety of products and services 
that are interconnected, and the huge number of private and public actors that bear their 
own responsibility risk undermining the smooth functioning of the [i]nternal [m]arket”.315 
Several Community directives had already been adopted in this area316, but they required 
different forms of technical and organisational applications by the Member States and the 
Commission, and their heterogeneous application could lead to inefficient solutions and 
create obstacles in the internal market.317 This called for the creation of a centre of 
expertise at the European level by way of ENISA in order to provide advice and 
assistance to the European institutions and national authorities.318  ENISA did not have 
the means of directly approximating the laws of the Member States, i.e., it could not itself 
adopt approximating measures, and it did not take part in procedures for the adoption of 
such measures.319  Instead, it was to contribute to the approximation process indirectly by 
way of basic tasks, such as giving advice and facilitating cooperation between the 
Member States and institutions with a view to combating network and information 
security problems throughout the Union and ensuring the uniform application of the 
measures adopted in this field.320  
 
Similar to Smoke Flavourings, the UK argued that the creation of a Community 
body exceeded the ambit of approximation of Article 95 EC, and as such, the Regulation 
should have been based on Article 308 EC instead.321 Compared to Smoke Flavourings, 
the UK did not rely on the principle of proportionality or the principle of subsidiarity to 
challenge the Regulation. Yet, these principles fed into the arguments of the defending 
institutions, particularly those of the European Parliament, which emphasised that, “The 
EC Treaty does not require that measures based on that legal basis [Article 95 EC] 
approximate substantive rules of national legislation where a lesser degree of Community 
action would be more appropriate”.322 In its view, while in theory the European legislator 
could have adopted rules directly approximating the laws of the Member States, given the 
technical complexity of the area concerned and its rapidly evolving character, it drew up 
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the Regulation embodying “low intensity approximation”, thereby enabling the Member 
States to adopt homogeneous measures to implement the various measures in the field.323  
 
In her Opinion, Advocate General Kokott concluded that the Regulation could not 
be based on Article 95 EC and should be annulled.324 Despite ENISA’s “potential 
contributions” to approximation in various ways, such as rendering advice to the 
European institutions and serving as a discussion forum to promote voluntary parallel 
action in the Member States, it was not predictable whether and in what form ENISA 
would concretely contribute to the approximation of laws.325 Moreover, the Regulation 
was not actually tied to the implementation of the various Community directives in the 
field.326 As such, the Regulation was “not so much an intermediate step on the way to the 
approximation of laws of the Member States as a step into the uncertain.”327   
 
 The Court disagreed with the Advocate General and upheld the use of Article 95 
EC as the legal basis for the Regulation. It reiterated on the basis of Smoke Flavourings 
that the term “measures for the approximation” of national laws under Article 95(1) EC 
bestowed the Community legislature with discretion, depending on the circumstances 
involved, as regards the most appropriate method of approximation for achieving the 
desired result, particularly in complex technical fields.328 Then the Court added:   
 
Nothing in the wording of Article 95 implies that the addressees of the  
measures adopted by the Community legislature on the basis of that  
provision can only be the individual Member States. The legislature  
may deem it necessary to provide for the establishment of a Community  
body responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of 
harmonisation in situations where, in order to facilitate the uniform 
implementation and application of acts based on that provision, the  
adoption of non-binding supporting and framework measures seems  
appropriate.329  
 
Yet, in such cases, two conditions must be satisfied:   first, the tasks and objectives of the 
Community body must be “closely linked” to the subject-matter of the approximation 
legislation in the field concerned330; and second, those objectives and tasks must be 
regarded as “supporting and providing a framework” for the implementation of that 
legislation.331  As far as the Regulation was concerned, both conditions were fulfilled.332  
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As a result, the Court upheld Article 95 EC as the legal basis for the Regulation and 
dismissed the UK’s action.333   
 
9.3.3.3 Implications for European contract law 
As glimpsed through the lens of the “object” prong of the case law, even if in 
principle the Court has confirmed that action under Article 95 EC must comply with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, in practice once the threshold requirements 
placed on the limits of Article 95 EC have been met, it is difficult to demonstrate lack of 
compliance with these principles.  In other words, for those looking to subsidiarity and 
proportionality as a barrier to Community action under Article 95 EC in relation to 
European contract law, this case law sadly disappoints.   
 
Taking account of the “approximation” prong, however, has the potential to 
provide a more nuanced reading of the operation of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as well as the principle of sincere cooperation to some extent, in relation 
to Article 95 EC.   By allowing the use of approximation mechanisms or techniques that 
indirectly, not just directly, approximated the laws of the Member States, the Court’s 
judgments in Smoke Flavourings and ENISA can be read to expand the reach of 
approximation under Article 95 EC.  Yet, at the same time, by emphasising the European 
legislator’s discretion to choose the most appropriate approximation technique depending 
upon the relevant circumstances, these judgments allow for recourse to techniques that 
may be less intrusive on the competences of the Member States and narrowly tailored to 
targeting areas where the Member States fall short in line with the tenets of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. Such techniques have the potential to provide for more “cooperative” 
solutions between the Community and the Member States, and especially to the extent 
that such solutions are situated at the national level, this may in turn trigger a role for the 
principle of sincere cooperation to play. Importantly, given the Court’s approach in 
underscoring the European legislator’s discretion to choose the most appropriate 
approximation technique under Article 95 EC, this makes it conceivable that other types 
of approximation techniques in addition to those at issue in Smoke Flavourings and 
ENISA could be contemplated in this regard. Consequently, the “approximation” prong 
helps to demonstrate that the expansion of the scope of Article 95 EC need not 
necessarily lead to the curtailment of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
but in fact may contribute to their fulfillment.  As the scope of approximation within 
Article 95 EC expands, this may be considered to allow greater space “inside” the 
lawmaking process within which to give expression to tenets of subsidiarity and 
proportionality in guiding the European legislator’s exercise of its competence under 
Article 95 EC than may be apparent “outside” the lawmaking process once the 
requirements for Article 95 EC have been met  as illustrated by the “object” prong.  With 
the interplay between the “object” and “approximation” prongs, this may help to lessen 
tensions regarding the perceived failure of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality in relation to Article 95 EC taking account of the “object” prong alone.   
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As far as European contract law is concerned, the interplay between the two 
prongs of the case law provides possibilities for the operation of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, depending upon the future dimensions of a European contract law 
instrument.  Certainly, it remains to be seen how this would play out, given that an 
instrument approximating the contract laws of the Member States is not presently 
contemplated in the debate.  Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that there 
is leeway for the  European legislator to devise approximation techniques by which to 
reconcile the need for EU rules in contract law and the accommodation of residual space 
for the Member States if Article 95 EC is resorted to.   
 
9.3.4 Comparative reflection with the United States 
The foregoing analysis of Article 95 EC cannot help but prompt a “comparative 
leap” to the United States.  This is because in the wake of Tobacco Advertising I, a flurry 
of literature sprang up334, comparing this case to jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court 
decided around the same time period, particularly the cases of United States v. Lopez335 
and United States v. Morrison336, whereby the Court struck down somewhat egregious 
federal statutes as beyond the scope of Congress’ competence under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause and ushered in a new era of federalism in the United States.337  In this 
way, this case law illuminated similar roles of the Court of Justice and the US Supreme 
Court in protecting the competences of the Member States from potential encroachment 
by the federal or Community legislator.  At the same time, however, this case law also 
saw both Courts mindful not to unduly constrict the ambit for legislative action on this 
basis of these provisions.  Akin to avenues afforded to the European legislator under 
Tobacco Advertising I discussed above, Lopez left untouched various powers of Congress 
under the Interstate Commerce Clause, which prompted remarks that its impact would 
depend upon later cases.338 
 
Consequently, with the evolution of the Court of Justice’s Tobacco Advertising I 
case law, there are striking parallels with the US Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
on the Interstate Commerce Clause. For example, just as the second Tobacco Advertising 
Directive was upheld by the Court in Tobacco Advertising II, the statute struck down in 
Lopez was readopted by Congress with a revised jurisdictional “hook” indicating a link 
between the measure concerned and interstate commerce, which passed muster in the 
American federal courts.339  And just as the Court confirmed that measures adopted under 
Article 95 EC could extend to purely intrastate transactions so as not to preclude the 
objectives to be achieved in Tobacco Advertising II, the US Supreme Court upheld the 
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application of federal drug legislation to purely intrastate, non-commercial usage of 
medical marijuana on the basis of the cumulative effects of such local usage on interstate 
commerce in Gonzales v. Raich.340  In this way, the recent line of cases attests to the 
importance of reading cases such as Tobacco Advertising I and Lopez alongside their 
progeny manifesting more room for maneuver at the centralised (Community or federal) 
level than may initially have been evident from the tenor of those cases alone. 
 
Notably, however, there is a glaring difference in approach when it comes to the 
recourse to Article 95 EC and the Interstate Commerce Clause, respectively, in relation to 
the approximation (or federalisation) of contract law.  From the American perspective, 
the discussion of the constitutionality of a European contract law instrument may seem 
somewhat bizarre. As illustrated in Chapter 4, it has been posited by commentators over 
the years that there is sufficient federal competence primarily on the basis of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause to unify areas of contract law and other fields of commercial 
law. Despite numerous attempts, however, this has not occurred, and instead, action 
continues to be situated in large part at the state level apart from the federal constitutional 
framework in the United States. By comparison, in the European Union, the ongoing 
activities concerning European contract law are ingrained inside, not outside, the 
constitutional framework.  As a result,  mechanisms inside this framework by which to 
guide the exercise of Union competence under Article 95 EC loom larger. This places 
focus on the multi-directional force of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
“inside” as well as “outside” the EU lawmaking process in relation to Community action 
under Article 95 EC by virtue of the “object” and the “approximation” prongs of the case 
law.  This also raises the prospect of other mechanisms embodying tenets of subsidiarity 
and proportionality that lie outside the strict confines of Article 95 EC, particularly 
optional legal forms, which generally have not been resorted to in the American private 
law framework341 but figure prominently in the debate about European contract law as 
seen below.   
 
9.4 The relationship between Articles 95 and 308 EC 
9.4.1 General overview:  Roles played by Article 308 EC vis-à-vis Article 95 EC 
As framed by the Court, “Article 308 EC is designed to fill the gap where no 
specific provisions of the Treaty confer on the Community institutions express or implied 
powers to act, if such powers appear nonetheless to be necessary to enable the 
Community to carry out its functions with a view to attaining one of the objectives of the 
Treaty”.342   As far as the adoption of a European contract law instrument is concerned, 
this means that Article 308 EC has the potential to play two distinct roles in order to 
achieve the Community’s internal market objectives.  First, in the context of an 
instrument approximating the contract laws of the Member States,  Article 308 EC has 
                                                 
340
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  For a general overview, see E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: 
Principles and Policies 264-273 (3rd ed., Aspen, 2006); “Symposium:  Federalism after Gonzales v. Raich”, 
9 Lewis and Clark Law Review 743 (2005) (and further citations therein). 
341
 Yet, one cannot say that the prospect of optional legal forms, albeit at the state level, was never aired as 
a possible solution in the American setting:  see Chapter 4, § 4.3.2, at 126 n.175 and accompanying text. 
342
 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council 
and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 211 (citations omitted). 
Chapter 9:  European Contract Law and the Internal Market 
 385 
the potential to play a residual or complementary role in relation to Article 95 EC where 
Article 95 EC would be deemed an insufficient legal basis, in all or in part, for the 
adoption of such an instrument.343  Second, in the context of an optional instrument 
running alongside the national contract law regimes, Article 308 EC can serve as the 
legal basis for such an instrument where it would be considered to fall outside the 
confines of approximation under Article 95 EC. Both roles squarely implicate the 
relationship between Articles 95 and 308 EC.  Each is taken in turn. 
 
9.4.2 Approximation 
 In principle, the relationship between Articles 95 and 308 EC in the context of 
approximation presents two situations.  The first situation posits that Article 95 EC is 
entirely insufficient to serve as a legal basis for a European contract law instrument, and 
therefore, Article 308 EC serves as the “fallback” position. The second situation posits 
that Article 308 EC could be used in combination with Article 95 EC under 
circumstances where particular aspects of a European contract law instrument would 
exceed the scope of Article 95 EC.  In other words, in the first situation, Article 308 EC 
plays a residual role in relation to Article 95 EC, whereas in the second situation, Article 
308 EC plays a complementary role alongside Article 95 EC. 
 
 As far as the first situation is concerned, the case law so far has not yet 
definitively addressed the extent to which approximation measures falling outside the 
scope of Article 95 EC would still be covered under Article 308 EC.  To recall, in Spain 
v. Council344, Spain sought to justify recourse to Article 308 EC (as well as Article 94 
EC), as opposed to Article 95 EC, on the grounds that since it required unanimous voting 
in the Council, it trespassed much less on the sovereignty of the Member States.  This 
argument was quickly rejected by the Court and did not provide a platform from which 
the Court provided detailed guidance as regards the relationship between Articles 95 and 
308 EC.  As far as Article 308 EC was concerned, the Court recalled previous case law in 
the intellectual property field substantiating that this provision could be used as the basis 
for creating new rights superimposed on national rights, which was not at issue in that 
case.345 The Court concluded that since Article 95 EC was the proper legal basis for the 
measure, it did not have to be adopted on the basis of either Article 94 EC or Article 308 
EC.346  This seemed to imply that if Article 95 EC was insufficient, then recourse could 
have been made to Article 308 EC, but it was left unclear whether this referred to Article 
308 EC as a “last resort” in the context of approximation or to the Court’s previous 
finding regarding the use of Article 308 EC for the creation of European legal forms.   
Thereafter, in Tobacco Advertising I347, the issue as to whether the annulled Tobacco 
Advertising Directive could possibly have sought refuge in another legal basis such as 
                                                 
343
 Article 94 EC is not mentioned here because Article 95 EC takes precedence over Article 94 EC in this 
regard:  see supra section § 9.2.  As regards reference to Article 95 EC’s counterpart in the Lisbon Treaty, 
see supra note 69.  The reframing of Article 308 EC as Article 352 TFEU is discussed further below. 
344
 Case C-350/92 Spain v. Council [1995] ECR I-1985. 
345
 Id., para. 27. 
346
 Id., para. 40. 
347
 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I [2000] ECR I-8419. 
Chapter 9:  European Contract Law and the Internal Market 
 386 
Article 308 EC was not before the Court.348 Given the far-reaching nature of the 
Directive concerned, however, it was surmised by scholars as well as the Council’s Legal 
Service that Article 308 EC could not have been used.349  Still, the relationship between 
Articles 95 and 308 EC as regards less extreme measures was left unclear.  
 
While further case law is certainly warranted, as far as European contract law is 
concerned, this issue may present somewhat of a theoretical, as opposed to practical, 
problem.  In principle, there are strong arguments that Article 308 EC can serve as the 
legal basis for a European contract law instrument, whether under the previous t or the 
present Treaty framework.  Under the EC Treaty, Article 308 EC reads in full:  
 
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of  
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community,  
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the  
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.350 
 
Taking apart this paragraph, the limits and the exercise of Community competence under 
Article 308 EC are generally framed around the following five requirements:  (1) the 
necessity test (“action by the Community should prove necessary”); (2) linkage to the 
common market (“in the course of the operation of the common market”); (3) linkage to 
Community objectives (“one of the objectives of the Community”); (4) no other 
provision of the Treaty is sufficient (“this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers”); and (5) the adoption of “appropriate measures”.351  There is certainly much 
debate to be had as regards these requirements, but by and large, given the Court’s 
expansive interpretation to each352, they do not seem to present major hurdles for the 
purposes of European contract law. Indeed, a major complaint with Article 308 EC over 
the years has been its use precisely for measures that had nothing to do with the 
“operation of the common market”353, as illustrated by recent cases concerning Union 
measures for combating terrorism.354 
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In fact, one of the most well-known cases that is often mentioned in the debate is 
Opinion 2/94355, which rejected the use of Article 308 (then Article 235) EC as the legal 
basis for the European Community’s accession to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR).356  Famously, the 
Court declared that:   
 
Accession to the Convention would, however, entail a substantial change  
in the present Community system for the protection of human rights  
in that it would entail the entry of the Community into a distinct  
international institutional system as well as the integration of all the  
provisions of the Convention into the Community legal order. Such a 
modification of the system for the protection of human rights in the 
Community, with equally fundamental institutional implications for the 
Community and for the Member States, would be of constitutional 
significance and would therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of 
Article 235 [now Article 308]. It could be brought about only by way  
of Treaty amendment.357 
 
Thereafter, this passage of Opinion 2/94 fed into the debate about the constitutionality of 
a European civil code on the grounds that, in view of certain jurists, the adoption of such 
a code could be deemed of “constitutional significance” for the framework of the 
Community legal order and hence would exceed the Community’s competence under 
Article 308 EC.358  Yet, leaving aside a European civil code, which by the Commission’s 
repeated admonitions seems out of the running at present, the prospect of a European 
contract law instrument would not seem to raise such flags.  By comparison to the 
Community’s accession to an international convention that would subject the Community 
to the purview of the European Court of Human Rights and exact major implications for 
the institutional framework of the European Union, a European contract law instrument is 
situated within the Community legal framework, with a view to contributing to the 
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Community’s objective to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market. In other 
words, the ambit of latitude for recourse to Article 308 EC in the context of contract law 
does not seem to have been severely curtailed by this Opinion.   
 
 Much the same could be said as regards Article 308 EC’s reframing in the Lisbon 
Treaty. It is perhaps an understatement to say that Article 308 EC received its fair share 
of attention in the events paving the way for this Treaty.  It was singled out alongside 
Article 95 EC for specific mention in the Laeken Declaration and for elimination from 
the Treaty itself within the context of the European Convention.359  It emerged in the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty as the so-called “flexibility clause”360, whose text was taken 
over in large part by Article 352 TFEU of the Lisbon Treaty.361  Article 352 TFEU  
provides in relevant part:   
 
 If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the 
 policies defined by the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the
 Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council 
 acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining 
 the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.362 
 
As compared to Article 308 EC, Article 352 TFEU eliminates the reference to “in the 
course of the operation of the common market”, albeit linking the objectives to be 
achieved explicitly to those set out in the Treaties, of which those relating to the internal 
market would be included.  This provision also introduces changes as regards the 
requisite decision-making procedures, thereby giving the European Parliament the right 
not merely to be consulted but to give its consent to action taken under this provision.  
Moreover, this provision provides for an ex ante procedure for national parliaments’ 
scrutiny of proposals based on this provision as has been done for the monitoring of the 
principle of subsidiarity.363 As such, while Article 308 EC’s counterpart in the Lisbon 
Treaty is situated within a “constitutional climate” of greater vigilance to proposals based 
on this provision, the extent of the Union’s competence under this provision arguably has 
not been substantially altered as far as the adoption of a European contract law instrument 
is concerned.  
 
 In any case, as a practical matter, it is difficult to picture a European contract law 
instrument falling completely outside the scope of the Community’s competence under 
Article 95 EC in line with the analysis of the previous section.  In other words, given the 
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ambit of Article 95 EC under the case law so far, this serves to undercut arguments 
concerning Article 308 EC in this regard. Nonetheless, for those who consider, contrary 
to this study, that Article 95 EC cannot serve as a legal basis for the adoption of a 
European contract law instrument in toto, the residual role of Article 308 EC as the legal 
basis for such instrument cannot be foreclosed. Such as position also points to issues 
concerning the potential for Article 308 EC to play a complementary role alongside 
Article 95 EC. 
 
As far as the second situation  is concerned, the combined use of Articles 95 and 
308 EC has been contemplated in the debate about European contract law.364  On the 
basis of Titanium Dioxide365, it used to be presumed that the combination of Articles 95 
and 308 EC was foreclosed on account of the fact that the respective decision-making 
procedures were assumed to be incompatible with each other:  Article 95 EC stipulates 
qualified majority voting in the Council and the co-decision procedure366, whereas Article 
308 EC requires unanimous voting in the Council and consultation of the Parliament.367   
With recent case law, however, this is no longer sure.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, European Parliament v. Council (“International Fund 
for Ireland”)368 confirmed the combination of Articles 159 and 308 EC, which stipulate 
exactly the same decision-making procedures as Articles 95 and 308 EC, respectively.  
There are compelling arguments that the Court’s rationale in that case would apply 
mutatis mutandis to Articles 95 and 308 EC, since it would ensure that the limits of the 
Community’s more specific competence under Article 95 EC vis-à-vis Article 308 EC 
would not be transgressed, whilst allowing for a optimal way by which to achieve the 
Community’s objectives related to the internal market, as opposed to splitting the 
particular measure as between the elements that would fall within Article 95 EC and 
those that would not, thereby requiring Article 308 EC, if another more specific legal 
basis was not available.  While the combination of the co-decision procedure (from 
Article 95 EC) and unanimous voting in the Council (from Article 308 EC)  in this case 
was made under the present Treaty framework, the Court has yet to pronounce on the 
treatment of a similar case under the Lisbon Treaty in view of the changes made to 
Article 308 EC, whereby unanimous voting in the Council would be combined with the 
consent, and no longer merely the consultation, of the European Parliament under Article 
352 TFEU.  Arguably, the Court’s approach would not dramatically change, however. 
This is because  as a practical matter, aspects of the consent procedure would essentially 
be read into the co-decision procedure (under Article 95 EC) in tandem with unanimous 
voting in the Council (under Article 308 EC), which would uphold the Parliament’s rights 
of participation in the decision-making process.  Above all, International Fund for 
Ireland strongly suggests that Articles 95 and 308 EC (now Articles 114 and 352 TFEU 
in the Lisbon Treaty) may be used together for the adoption of a European contract law 
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instrument.  As a result, depending upon the dimensions of such an instrument, elements 
that would be considered to fall outside the scope of Article 95 EC, say in relation to 
aspects that were not deemed to be tied to eliminating obstacles to trade and/or 
appreciable distortions of competition, could be covered by Article 308 EC, thereby 
giving the Community the requisite competence to adopt such an instrument. 
 
9.4.3 Optional legal forms 
9.4.3.1 The case law: Carving out the boundary line between Articles 95 and 308 EC 
 With the progression towards one or more optional instruments in the debate 
about European contract law, this implicates important issues underlying the relationship 
between Articles 95 and 308 EC in terms of the boundary line between approximation 
and the creation of optional European legal forms.  Over the past years, there have been 
several cases in the intellectual property field in which the Court has been confronted 
with this issue.  Some of these cases intersected with the Court’s jurisprudence 
concerning Article 95 EC as part of arguments put forward to challenge the use of this 
provision as the legal basis of a particular measure.  For example, as already noted, in 
Spain v. Council369, the Court took the opportunity to underscore previous case law, 
namely Opinion 1/94370, that the Community was competent in the field of intellectual 
property to harmonise national laws under Articles 94 and 95 EC, whereas Article 308 
EC may be used as the basis for creating new rights superimposed on national rights, 
which was not at issue there.371  Several years later, in Biotechnology372, the Netherlands 
contested the use of Article 95 EC, among other things, on the grounds that the Directive 
went beyond approximation and created a new type of property right distinct from the 
rights covered by existing national patent law.373  The Court dismissed this argument, 
again relying on its previous ruling in Opinion 1/94 that the patents issued under the 
Directive were national patents governed by national law and that the Directive did not 
introduce a new right superimposed on national rights, which would have required 
recourse to Article 308 EC.374 The Directive concerned sought to have the Member States 
“adjust” their national patent laws to a uniform standard, not to create any sort of 
European framework with respect to patents at Community level.375 The fact that the 
Directive extended patentability to cover matters not previously protected by national 
patent laws only served to bolster the need for harmonisation itself.376  As such, the case 
belied the subtlety between approximation and the creation of new legal forms at the 
European level in the sense that this depended on the conception of a new “right”, which 
                                                 
369
 Case C-350/92 Spain v. Council [1995] ECR I-1985. 
370
 Opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services 
and the protection of intellectual property [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 59. See also Case C-9/93 IHT 
Internationale Heizetechnik GmbH and Danziger v. Ideal-Standard GmbH and Wabco Standard GmbH 
(“Ideal-Standard”) [1994] ECR I-2789, paras 55-58. 
371
 Case C-350/92 Spain v. Council, paras 23, 27. 
372
 Case C-377/98 Biotechnology [2001] ECR I-7079.  
373
 Id., para. 23.  
374
 Id., paras 24-25. 
375
 See E.R. Gold and A. Gallochat, “The European Biotech Directive: Past as Prologue”, 7 European Law 
Journal 331, 352-353 (2001).   
376
 See Case C-377/98 Biotechnology, para. 25. 
Chapter 9:  European Contract Law and the Internal Market 
 391 
some commentators found present in relation to changes exacted to national law, as 
opposed to the creation of a European legal form, which was not.377   
 
Yet, it was the 2006 European cooperative society case378, which squarely 
confronted the Court with the line between approximation and new legal forms outside 
the confines of the intellectual property field for the first time.379  This case concerned a 
dispute between the European Parliament and the Council concerning the legal basis of a 
Regulation on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society, which was adopted under 
Article 308 EC.380  In the Parliament’s view, Article 95 EC should have been used 
instead and brought an action to annul the measure on this ground.381  As explained in the 
Preamble, the purpose of this Regulation was to introduce a European form of 
cooperative society, which would allow for this type of business form to be established 
by persons or entities from different Member States.382  As indicated in the Preamble, 
cross-border cooperation between cooperatives was hampered by legal and administrative 
difficulties presented by the various national legal regimes, and the Regulations 
establishing other European business forms were not well-suited to the specific features 
of cooperatives.383  In principle, the European legislator could have adopted a directive or 
a regulation approximating national laws on the subject, but that was not the approach 
taken.384 Instead, the Regulation introduced a optional legal form for cooperatives 
running alongside the laws of the Member States.385   
 
In its judgment, the Court upheld the Regulation as properly based on Article 308 
EC.  After recalling previous case law in the intellectual property field386, the Court 
considered that the Regulation sought to introduce a new legal form that coexisted with 
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the national forms of cooperative societies.387  It then declared:  “the contested regulation, 
which leaves unchanged the different laws already in existence, cannot be regarded as 
aiming to approximate the laws of the Member States applicable to cooperative societies, 
but has as its purpose the creation of a new form of cooperative society in addition to the 
national forms”.388  This finding was not changed by virtue of the fact that the Regulation 
contained various references to national law, since the legal framework of the European 
cooperative society primarily emanated from the Regulation itself and such references 
were of a subsidiary nature.389 The European cooperative society was governed “first and 
foremost” by that Regulation; it was only in the alternative – as in the case of matters not 
covered by the Regulation – that it referred to national law.390 On these grounds, the 
Court held that Article 95 EC could not constitute a legal basis for the Regulation and 
that it was correctly adopted under Article 308 EC.391 
 
In her Opinion, Advocate General Stix-Hackl came to the same conclusion, 
though she delved into the ambiguities underlying the relationship between Article 95 EC 
and Article 308 EC in greater detail.  She started with the framework set by the case law 
in the intellectual property field, which indicated that recourse was to be had to Article 
308 EC for the creation of legal institutions or legal forms governed by Community 
law.392  Yet, she found that it was not possible to derive from that case law any clear 
distinction between approximation in the sense of reducing disparities between national 
laws and the creation of new legal forms, as illustrated by the instant case in which the 
new legal framework created by the Regulation establishing the European cooperative 
society also helped to reduce disparities by virtue of the fact that the Member States 
would adhere to those uniform Community rules.393  She then surmised: 
 
 Whilst the creation of new Community legal forms alongside national 
 legal forms is not therefore covered by Article 95 EC, the legal position 
 is not as clear in the case of legal forms that are not independent of  
 national legislation or in the case of legal rights that are afforded  
 protection independently of national law.  It is not finally established, 
 in particular, where the dividing line runs between genuine or completely 
 new legal forms and those new legal forms to which national law also  
applies.394 
 
This led her to conclude that the question of the use of Article 95 EC vis-à-vis Article 
308 EC must be examined on a case-by-case basis.395  As regards the Regulation 
concerned, it created a Community structure in parallel with national structures and thus, 
despite the occasional references to national law, was considered a genuinely new 
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creation.396 In her view, the essential feature of the Regulation was the creation of 
“something new”, which could only be achieved by Article 308 EC; the aim that it 
pursued in connection with the internal market was secondary.397 
 
 In all, the Court’s judgment in European cooperative society was not all that 
surprising, since it was in line with prior case law in the intellectual property field as 
mentioned above.  Nevertheless, as highlighted in the Opinion of the Advocate General, 
there had been considerable disagreement among scholars on the use of Article 95 EC in 
relation to the creation of new legal forms398, and even the Parliament had attempted to 
argue that that the intellectual property field should be a considered a special case.399 
Therefore, this case affirmed in the context of the internal market programme that Article 
95 EC could not be used for the creation of European legal forms that run alongside the 
national legal regimes; recourse must be made to Article 308 EC.   
 
 Looked at from another vantage point, however, the European cooperative society 
case spoke as much to the limits as to the exercise of Community competence under 
Article 308 EC.  Not coincidentally, this case was decided on the very same day as 
ENISA400, and took its place alongside that case and Smoke Flavourings for delineating 
the scope of “measures for the approximation” of national laws under Article 95(1) as 
part of the “approximation” prong of the case law.  Whilst under ENISA, the creation of 
Community bodies fell within the European legislator’s discretion to choose the most 
appropriate approximation technique (provided that the requisite conditions were 
satisfied) under Article 95 EC, the European cooperative society case made clear that 
Article 95 EC could not be stretched to encompass the creation of European legal forms 
lying parallel to the national legal regimes.  At the same time, the Court upheld the use of 
a complementary mechanism on the basis of Article 308 EC, alongside the European 
legislator’s arsenal of approximation techniques allowed under Article 95 EC, to achieve 
the Community’s objectives concerning the internal market.  While not detailed expressly 
in either the Court’s judgment or the Advocate General’s Opinion, the case subscribes to 
a form of Community action that evinces a “softer touch” vis-à-vis the national legal 
orders by running alongside them, rather than displacing or adjusting national laws via 
approximation.401  Thus, although there was no explicit mention of subsidiarity or 
proportionality in the case itself, European cooperative society was nonetheless infused 
with these principles.   
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9.4.3.2 Dimensions of a European optional instrument in contract law 
As the debate about European contract law is still ongoing, the dimensions of an 
optional instrument (or instruments402) in the field of contract law remain unsettled.403  
Still, on the basis of the institutional documents thus far, particularly the parameters of an 
optional instrument outlined in Annex II of the Commission’s 2004 Communication, 
such an instrument has been framed as running alongside the national contract regimes as 
a “28th regime”, with a view to facilitating cross-border transactions in the internal 
market.404   
 
Generally speaking, there seems to be considerable agreement that Article 308 
EC, as opposed to Article 95 EC, would be the proper legal basis for an optional 
instrument running in parallel with the contract law regimes of the Member States.405  
Yet, ambiguity remains in light of the chameleonic nature of such an instrument.  To 
explain, the nature of a potential European optional contract law instrument has been 
presented as manifesting either an opt-in or opt-out regime, though in the 2004 
Communication, the Commission indicated that there was a preference for an opt-in 
approach.406 In some of the commentary surrounding the Communications, however, it 
was considered that the optional nature of the instrument could give way to combinations 
or alternatives including but not limited to opt-in/opt-out regimes. For example, such an 
instrument could provide for an opt-out regime for cross-border contracts as opposed to 
an opt-in regime for domestic contracts, or start out as either opt-in or opt-out but 
eventually lead to the adoption of a compulsory instrument displacing national contract 
law.407 This demonstrates that there are several aspects of a European optional contract 
law instrument that must be clearly distinguished as far as the interplay between Articles 
95 and 308 EC are concerned.408  These primarily concern three situations:  (1) the 
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distinction between an optional and a compulsory instrument; (2) the use of opt-in and/or 
opt-out models; and (3) the contemplation of progressive or hybrid methods involving the 
use of an optional and/or compulsory instrument. Each are taken in turn, with the 
assumption that other requirements relating to the use of Article 95 and 308 EC have 
been fulfilled. 
 
 First, as regards the distinction between an optional and compulsory instrument, it 
may seem at first sight that the emphasis placed on the use of an optional instrument to 
eradicate barriers to the smooth functioning of the internal market would constitute a 
direct invitation to the use of Article 95 EC.  Yet, as made clear in European cooperative 
society, even though a Community measure has as its aim to improve the conditions for 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the creation of a European legal 
form that exists in parallel with the national legal orders falls outside the ambit of 
approximation under Article 95 EC and is properly adopted under Article 308 EC.   In 
this regard, a European optional instrument in contract law seems to correspond to the 
nature of the European legal form at issue in that case in the sense that both sought to 
introduce a new form coexisting, rather than displacing, the relevant national legal 
regimes, which presents compelling arguments for the use of Article 308 EC, not Article 
95 EC.  For that matter, it is conceivable that the optional instrument may not 
exhaustively cover all fields of contract law but may only establish a set of rules 
considered most relevant to facilitate cross-border transactions, which could result in 
references to the contract laws of the Member States (and possibly other areas of private 
law as the case may be) in the instrument. The Court’s emphasis in European cooperative 
society that subsidiary references to national laws did not alter recourse to Article 308 EC 
seems to provide further support for the use of Article 308 EC, as opposed to Article 95 
EC, in relation to future plans for the optional instrument.  That being said, as highlighted 
in the Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion in this case, questions do remain in the case of 
optional legal instruments in which the dividing line between the application of European 
and national rules is not clear-cut, which may become relevant depending upon further 
developments concerning the formulation of one or more optional instruments in the 
debate. 
 
Second, as regards recourse to opt-in and/or opt-out models, both would concern 
an optional instrument as lying parallel to the national regimes, but whereas an “opt-in” 
regime would provide the parties with an instrument that they would be free to choose, or 
not, as the applicable law to their contract, an “opt-out” regime would make the 
instrument the applicable law for the particular contract unless the parties chose to “opt-
out” of such an instrument.  The “opt-out” regime can easily give way to ambiguities in 
discerning where approximation ends and the creation of new legal forms begins, since 
an opt-out regime could potentially be viewed as amounting to “default” approximation 
in the sense that parties would be governed by the optional instrument within the national 
legal orders, except in cases where they chose otherwise. To be clear, however,  this is 
not the same thing as approximation, much less optional harmonisation, where the parties 
are required to follow the rules set down in the harmonisation measure for inter-
Community trade, but are given the “option” to choose either the Community rules or the 
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relevant national rules for domestic transactions.409 Those cases involve a body of 
Community rules which displaces national rules as far as certain (cross-border or 
otherwise) transactions are concerned.  By contrast, in the case of an opt-out regime, the 
optional instrument would still constitute an additional legal regime running alongside 
the national legal orders.  The parties would not be required to utilise such an instrument 
for cross-border transactions but would merely do so under circumstances where they did 
not specify another applicable law.  While further case law cannot be ruled out, European 
cooperative society lays primary emphasis upon the impact of the particular measure on 
the national legal orders and its relationship with national law, i.e., whether the measure 
exists in parallel to the national regimes and whether the legal form established by the 
measure is “primarily” governed by the measure concerned.  On those grounds, although 
the use of an opt-out instrument may be argued to have the effect of bringing about 
approximation indirectly in the sense of eliminating disparities and bringing national 
contract laws closer together, the formal construct of the European optional instrument as 
comprising a distinct set of contract law rules embodied in the instrument adopted at the 
European level would seem to take precedence under the case law, which argues for 
Article 308 EC, as opposed to Article 95 EC, as the proper legal basis. 
 
Third, as part of the discourse on European contract law, there has been a variety 
of progressive or hybrid methods involving the use of a compulsory instrument 
approximating national contract laws and an optional instrument lying alongside them. 
As contemplated in the debate, for example, this could involve starting out with some 
form of optional instrument, which would culminate in the adoption of a compulsory 
contract law instrument displacing the contract laws of the Member States. As such, the 
use of an optional instrument could be viewed as part of a larger project to bring about 
the approximation of national contract law. Yet, as described in the foregoing sections, 
the use of an optional instrument lying parallel to the national regimes would likely call 
for use of Article 308 EC, whereas the substitution for an instrument wholly 
approximating the laws of the Member States would likely require recourse to Article 95 
EC, either alone or alongside Article 308 EC.  As a result, this requires recourse to 
different legal bases, which may be inconvenient but is the result of the particular scheme 
of Community competences laid by the Treaties.  
 
Furthermore, while not contemplated much as of yet, another method could 
involve combining compulsory and optional aspects in the same instrument.  
Hypothetically, for example, one could surmise a systematic instrument on contract law, 
which could contain provisions seeking to approximate the contract laws of the Member 
States as well as other provisions establishing a set of optional contract law rules that 
would provide an additional option for the parties for cross-border transactions.  In such a 
case, this would argue for the combination of Articles 95 and 308 EC, which on the basis 
of the International Fund for Ireland case may be possible.  While all eyes have been 
placed on a purely optional instrument so far in the debate, this type of hybrid instrument 
may provide a pragmatic approach for the European legislator depending upon further 
developments. 
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9.5 Conclusion 
Given the emphasis so far on an optional instrument (or instruments) in contract 
law, it may very well be the case that Article 308 EC, as opposed to Article 95 EC, will 
assume predominant focus as the debate about European contract law proceeds.  This 
does not lessen the importance of the foregoing analysis, however. By addressing the 
relationship between Articles 94 and 95 EC, it helped to resolve longstanding controversy 
concerning the apparent differences in scope between the two provisions.  By confronting 
the scope of Article 95 EC, it demonstrated that the limits of Article 95 EC cannot be 
restricted to myopic focus on Tobacco Advertising I or tied to the scope of the free 
movement rules (namely, Articles 28-30 EC) and that there is a nuanced relationship 
between Article 95 EC and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which may 
go some way in soothing tensions with respect to their role in guiding the exercise of 
Community competence in this context. Finally, it delved into the relationship between 
Articles 95 and 308 EC, which demonstrates that while Article 308 EC may serve as a 
proper legal basis for the adoption of an optional legal instrument running parallel to the 
national contract regimes, this provision also has the potential to play a “backup” or 
complementary role vis-à-vis Article 95 EC as far as an instrument approximating 
national contract law is concerned. On the basis of the case law so far, Article 308 EC has 
the potential to be used alongside Article 95 EC as far as an instrument combining both 
approximating and optional elements is concerned.  In all, while various questions remain 
open, the foregoing analysis indicates that there is a solid basis to find that that the 
European Union has been conferred the requisite competence to adopt a comprehensive 
European contract law instrument, optional or otherwise, on the basis of Articles 95 
and/or 308 EC (and their counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty). 
 
Certainly, this finding may not be welcomed by all audiences.  Long before the 
debate about European contract law, Articles 95 and 308 EC had been depicted as 
particularly notorious provisions responsible for the undue extension of Community 
competence. By their very nature, there will forever be tensions underlying both 
provisions in relation to fears of encroachment on Member State domains, especially as 
regards contract law and other fields of private law.  Yet, such tensions should not 
obscure the important role played by these provisions to help the European Union to 
achieve its foremost objective to ensure the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market, within which a European contract law instrument, optional or otherwise, can play 
an important role.  It remains to be seen whether Articles 95 and/or 308 EC (now Articles 
114 and/or 352 TFEU) will be put to use by the European legislator in the adoption of a 
European (optional) contract law instrument. Yet, this analysis demonstrates that a solid 
case can be made that to the extent such an instrument is needed, its constitutionality 
should not considered to present an insurmountable barrier in this regard. 
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European Contract Law and Consumer Protection 
 
10.1 Introduction 
As illustrated in Part Two, Article 153 EC, either by itself or alongside Article 95 
EC, steadily filtered into documents issued by the European institutions and stakeholders 
as part of the debate about European contract law.1  Article 153 EC also makes an 
appearance in much of the scholarly literature surrounding this debate.  On the one hand, 
this is not all that surprising. Given that much of the “hard core” of the Community 
acquis concerns consumer contract law, the reference to Article 153 EC equipping the 
Community with specific competence in the field of consumer protection would seem to 
be expected.2 Yet, on the occasions in which it has been contemplated in the literature, 
Article 153 EC is usually passed over without much detailed analysis, often due to 
perceptions of its limited scope and its aptitude for being overshadowed by Article 95 
EC.3  As a result, Article 153 EC seems to play more of a role akin to “second runner up” 
at a beauty pageant – mentioned but never chosen in the end.   
 
Upon closer examination, however, inquiry into Article 153 EC in the context of 
European contract law breaks open longstanding ambiguity and controversy regarding the 
scope of this provision and its linkage to Article 95 EC. The shift from minimum to 
maximum harmonisation in the context of the Commission’s review of the consumer 
acquis has placed renewed focus on the potential recourse to Article 153 EC by virtue of 
its allowance – unlike Article 95 EC – for minimum harmonisation as a matter of primary 
Community law.4  Given the interplay between consumer contract law and general 
contract law in the ongoing debate, this begs provocative questions as regards the extent 
to which Article 153 EC may be used a legal basis alongside others such as Articles 95 or 
Article 308 EC for the adoption of a comprehensive European contract law instrument, 
optional or otherwise, encompassing consumer contract law. In fact, both inside and 
outside the confines of the debate about European contract law, one continues to find 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 7, § 7.2.1.2. 
2
 As regards terminology, there has been attention drawn to the distinction between “consumer protection” 
and “consumer policy” in the sense that the former may carry connotations of paternalism that the latter 
does not.  See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the “Consumer policy action 
plan 1999-2001”, [1999] OJ C 209/1, point 2.4.  Yet, for the most part, the two terms have been used 
interchangeably in the various institutional documents, and the term, “consumer protection” is used as the 
heading of the specific title of the EC Treaty and of the TFEU in the Lisbon Treaty encompassing Article 
153 EC and Article 169 TFEU, respectively. 
3
 See, e.g., V. Constantinesco, “La ‘codification’ communautaire du droit privé à l’épreuve du titre de 
compétence de l’Union européene”, 44 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 707, 716-717 (2008); S.A. de 
Vries, Tensions within the Internal Market: The Functioning of the Internal Market and the Development of 
Horizontal and Flanking Policies 301-303 (Europa, 2006); C. Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of 
Contract Law 33-34 (Routledge-Cavendish, 2008); S. Weatherill, “Justifying Limits to Party Autonomy in 
the Internal Market – EC Legislation in the Field of Consumer Protection”, in Party Autonomy and the Role 
of Information in the Internal Market 173, 188-190 (S. Grundmann et al. eds, de Gruyter, 2001).   
4
 Article 153(5) EC. 
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instances in which Article 153 EC has been advocated either by itself or in tandem with 
Article 95 EC as a legal basis for a particular Community measure, but is not taken up.5  
This seems to indicate some uncertainty among the European institutions themselves as 
regards the use of Article 153 EC and its interplay with Article 95 EC, among other 
Treaty provisions.6  
 
In view of the foregoing remarks, the aim of this chapter is to examine the extent 
of the European Union’s competence under Article 153 EC (and its counterpart in the 
Lisbon Treaty) to adopt a European contract law instrument including or limited to 
consumer contract law and the linkage between this provision and Articles 95 and 308 
EC in that regard.  It is divided into three main parts.  The first part sets forth the 
overarching framework or template for the analysis of Article 153 EC, which 
encompasses three key components:  the chronological development of Article 153 EC in 
the past and present Treaty framework; the relevant case law of the Court of Justice; and 
the institutional practice concerning the use, or lack thereof, of Article 153 EC.  The 
second part analyses the scope of the Union’s competence under Article 153 EC in 
relation to the achievement of consumer protection objectives sensu stricto on the basis 
of Article 153(3)(b) EC, which includes both the limits of such competence and its 
exercise in relation to the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, and sincere 
cooperation.  The third part evaluates the relationship between Articles 153, 95, and 308 
EC as far as the adoption of a European contract law instrument encompassing consumer 
contract law, optional or otherwise, is concerned, drawing in relevant part on comparative 
reflection with the United States. 
 
The organisation of this chapter is intentional.  The three components comprising 
the template for the analysis of Article 153 EC – i.e., the Treaty, case law, and usage – 
are presented together in the first part because they lay the groundwork for the analysis of 
Article 153 EC and its linkage to Articles 95 and 308 EC in the sections that follow.  
Admittedly, this makes the chapter “top heavy”, and it could be thought preferable to 
incorporate these components within the inquiry of Article 153 EC itself. Yet, 
methodologically, there are good reasons to justify the approach taken here.  In light of 
the considerable ambiguity surrounding Article 153 EC and the divergent opinion among 
commentators regarding the potential role, or not, to be played by this provision in 
European contract law, it is only by examining these three components together that the 
ambit of Article 153 EC and its linkage to Article 95 EC comes into view. Moreover, 
each of these components is inextricably intertwined with both the scope of the 
Community’s competence under Article 153 EC and the interplay between Articles 153 
and 95 EC as far as Community consumer contract law is concerned, which makes 
separating out the elements associated with each extremely difficult.  For that matter, 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., T. Bourgoignie, “European Community consumer law and policy: from Rome to Amsterdam”, 
16 Consumer Law Journal 443, 447-448 (1998). 
6
 For example, with the rising importance given to the need to ensure adequate enforcement of consumer 
measures and access to justice for consumers, this implicates issues concerning the relationship between 
Articles 153, 95, and 65 EC, which regrettably exceed the scope of this study.  For further discussion, see J. 
Stuyck, “Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Protection: General Comparison EU-USA”, in New 
Frontiers of Consumer Protection: The Interplay Between Private and Public Enforcement 63, 65-69 (F. 
Cafaggi and H-W. Micklitz eds, Intersentia, 2009).  
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these three components are themselves interlocking:  one cannot assess the case law or 
the institutional practice regarding Article 153 EC, for example, without first 
understanding its evolution in the Treaty.   
 
This in turn alludes to certain challenges underlying this inquiry.  First, Article 
153 EC is deeply embedded in the emergence and the development of Community 
consumer policy, which commands a quite extensive body of materials all its own.  To be 
clear, the purpose of this chapter is not to engage in comprehensive study of Community 
consumer policy, but it cannot be left out entirely because it not only permeates the text 
of Article 153 EC and the institutional practice surrounding this provision, but also bears 
directly on the relationship between Articles 153 and 95 EC as far as the adoption of a 
European consumer contract law instrument is concerned. Second, Article 153 EC is 
presently one of the most underdeveloped, if not underestimated, provisions of the 
Treaty.  It is couched in  notoriously vague language, which has not yet received much 
clarification in the case law of Court of Justice, and it is exceptionally used by the 
European institutions, despite the consistent avowal to do so.  This no doubt explains one 
of the reasons why much of the scholarly literature on Article 153 EC is loathe to go into 
considerable detail as regards the extent of the Community’s competence under this 
provision.  In other words, there is simply not a plethora of materials on Article 153 EC 
to work with.  That said, the field is by no means barren, and the relevant case law, 
commentary, and institutional documents that are available already provide salient 
outlines of the dimensions of Article 153 EC and its linkage to Article 95 EC, as well as 
to Article 308 EC to some extent, in relation to the constitutionality of European contract 
law on the basis of the template presented below. 
 
10.2 Template for the analysis of Article 153 EC:  Treaty, case law, and usage 
10.2.1 Treaty:   The emergence and development of Article 153 EC  
By way of overview, Article 153 EC was a relative latecomer to the Treaty 
framework. Neither the EEC Treaty nor the Single European Act contained any specific 
provision conferring specific competence on the Community in the field of consumer 
protection. Rather, it was the Maastricht Treaty that first introduced such a competence 
by way of Article 129a EC. With some adjustments in the Amsterdam Treaty, this 
became Article 153 EC, whose substance has remained unchanged ever since in the 
present Treaty framework and will continue to do so in the Lisbon  Treaty.   
 
By virtue of this heritage, Article 153 EC possesses certain unique attributes.  
First, Article 153 EC was introduced into the Treaty framework long after the 
development of Community consumer protection policy was underway. Unlike other 
Treaty provisions that provided the basis upon which to spur Community action, Article 
153 EC was in fact the product or the outcome of the steady progression of Community 
consumer policy, which filtered into the framing of this provision.  Furthermore, Article 
153 EC was not inserted into the Treaty on an entirely clean slate.  It was laid on the 
foundation of previous institutional practice in which consumer policy had long been 
considered within the context of other policy fields particularly the internal market 
programme. This was augmented by explicit mention of consumer protection within the 
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confines of Article 100a (now Article 95) EC in the Single European Act, which laid the 
groundwork for the fusion between Articles 153 EC and 95 EC in the text of Article 153 
EC itself.  Finally, the fact that Article 153 EC was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
served to join the analysis of this provision with the principle of subsidiarity and certain 
so-called “flanking policies”, such as education, public health, and culture, which were 
introduced into the Treaty at the very same time and served to colour the interpretation of 
Article 153 EC in subsequent years. In turn, these attributes of Article 153 EC filtered 
into discussion of this provision as part of the European Convention and the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty, which paved the way for the Lisbon Treaty.   As such, the 
chronological development of Article 153 EC in both the past and present Treaty 
framework provides the starting point for the assessment of the Union’s competence 
under this provision and its linkage to Article 95 EC.  Each are taken in turn. 
 
10.2.1.1 Past Treaty framework 
At the forefront of the EC Treaty, Article 3 EC lists as one of the Community’s 
activities “a contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection”.7  This corresponds 
to the specific title of the Treaty devoted to consumer protection, within which Article 
153 EC is the sole provision.8  Article 153 EC consists of five paragraphs.  The first 
paragraph sets forth the Community’s objectives “to promote the interests of consumers 
and to ensure a high level of consumer protection” by contributing “to protecting the 
health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as promoting their right to 
information, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests”.9  
The second paragraph makes explicit the “horizontal” nature of consumer protection 
requirements, providing that “[c]onsumer protection requirements shall be taken into 
account in defining and implementing other Community policies and activities”.10  The 
third paragraph constitutes the “heart” of Article 153 EC as far as the scope of 
Community competence is concerned, providing that: 
 
 The Community shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives referred 
 to in paragraph 1 through: 
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 in the context of the completion of 
the internal market; 
(b) measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the 
Member States.11 
 
As regards the measures adopted under indent (b), the fourth paragraph stipulates the 
decision-making procedure to be followed, i.e., qualified majority voting in the Council 
and the co-decision procedure, with consultation of the European Economic and Social 
Committee (the EESC).12 This is followed by the fifth paragraph, the so-called 
“minimum harmonisation” provision, which stipulates that the Community measures 
                                                 
7
 Article 3(1)(t) EC. 
8
 Title XIV of the EC Treaty. 
9
 Article 153(1) EC. 
10
 Article 153(2) EC. 
11
 Article 153(3) EC. 
12
 Article 153(4) EC. 
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adopted under paragraph 4 (meaning those concerning indent (b)) “shall not prevent any 
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures” 
provided that such measures are compatible with the Treaty and the Commission is 
notified of them.13  
 
As already alluded to, the text of Article 153 EC did not spring magically out of 
thin air but in fact drew greatly upon previous institutional developments concerning 
Community consumer policy starting in the 1970s.14  To explain, in the early years of 
European integration, the need for a specific competence in the Treaty in the field of 
consumer protection was not foremost on the minds of the framers. In the original EEC 
Treaty, consumers were mentioned only in the context of Community policies concerning 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), competition law, and State aid.15  Still, it was 
not long before consumer protection became the focus of attention by the European 
institutions. This was evident early on with the 1969 European Parliament Resolution and 
accompanying “Boersma Report”, which were concerned with the strengthening of the 
position of the consumer in the common market and called for the increased recognition 
of consumer interests within the various Community policies in the Treaty.16  Yet, most 
often in the literature, emphasis is placed on the 1972 Paris Summit and the subsequent 
1975 Council Resolution laying out a preliminary programme on consumer protection, 
two foundational events credited for giving birth to Community consumer policy.  
 
The proceedings of the 1972 Paris Summit17 comprising the meeting of the Heads 
of State of then nine Member States18, were encapsulated in an ambitious Declaration 
concerned with the development of a multitude of different policy fields.19  This included 
the category of “social policy”; which contained instructions for the European institutions 
to draw up an action programme with a view to, among other things, “strengthen and 
                                                 
13
 Article 153(5) EC. 
14
 See, e.g., S. Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (2nd ed., Elgar, 2005), Chapter 1;  Bourgoignie, 
“European Community consumer law and policy: from Rome to Amsterdam”, supra note 5; H-W. Micklitz 
and S. Weatherill, “Consumer Policy in the European Community: Before and after Maastricht”, 16 
Journal of Consumer Policy 285 (1993); J. Stuyck, “European Consumer Law After the Treaty of 
Amsterdam: Consumer policy in or beyond the internal market?”, 37 Common Market Law Review 367 
(2000).   
15
 Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy, supra note 14, at 3.   
16
 Résolution sur le renforcement de la position du consommateur dans le marché commune, [1969] OJ C 
17/4; Rapport fait au nom de la commission économique sur la proposition de résolution présentée au nom 
du groupe socialiste par M. Metzger (Doc. 95/68) relative au renforcement de la position du consommateur 
dans le Marché commun (referred to as the Boersma Report after the Rapporteur, Mr. J. Boersma), Doc. 
189/68, Parlement Européen Documents de Séance 1968-1989, 20 Jan. 1969. 
17
 Meetings of the Heads of State or Government, Paris, 19-20 October 1972, Bulletin of the European 
Communities No. 10/1972 (hereinafter 1972 Paris Summit). 
18
 This included the six original Member States (i.e., Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands), as well as Denmark, Ireland, and the UK. Norway was initially involved, but with the 
negative referendum, it did not attend the conference:  see  id., at 14 n.1.  Technically speaking, this was 
not considered a meeting of the “European Council”; the creation of this distinct body would come a few 
years later.  See K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union § 2-018, at 39; 
and § 10-003 - § 10-007, at 384-388 (R. Bray ed., 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005).   
19
 1972 Paris Summit, supra note 17,  at 14-23. 
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coordinate action for protecting the consumer”.20 This Declaration proved to be the 
catalyst for Community action in this area21 and stimulated the publication of the first 
consumer protection programme three years later.   
 
In 1975, the Council adopted its landmark Resolution setting forth a Preliminary 
Programme of the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and 
information policy.22 The Resolution itself was quite short; it was the accompanying 
Preliminary Programme that was considerably more lengthy and essentially contained the 
“meat” for the creation of a Community consumer policy.23  Famously, the Preliminary 
Programme established a distinct set of five basic consumer rights: 
 
(1) the right to protection of health and safety; 
(2) the right to protection of economic interests; 
(3) the right of redress; 
(4) the right to information and education; and 
(5) the right of representation (the right to be heard).24  
 
According to the Council, these rights should be “given greater substance” by action 
taken under specific Community policies as well as by the approximation of laws, both of 
which fell within the context of the Community’s objective to improve living conditions 
                                                 
20
 Id., point 6, second para.  
21
 See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council, A New Impetus for Consumer Protection 
Policy, COM(85) 314 final, 27.6.1985, point 2 (hereinafter 1985 Communication) (considering it “the first 
impetus for consumer protection policy” in the Community). 
22
 Council Resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary programme of the European Economic 
Community for a consumer protection and information policy, [1975] OJ C 92/1 (hereinafter 1975 Council 
Resolution). 
23
 Preliminary Programme of the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and 
information policy, [1975] OJ C 92/2 (hereinafter 1975 Preliminary Programme). 
24
 Id., point 3.  In this regard, a “comparative leap” to the United States has often been made in the 
literature by virtue of President John F. Kennedy’s 1962 Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the 
Consumer Interest, which espoused a similar, though not identical, list of the following consumer rights:  
(1) the right to safety – to be protected against the marketing of goods which are hazardous to 
health or life. 
(2) the right to be informed – to be protected against fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly misleading 
information, advertising, labeling, or other practices, and to be given the facts he needs to 
make an informed choice. 
(3) the right to choose – to be assured, wherever possible, access to a variety of products and 
services at competitive prices; and in those industries in which competition is not workable 
and Government regulation is substituted, an assurance of satisfactory quality and service at 
fair prices. 
(4) the right to be heard – to be assured that consumer interests will receive full and sympathetic 
consideration in the formulation of Government policy and fair and expeditious treatment in 
its administrative tribunals. 
J.F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the Consumer Interest, March 15, 1962”, in 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John. F. Kennedy, Containing the Public Messages, 
Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1962 235, 236 (United States Government Printing Office, 
1963). President Kennedy’s Special Message was considered to have had some influence on the Council’s 
1975 Preliminary Programme:  see, e.g. Stuyck, supra note 14, at 377. 
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under then Article 2 EEC.25  These five consumer rights informed the objectives, the 
governing principles, and the priority action to be taken in relation to the elaboration of a 
Community consumer policy detailed in the Programme. 
 
 Importantly, the section concerning the protection of the economic interests of 
consumers contained the embryo for several measures within the “hard core” of EC 
contract law.  Among the principles governing this type of protection, listed first was the 
protection of purchasers of goods and services from abuse of power by the seller, 
particularly against one-sided standard contracts, the unfair exclusion of essential rights 
in contracts, harsh conditions for credit, demands for payment for unsolicited goods, and 
high-pressure selling methods.26 As regards the priority measures to be taken, the 
harmonisation of consumer credit laws and the protection of consumers involving 
contract terms, conditions in guarantees for consumer goods, and door-to-door sales were 
listed.27  In hindsight, this would pave the way for the Consumer Credit, Unfair Contract 
Terms, Consumer Sales, and Doorstep Selling Directives, respectively. 
 
 The Council’s 1975 Preliminary Programme was followed by a successive string 
of further action programmes. In 1981, the Council adopted a Resolution on a Second 
Programme of the  European Economic Community for a consumer protection and 
information policy28, which reiterated the importance of consumers’ five basic rights29, 
and akin to the first Programme, would be carried out using the appropriate means laid 
down in the EEC Treaty.30  In 1985, in light of the tenth anniversary of the Council’s 
1975 Preliminary Programme, the Commission disseminated a Communication entitled 
“A New Impetus for Consumer Protection Policy”31, which coincided with the 
publication of Lord Cockfield’s famous White Paper on the Internal Market and 
increased consciousness of addressing consumer concerns as part of preparations for the 
internal market.32 One of the Commission’s objectives was that consumers must be able 
to benefit from the common market, explaining that, “If the common market is to be fully 
effective, it must be made easier for consumers to buy goods in other countries, to use 
them at home, to get them repaired like domestically purchased products, and to see 
complaints handled effectively”.33 This led it to list various measures that were necessary 
to protect the economic interests of consumers, including proposals on unfair contract 
terms, and consumer credit, guarantees and warranties for consumer goods, and package 
                                                 
25
 1975 Preliminary Programme, supra note 23, point 4; 1975 Council Resolution, supra note 22, first-third 
recitals. 
26
 1975 Preliminary Programme, supra note 23, point 19(i).  
27
 Id., point 24.   
28
 Council Resolution of 19 May 1981 on a second programme of the European Economic Community for 
a consumer protection and information policy, [1981] OJ C 133/1. 
29
 Interestingly, the language describing these rights was noticeably strengthened in this Programme, as 
demonstrated by the Council’s reference to the consumer rights elaborated in the previous Programme  as 
“fundamental rights”:  id., point 6, first para. 
30
  Id., points 8(1), 10 (citing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), competition policy, and industry 
policy explicitly). 
31
 1985 Communication, supra note 21.   
32
 Communication from the Commission - Three-Year Action Plan of Consumer Policy in the EEC 1990-
1992, COM (90) 98 final, 3.5.1990 (hereinafter First Three-Year Action Plan), at 2. 
33
 1985 Communication, supra note 21, point 18, second indent; point 29.   
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travel, among many others.34 The Commission underlined that the actions set out in the 
Communication complemented those within the larger programme for the completion of 
the internal market.35  The Communication was welcomed by the Council, which adopted 
a Resolution endorsing the objectives of the programme, especially those concerned with 
the completion of the internal market.36 
 
This linkage between consumer protection and the internal market programme 
soon became constitutionalised in the Treaty itself with the adoption of the Single 
European Act.  In the newly minted Article 100a EEC (now Article 95 EC), the third 
paragraph stated that, “The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 
concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as 
a base a high level of protection”.37  Later reframed as Article 95(3) EC38, this language 
was not altered in subsequent revisions of the EC Treaty or by the Lisbon Treaty.39 
Article 100a(3) EEC was the first formal recognition of consumer protection as an 
autonomous policy objective in the Treaty, but noticeably, it was grounded in the 
Community’s action to achieve its internal market objectives.40 There was no explicit 
legal basis in the Single European Act conferring specific competence on the Community 
in the field of consumer protection.41   
 
The Maastricht Treaty heralded a sea change in relation to the Community’s 
competence in this field.  It added consumer protection to the Community’s activities in 
Article 3 EC42 and inserted a new title of the Treaty concerning consumer protection, 
thereby introducing Article 129a EC, a relatively short provision comprised of three 
                                                 
34
 Id., points 29-31, 35, 37. 
35
 Id., at 23. 
36
 Council Resolution of 23 June 1986 concerning the future orientation of the policy of the European 
Economic Community for the protection and promotion of consumer interests, [1986] OJ C 167/1.  This 
was reiterated months later in the Council Resolution of 15 Dec. 1986 on the integration of consumer 
policy in the other common policies, [1987] OJ C 3/1. 
37
 Single European Act, Article 100a(3) EEC (emphasis added).   
38
 Starting with the Amsterdam Treaty, Article 95(3) EC included further language, reading in full:  “The 
Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental protection 
and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any 
new development based on scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and 
the Council will also seek to achieve this objective.”   
39
 See Article 114(3) TFEU. 
40
 Stuyck, supra note 14, at 378. 
41
 This is not to say that the notion had not been considered. As noted by scholars, there had been a specific 
provision concerning consumer policy envisaged as part of the European Parliament’s 1984 Draft Treaty on 
European Union, but it did not make its way into the Single European Act. Article 57 of the 1984 Draft 
Treaty on European Union stated:  “The Union may lay down rules designed to protect the health and 
safety of consumers and their economic interests, particularly in the event of damage. The Union may 
encourage action to promote consumer education, information and consultation.”  This provision was part 
of the framework setting out the Union’s concurrent competence in relation to various fields under the 
rubric of “policy for society” in Article 55. This Treaty is reprinted in R. Bieber et al., An ever closer 
Union: A critical analysis of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union (European Commission, 
1985); see also F. Capotorti et al., The European Union Treaty: Commentary on the draft adopted by the 
European Parliament on 14 February 1984 (Clarendon, 1986). 
42
 Article 3(s) EC (now Article 3(1)(t) EC). 
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paragraphs. The first paragraph delineated the framework for the Community’s 
competence in this field: 
 
The Community shall contribute to the attainment of a high level of  
consumer protection through:   
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 100a in the context of the  
      completion of the internal market;  
(b) specific action which supports and supplements the policy pursued by the 
Member States to protect the health, safety and economic interests of  
consumers and to provide adequate information to consumers.43 
 
The second paragraph stipulated the decision-making procedures for the “specific action” 
referred to indent (b), i.e., qualified majority voting in the Council and the co-decision 
procedure (with consultation of the EESC)44, which were the same decision-making 
procedures prescribed for measures adopted under Article 100a EC via indent (a).45  The 
third paragraph prescribed recourse to minimum harmonisation, providing that “[a]ction 
adopted pursuant to paragraph 2 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
introducing more stringent protective measures”, but such measures must be compatible 
with this Treaty and notified to the Commission.46  
 
Looking closely at the text of Article 129a EC, it drew from the elaboration of the 
specific consumer rights enshrined in the previous programmes on Community consumer 
policy, even if inadvertently or not, three out of the five consumer rights relating to 
education, redress, and representation were left out.47   More to the point, however, the 
Community’s competence under Article 129a EC was saddled to Article 100a EC and 
linked to both the principle of subsidiarity and several neighbouring policies introduced 
by Maastricht at the same time, all of which left an indelible imprint on this provision.   
 
As regards its relationship to Article 100a (now Article 95) EC, Article 129a EC 
itself dictated a dual route by which Community action would proceed via measures 
adopted under Article 100a EC under indent (a) and “specific action to support and 
supplement” national consumer policy under indent (b).  Thus, rather than cutting the 
cord with the internal market, it strengthened it further by containing an express renvoi to 
Article 100a EC, something that was quite novel in the system of the Treaties.48 In the 
negotiations surrounding the Maastricht Treaty, Article 129a EC was said to embody a 
crucial compromise between those who favoured Community action in the consumer 
field and those who found it impossible to sever the ties between internal market and 
consumer protection and hence preferred indirect action relating to consumer interests in 
                                                 
43
 Article 129a(1) EC.  
44
 Article 129a(2) EC.  
45
 Article 100a EC.  The Maastricht Treaty had amended Article 100a EC so as to substitute the co-decision 
procedure for that of cooperation.  
46
 Article 129a(3) EC. 
47
 Bourgoignie, supra note 5, at 448.   
48
 See J. Cloos et al., Le traité de Maastricht: genèse, analyse, commentaires 335 (2nd ed., Bruylant, 1994).   
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the internal market programme.49  This played out in the framing of Article 129a EC in 
the sense it was praised for establishing an autonomous Community competence in the 
field of consumer protection for the first time, whilst it was criticised for generating 
ambiguity as regards between measures to be adopted under indent (a) as opposed to 
indent (b).50   
 
 The text of Article 129a EC was also conjoined with the principle of subsidiarity 
also introduced by the Maastricht Treaty as a constitutional principle governing the 
exercise of Community competence. This was credited to the fact that the Community 
would “contribute” to consumer policy by way of “specific action” that “supports and 
supplements the policy pursued by the Member States”, thereby exuding the notion that 
Member State action was primary and Community action merely playing a secondary 
role.51  Moreover, scholars espoused the merits of inscribing minimum harmonisation in 
the text of this provision so as to preserve leeway for the Member States to provide for 
more stringent protection in areas covered by the “specific action” taken under this 
provision.52   
 
 Along with subsidiarity, Article 129a EC entered the Treaty alongside other new, 
so-called “flanking policies”, which included education, culture, and public health. These 
three policy fields were listed right before Article 129a EC in the Treaty and their 
nuances in language as compared to Article 129a EC stood out.  As with consumer 
protection, they too were added to the list of activities in Article 3 EC, stipulating the 
Community’s “contribution” to the area concerned.53  For each, a new title of the Treaty 
was created, and their provisions also began with mention that the Community would 
“contribute” to the policy field concerned, but here Community action was aimed at 
“encouraging cooperation between Member States, and if necessary, by supporting and 
supplementing their action” in the case of education and culture54 or by “lending support 
to their action” in the case of public health.55  In contrast, Article 129a EC had not 
prioritised Member State cooperation but in fact placed Community supporting and 
supplementing action at the forefront.  Moreover, Community action in these three fields 
was expressly restricted to “incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of laws” or 
to non-binding recommendations56, which was absent in the text of Article 129a EC.  
                                                 
49
 Id. See also R. Corbett, The Treaty of Maastricht - From Conception to Ratification: A Comprehensive 
Reference Guide 52 (Longman, 1993). 
50
 See, e.g., Bourgoignie, supra note 5, at 447-448; Micklitz and Weatherill, supra note 14, at 300; S. 
Weatherill, “The Evolution of European Consumer Law and Policy: From Well Informed Consumer to 
Confident Consumer?”, in Rechtseinheit oder Rechtsvielfalt in Europa? Rolle und Funktion des 
Verbraucherrechts in der EG und den MOE-Staaten 423, 448 (H-W. Micklitz ed., Nomos, 1996). 
51
 See, e.g., G. Howells and S. Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law 128 (2nd ed., Ashgate, 2005). More 
generally, the interplay between subsidiarity and EC consumer policy arose well before the Maastricht 
Treaty:  see Weatherill, supra note  14, at 19-20.  
52
 See, e.g., Bourgoignie, supra note 5, at 447; Micklitz and Weatherill, supra note 14, at 301-302. 
53
 See Article 3(o) EC (now Article 3(1)(p) EC) (“a contribution to the attainment of a high level of health 
protection”); Article 3(p) EC (now Article 3(1)(q) EC) (“a contribution to education and training of quality 
and to the flowing of the cultures of the Member States”). 
54
 See Article 126(1) EC; Article 128(1)-(2) EC.   
55
 See Article 129(1) EC. 
56
 See Article 126(4) EC; Article 128(5) EC; Article 129(4) EC. 
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This drew comparison with some of the more heartier “flanking policies”, especially 
environmental policy and social policy, both of which were inserted into the Treaty 
framework earlier on, but revised in the Maastricht Treaty.57   These latter two policy 
fields expressly allowed for harmonisation measures, and both contained provisions 
allowing the Member States to take more stringent protective measures in the areas 
concerned, which were substantially identical to Article 129a(3) EC.58  In this way, 
Article 129a EC seemed to sit somewhere in the middle, straddling the more limited 
provisions concerning education, public health, and culture and the more robust 
provisions concerning environmental policy and social policy. This continued in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty exacted certain changes to the text of Article 129a EC, but 
on the whole, it did not resolve the ambiguities surrounding the demarcation between 
measures adopted under indent (b) of this provision as opposed to those enacted under 
Article 95 EC via indent (a).59  In fact, it is not clear to what extent these issues were 
addressed, since as noted by one jurist, little is known about the negotiations about the 
revision of this provision, save that it was “a hardly debated compromise between 
Scandinavian proposals for broader Community powers and, in particular, German and 
British opposition”.60  In any event, while not wholly insignificant, the changes brought 
by the Amsterdam Treaty amounted to more tinkering than fundamental reworking of 
Article 153 EC on the competence front. 
 
 Under the Amsterdam Treaty, Article 129a EC, now renumbered Article 153 EC, 
was enlarged to five paragraphs.  The first paragraph of Article 153 EC provided:   
 
In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level  
of consumer protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting  
the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to  
promoting their right to information, education and to organise themselves  
in order to safeguard their interests.61  
 
This attempted to rectify the purported neglect of certain consumer rights in the previous 
Article 129a EC by tacking on the right to education and representation, although the 
                                                 
57
 Provisions on social policy had been an original fixture of the EEC Treaty, whereas those concerning 
environmental policy were introduced by the Single European Act. Aside from changes to their substantive 
provisions, the Maastricht Treaty made sure to include them in Article 3 EC espousing a “policy”, as 
opposed to a “contribution”, in this fields:  see Article 3(i) EC (now Article 3(1)(j) EC) (“a policy in the 
social sphere comprising a European social fund”); Article 3(k) EC (now Article 3(1)(l) EC) (“a policy in 
the sphere of the environment”). 
58
 For social policy, see Article 118a(3) EC.  This had been inserted by the Single European Act; the 
Maastricht Treaty merely revised the decision-making procedures to be followed in the area.  For 
environmental protection, see Article 130t EC  This provision was augmented by the Maastricht Treaty so 
as to make clear that such measures must be compatible with the Treaty and notified to the Commission, 
verbatim to Article 129a(3) EC. 
59
 See Bourgoignie, supra note 5, at 461. 
60
 Stuyck, supra note 14, at 383. 
61Article 153(1) EC. 
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right to redress was still not explicitly mentioned.62  Furthermore, by moving the 
Community’s objectives to the forefront, Article 153(1) EC made clear that measures 
taken on the basis of Article 95 EC via indent (a) encompassed the abovementioned 
rights and interests including the protection of consumers’ economic interests within 
which European consumer contract law was situated, in comparison with the old Article 
129a(1) EC that had listed such rights and interests in relation to measures taken under 
indent (b).63  The second paragraph finally made explicit the “horizontal” nature of 
consumer protection requirements to be taken into account as part of other Community 
policies, which had been neglected in Article 129a EC.64  The fourth and fifth paragraphs 
of Article 153 EC copied the relevant paragraphs of Article 129a EC as regards the 
decision-making procedures to be followed and the recourse to minimum harmonisation, 
respectively.65 
 
Noticeably, under the third paragraph of Article 153 EC, the dual track remained.  
The reference to measures adopted under Article 95 EC “in the context of the completion 
of the internal market” in indent (a) stayed the same.  It was indent (b) where certain 
changes had been made:  “specific action” was replaced by “measures”, and  the word, 
“monitor”, was added, now reading “measures which support, supplement and monitor 
the policy pursued by the Member States”.  No explanation was provided as regards what 
was meant by these revisions.  Scholars came to surmise that “measures” adopted under 
indent (b) could be of a legislative nature and that the word “monitor” implied some sort 
of enforcement role at the Community level.66  Regrettably, any opportunity to clarify 
matters left open by the Amsterdam Treaty was foregone in the subsequent round of 
Treaty amendments, and the framing of Article 153 EC in Amsterdam Treaty remained 
untouched by the Nice Treaty.   
 
10.2.1.2 Present Treaty framework 
Needless to say, the lingering ambiguities underlying Article 153 EC, especially 
as regards the boundary line between indents (a) and (b) of Article 153(3) EC, were not 
answered by the Lisbon Treaty.  Still, the progression from the European Convention and 
the Draft Constitutional Treaty shed some light on the Community’s competence under 
this provision. Starting with the European Convention, Article 153 EC was discussed 
within Working Group V on Complementary Competencies.  Weaved through much of 
the discussion of the Working Group was the issue of which Community (now Union) 
competences could be classified under the category of “complementary competence”, 
which espoused a more limited role for the Union vis-à-vis the Member States, as 
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 See Bourgoignie, supra note 5, at 461. 
63
 Stuyck, supra note 14, at 386. 
64
 Article 153(2) EC provides:  “Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining 
and implementing other Community policies and activities.”  The lack of such a provision in Article 129a 
EC had been criticised:  see Bourgoignie, supra note 5, at 448. 
65
 Article 153(4)-(5) EC. 
66
 See Stuyck, supra note 14, at 387-388 (and citations therein); N. Reich, “Economic Law, Consumer 
Interests and EU Integration”, in Understanding EU Consumer Law 1, 33-35 (H-W. Micklitz et al. eds, 
Intersentia, 2009). 
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compared to that of “shared competence”.67 With respect to consumer protection, 
opinions became divided, since for some the reference to Article 95 EC in Article 153 EC 
made this a shared competence, whilst others thought that measures adopted under 
Article 95 EC in the framework of the internal market constituted a shared competence, 
whereas consumer protection remained a complementary competence.68  In the Working 
Group’s Final Report, this was settled in favour of shared, not complementary, 
competence, on the grounds that legislation in the form of regulations and/or directives 
was “clearly” authorised under Article 153 EC, and even though most Community acts 
adopted in this field were based on other provisions, “the fact that (minimum) directives 
could be adopted under Article 153 made it logical that consumer protection should be 
classified as shared competence”.69    
 
During the European Convention, there were only a handful of proposals 
concerning the revision of Article 153 EC, and of those, most were not concerned with 
changing the language of Article 153(3) EC as regards the scope of the Community’s 
competence under indent (b) vis-à-vis indent (a).70 Of note, however, was the submission 
of certain Swedish Government and National Parliament representatives who suggested 
inserting an additional clause between indents (a) and (b), allowing for “other measures 
including those which ensure the effective enforcement of the Union’s measures adopted 
to achieve a high level of consumer protection”.71  As explained therein, the reason for 
this change was that, “[a] firm legal base, as a supplement to Article 95 EC, is required 
for common consumer legislation in areas which do not primarily relate to the 
functioning of the Internal Market”.72  This submission also advocated the deletion of 
Article 153(5) EC, on the grounds that “[t]he appropriate level of harmonisation should 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis” and “[t]he present minimum harmonisation rule is 
bound to diminish the impact of the article as a base for consumer legislation”.73 
 
Needless to say, the Draft Constitutional Treaty did not take this proposal on 
board and was conservative as to the changes made to Article 153 EC.74  In the 2003 
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 See Mandate of the Working Group on Complementary Competencies, CONV 75/02, dated 31 May 
2002, at 2-3. Incidentally, the Working Group found the term “complementary competence” inadequate 
and misleading and recommended that it be replaced by another term, such as “supporting measures”, 
which better denoted the essence of the relationship between the Union and the Member States.  Final 
Report of Working Group V, CONV 3751/1/02REV 1 WGV 14, dated 4 Nov. 2002 (hereinafter Working 
Group V Final Report), point 2.  This was not taken up in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, which paved the 
way for the Lisbon Treaty.  For further discussion of the categorisation of competences in the Lisbon 
Treaty, see Chapter 8, § 8.4.2.3.   
68
 Summary of the meeting on 7 Oct. 2002, CONV 347/02 WGV 12, dated 16 Oct. 2002, at 2. 
69
 Working Group V Final Report, supra note 67, point 6, at 9.   
70
 See Proposed Amendments, Part III of the Constitution, Section 6-Consumer protection, available at 
http://european-convention.eu.int. 
71
 Suggestion for amendment of Article: III-127(ex 153) by Mrs. Lena Hjelm-Wallén and Mr. Sven-Olof 
Petersson, government representatives, and Mr. Sören Lekberg, Swedish national parliament representative.  
72
 Id., para. 3 n.2  Confusingly, this seemed to imply that measures under indent (b) were not considered as 
such, but in any event, the proposal was meant to bolster Union competence in the field of consumer 
protection apart from the internal market programme. 
73
 Id., para. 5 n.3. 
74
 Beyond the text of Article 153 EC itself, it should be emphasised that by incorporation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the Draft Constitutional Treaty thereby included Article II-38, providing that: “Union 
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version, the new Article III-132 was slimmed to four paragraphs. The “horizontal” clause 
of Article 153(2) EC was moved to the forefront of the Treaty with other clauses of 
general application.75  For indent (b), the word “measures” were to be enacted by 
European laws or framework laws, which made clear that legislative measures essentially 
in the form of regulations or directives, respectively, could be adopted under this 
provision.76  In the 2004 version, the now-renumbered Article III-235 retained the 
aforementioned changes and made a slight adjustment to indent (a) in relation to 
measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 EC (now Article III-172) “in the context of the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market”, as opposed to the previous 
wording (“in the context of the completion of the internal market”) of Article 153 EC, 
thereby seeking to align the two provisions.77  
 
What was more interesting was the comparison in treatment between consumer 
protection and the other “flanking policies” in both the 2003 and 2004 versions of the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty.  Consumer protection was classified alongside the internal 
market, environmental policy, social policy, and certain aspects of public health, among 
others, as shared competences78, whereas other aspects of public health along with 
education and culture were listed under the category of complementary competence for 
which harmonisation measures were expressly excluded.79 Consequently, Article 153 
EC’s counterpart was placed right after the Treaty provisions concerning environmental 
policy in the specific chapter concerning Union policies in other (specific) areas80, as 
opposed to the provisions concerning education, culture, and public health, which were 
segregated to a wholly different chapter of the Treaty concerned with Union supporting, 
coordinating, or complementary action.81 
 
The Lisbon Treaty followed along similar, albeit not identical, lines of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty in the reframing of Article 153 EC as Article 169 TFEU.  Gone 
were the revisions related to European laws and framework laws and the attempted 
symmetry with the text of Article 95 EC in indent (a).   Yet, like the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty, the same classification of shared and complementary competences was retained, 
                                                                                                                                                 
policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection”.  With the Lisbon Treaty, the text of the Charter 
is not included in the Treaties; it has been re-enacted by the European Parliament, the Council, and the 
Commission and published separately in the Official Journal, [2007] OJ C 303/1.  Nevertheless, the Lisbon 
Treaty recognises the legally binding force of the Charter and thus pays heed to this provision (Article 38).  
See Article 6(1) EU; Declaration (No. 1) concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. But see L. Defalque, “Vers une plus grande cohérence dans la protection du consommateur?”, in 
Mélanges en hommage à Georges Vandersanden – Promenades au sein du droit européen 465-466 (A. De 
Walsche and L. Levi eds, Bruylant, 2008).  
75
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article III-5. 
76
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article III-132(2)(b), (3); Article 32. 
77
 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article III-235(2)(a).  
78
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article 13(2); 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article I-14(2). 
79
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article 16; 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article I-12(5), second 
para.; Article I-17. 
80
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Part III, Title III, Chapter III (“Policies in other specific areas”); 2004 
Draft Constitutional Treaty, Part III, Title III, Chapter III (“Policies in other areas”). 
81
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Part III, Title III, Chapter V (“Areas where the Union may take 
coordinating, complementary or supporting action”); 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Part III, Title III, 
Chapter V (“Areas where the Union may take supporting, coordinating or complementary action”). 
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thereby placing consumer protection on par with the internal market, environmental 
policy, social policy, and certain aspects of public health policy82, the only difference is 
that these various policy fields are not split into different chapters, but instead remain 
side by side in successive titles of Part Three of the TFEU.  Likewise, the “horizontal” 
clause of Article 153(2) EC was moved upfront to Part One of the TFEU concerning 
provisions having general application.83  The remaining four paragraphs of Article 169 
TFEU are virtually identical to Article 153 EC, save for a few clerical alterations in 
wording.84 As a result, the assessment of the Union’s competence under Article 169 
TFEU follows that of Article 153 EC. 
 
10.2.2 Case law:   The indirect role of Article 153 EC  
As already noted, there is not yet a substantial body of case law on the scope of 
Article 153 EC.  As seen below, in the most well-known cases so far, the Court of Justice 
(or the Court85) has engaged in limited analysis of this provision, with the accompanying 
Opinions of the Advocates General containing the more detailed inquiry.  Moreover, the 
vast majority of cases concern the indirect use of Article 153 EC as a “defensive shield” 
or an “interpretative device” vis-à-vis other Treaty provisions, as opposed to the direct 
use of Article 153 EC as the legal basis for a particular Community measure.  
Consequently, until cases challenging Article 153 EC (now Article 169 TFEU) in the 
latter sense arise, the Court (or the Court of First Instance, now the General Court under 
the Lisbon Treaty, as the case may be) may not be given any real opportunity to 
pronounce on the extent of the Union’s competence under this provision.  Admittedly, 
this is something of a “vicious circle” in the sense that as long as Article 153 EC is not 
widely resorted to by the European legislator, there is less likelihood of cases challenging 
its use before the Court; conversely, the more there is no case law, the less likely it may 
be that the legislator will be more attracted to its use. Nonetheless, the present case law 
does provide salient indications of the scope of Article 153 EC and its relationship to 
Article 95 EC. 
 
 In 1996, El Corte Inglés86 presented the first occasion for the substantial 
assessment of Article 153 EC (then Article 129a EC in its Maastricht version)87.  The 
case concerned a preliminary ruling from a Spanish court concerning the interpretation of 
the Consumer Credit Directive88, namely whether this Directive could be considered to 
                                                 
82
 Article 4(2) TFEU; compare Article 6 TFEU. 
83
 Article 12 TFEU.   
84
 See Article 169 TFEU.  Aside from the renumbering of Article 95 EC as Article 114 TFEU, the 
“ordinary legislative procedure” is stipulated under Article 169(3) TFEU, which essentially denotes the 
same decision-making procedures prescribed under Article 153(4) EC (i.e., qualified majority voting in the 
Council and the co-decision procedure), along with the consultation of the EESC. 
85
 Again, it bears emphasis that the reference to the Court of Justice is not to discount the potential role to 
be played by the other Union courts, but stems from the fact that the case law to date concerns the Court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over preliminary rulings and infringement actions.  
86
 Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés SA v. Bláquez Rivero (“El Corte Inglés”) ECR I-1281. 
87
 For earlier cases that included mention of this provision but with minimal results, see infra note 117. 
88
 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 Dec. 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, [1987] OJ L 42/48 (hereinafter 
Consumer Credit Directive).  It has been replaced by a new Directive:  see Chapter 2, § 2.3.3. 
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have “direct effect” in a dispute between two private parties.  In its reference, the national 
court was cognisant of previous jurisprudence precluding the direct effect of 
unimplemented directives in disputes between private parties (i.e., the so-called 
“horizontal direct effect” of directives), but it wondered whether the introduction of 
Article 129a EC prompted any change in this regard.89 Thus, this provision entered into 
play indirectly in the national proceedings as potentially relevant in relation to the 
Court’s case law on the direct effect of directives.  The case did not concern the use of 
Article 153 EC as the legal basis for a particular Community measure; this Directive, one 
of the “hard core” of Community contract law, was based on Article 94 EC (then Article 
100 EC).90 
 
In its judgment, the Court reiterated its previous case law precluding the “direct 
effect” of unimplemented directives vis-à-vis private parties.91 It then declared that 
“Article 129a of the Treaty cannot alter that case-law, even if only in relation to 
directives on consumer protection”.92  It explained: 
 
Suffice to say in this connection that the scope of Article 129a is limited. 
 On the one hand, it provides that the Community is under a duty to  
 contribute to the attainment of a high level of consumer protection. On the 
 other, it creates Community competence with a view to specific action 
 relating to consumer protection policy apart from measures taken in  
 connection with the internal market.93 
 
As this provision “merely assigns an objective to the Community and confers powers on 
it to that end without also laying down any obligation on Member States or individuals”, 
it cannot justify the “horizontal direct effect” of directives on consumer protection.94 The 
Court did not elaborate further as regards the ambit of what could be considered “specific 
action relating to consumer protection policy” under Article 129a EC.   
 
 By comparison, Advocate General Lenz’s Opinion contained more ample 
discussion, delving into the function and significance of Article 129a EC.  He found it 
“conspicuous” that Article 129a(a)(1) EC merely provided that the Community was to 
“contribute” in the sphere of consumer protection, with the result that “it was evidently 
intended also to leave leeway for competence on the part of the Member States” and thus 
embodies a “concurrent” (or shared) competence subject to compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity.95 As such, “even if Article 129a contained something novel, it would be 
subject to Community action being necessary rather than action on the part of the 
                                                 
89
 Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés, paras 11-13. For further discussion of the salient aspects of this case in 
relation to the direct effect jurisprudence, see J. Stuyck, Case note, 33 Common Market Law Review 1261 
(1996).   
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 See Chapter 2, § 2.2.3. 
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 Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés, paras 15-17. 
92
 Id., para. 18.  
93
 Id., para. 19 (emphasis added). 
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 Id., paras 20, 23. 
95
 Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés, para. 27. 
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Member States”.96  From there, he delved into the independent significance of Article 
129a EC vis-à-vis Article 100a EC, emphasising that although indent (b) of Article 
129a(1) EC established Community competence to take “specific action” in the field of 
consumer protection policy outside the ambit of measures relating to the internal market, 
it authorised the Community only to support and supplement the policies of the Member 
States and hence to act on an ancillary basis.97  The placement of Article 129a EC at the 
end of the part of the Treaty relating to Community policies and the use of “specific 
action” as opposed to “measures” suggested, in his view, that Community acts adopted 
under indent (b) were not binding.98  Given that a large number of internal market 
measures contained references to consumer protection, “Article 100a might have to be 
regarded as the more specific provision, compared with Article 129a, as regards 
consumer protection in the context of the internal market”.99 Moreover, indent (a) of 
Article 129a(1) EC was intended to make use of the possibilities already available in the 
context of the completion of the internal market pursuant to Article 100a  EC and the 
only divergence between the two provisions was that the former committed the 
“Community” to achieving a “high level of consumer protection”, whereas the latter 
placed only the Commission under such a duty.100  This led him to conclude that no 
competence on the part of the Community to adopt measures binding on private persons, 
upon which the horizontal direct effect of directives would depend, could be inferred 
from Article 129a EC and that the insertion of this provision did not exact any changes to 
the Court’s case law in this regard.101 
 
 In 1997, Germany v. European Parliament and Council (“Deposit 
Guarantees”)102 constituted the second major opportunity for Court to address Article 
129a EC, still in its Maastricht Treaty version.  In this case, Germany sought the 
annulment of Directive 94/19/EC103 on deposit-guarantee schemes on various grounds, 
including that Article 57(2) (now Article 47(2)) EC could not serve as the sole legal basis 
for the Directive.104  Germany contended the Directive should have also been based on 
Article 235 (now Article 308) EC, reasoning that neither Article 100a (now Article 95) 
EC nor Article 129a EC were applicable:  Article 57 EC was the more specific provision 
vis-à-vis Article 100a EC, and although Article 129a EC concerned the protection of 
consumers as in the case of depositors concerned here, it did not empower the 
Community legislator to adopt measures, apart from those under Article 100a EC, falling 
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 Id. 
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 Id., para. 32.    
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 Id. 
99
 Id., para. 31.   
100
 Id., para. 28.  This would be changed in subsequent revisions to Article 95(3) EC: see supra note 38. 
101
 Id., paras 33, 36. 
102
 Case C-233/94 Germany v. European Parliament and Council (“Deposit Guarantees”) [1997] ECR I-
2405. 
103
 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee 
schemes, [1994] OJ L 135/5. 
104
 Germany’s principal claim was for the annulment of the entire Directive based on the lack of proper 
legal basis and breach of the obligation to state reasons in relation to lack of compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity; in the alternative, Germany sought the annulment of three provisions of the Directive.  See  
Case C-233/94 Deposit Guarantees, paras 1, 9, 30.   For detailed discussion of the case, see, e.g., W-H. 
Roth, Case note, 35 Common Market Law Review 459 (1998); J. Wouters, Case note, Euredia 241 (1999).   
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within the scope of the legal instruments set forth in Article 189 (now Article 249) EC.105  
In its view, by authorising “specific action”, Article 129(1)(b) EC only allowed the use of 
non-binding action plans and programmes, and the condition that this provision be used 
to support and supplement the policy pursued by the Member States was lacking because 
two Member States had not previously introduced a deposit-guarantee scheme.106 
 
 In its judgment, the Court upheld the use of Article 57(2) EC as the legal basis for 
the Directive, but made no mention of Article 129a EC, even if only to clarify whether 
the Germany’s arguments regarding the scope of this provision were correct.107 Yet, the 
Court was more forthcoming in the context of one of Germany’s alternative claims to 
annul a particular provision of the Directive on the ground that it was incompatible with 
the objective of ensuring a high level of consumer protection under Articles 3 and 129a 
EC.108  In that regard, the Court held that, “no provision of the Treaty obliges the 
Community legislature to adopt the highest level of protection which can be found in a 
particular Member State”.109  Although there may be a reduction in the level of protection 
in certain cases via the application of the provision concerned, this did not call into 
question the general result which the Directive sought to achieve, namely the 
considerable improvement in depositor protection within the Community.110  Ultimately, 
the Court dismissed Germany’s case in full.  
 
 Unlike the Court’s judgment, Advocate General Léger’s Opinion in Deposit 
Guarantees delved into the applicability of Article 129a EC as a legal basis for the 
Directive concerned, thereby disputing Germany’s assertions about the limited scope of 
this provision.  First, he found that nothing in the text of Article 129a EC implied that its 
field of application was limited, since when the Community legislator’s powers were 
limited to actions of a non-binding nature or harmonisation was excluded in relation to a 
particular provision, this was explicitly stated in the Treaty, as in the case of the 
provisions on education, culture, and public health.111 For that matter, there was no 
indication that Community action under Article 129a EC must be linked to the policy of 
each Member State in a given sphere, but instead should “be understood as describing 
specific action which supports and supplements the policy pursued by the Member States 
as a whole”, as here concerning the protection of the economic interests of consumers.112  
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 Case C-233/94 Deposit Guarantees, paras 10-11. 
106
 Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-233/94 Deposit Guarantees, paras 55-56. 
107
 Case C-233/94 Deposit Guarantees, paras 12-21. 
108
 See id., paras 33, 46-47. This was in relation to the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Directive 
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changes brought by the Amsterdam Treaty. See further Roth, supra note 104, at 472-473. As such, the 
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Thus, it mattered little that some Member States had not yet introduced a deposit-
guarantee scheme; it was “enough that internally there is an overall policy undertaken to 
protect the interests of consumers, a fact of which there is no doubt” in the case.113  In 
fact, Community action in this area was confirmed by the fact that, as indicated in the 
Directive, the objective of ensuring consumer protection in the field of bank-deposit 
guarantees had not yet been fully attained by action taken by the Member States.114  
Finally, he attributed significance to the fact that the decision-making procedures 
provided in Articles 57(2), 100a, and 129a EC were the same, which demonstrated that 
the areas covered by those provisions were, from an institutional perspective, of equal 
importance.115  On that basis, he concluded that Article 129(1)(b) EC did allow for the 
adoption of binding provisions, and should a second legal basis be necessary for the 
Directive concerned, it would have to be that provision.116   
 
 In the years following these cases, the Court’s jurisprudence came to be even 
more confined to the indirect relevance of Article 153 EC vis-à-vis Community measures 
based on other Treaty provisions.117  Notable examples were the three companion cases 
concerning the Defective Products Directive118 – Commission v. France119, Commission 
v. Greece120, and González Sánchez121 – decided by the Court on 25 April 2002. The 
crucial issue in those cases was the degree of harmonisation established by this Directive, 
namely whether it provided for minimum harmonisation so as to preserve the particular 
French, Greek and Spanish legislation that laid down more stringent protection than what 
had been set down in the Directive.122 The Defective Products Directive had been 
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adopted in 1985 on the basis of the Article 100 EEC (now Article 94 EC).123  Certain 
Member States sought to rely on the subsequent introduction of Article 153 EC in the 
Treaty and its stipulation for minimum harmonisation in Article 153(5) EC as support for 
interpreting the Directive in favour of minimum harmonisation.124 
 
 This argument did not go over well with the Court or Advocate General 
Geelhoed.  In line with the Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court held that the 
competence retained by the Member States pursuant to Article 153(5) EC only concerned 
those measures adopted under indent (b), not those adopted pursuant to indent (a) in the 
context of Article 95 EC with which measures adopted under Article 94 EC must be 
equated.125  Referring to the Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court declared that Article 
153 EC was worded in a form of an instruction addressed to the Community concerning 
future policy and did not permit the Member States autonomously, in light of the direct 
risk that it would pose to the acquis communautaire, to adopt measures contrary to the 
Community law contained in directives already adopted.126  The Court then underscored 
that the margin of discretion left to the Member States must be assessed on the basis of 
the Directive itself, looking to its wording, purpose, and structure127, thereby noting in 
relevant part that unlike the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the Directive concerned did 
not contain a minimum harmonisation clause.128  Ultimately, the Court concluded that the 
Directive provided for complete harmonisation129, which effectively precluded the 
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national measures concerned.130  As such, it was readily assumed by the Court, the 
Advocate General, and the parties involved that Article 153 EC preserved recourse to 
minimum harmonisation for measures adopted under indent (b); it was the alleged cross-
application to measures adopted under Articles 94 and 95 EC that was the problem. 
 
 Recently, Gintec131 presented a similar case in which discussion of Article 153 
EC arose in relation to the interpretation of Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use132, which was based on Article 95 EC.  
Again, the heart of the case turned on the degree of harmonisation involved, so as to 
determine whether German rules providing for more stringent protection in relation to the 
advertising of medicinal products were precluded by the Directive.133  The Court ruled 
that the Directive provided for “complete” harmonisation with the result that Member 
States, such as Germany, could not derogate or go further than what was provided in the 
Directive.134  More provocative was Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s Opinion, 
which seemed to glean further support for this finding from the text of Article 153 EC: 
 
Under that article consumer protection is to be attained through approximation 
measures based on Article 95 EC, as well as through other measures which 
support, supplement and monitor the policies of the Member States (Article 
153(3)), adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 251 EC (Article 
153(4)). Thus, national initiatives giving a higher level of protection are 
authorised only under the second limb, from which it can be concluded that the 
harmonisation under Article 95 EC is maximum harmonisation apart from the 
exceptions provided for by that provision.135  
 
Read at face value, the Advocate General’s statements were quite far-reaching, since he 
seemed to infer from the dual route provided by Article 153 EC that minimum 
harmonisation was required only for measures adopted under indent (b), thereby 
predicating the use of maximum harmonisation for measures adopted under indent (a) via 
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Article 95 EC.  He did not explain how to reconcile this position with the Court’s case-
by-case approach on the basis of the wording, purpose, and structure of the particular 
Community measure concerned, as highlighted by the previous cases. Given the technical 
subject of the harmonised rules (that of medicinal products for human use) and previous 
case law in the field136, however, it is wondered whether the Advocate General’s 
statements were meant to be confined to the context at hand.  In any event, the Court did 
not take up the Advocate General’s reasoning in this regard or even cite Article 153 EC 
in its judgment. 
 
 Ironically, one of the most important cases bearing on the scope of Article 153 EC 
never mentioned Article 153 EC itself:  Tobacco Advertising I.137  To recall from Chapter 
9, the Court ruled in Tobacco Advertising I (and several cases thereafter) that Article 95 
EC was a proper legal basis for a Community measure even if public health protection 
was a “decisive factor” in the choices to be made, provided that the requirements for 
recourse to Article 95 EC were satisfied.138  The Court’s rationale in that case was 
underpinned both by Article 95(3) EC, stipulating a “high level”  of public health 
protection for measures based on Article 95 EC, and by the “horizontal” provision set 
forth in Article 152 (then Article 129) EC ensuring that public health requirements were 
taken into account in relation to other Community policies. Admittedly, Article 153 EC 
was not at issue in this case and was never explicitly referred to therein. Nevertheless, 
Tobacco Advertising I provides compelling arguments for an analogous reading of 
Article 95 EC vis-à-vis Article 153 EC as was done in relation to Article 152 EC.  In fact 
such arguments may even be stronger, given the reference to consumer protection in 
Article 95(3) EC and the “horizontal” provision of Article 153(2) EC, as well as the fact 
that Article 153 EC itself contains an express renvoi to Article 95 EC via indent (a) of 
Article 153(3) EC, without any such express preclusion of harmonisation in its text.  As 
such, the Tobacco Advertising I case law strongly argues for the use of Article 95 EC 
under circumstances where consumer protection objectives are taken into account as part 
of the achievement of the Community’s internal market objectives underlying a particular 
Community measure in line with Articles 153(2) and 95(3) EC, thereby leaving indent (b) 
of Article 153(3) EC for the adoption of Community measures that are rooted in the 
achievement of the Community’s consumer protection objectives sensu stricto separate 
from those relating to the internal market. 
 
 Taking the foregoing case law into account, further jurisprudence on Article 153 
EC is sorely needed.  Notably, the two principal cases dealing with Article 153 EC so far 
– El Corte Inglés and Deposit Guarantees – were both decided over a decade ago and 
concerned the old version of Article 153 EC under the Maastricht Treaty before its 
substantial revision in the Amsterdam Treaty, which constituted the basis for the 
reframing of Article 153 EC in the Lisbon Treaty.  Indeed, Advocate General Lenz’s 
assertion in his Opinion in El Corte Inglés that Article 129a EC was limited to non-
binding measures has been superseded by later cases in which the use of Article 153 EC 
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to adopt minimum harmonisation measures is readily acknowledged. Moreover, it is 
commonly missed that the Court’s consideration of Article 129a EC as “limited” in El 
Corte Inglés was tied to the specific context of that case in relation to its impact on 
previous jurisprudence on the “horizontal direct effect” of directives; the Court’s 
assessment of the Community’s competence under Article 153 EC in and of itself 
remains to be seen.  
 
In any event, a common theme running through the cases discussed above is the 
recognition of two routes enshrined in Article 153 EC concerning measures adopted 
under indent (b) relating to the achievement of the Community’s consumer protection 
objectives, on the one hand, and measures adopted under Article 95 EC via indent (a) that 
incorporate the Community’s consumer protection objectives within the internal market 
programme, on the other hand. This is strongly evidenced by the Court’s express 
language (echoed by Advocate General Lenz) in El Corte Inglés that measures under 
indent (b) are taken “apart” from those relating to the internal market under indent (a).  
Arguably, this also emanates, albeit implicitly, to some extent from the Court’s Tobacco 
Advertising I case law. 
 
Furthermore, while the language of indent (a) in reference to measures adopted 
under Article 95 EC “in the context of the completion of the internal market” is not 
identical to what is found in the text of Article 95(1) EC as regards measures having as 
their object “the establishment and functioning of the internal market”, this discrepancy 
does not seem to have bothered the Court or the Advocates General, and it seems to be 
generally assumed that the two refer to the same thing, regardless of the failed attempt to 
align them in the Draft Constitutional Treaty.139  In other words, such measures are 
adopted under Article 95 EC and must satisfy the requirements elaborated by the Court in 
relation to that provision.  In fact, this is supported by the various language versions of 
indent (a), which demonstrate that “in the context of the completion of the internal 
market” was not meant to diverge from the text of Article 95(1) EC but instead to imply 
that such measures would be situated within the overall context of the realisation or the 
achievement of the internal market, thereby reconciling the two.140   
 
10.2.3 Usage:  Theory versus practice and proposals for change 
As things stand at present, there is a striking paradox underlying the use of Article 
153 EC by the European institutions:  while there is a steady stream of institutional 
documents extolling the importance of Article 153 EC and encouraging greater recourse 
to this provision in theory, in practice, Article 153 EC is rarely resorted to.  To date, the 
number of measures based on Article 153 EC is few, and after isolating those measures 
adopted pursuant to indent (b) of Article 153 EC (or its predecessor in the Maastricht 
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Treaty), as opposed to Article 153 EC more generally141, the number becomes even 
smaller.  As a result, Article 153 EC has attracted more than its fair share of proposals to 
entice the European institutions to its use.  Each of these aspects – theory, practice, and 
proposals for change – are evaluated below. 
 
10.2.3.1 Theory 
Following the early programmes mentioned above, Community consumer policy 
continued to advance by virtue of a successive stream of action plans and 
communications disseminated by the Commission, which in turn led to documents issued 
by the other European institutions and bodies.  As examined below, many of these 
institutional documents contained fruitful discussion of Article 153 EC, often in 
conjunction with the principle of subsidiarity, at the same time that they ingrained  
Community consumer contract law within the internal market programme.  
 
In 1990, the Commission published the First Three-Year Action Plan of 
Consumer Policy for the years 1990-1992.142 The Action Plan identified four main areas 
of focus concerning consumer representation, consumer information, consumer safety, 
and consumer transactions, in view of “their importance in building the consumer 
confidence necessary to support the implementation of the internal market”.143 In the 
section on consumer transactions, the Commission devoted attention to the field of 
consumer contract law, explaining that: 
 
 The differences in conditions of sale in contracts across the twelve Member 
 States are such as to inhibit consumers from purchasing significant items or 
 services away from his or her place of residence. The risks involved in 
 so doing, without hiring a lawyer to guide and advise on the purchase, will 
 be formidable. Most prudent consumers will not take such risks. With each 
 Member State having a different legal system, complicated additionally by 
 nine Community languages, the inability of citizens to confidently cope with 
                                                 
141
 Recourse to Article 153 EC generally has been made for institutional matters relating to Community 
consumer policy.  For example, the series of Decisions establishing the general framework and financing 
for Community action in the field of consumer policy for a certain period of years starting in 1999 through 
the present have each been based on Article 153 (ex Article 129a) EC, the most recent of which is Decision 
1926/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 Dec. 2006 establishing a programme of 
Community action in the field of consumer policy (2007-2013), [2006] OJ L 404/3).  Article 153 EC has 
also been included alongside other legal bases in measures relating to the conclusion of Framework 
Agreements with third States involving the application of Community programmes (see, e.g., Council 
Decision 2005/528/EC of 2 June 2005 concerning the conclusion of a Protocol to the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the 
European Community and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the general principles for the 
participation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in Community programmes, [2005] OJ L 
192/86) or relating to the composition of certain committees  involved in the decision-making process (see, 
e.g., Commission Decision 2004/210/EC of 3 March 2004 setting up Scientific Committees in the field of 
consumer safety, public health and the environment, [2004] OJ L 66/45, which is based on Articles 152 and 
153 EC). 
142
 First Three-Year Action Plan, supra note 32.   
143
 Id., point B, second para., at 5.  
Chapter 10:  European Contract Law and Consumer Protection  
 422 
 such complexities will inhibit purchasing across frontiers.144 
 
On this basis, it was necessary to identify the elements in the contract laws of the 
Member States that were likely to inhibit consumer purchasing, as in the case of 
unbalanced and potentially damaging contract terms that are often not expected by 
consumers.145  Furthermore, “consideration must be given to whether, in the internal 
market, it might not be helpful to both producers and consumers alike to construct a 
model set of contract conditions (i.e., a sale of goods act) as part of the appraisal of civil 
law in the Community”, which would include guarantees and warranties available on a 
uniform basis across the whole internal market.146 The section ended with a list of actions 
to be taken in this field, which included proposals for directives concerning unfair 
contract terms and distance selling, and possible initiatives to simplify cross-frontier 
consumer contracts, guarantees, and after sales service.147   
 
 In the aftermath of this Action Plan, the Parliament adopted a Resolution on the 
consumer protection and health requirements to be taken into account in the completion 
of the internal market148, whose very first recital paid heed to the Maastricht Treaty’s 
introduction of Article 129a EC, which created “a separate, well-defined Community 
competence in the field of consumer protection legislation”.149  In the accompanying 
Report, it was stressed that European consumer protection resembled a “patchwork quilt” 
in part because the original 1957 Treaties of Rome contained no suitable legal basis for 
the legislation that rapidly became necessary, and thus, such a legal basis must be created 
for consumer protection in the forthcoming Treaty revision, which could give a boost to 
its importance.150 A few months later, the Council adopted a Resolution on future 
priorities for the development of consumer protection policy151, which was prompted by 
the fact that the Commission’s First Action Plan  had not yet been fully realised152, 
thereby inviting the Commission to, among other things, adopt measures as soon as 
possible to create consumer confidence in the single market, particularly in the context of 
the protection of consumers’ economic interests, and to adopt another action plan to 
develop Community consumer policy in the coming years.153 
 
In response, in 1993, the Commission published the Second Three-Year Action 
Plan on consumer policy for the years 1993-1995, entitled “Placing the single market at 
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the service of European consumers”.154 It was introduced as belonging in the context of 
the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, since this Treaty “raised consumer 
protection to the rank of a genuine Community policy”, as illustrated by Article 3(s) EC 
and Article 129a EC, both of which were cited in full.155 The Commission proclaimed: 
“By conferring on the Community competences which are both wider and better defined 
in this area, the Maastricht Treaty opens up a new domain of Community action” and it 
“intends to exploit the full potential of the new provisions”.156  It added that this would be 
done with due account of the principle of subsidiarity “interpreted in a positive manner, 
i.e., in such a way as to ensure that an optimum result is obtained by Community 
action”.157 This Action Plan focused on two basic approaches:  first, consolidation of 
Community legislation; and second, selective priorities to raise the level of consumer 
protection and to make consumers more aware of their rights.158 As for the former, the 
Commission reasoned that in order to place the internal market at the service of 
consumers and to prepare for the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, the existing 
acquis must be consolidated by ensuring both the implementation of the measures in 
force and the adoption of proposals on which the Council has not yet reached agreement 
and by preparing new proposals.159 In this regard, the Commission cited several measures 
within the “hard core” of Community contract law, including the Package Travel 
Directive, the Consumer Credit Directive, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the 
Distance Selling Directive, and the Timeshare Directive.160 
 
In 1995, the Commission issued the Third Three-year Consumer Policy Action 
Plan entitled “Priorities for Consumer Policy” for the years 1996-1998.161  The 
Commission explained that while it remained necessary to complete the work envisaged 
by the previous action plans, it was important at this stage “to face up to other questions 
and problems which confront consumers, building on what has been achieved but which 
are not exclusively linked to the Internal Market”.162 It then referred to Article 129a EC: 
 
 The insertion of Article 129A into the Treaty clearly requires the European 
 Community to deal with a broad range of consumer issues, not just those  
 related to the Internal Market project. This obligation implies careful  
 consideration of subsidiarity at all stages so that appropriate solutions  
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 vis-à-vis Member States are adopted.163 
 
This led the Commission to list ten priorities for action, some of which focused on the 
Community realm, such as improving consumer education, information and 
representation, and others manifesting broader considerations such as assisting the 
development of consumer policy in third countries.164  
 
This Action Plan was well-received by the other European institutions and 
bodies.165 Yet, the EESC emphasised that it would be useful to know the Commission’s 
judgment on the functioning of Article 129a EC166 and its choice of priorities to be taken 
from the point of view of subsidiarity, i.e., where does the Commission aim at proposing 
harmonised solutions and where does it intend to leave Member States a framework, or 
other instruments, to help them find solutions?167 Similarly, the Committee of the 
Regions (the COR) stressed that Article 129a EC should be strengthened and clarified, 
with a view to improving consumer rights and recognising consumer policy as an 
independent policy area, but in any event agreed with the Commission’s view that this 
provision required the Community to deal with other consumer issues above and beyond 
those affecting the internal market.168  In its Resolution, the Parliament paid particular 
attention to the role played by subsidiarity, stating that “the priority objectives and 
measures of a European consumer policy, particularly in view of the consequences of the 
single market for the consumer, can be attained more successfully at Community level 
than at Member State level” and this principle “must be not abused to prevent action in 
the interest of Europe’s consumers”.169   
 
 By the time of the Commission’s Fourth Three-Year Consumer Policy Action 
Plan for 1999-2001170, issued at the end of 1998, the Amsterdam Treaty was undergoing 
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ratification in the Member States, which prompted even greater attention being placed on 
Article 153 EC.171  The Commission carved out discussion of Article 153 EC in a special 
box entitled “The Treaty of Amsterdam”, stressing that this new provision “confirms that 
consumer policy is an area where the EU can really add value” and “enhances the 
capacity of the EU to discharge its responsibilities in this area”.172  It then evaluated each 
paragraph of Article 153 EC, one by one, although as regards the Community’s 
competence under Article 153(3) EC, the Commission merely stated that this paragraph 
provided for “legislative and other measures” to be adopted either in the context of the 
internal market, on the basis of Article 95 EC, or “which support, supplement and 
monitor the policy pursued by the Member States” under Article 153(3)(b) EC.173 After 
citing other provisions relevant to consumer policy174, it acknowledged that the Treaty 
did not spell out the priorities for action and the measures to be taken.  On that basis, it 
opined:  “If the Treaty does not include a detailed road map, the main tasks for consumer 
policy set out in Article 153 are an effective compass”.175  
 
 Emphasis on Article 153 EC ran through the responses of the European 
institutions and bodies to this Action Plan.  In particular, the Parliament called on the 
Commission to, among other things, employ Article 153 EC more consistently as the 
legal basis in the development of EU consumer policy.176 Likewise, the EESC stressed 
that the Amsterdam Treaty had expanded the scope for an effective consumer policy, and 
while the need for a high level of consumer protection continued to be the basic 
requirement, it was now stipulated in Article 153 EC that account had to be taken of 
consumer protection in other policy areas.177  The Council was more cautious, noting that 
Community consumer policy must respect the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and, without citing Article 153 EC explicitly, reiterated its “supporting 
and supplementing” language and provision for minimum harmonisation.178 Taking a 
similar tone, the COR opined that under Article 153 EC, “the European Union is enjoined 
merely to ‘contribute’ to this objective179 and Community action must be in accord with 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.180 That said, the COR stressed the need 
to forge ahead with the approximation of European consumer protection law, albeit on 
the basis of minimum standards as predicated by the Treaty, and  therefore, backed 
“moves to standardise rights in the consumer protection directives” finding that it “makes 
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sense, for example, to harmonise the different withdrawal rights and deadlines, to have 
standard definitions of consumers and enterprises and to develop a standard form of 
words in an international private law clause”.181 
 
 Through the present decade, references to Article 153 EC continue to filter 
through Community consumer policy documents right alongside Article 95 EC, thereby 
leaving some pregnant pauses as regards the relationship between the two provisions. For 
example, in the 2001 Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection182, the 
Commission noted that Article 153 EC enshrined a number of consumer rights but that 
the consumer protection directives “usually” based on Article 95 EC have fleshed out the 
detail of some of these rights.183 It also aired its perceptions of the “monitoring” language 
in Article 153 EC, which bore linkage to the internal market programme:   
 
A fully functioning consumer internal market depends on enforcement  
that is more or less equally effective in all Member States. Article 153  
of the EC Treaty was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam to clarify  
the Commission’s role as monitor of the effectiveness of national policies.  
At present there is no framework for the Commission to carry out this 
monitoring role and help to improve enforcement standards across the 
internal market. The need for the Commission to play this supportive 
role will increase with enlargement, and the accession of countries  
without a long history of consumer protection enforcement.184 
 
The following year, in its 2002 Communication on the Consumer Policy Strategy 
for 2002-2006185, the Commission highlighted various principles underlying Community 
consumer policy, i.e., those relating to consumer representation, consumer confidence in 
shopping across borders, and integration of consumer concerns in other Community 
policies, which were enshrined in Articles 153 and 95 EC186, though without providing 
any clarification between the two.  In response, the Parliament stressed that Article 153 
EC had only been used once as a legal basis for consumer protection legislation and 
asked the Commission to reflect on ways of ensuring its greater use.187  In doing so, the 
Parliament called for legislation to be drafted on the legal basis provided by Articles 95 
and 153 EC.188 
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 Recently, Article 153 EC came to the fore in the context of the Commission’s 
2007 Communication on the EU Consumer Policy Strategy for the years 2007-2013.189  
Previously, in 2005, the Commission had issued a Communication on a joint Public 
Health and Consumer Protection Strategy190, taking the view that in light of the synergy 
between these two policy fields, they should be joined together into one action 
programme.191  This was much to the consternation of the other European institutions and 
bodies.192 In particular, both the EESC and the COR stressed that in contrast to public 
health policy, Community consumer policy was largely subject to a “common approach”, 
with a view to promoting consumers’ rights and protecting their interests, especially 
where this concerned the completion of the internal market.193 In the COR’s view, 
bringing consumer protection policy into line with the strict complementarity and 
subsidiarity criteria of public health policy could have an adverse effect on the 
Community’s consumer protection competence.194 Ultimately, the Commission, 
separated the two policy fields, which led to the abovementioned Communication.195 Yet, 
in the accompanying Impact Assessment, Article 153 EC was cited as part of the 
discussion concerning the need to enhance cross-border transactions in the internal 
market, thereby noticeably blurring with Article 95 EC.196 
 
10.2.3.2 Practice 
In 1993, in the wake of the introduction of Article 129a EC in the Maastricht 
Treaty, Professors Hans-W. Micklitz and Stephen Weatherill opined:  “The practical test 
of the impact of Article 129a as a basis for increasing the profile of formal Community 
action will be measurable only some years in the future by reference to the list of 
measures adopted under it”.197  By that standard, the impact of Article 153 EC has been 
low, given the number of measures enacted pursuant to the Community’s competence 
under indent (b) of Article 153(3) EC via the decision-making procedures set down in 
Article 153(4) (ex Article 129a(2)) EC.  
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The most well-known measure to date is Directive 98/6/EC on consumer 
protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers198, often 
referred to as the Price Indication Directive, which is included as part of the 
Commission’s review of the consumer acquis.  It was adopted under Article 129a(2) EC, 
the Maastricht version of Article 153(4) EC.  While the reference to the internal market 
does appear in certain recitals199, the Directive is rooted in the primary objective to 
ensure a high level of consumer protection by taking “specific action” supporting  and 
supplementing the policy of the Member States regarding precise, transparent, and 
unambiguous information for consumers on the prices of products offered to them.200  No 
distinction is made as regards consumer products sold cross-border, meaning that it 
applies to cross-border and purely domestic situations.  While the Directive does not state 
explicitly whether it harmonises the laws of the Member States201, it seems to be readily 
considered to be a (minimum) harmonisation measure.202 This can be explained by the 
fact that  it sets forth a set of common rules regarding the indication of products, albeit 
leaving certain options to the Member States.203 It also contains an explicit minimum 
harmonisation clause along the lines of Article 153(5) EC.204 To the author’s knowledge, 
it is the only directive based on the Community’s competence under Article 153 (then 
Article 129a) EC, and as yet, there have been no regulations adopted pursuant to this 
provision. 
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There have been a few decisions, however. First, Decision 3092/94/EC 
introducing a Community system of information on home and leisure accidents (referred 
to as EHLASS) was adopted under Article 129a(2) (now Article 153(4)) EC.205 As set 
forth in the Preamble, in view of the increasing circulation of consumer products in the 
framework of the internal market, it was considered necessary for the Community to take 
“specific action” concerning the identification of the products involved in home and 
leisure accidents, and this would provide national authorities with “sufficiently 
homogeneous instruments” so that the information documented of one Member State 
could be used in other Member States and at the Community level.206  Therefore, for the 
period of 1994-1997, a Community system of information on home and leisure accidents 
was set up, with the objective to collect data with a view to promoting accident 
prevention, improving the safety of consumer products, and informing and educating 
consumers so that they make better use of products at both the national and the 
Community level.207  When the specified time period expired, the EHLASS system was 
extended by way of Decision 372/1999/EC, which was adopted under Article 129(4) EC 
concerning public health policy.208 
 
 Decision 276/1999/EC establishing a multiannual Community action plan on 
promoting safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and harmful content on global 
networks was also adopted under Article 129a(2) (now Article 153(4)) EC.209 As 
indicated in the Preamble, there was the need for “specific action” by the Community 
supporting and supplementing the policy pursued by the Member States regarding the 
need to provide information for consumers on the safer use of the Internet.210 To carry 
this out, the Decision set forth various courses of action to be taken under the guidance of 
the Commission, e.g., promoting industry self-regulation and monitoring schemes, 
encouraging industry to provide filtering tools and rating systems for children, and 
fostering cooperation and exchange of best practices at European and international 
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levels.211 Incidentally, the use of Article 129a(2) EC as the legal basis for this Decision 
had not been envisaged in the Commission’s proposal, but was later proposed by the 
European Parliament in the decision-making process.212  The Decision initially covered a 
four-year period, from 1999 to 2002213, but it was extended and ultimately replaced by 
subsequent measures, which were based on Article 153(2) EC or Article 153 EC 
generally214, instead of Article 153(4) EC / 153(3)(b) EC.  
 
 In all, there is a paltry amount of Community measures  predicated on the 
Community’s competence under Article 153 EC, and indeed, all three measures 
described above were based on the older version of this provision under the Maastricht 
Treaty.  They are also mainly concerned with the consumer’s right of information, i.e., 
information about prices, information about accidents, and information about safe use of 
the Internet, thereby leaving the other consumer rights and interests listed in Article 
153(1) EC on the sidelines. Of the group, Directive 98/6/EC seems to represent the 
stronger example of Community action in the sense of constituting minimum 
harmonisation of national laws in the area concerned, whereas the EHLASS and Internet 
Decisions were tethered to lesser forms of Community action along the lines of 
coordinating national laws and strengthening action taken at the national level.  That 
being said, each of the foregoing measures embody the achievement of the Community’s 
consumer protection objectives removed from the internal market programme. 
Noticeably, there is no mention of the particular measure’s aptitude for eliminating 
obstacles to trade or distortions of competition, for example. Where relevant, they cover 
both cross-border and domestic transactions; indeed, by their subject-matter, they seem to 
be predicated in large part on the domestic context.  Still, the fact that there has only been 
one directive to date and “backtracking” regarding the other two decisions signifies the 
timidity on the part of the European legislator in relying on this provision. This explains 
the impetus for proposals to revise Article 153 EC. 
 
10.2.3.3 Proposals for change 
In 1996, amidst the impending IGC leading to the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Commission received two related written questions, inviting it to comment on the merits 
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of then Article 129a EC.  The two questions, submitted by an Italian MEP, Amedeo 
Amadeo, concerned “the single market and consumer protection”, and though worded 
somewhat differently, both asked the Commission to respond as to whether 
improvements to Article 129a EC were needed.215 About a month later, Commissioner 
Emma Bonino gave a joint answer to both questions216, whereby she  declared:  “As 
things stand, Article 129a appears to be an adequate, appropriate legal basis for the 
development of consumer policy at Community level”.217  In that regard, she underscored 
that Article 129a(1)(b) EC had already been used on two occasions as the legal basis for 
the EHLASS Decision and the proposal for what would become Directive 98/6/EC.218  
She added that although the IGC was not designed to increase Community powers, “the 
Commission considers that the conference could provide a forum for looking into ways 
of achieving more effectively a high level of consumer protection under the different 
Community policies”.219 
 
Notwithstanding Commissioner Bonino’s statements, Article 153 EC has attracted 
an array of proposals on account of its weaknesses and underuse.  Over the years, the 
literature has been sprinkled with calls for revising Article 153 EC so as to break the tie 
with Article 95 EC and to fortify Community action on the basis of this provision. A 
notable example was Professor Sandie Chillon’s advocacy of the emancipation of then 
Article 129a EC from Article 100a EC by deleting indent (a) and the “support and 
supplement” language of indent (b) so as to make Article 129a EC a more capable legal 
basis for consumer protection measures.220 One of the most definitive proposals was 
submitted by Professors Hans-W. Micklitz, Norbert Reich, and Stephen Weatherill in the 
wake of the 2004 version of the Draft Constitutional Treaty.221 While cognisant of the 
political unacceptability of exacting major changes to either Articles 153 or 95 EC at that 
point, the commentators nonetheless advocated a wholly revised version of Article 153 
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EC in order to augment and to clarify the extent of Community action under both 
provisions.222  In particular, they introduced an additional indent as part of Article 153(3) 
EC denoting “measures which contribute to the protection and promotion of the interests 
of consumers [within the framework of EU policy]”, with a view to extending 
autonomous consumer protection competence at the Community level.223  They also 
substituted the “horizontal” clause of Article 153(2) EC with a new paragraph stipulating 
that “[t]he interests of the consumer in participating actively and confidently in the 
internal market shall be fully taken into account in the development of the Union’s 
activities”.224 This change was aimed not so much at Article 153 EC but to affect the 
interpretation of Article 95 EC, so as to strengthen the argument that this provision could 
be used for consumer-friendly measures even if the Tobacco Advertising I case law was 
read in a narrow manner.225 They further replaced the minimum harmonisation clause of 
Article 153(5) EC with a procedure modeled after Article 95(4)-(10) EC so as to align 
Articles 153 and 95 EC and thus allow for maximum harmonisation in areas of consumer 
protection policy unrelated to the internal market.226   
 
 Proposals urging revision of Article 153 EC have also emanated from the 
European level, particularly from the EESC, which has played a seminal role in calling 
for the strengthening of this provision, as well as its very creation, in several Opinions.  
In 1991, before Maastricht, the EESC adopted an Opinion on Consumer Protection and 
Completion of the Internal Market, which analysed the constraints of the reference to 
consumer protection as part of Article 95 EC (ex Article 100a EEC) and asserted the need 
for a specific provision in the Treaty on consumer protection policy.227  In 1995, after 
Maastricht, the EESC’s Opinion on the “Single Market and Consumer Protection:  
opportunities and obstacles” took issue with the lack of Community measures based on 
Article 129a(1)(b) EC and cautioned that the principle of subsidiarity should not be 
interpreted too narrowly so as to preclude the adoption of Community measures under 
this legal basis, thereby advocating the revision of Article 129a EC so as to stipulate, 
among other things, that the measures adopted by the Community in this area fell within 
its own competence and not that of the Member States in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity.228 This was echoed in the EESC’s 2005 Opinion on Consumer policy post-
enlargement, which highlighted that Article 153 EC gave rise to “dual subsidiarity”:  in 
addition to the subsidiarity test inscribed in the second paragraph of Article 5 EC, Article 
153(3)(b) EC was perceived as subjecting measures to an even more stringent test of 
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secondary subsidiarity by virtue of the fact that Community measures must “supplement” 
or “support” Member States’ initiatives in the areas concerned.229 In the EESC’s view, it 
was essential that the application of subsidiarity not hold up the adoption of much-needed 
consumer protection measures.230 
 
In 2006, the EESC’s Opinion on the “Legal framework for consumer policy” 
contained ambitious reform of Article 153 EC.231  The EESC set the stage by discussing 
the chronological development of Article 153 EC in the Treaty, noting that with the 
Maastricht Treaty, Article 129a EC was an inadequate basis for developing a fully-
fledged consumer policy and that the changes brought by the Amsterdam Treaty did not 
address these shortcomings.232 In its view, the Commission’s approach confirmed a 
“worrying decline” in the promotion and protection of consumer interests and that the 
deficiencies in the text of Article 153 EC were at the root of why it was not used much as 
the legal basis for developing consumer policy in the EU.233  It also reiterated that “dual 
subsidiarity” unduly paralysed, both at European and national levels, any policy designed 
to enhance consumer protection and needed to be abandoned.234  On that basis, it set forth  
two new provisions, Articles 153 and 153a, to replace the present Article 153 EC.235  The 
proposed Article 153 provided the general dimensions for Community consumer policy, 
thereby setting forth an enlarged list of Community objectives to be achieved236 and 
providing that it should aim at the “highest” level of protection based upon a number of 
framing principles.237 The proposed Article 153a EC outlined the scope of Community 
action in this field.  Of particular note was the fact that the dual route of Article 153 EC 
was gone; the “support, supplement and monitor” language was replaced by measures “as 
are necessary to obtain the objectives” listed in Article 153238; and although the recourse 
to minimum harmonisation was retained, the proposed Article 153a inserted a special 
procedure for the Commission’s review of more stringent national measures.239   
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Taken together, the proposals emanating from scholars and the EESC share the 
objective to embolden Community action based on Article 153 EC.  Part and parcel of 
this, some sought to break the tie between Article 153 EC and Article 95 EC inscribed in 
Article 153 EC.  Yet, they were not generally concerned with severing the link between 
Article 95 EC and the protection of consumers’ economic interests within which 
Community (consumer) contract law was situated.  If anything, as exemplified by the 
proposal of Professors Hans-W. Micklitz, Norbert Reich, and Stephen Weatherill, the 
prospect of making clear that consumer-related measures seeking to increase consumer 
confidence could be based on Article 95 EC only seemed to tie the two more tightly 
together.  By and large, it was the other consumer rights and interests that had laid fallow 
in the ongoing developments concerning Community consumer policy that were given a 
boost by many of the proposals. This is amplified by the various institutional documents 
espousing the merits of Article 153 EC above.  What was stressed, particularly 
consistently by the Commission, was the encouragement of Article 153 EC in relation to 
other areas of Community action separate from the internal market.  As such, the linkage 
between consumer protection and internal market policy, especially in connection with 
the protection of consumers’ economic interests within which European consumer 
contract law is situated, has continued unimpeded, indeed has been progressively 
strengthened, in the evolution of Community consumer policy programmes to date.   
 
10.3 The scope of Article 153 EC 
By virtue of the dual route inscribed in the text of Article 153 EC, the scope of the 
Community’s competence under this provision denotes the limits and the exercise of such 
competence under indent (b) of Article 153(3) EC to take action to achieve the objectives 
relating to consumer protection as elaborated in Article 153(1) EC.  This should be 
distinguished from indent (a) of Article 153(3) EC, which is targeted at the achievement 
of such objectives within the context of internal market measures adopted under Article 
95 EC, which is discussed in the next section.  By taking apart these two aspects 
comprising the limits and the exercise of Community competence, it may be seen that 
Article 153 EC has somewhat greater ambit than is commonly perceived.  
 
10.3.1 The limits of Article 153(3)(b) EC competence 
The limits of the Community’s competence under Article 153(3)(b) EC denotes 
the extent of Community action that can be taken in pursuit of the objectives elaborated 
in Article 153(1) EC, i.e., its contribution to “protecting the health, safety and economic 
interests of consumers” and “promoting their right to information, education and to 
organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests”.  This invites inquiry into two 
interrelated aspects:  the forms of Community action that can be taken on the basis of this 
provision to achieve these objectives; and the ambit of what is meant by action “to 
support, supplement and monitor” the policies of the Member States in that regard.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to ensure direct access for consumer associations in challenging Community measures based on this new 
provision.  See proposed Article 153a(4)-(5). 
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First, on the basis of the chronological development of Article 153 EC in the 
Treaty, the case law, and the institutional practice discussed in the preceding section, the 
stipulation of “measures” under Article 153(3)(b) EC allows for binding legislative action 
on the basis of legal instruments, such as directives, regulations, and decisions.  This 
coincides with the way the term “measures” is used in other provisions of the Treaty, 
such as Articles 95, 308, and 65 EC implicated in the debate about European contract 
law.  This is further evidenced by the acts adopted under this provision already and by the 
revision of this provision in the European Convention (referring to regulations and/or 
directives) and in the Draft Constitutional Treaty (citing European laws and European 
framework laws), which paved the way for the Lisbon Treaty.  As a result, in principle it 
is arguable that Article 153 EC has the potential to effect not only the harmonisation of 
national laws by way of directives, but also the unification of national laws by way of 
regulations, thereby encompassing approximation and not merely harmonisation.240  This 
need not necessarily undercut the stipulation inscribed in Article 153(5) EC or its 
equivalent in the Lisbon Treaty that Member States are allowed to prescribe more 
stringent protection in relation to the measure concerned since scholars have pointed out 
that regulations may be used to lay down minimum standards.241  That being said, given 
the limited measures to date and the prominence of the Price Indication Directive, 
harmonisation is more commonly associated with Article 153 EC. 
 
Importantly, within this context, there appears to be controversy as regards Article 
153 EC’s allowance for harmonisation, with several scholars disavowing the use of 
Article 153 EC for the adoption of harmonisation measures.242 Looking closer, however, 
this may boil down to the objectives to be achieved by such harmonisation as regards 
consumer protection “inside” versus “outside” the internal market.  As demonstrated 
above, it is widely recognised by the European institutions, including the Court of Justice, 
scholars, and members of the European Convention that Article 153(5) EC embodies a 
minimum harmonisation clause.  As such, it would be illogical if this provision did not 
allow for harmonisation in the first place, and as evidenced by the Price Indication 
Directive, this has been done. Indeed, given the express preclusion of harmonisation in 
the fields of public health, education, and culture, which entered into the Treaty at the 
same time and have continued to sit alongside Article 153 EC through the subsequent 
course of Treaty revisions through the Lisbon Treaty indicates the Treaty-framers’ 
intention not to restrict Article 153 EC in this way.  Thus, while not always stated clearly, 
whilst Article 153 EC’s allowance for harmonisation to achieve the Community’s 
consumer protection objectives sensu stricto seems to be readily agreed243, it may in fact 
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be the potential recourse to Article 153 EC outside the confines of consumer protection  
to effect harmonisation in the context of the internal market that is rejected in the 
literature. In any case, to the extent that such commentators submit that harmonisation is 
precluded on the basis of indent (b) of Article 153(3) EC (or Article 169(2) TFEU) in 
toto, the position of the present author departs from that view. 
 
As regards the scope of such harmonisation (or potentially approximation), 
Article 153(3)(b) EC is silent on the issue whether such measures must be limited to 
cross-border situations only or can extend to purely domestic situations.  Yet, at least as 
regards the Community measures adopted under this provision so far, no such limitation 
has been imposed.  In fact, considering the fact that Community action is predicated on 
“the policy pursued by the Member States”, the inclusion of both cross-border and 
domestic situations within a Community measure based on this provision would 
presumably not be foreclosed, depending upon the objectives to be achieved by the 
measure concerned. 
 
 Second, the “stickier” part of the inquiry concerns what is meant by measures 
“which support, supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the Member States”.  This 
is so, especially with the baggage of the Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon 
Treaty whereby the words “supporting” and “supplementing” became conjoined with the 
category of complementary competence, which denotes more limited Union action vis-à-
vis the Member States. Even so, the words “support, supplement and monitor” have 
varying connotations that could in principle veer either on the side of Community action 
or that of the Member States.  Delving deeper into the text, the word “supplement” in the 
English version assumes a somewhat stronger tenor in other language versions of Article 
153(3)(b) EC in the sense of Community action “completing” or “complementing” – 
even “integrating” in the Italian version244 – national consumer policy.245  
 
While the Court has not yet addressed the matter, this language was interpreted 
broadly by Advocate General Léger in the Deposit Guarantees case underscoring that 
Community action was not linked to the existence of a specific policy in each and every 
Member State; what mattered was the existence of an overall policy to protect consumers 
in the Member States as a whole.246 This is also echoed by scholars, such as Professor 
Jules Stuyck who remarked that “the actual subject-matter of the Community measure 
may differ from anything already existing in the Member States, so long as it 
                                                                                                                                                 
European Civil Code 89, 100 (M.W. Hesselink ed., Kluwer, 2006).  See also, albeit on tentative grounds, 
W. van Gerven, “Codifying European private law? Yes, if . . . !”, 27 European Law Review 156, 167 
(2002). 
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Überwachung der Politik der Mitgliedstaaten”); Spanish version (“medidas que apoyen, complementen y 
supervisen la política llevada a cabo por los Estados miembros”). 
246
 See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text. 
Chapter 10:  European Contract Law and Consumer Protection  
 437 
supplements existing goals of consumer policy in (some of) the Member States”.247 
Indeed, the text of Article 153 EC is framed in relation to the policy “pursued” by the 
Member States, which seems to invite some flexibility in the assessment. As a practical 
matter, it is doubtful at this stage of European integration that the Member States would 
not have at least some sort of consumer policy, even if at different stages of 
development.248 For that matter, while the “monitoring” language of Article 153 EC 
remains to be fleshed out in the case law, the Commission’s musings discussed above 
seem to indicate, at least in its view, a strong role in upholding consumer protection 
standards across the EU.249 By and large, the supporting, supplementing and monitoring 
language of Article 153(3)(b) EC would seem to invite wider margin for Community 
action in pursuit of its objectives, without being tied to particular consumer policies of 
the Member States.  And while measures so far have mainly targeted at consumer 
information, the protection of the other consumer rights and interests inscribed in Article 
153(1) EC also provide the basis for Community action in this regard.   
 
To summarise, in line with the objectives set forth in Article 153 EC, Community 
action under this provision can conceivably encompass both the harmonisation and the 
unification of national laws; can potentially extend to both cross-border and purely 
domestic situations; and can diverge from the consumer policies of the Member States to 
varying degrees so long as the measures concerned “support, supplement and monitor” 
national consumer policy as a whole.  In fact, it is in large part the confluence of the 
“support, supplement and monitor” language with the principle of subsidiarity that has 
been credited with holding Article 153 EC back, which leads to the next section. 
 
10.3.2 The exercise of Article 153(3)(b) EC competence 
As captured in scholarly literature and some of the institutional documents 
described above, there is perceived to be a “dual role” played by the principle of 
subsidiarity in relation to Article 153 EC.250  The idea is that subsidiarity infiltrates 
Community action under Article 153 EC in two distinct ways:  first, in the framing of the 
provision itself, in the sense that Community action must only “support, supplement and 
monitor” Member State action under Article 153(3)(b) EC and that the Member States 
are not precluded from setting more stringent protection standards by virtue of the 
minimum harmonisation clause of Article 153(5) EC; and second, that Community action 
under Article 153 EC must satisfy the subsidiarity test outlined in the second paragraph 
of Article 5 EC, i.e., that such action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore be better achieved by the Community. Both applications embody 
the perspective that action taken at the Member State level in the consumer sphere is 
prioritised, with Community action assuming a secondary, literally supporting, role.   
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Yet, it is often overlooked that these two roles manifest different conceptions of 
subsidiarity.  As discussed in Chapter 8251, the first embodies a “supra-constitutional” 
conception of subsidiarity in the sense that tenets of subsidiarity infuse the way that 
Article 153 EC is framed in the Treaty, which then impacts the principle of conferral in 
the sense of delineating the scope of Community competence under this provision.  In 
other words, it informs the language of Article 153 EC which then necessitates inquiry 
into what it means to “support, supplement or monitor” Member State action, the 
preservation of minimum harmonisation, etc.  The second constitutes the traditional 
“constitutional” conception of subsidiarity relating to its potential to guide the exercise of 
Community competence in line with the subsidiarity calculus of Article 5 EC.   
 
  Admittedly, on a practical level it is difficult to differentiate the outcome of these 
different conceptions of subsidiarity.  Whether on the basis of a limited interpretation of 
the text of Article 153 EC or on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 5 EC, the 
result could be just the same, that action at the Member State level concerning a certain 
matter of consumer policy is preferred.  Even so, these two conceptions of subsidiarity 
must be distinguished because they have very different consequences for the analysis of 
the Community’s competence under Article 153 EC.  On the one hand, supra-
constitutional subsidiarity seems to have had a considerable impact in restraining the 
course of Community action under this provision.  Remarkably, in contrast to other 
provisions such as Article 95 EC where the principle of subsidiarity (as well as the 
principle of proportionality) underlie tensions as regards the need for protecting or 
preserving Member State competence in the face of Community action, in the case of 
Article 153 EC, the converse seems to be true.  As illustrated by some of the literature 
and institutional documents on Article 153 EC, subsidiarity carries concerns that it has 
operated too far in the opposite direction, that is to say, that it has been abused or 
interpreted narrowly in favour of the Member States as the expense of unduly 
emasculating Community action in areas where it is needed.252  As such, the predominant 
role of subsidiarity in relation to Article 153 EC may have obfuscated the scope of 
Community action in the sense of unduly painting the dimensions of Community 
competence Article 153 EC in a very restrictive manner.   On the other hand, as regards 
constitutional subsidiarity, Community action in this field is taken with a view to 
“supporting, supplementing and monitoring” Member State action, i.e., it is intended to 
provide added value to the protection of consumers, which is not capable of being 
achieved by national consumer policies.  Hence assuming that such Community action 
falls within the boundaries of Article 153(3)(b) EC, the hurdle posed by the subsidiarity 
test of Article 5 EC would not seem to be insurmountable.  This may explain why 
scholars have found the impact of the principle of subsidiarity (in its constitutional form) 
to be low in relation to Community competence under Article 153 EC.253   
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 Moreover, by separating these two conceptions of subsidiarity, this may serve to 
place further attention on the roles played by the other constitutional principles alongside 
subsidiarity that guide the exercise of Community competence under Article 153 EC, 
namely the principles of proportionality and sincere cooperation, which taken together 
may offset tensions relating to perceived ineffectiveness of (constitutional) subsidiarity 
acting alone. Compared to the principle of subsidiarity, the principle of proportionality 
has not seemed to garner as much attention in the literature or institutional documents.  
Nonetheless, at least one scholar has emphasised the importance of this principle in the 
sense of guiding the intensity of Community action in the field of consumer policy by 
limiting the scope and the type of action taken.254  Moreover, the role played by the 
principle of sincere cooperation has been underlined by several scholars in the literature.  
In particular, Professor Sandie Chillon considered the operation of the principle of 
sincere cooperation as an “antidote” for the subsidiarity barrier in the sense of enhancing 
the synergy between action taken in the field of consumer policy at the Community and 
Member State levels.255  Likewise, Professors Hans W.-Micklitz and Stephen Weatherill 
highlighted the shared responsibility of Member States and the Community for consumer 
policy on the basis of relationship between Article 153 EC, the principle of subsidiarity, 
and the principle of sincere cooperation with the result that action situated at Community, 
national, and even regional levels can have a role to play within the Community 
framework concerning consumer policy.256   
 
 Certainly, the lack of Community measures based on Article 153 EC makes it 
difficult to assess the operation of the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, and 
sincere cooperation, and thus the analysis may be rooted more in theory than practice at 
this point.  Nonetheless, drawing from the foregoing observations, the interplay between 
these three principles has the potential to contribute to a more balanced or cooperative 
relationship between the Community and the Member States in relation to the exercise of 
the Community’s competence under Article 153 EC. Proportionality cum subsidiarity has 
the potential to eradicate fears of unduly precluding Community action by working to 
target the areas in which Community is needed and within those areas to gauge the 
intensity of such action at the Community level whether as part of the subsidiarity 
calculus under the second paragraph of Article 5 EC or under the third paragraph of 
Article 5 EC.257  Furthermore, under circumstances where the subsidiarity calculus 
indicates that the objectives of the proposed action can be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, the principle of sincere cooperation ensures that the Member States, 
whether at national, regional, or local level, must achieve such objectives so as to ensure 
that consumer protection does not “fall between the cracks”, so to speak, between the 
Community and the national levels.  In this way, distinguishing the different conceptions 
of subsidiarity may help to remedy misperceptions about the extent of Community 
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competence under Article 153 EC emanating from its supra-constitutional form and to 
illuminate the role played by the principles of proportionality and sincere cooperation 
alongside subsidiarity in its constitutional form, in relation to Article 153 EC. 
 
10.4 The relationship between Articles 153, 95, and 308 EC 
10.4.1  European consumer contract law and ties that bind:  Consumer protection 
and the internal market 
 
The prospect of a European contract law instrument including or limited to 
consumer contract law strikes at the heart of the relationship between Articles 153 and 95 
EC.  Noticeably, the Treaty is silent when it comes to answering questions about the 
linkage between the two provisions, namely how to determine the boundary line between 
the two provisions and as such whether a measure can be based jointly on the two 
together or instead one alone.  In the literature, there does not seem to be firm agreement 
on the matter.  Certain scholars opine that Articles 153 and 95 EC are mutually exclusive 
and thus cannot be used together, since they have different scopes of application and 
manifest different effects on Member State competence258, whereas some, at least 
tentatively, have considered proposals for a European consumer contract law instrument 
on a combination of the two.259   Added to this is the case law of the Court of Justice, 
which has not yet provided definitive answers.  In El Corte Inglés, the Court’s finding 
that Article 129a EC created limited Community competence in the consumer field 
“apart” from measures taken in connection with the internal market strongly supports the 
separation of consumer measures into two categories:  one related to the internal market 
and the other divorced from it.  Yet, this did not answer the question of the overlap 
between the two, and as yet there has been no case that has confronted the Court with 
such an issue.  
 
 At base, the inquiry revolves around the objectives to be achieved by the measure 
concerned, in terms of the distinction emanating from the case law and institutional 
practice as regards the extent to which a particular measure is rooted in consumer 
protection objectives sensu stricto under indent (b) of Article 153(3) EC, as opposed to 
the achievement of such objectives as part of the internal market programme, which 
merits recourse to Article 95 EC pursuant to indent (a) of Article 153(3) EC. Generally 
speaking, there are compelling arguments that in principle Articles 95 and 153 EC can be 
used together as the legal basis for a particular Community measure under circumstances 
where the measure is predicated equally and indissociably on the Community’s 
objectives related to the internal market, on the one hand, and consumer protection, on 
the other.  This was somewhat alluded to in Advocate General Léger’s Opinion in the 
Deposit Guarantees case, in which he posited that Article 153 (ex Article 129a) EC could 
potentially serve as a second legal basis alongside Article 57 (now Article 47) EC for the 
Directive concerned, although this did not squarely concern Article 95 EC. As also 
emphasised in that Opinion, the decision-making procedures for Articles 153 and 95 EC 
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are compatible, indeed identical.  Furthermore, such a combination is not expressly 
foreclosed by the Treaty.  Notably, the dual route inscribed in Article 153(3) EC has been 
separated by a semi-colon from its introduction in the Maastricht Treaty to its reframing 
in the Lisbon Treaty.  Arguably, this can be viewed as an ingenious way on the part of the 
Treaty framers to leave open the possibility for the European legislator to have recourse 
to both provisions under the relevant circumstances.   
 
As far as institutional practice is concerned, there has not yet been any measure 
adopted under both Articles 95 and 153 EC. Yet, there has been recourse to the 
combination of Articles 95 and 175 EC concerning environmental policy260 and that of 
Article 95 and Article 152 (4)(b) EC concerning public health protection261, which 
provide concrete examples of measures, or portions thereof, rooted in the Community’s 
objectives in the internal market, on the one hand, and the Community’s objectives 
specific to those policy fields, on the other.  In fact, sometimes the provisions are 
separated in the measure itself according to each set of objectives, whereby different 
levels of harmonisation are established.262 This demonstrates that in situations where the 
chosen degree of harmonisation may diverge, e.g., minimum versus maximum 
harmonisation, this does not necessarily preclude the combination of Articles 95 and 153 
EC but may require the measure to be compartmentalised.  Certainly, in accordance with 
vested case law, institutional practice is not determinative, and the matter will inevitably 
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prevent or to reduce the generation of spent batteries and accumulators and the negative environmental 
impacts of the metals used in them were based on Article 175 EC, which would not prevent the Member 
States from adopting more stringent requirements on their national territory.  Commission Proposal, COM 
(2003) 723 final, 21.11.2003, point 9, at 24-25. 
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remain unsettled until the Court of Justice is given the opportunity to address it. 
Nevertheless, such examples find ready analogy to the situation involving Articles 95 and 
153 EC, which indicate that such a possibility cannot be foreclosed. 
 
 That all being said, as far as the adoption of a European contract law instrument 
encompassing consumer contract law in all or in part is concerned, there are good 
arguments that a combination of Articles 95 and 153 EC is generally precluded and that 
action must be taken on the basis of Article 95 EC alone pursuant indent (a) of Article 
153(3) EC. This goes back to the objectives underlying the Community measures 
concerning consumer contract law adopted thus far.  Interwoven through the 
“constitutional fabric” of Community consumer contract law is that the various measures 
espouse dual objectives related to both ensuring the establishment and the functioning of 
the internal market and attaining a high level of consumer protection.263 In other words, 
consumer protection objectives are part of the Community’s objectives to make the 
internal market function on the basis of the particular measure adopted.  As demonstrated 
by the analysis above, since the very beginning of Community consumer policy, 
European consumer contract law continues to be situated within the context of the 
protection of consumers’ economic interests as part of the internal market programme.  
This has become more apparent in the Commission’s plans for the review of the 
consumer acquis and the proposed Directive on consumer rights.264 In short, Community 
consumer contract law measures are not concerned with consumer protection policy 
sensu stricto divorced from the internal market but in fact are part of it.   
 
Consequently, this makes proposals made by scholars to take the Community 
consumer contract law measures adopted under Articles 94 and 95 EC and convert them 
into a comprehensive instrument based on Article 153 EC confusing.  In particular, 
Professor Nobert Reich proposed the codification of Community consumer contract law 
under Article 153(3)(b) EC, which seems to be motivated in large part by the “double 
advantage” of preserving recourse to minimum harmonisation and having recourse to a 
regulation, as opposed to directive.265 With greatest respect to this prominent jurist, it is 
not clear how measures rooted in the Community’s dual objectives related to the internal 
market and consumer protection can be adopted, at least as they are framed now, under 
Article 153(3)(b) EC, since they do not embody consumer protection objectives separate  
from those relating to the internal market.  
 
Understandably, this may stimulate sensitivities regarding the imbalance between 
the two provisions in the sense of preferencing Community action under Article 95 EC at 
the expense of that taken under Article 153 EC.  Yet, from another vantage point, this 
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 See Chapter 2, § 2.4. 
264
 In much of the case law concerning the “hard core” of EC contract law, the dual objectives of consumer 
protection and internal market have been underlined:  see Chapter 3. 
265
 See N. Reich, “A European Contract Law, or an EU Contract Law Regulation for Consumers?”, 28 
Journal of Consumer Policy 383, 398 (2005) (repeated in subsequent publications: see, e.g., N. Reich, 
“Crisis or Future of European Consumer Law?”, in The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2009 3, 33 (D. Parry 
ed., Ashgate, 2009)). This position has been seconded by other scholars: see, e.g., H-W. Micklitz, “The 
Targeted Full Harmonisation Approach: Looking Behind the Curtain”, in Modernising and Harmonising 
Consumer Contract Law 47, 55 (G. Howells and R. Schulze eds, Sellier, 2009).  
Chapter 10:  European Contract Law and Consumer Protection  
 443 
constitutes a well-devised tradeoff dictated by the Treaty in terms of allowing for a more 
holistic and well-rounded conception of internal market encompassing “social” interests 
such as those relating to consumer protection, environmental protection, and public 
health as dictated by Article 95(3) EC, as opposed to a compartmentalised internal market 
rooted only in the “economic” side of the equation.  In fact, looked at more closely, it is 
not so much tensions relating to the overuse of Article 95 EC but those relating to the 
underuse of Article 153 EC that are at issue. Given the emergence and the development 
of Community consumer policy presented above, it has become commonplace to view 
consumer protection as part of the internal market programme and thus more difficult, in 
view of the arrested development of autonomous Community consumer policy separate 
from the internal market, to envisage the kinds of measures that could be adopted under 
Article 153 EC.266  This is at the crux of the various proposals and institutional activities 
seeking to bolster Article 153 EC, and it remains to be seen to what extent they may 
stimulate Community action in future years, which may remedy, or at least lessen, the 
asymmetry in the relationship between Articles 95 and 153 EC in this regard. 
 
Certainly, it can be wondered whether the assessment of the constitutionality of a 
European contract law instrument encompassing consumer contract law in all or in part 
would be different if the Community consumer contract law acquis was reconfigured to 
embody consumer protection objectives outside the confines of the Community’s internal 
market programme. Yet, given the path of Community consumer contract law as it stands 
now, there is a convincing case on the basis of the Treaty, the case law, and institutional 
practice that Article 95 EC, not Article 153 EC, is a proper legal basis for the adoption of 
an instrument that is rooted in the Community’s dual consumer protection and internal 
market objectives. As such, Article 153 EC plays an important role in the debate about 
European contract law by placing further attention on the recourse to Article 95 EC in 
connection with the adoption of a European contract law instrument approximating the 
consumer contract laws of the Member States. 
 
Similar remarks can be made in relation to the relationship between Articles 153 
and 308 EC as far as an optional instrument of consumer contract law.  As highlighted in 
Part Two of this study, institutional documents in the debate about European contract law 
have placed particular emphasis on the prospect of one or more optional instruments 
concerned with specific types of contracts, including consumer contracts. Moreover, a 
comprehensive optional instrument including contract law rules pertaining to both 
business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) transactions in the internal 
market may also be contemplated. While the final dimensions of one or more optional 
instruments remain to be seen, so far the prospect of an optional instrument has been 
framed in the debate as running alongside the national contract law systems with the aim 
of ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market. This brings the relationship 
between Articles 153 and 308 EC to the fore, to the extent that such an instrument would 
be considered to fall outside the scope of approximation under Article 95 EC.267  In 
principle, there are grounds to argue on the basis of the International Fund for Ireland 
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 See L.W. Gormley, “The Consumer Acquis and the Internal Market”, 20 European Business Law 
Review 409, 421-422 (2009). 
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 See Chapter 9, § 9.4. 
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case268 that a Community measure can be based on a combination of Articles 153 and 
308 EC under circumstances similar to those implicated in that case, i.e., a measure based 
on the Community’s specific competence of Article 153(3)(b) EC contains elements that 
exceed the scope of the Community’s competence under that provision and thus Article 
308 EC must be resorted to, provided that there are no other Treaty provisions that could 
be used.  Yet, as far as the adoption of an optional instrument comprising consumer 
contract law is concerned, the arguments above in relation to the relationship between 
Articles 153 and 95 EC bear salience here in the sense that the Community’s internal 
market and consumer protection objectives are infused in such an instrument. As a result, 
there are strong indications that such an instrument must be adopted on the basis of the 
Community’s competence under Article 308 EC to achieve the Community’s objectives 
concerning the internal market, within which the Community’s consumer protection 
objectives can be taken into consideration by virtue of the “horizontal” nature of 
consumer protection policy prescribed by Article 153(2) EC. 
 
10.4.2 Comparative reflection with the United States 
The prominent role placed on the Community’s internal market competences in 
the consumer sphere cannot help but beckon reflection with the United States.  Notably, 
there is no provision in the US Constitution setting forth a specific legal basis for federal 
action in the field of consumer protection equivalent to Article 153 EC.  This serves to 
highlight the special role played by Article 153 EC in the European setting.  Yet, when it 
comes to the field of consumer contract law, there are remarkable parallels in the 
approaches taken in the American and European settings. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
federal measures in the field of consumer protection bearing on consumer contract law 
were enacted in large part pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause of the US 
Constitution and embodied the dual objectives of ensuring the free flow of interstate 
commerce and sufficient protection for consumers, and in fact, some notable case law 
confirming Congress’ reach to intra-state transactions under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause emanated from such measures.269 Moreover, akin to the European approach, the 
American approach to matters of consumer contract law demonstrates considerable 
respect for action situated at the (Member) State level, as illustrated by recourse to 
minimum harmonisation and allowance for states to exempt out of federal measures 
concerned with consumer (contract) law. In this way, despite the lack of any equivalent to 
Article 153 EC, the United States and the European Union may be travelling down 
similar paths in the field of consumer contract law in terms of situating measures within 
the internal market programme within which consumer protection objectives take part.  
 
Going one step further, federal intervention in matters of consumer contract law 
in the United States bears considerable resonance with the approach taken by the 
European legislator underlying the debate about European contract law.  Federal action in 
this setting has been largely piecemeal in response to particular problems without 
blanketing the field completely.  This has given way to a complex array of various federal 
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and state sources in the consumer field particular when it comes to matters of consumer 
contract law.  Consequently, it may be wondered to what extent this may find the United 
States following in the footsteps of the European Union in the sense of grappling with 
problems caused by the ad hoc federal approach and lack of coherency in the consumer 
sphere, which may in turn provide new avenues for  comparative discourse in connection 
with the debate about European contract law.    
 
10.5 Conclusion 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, there is a strong case that it is unlikely that 
Article 153 EC (now Article 169 TFEU) can serve as the legal basis for the adoption of a 
European contract law instrument comprising consumer contract law in all or in part.  On 
the one hand, as demonstrated above, the scope of the Community’s competence under 
Article 153 EC is wider than is commonly perceived once the limits of this provision and 
its relationship with the principle of subsidiarity are fully gleaned.  On the other hand, 
given the entrenchment of Community consumer contract law within the context of the 
internal market programme, Article 153 EC plays an important role, albeit an indirect 
one, in the debate about European contract law by placing further impetus on the use of 
the Community’s internal market competences of Articles 95 and 308 EC for the 
adoption of a European (optional) contract law instrument including or limited to 
consumer contract law in this setting. While this may generate tensions about the 
overshadowing of the Community’s consumer protection competence of Article 153 EC 
by its internal market competence of Article 95 EC, this study demonstrates a readiness 
on the part of the European institutions to take action under Article 153 EC in various 
areas of consumer protection outside the confines of the internal market, which may lead 
to a more balanced relationship between the two provisions in the foreseeable future.   
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11 
 
European Contract Law and Judicial Cooperation in Civil 
Matters 
 
11.1 Introduction 
At first glance, there seems to be a striking paradox concerning the role played by  
Article 65 EC in the debate about European contract law.  On the one hand, Article 65 
EC, conferring competence on the Community to adopt measures in the field of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters, is generally perceived as relating to matters of procedural 
law, private international law, and transnational litigation, not substantive contract law 
(or substantive private law generally).1 This explains why on the occasions in which 
Article 65 EC is contemplated in the debate about European contract law, it is often 
dismissed without much ado as being incapable of providing a legal basis for a European 
contract law instrument.2  On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 5, a major catalyst 
for the debate about European contract law was point 39 of the European Council’s 
Tampere Conclusions, which was grounded in the text of Article 65 EC itself.3  This set 
into motion the infusion of European contract law within the institutional activities taking 
place within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (the AFSJ) through the 
foundations established by the European Council’s Hague Programme and forthcoming 
Stockholm Programme.  As a consequence, it has become something of “popular sport” 
to witness the increasing number of instances in the literature in which scholars routinely 
refer to the institutional activities concerning European contract law amidst discussion of 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law 370 (2nd ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2006); J. 
Basedow, “The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam”, 37 Common 
Market Law Review 687, 702 (2000); G. Betlem and E. Hondius, “European Private Law after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam”, 9 European Review of Private Law 3, 4 (2001).   
2
 As for the European institutions, see Chapter 7 § 7.2.4.2. As for scholars, see, e.g., M.W. Hesselink et al., 
“The legal basis for an optional instrument on European contract law”, Centre for the Study of European 
Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2007/04, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091119, at 43; P-
C. Müller-Graff, “Closer Cooperation in European Community Contract Law”, in The Future of European 
Contract Law – Essays in honour of Ewoud Hondius 91, 99-100 (K. Boele-Woelki and W. Grosheide eds, 
Kluwer, 2007); J. Ziller, “The Legitimacy of the Codification of Contract Law in View of the Allocation of 
Competences between the European Union and its Member States”, in The Politics of a European Civil 
Code 89, 101 (M.W. Hesselink ed., Kluwer, 2006).  
3
 To recall, point 39 stated in relevant part:  “As regards substantive law, an overall study is requested on 
the need to approximate Member States’ legislation in civil matters in order to eliminate obstacles to the 
good functioning of civil proceedings.”  Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 Oct. 
1999 (hereinafter Tampere Conclusions) (emphasis added). By comparison, Article 65 EC referred to 
“eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the 
compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States.”  Article 65(c) EC (emphasis 
added).  This is not to say that questions had not arisen, even before Tampere, as regards whether the 
approximation of substantive private law could be considered to fall within the ambit of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters:  see U. Drobnig, “European Private International Law After The Treaty of 
Amsterdam: Perspectives for the Next Decade”, 11 The King’s College Law Journal 190, 191-192 (2000). 
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judicial cooperation in civil matters and the AFSJ without much critical analysis for why 
that is even so.4   
 
With a closer look, however, this situation may not be so paradoxical after all, 
once Article 65 EC’s role in European contract law is fully grasped. Article 65 EC 
underpins two key issues bearing directly on the constitutionality of European contract 
law, which demonstrate that it is a mistake to discount or to dispose of Article 65 EC too 
quickly.  First, there is Article 65 EC’s role as a potential legal basis for a European 
contract law instrument.  Remarkably, although Article 65 EC has not been given much 
credence in the debate by commentators, it was mainly in relation to this provision, as 
opposed to others such as Article 95 EC, that proposals were submitted during the 
European Convention to introduce a specific legal basis in the Treaties for the 
approximation of contract law (as well as other fields of private law). The fact that such 
proposals were made begs questions concerning the Community’s competence under this 
provision in relation to European contract law, and the fact that they failed necessitates 
inquiry as to whether this cuts against arguments supporting the Community’s (now 
Union’s) competence in this domain under the Treaty framework as it stands now under 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Second, there is Article 65 EC’s linkage to Articles 95 and 308 EC as far as the 
adoption of a European contract law instrument, optional or otherwise, is concerned.  In 
the discourse, certain scholars have claimed that even though Article 65 EC cannot itself 
serve as a legal basis for such an instrument, it strengthens the case for recourse to Article 
95 EC.5 Moreover, while not yet captured in the discourse, the exercise of the 
Community’s competence under Article 65 EC bears resonance for the interplay between 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the use of optional instruments 
running alongside the national legal orders, which casts an eye to Article 308 EC. As 
such, the extent to which Article 65 EC may bolster potential recourse to the 
Community’s internal market competences of Articles 95 and 308 EC in relation to the 
adoption of a European contract law instrument, optional or otherwise, merits inquiry. 
 
In light of the foregoing remarks, the aim of this chapter is to examine the extent 
to which the Community’s competence under Article 65 EC can serve as a legal basis for 
a European contract law instrument and its linkage to Articles 95 and 308 EC in this 
regard. This will be done in two main parts. The first part analyses the extent of the 
Community’s competence under Article 65 EC (and its counterpart in the Lisbon Treaty) 
to adopt a European contract law instrument, with the spotlight placed on the evolution of 
Article 65 EC in the system of the Treaties and the proposals submitted during the 
European Convention to introduce a specific legal basis for the approximation of contract 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g., P.E. Herzog, “TEC, Article 65 on Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters”, in 2 Smit and Herzog 
on The Law of the European Union 146-1, at 146-85-146-86 (H. Smit et al. eds, Matthew Bender and Co., 
2007) (hereinafter Smit and Herzog); “Le rapprochement des législations pour réaliser l’espace de liberté, 
de sécurité et de justice”, in L. Defalque et al., Commentaire J. Mégret:  Marché interieur – Libre 
circulation des personnes et des capitaux / Rapprochement des législations 271, 284-285 (C. Blumann ed., 
3rd ed., Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2006); Peers, supra note 1, at 362-363. Compare E. 
Storskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncovered 7 n.10 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2008). 
5
 See infra 11.3.1.  
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law in connection with this provision. The second part confronts the linkage between 
Articles 65, 95, and 308 EC in European contract law by evaluating several Community 
measures adopted pursuant to Article 65 EC that illuminate both the limits and the 
exercise of Community competence under this provision and their bearing on the use of 
Articles 95 and 308 EC as far as the adoption of a European (optional) contract law 
instrument is concerned.   
 
11.2 Article 65 EC as a potential legal basis for European contract law 
11.2.1 Past Treaty framework 
As a formal matter, Article 65 EC was the creation of the Amsterdam Treaty.  In 
the original EEC Treaty, there was no mention of “judicial cooperation in civil matters”, 
let alone any provision resembling Article 65 EC. Yet, there were certain provisions that 
were concerned in one way or another with the topic of private international law for 
which Article 65 EC eventually become connected. In particular, Article 220 EEC (now 
Article 293 EC) provided: 
 
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with  
each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals:  . . .  
the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and  
enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.6 
 
Indeed, it was this provision upon which the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction 
and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters was based, before its 
subsequent conversion into a Community instrument under Article 65 EC.7  Article 293 
EC remained unchanged over the years, though it is now eliminated by the Lisbon 
Treaty.8 In any event, its authorisation of the use of intergovernmental conventions in 
matters that would eventually come to be encompassed within Article 65 EC was echoed 
in Article 65 EC’s predecessor in the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced the notion of “judicial cooperation in civil 
matters” within the newly constructed third pillar of the European Union concerning 
Justice and Home Affairs.9  The third pillar essentially took intergovernmental 
cooperation in this area “up a notch” by housing it within the Treaty framework itself.   
Under Article K.1, as part of the Union’s objectives in this field, there were nine areas 
                                                 
6
 Article 220, fourth indent EEC (now Article 293, fourth indent EC).  For discussion as to why this field 
was chosen, see J. Pipkorn, “Les methodes de rapprochement des législations à l’intérieur de la C.E.E”, in 
P. Bourel et al., L’influence des Communautés européennes sur la droit international privé des Etats 
membres / The Influence of the European Communities upon Private International Law of the Member 
States 13, 31 (Larcier, 1981). The other three fields singled out by this provision were as follows: (1) the 
protection of persons and the enjoyment of rights under the same conditions as those accorded by each 
State to its own nationals; (2) the abolition of double taxation within the Community; and (3) the mutual 
recognition of companies, the retention of legal personality in the event of transfers of company seat from 
one Member State to another and the possibility of mergers between companies governed by laws of 
different countries. 
7
 See, e.g., Brussels I Regulation 13 (U. Magnus and P. Mankowski eds, Sellier, 2007). 
8
 Lisbon Treaty, Table of Equivalences, [2008] OJ C 115/361, at 387. 
9
 Maastricht Treaty, Title VI EU.   
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regarded as “matters of common interest” for the Member States, the sixth of which was 
labeled “judicial cooperation in civil matters”.10 There was no further provisions 
elaborating the meaning or the scope of what was meant by this concept, save for Article 
K.3, which specified the types of measures that could be taken by the Council in this 
field, thereby including, “without prejudice to Article 220 EC”, recourse to conventions 
that would be recommended to the Member States for adoption in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements.11   
 
In view of the minimalist approach of the Maastricht Treaty, the momentous 
changes brought by the Amsterdam Treaty stand out in terms of fleshing out in greater 
detail the field of “judicial cooperation in civil matters” and transferring it, along with 
certain other fields, to the Community pillar under Title IV of the EC Treaty concerning 
“Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons”.  
Title IV of the EC Treaty in conjunction with Title VI of the EU Treaty, the third pillar of 
the Union concerning “Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters” (the 
PJCCM), comprise the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which was 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty as a foremost objective of the European Union.12  
 
As far as Article 65 EC was concerned, the Amsterdam Treaty gave with one 
hand what it took away with the other.  It put flesh on the bones of judicial cooperation in 
civil matters and cemented it to the achievement of the AFSJ at the same time that it 
housed it in a special section of the Treaty, the so-called “ghetto” of Title IV EC13, 
thereby saddling it to sensitive policies concerning visas, asylum, immigration, and the 
free movement of persons, much to the chagrin of commentators who viewed this as 
stifling or marginalising the aptitude of this provision.14   The placement of Article 65 EC 
in Title IV of the EC Treaty had crucial implications for the institutional framework 
concerning Community action in judicial cooperation in civil matters, which diverged 
somewhat from mainstream Community practice – e.g., the prominence of the Member 
States and the Council in the decision-making process15, the opt-outs for the UK, Ireland, 
and Denmark16, and the restrictions placed on the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction.17 It also 
filtered into the academic debate on the scope of Article 65 EC and the extent to which it 
would displace, or not, the Community’s competence under other Treaty provisions 
particularly as regards the approximation of private international law rules vis-à-vis 
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 Maastricht Treaty, Article K.1(6). 
11
 Maastricht Treaty, Article K.3(2)(c). 
12
 Amsterdam Treaty, Article B, fourth indent; Preamble of EU Treaty, tenth recital (now Article 2, fourth 
indent, EU; Preamble of EU Treaty, eleventh recital). 
13
 See, e.g., Peers, supra 1, at 1. 
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 See, e.g., J. Meeusen, “Fifteen Theses on Brussels I, Rome I and the European Union’s Institutional 
Framework”, in Enforcement of International Contracts in the European Union: Convergence and 
divergence between Brussels I and Rome I 43, 47-50 (J. Meeusen et al. eds, Intersentia, 2004); P-E. 
Partsch, Le droit international privé européen: De Rome à Nice 295-298 (Larcier, 2003); Drobnig, supra 
note 3, at 193.  
15
 See Article 67 EC.  
16
 See generally Peers, supra note 1, at 55-62. 
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 See Article 68 EC.  
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Article 95 EC.18  Thereafter, Article 65 EC was not modified by the Nice Treaty aside 
from arrangements concerning the requisite decision-making procedures.19 Thus, the 
scope of the Community’s competence under Article 65 EC was fixed by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which sets the stage for this discussion. 
 
At the forefront of the EU Treaty, Article 2 EU declared as one of the Union’s 
objectives “to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, 
in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime”20, thereby leaving out judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, inadvertently or not. Nevertheless, as the first provision of Title IV of the EC 
Treaty, Article 61 EC stipulated that “[i]n order to establish progressively an area of 
freedom, security and justice, the Council shall adopt . . . measures in the field of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters as provided for in Article 65”.21  Proceeding to Article 65 
EC, this provision stated in full:  “Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters having cross-border implications, to be taken in accordance with Article 6722 and 
insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, shall include: 
 
(a) improving and simplifying: 
- the system of cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents; 
- cooperation in the taking of evidence; 
- the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, 
including decisions in extrajudicial cases; 
(b) promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States 
concerning the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; 
(c) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by 
promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the 
Member States.23 
 
As highlighted by the italicised language, the requirements relating to Article 65 
EC’s “cross-border implications” and its linkage to the “proper functioning of the internal 
                                                 
18
 Compare, e.g., Partsch, supra note 14, at 414-450; Basedow, supra note 1, at 696-708; J. Israël, 
“Conflicts of Law and the EC after Amsterdam: A Change for the Worse?”, 7 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 81, 88-98 (2000); O. Remien, “European Private International Law, The 
European Community and Its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, 38 Common Market Law 
Review 53, 72-73 (2001). More recently, see, e.g., M. Fallon and S. Francq, “Vers un droit proprement 
communautaire des conflits de lois ou de juridiction”, in Une Constitution pour l’Europe 239, 259-260 (O. 
De Schutter and P. Nihoul eds, Larcier, 2004); Meeusen, supra note 14, at 51-55. 
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 Article 67 EC had stipulated recourse to unanimous voting in the Council and consultation of the 
European Parliament on proposals submitted by the Commission or a Member State for an initial period of 
five years from entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. As part of the revisions made by the Nice Treaty, 
Article 67 EC was changed so as to provide, inter alia, that “the measures provided for in Article 65 EC 
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Article 251 EC with qualified majority voting in the Council.  See Article 67(5), second indent EC. 
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 Article 2, fourth indent EU. 
21
 Article 61(c) EC. 
22
  See supra note 19. 
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 Article 65 EC (emphasis added). 
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market” underpin substantial controversy concerning the Community’s competence under 
Article 65 EC, as discussed in the next section.  Moreover, the wording, “include” was 
interpreted as meaning that the measures elaborated under Article 65 EC were not 
exhaustive.24 These attributes in combination with the particular language used for each 
of the three subsections makes Article 65 EC a difficult and complex provision, entailing 
scrutiny into its various components, none of which are fleshed out with much guidance.  
This was symptomatic of the political negotiations surrounding Article 65 EC as well as 
Title IV of the EC Treaty generally.25  There has been much in-depth study made of the 
genesis of Article 65 EC, which need not be rehearsed here.26  Suffice to say that the 
approximation of substantive private law does not seem to have figured into the 
discussion, with the Commission explicitly opining that the objective of Article 65 EC 
was not to establish a civil code or even a code of civil procedure.27   
 
Given the text of Article 65 EC, this explains why this provision is not generally 
considered by commentators to support the adoption of a substantive European contract 
law instrument.  For European contract law, the major stumbling block centers on Article 
65 EC’s substantive scope in terms of the subject-matter or areas covered by this 
provision. By virtue of the topics listed in its three subsections, Article 65 EC expressly 
excludes matters of substantive private law, including substantive contract law, from its 
scope, thereby putting an immediate end to the discussion.  In the interests of 
completeness, there are certain ambiguities raised by Article 65 EC’s non-exhaustive 
nature and certain terminological concepts related to the scope of this provision, but with 
closer examination, these points would not change the assessment of Article 65 EC in 
relation to European contract law.   
 
First, as regards terminology, the terms used in Article 65 EC – e.g., “civil 
proceedings”, “civil procedure”, “conflicts of law”, and even “judicial cooperation in 
civil matters” itself – are left undefined.28  As emphasised by scholars, the term “judicial 
cooperation in civil matters” is particularly misleading:  the matters listed in Article 65 
                                                 
24
 See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
25
 See, e.g., C. Kohler, “Interrogations sur les sources du droit international privé européen après le traité 
d’Amsterdam”, 88 Revue critique de droit international privé  1, 13 n.22 (1999); Smit and Herzog, supra 
note 4, at 146-5. 
26
 See Kohler, supra note 25, at 9-14; H. Labayle, “Un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice”, 33 Revue 
trimestrielle de droit européen 105, 148-150 (1997); Partsch, supra note 14, 299-302. 
27
 Kohler, supra note 25, 11-12 n.16.  For that matter, despite suggestions for mentioning “access to 
justice” and “approximation”, among other things, explicitly in the text of Article 65 EC, this was not taken 
up.  See id. As seen below, these matters would eventually make their way into the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty and ultimately the Lisbon Treaty. 
28
 Ironically, while the term, “private international law” is readily associated with Article 65 EC, it is not 
explicitly cited therein.  From the European standpoint, the term can be viewed in either broad or limited 
terms, meaning it can be restricted to conflicts of law matters or extend to other matters such as 
jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments in the EU.  See Storskrubb, supra note 4, at 9-10 
(and further citations therein); Communication from the Commission, Green Paper on the conversion of the 
Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument 
and its modernisation, COM (2002) 654 final, 14.1.2003, point 1.2 n.2.  Under Article 65(b) EC, conflicts 
of law is distinguished from jurisdiction, although recognition and enforcement appear one line up in 
Article 65(a) EC. As such, despite the somewhat awkward division, the broad conception of “private 
international law” is generally covered in Article 65 EC. 
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EC are not solely “judicial” by virtue of its coverage of “conflicts of law” and 
“extrajudicial cases”; the reference to “cooperation” harkens back to its 
intergovernmental lineage in the Maastricht Treaty, even though Article 65 EC is readily 
used to approximate national laws; and “civil matters” could be read to imply a narrow 
scope but in fact is understood more broadly as pertaining to non-criminal or 
administrative matters.29 Be that as it may, while each of Article 65 EC’s components 
could assume different shapes if taken in isolation, it is their placement within the 
provision as a whole that is determinative for the substantive scope of Article 65 EC, 
which excludes action to approximate substantive private law, including contract law. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that Article 65 EC is considered to be non-exhaustive would 
not alter this situation. The English version, among other language versions, of Article 65 
EC uses the word “include”, which indicates that the specific topics explicitly listed in 
the various subsections of Article 65 EC are not exhaustive.30  The French version makes 
this explicit, by stipulating “among others” in the text of Article 65 EC.31  Nonetheless, 
taking into account the list of topics that are elaborated in Article 65 EC and both the 
purpose and the context of this provision in relation to the Community’s objectives to be 
achieved in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, it would be a difficult 
stretch, arguably ultra vires, to extend Community competence under this provision to a 
substantive contract law instrument.32  In any event, this issue has become moot with the 
Lisbon Treaty, whereby Article 65 EC’s counterpart is considered to be exhaustive and, 
while adding to the list of topics, remains outside the ambit of substantive private law, 
which leads to the next section. 
 
11.2.2 Present Treaty framework 
Paving the way for the Draft Constitutional Treaty and ultimately the Lisbon 
Treaty, the framework comprising the AFSJ, including Article 65 EC, was the focal point 
of Working Group X on “Freedom, Security and Justice” within the European 
Convention.  To a great extent, the discussion of Article 65 EC was largely 
overshadowed by other policy fields, such as asylum, immigration and criminal matters, 
or more institutional matters, such as the regime of legal instruments, decision-making 
procedures, etc.33  Article 65 EC was not wholly neglected, however, and it stimulated 
                                                 
29
 See Meeusen, supra note 14, at 48-49; Storskrubb, supra note 4, at 9-12.  See also Opinion of Advocate 
General Kokott in Case C-435/06 C [2007] ECR I-10141, para. 52. 
30
 See, e.g., Dutch version (“omvatten”); German version (“schließen ein”); Spanish version (“incluirán”); 
Italian version (“includono”). See further Basedow, supra note 1, at 700-701 (noting that the Dutch 
proposal for exhaustive wording rejected). 
31
 French version (“entre autres”). 
32
 This was alluded to in relation to European private law as a whole in the chapter concerning the 
Community’s competence to adopt a European civil code authored by Professors Wilfried Tilmann and 
Walter van Gerven as part of the Parliament’s 1999 Working Paper:  see European Parliament Directorate 
General for Research, “Working Paper – The Private Law Systems In The EU: Discrimination On Grounds 
of Nationality And The Need For A European Civil Code”, Legal Affairs Series, JURI-103 EN, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu and on the website of the Study Group on a European Civil Code, 
http://www.sgeec.net/ (hereinafter 1999 Working Paper), at 192.  See further Chapter 5, § 5.3.4. 
33
 See, e.g., Mandate of Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice”, CONV 258/02 WGX3, dated 
12 Sept. 2002, point II; Summary of the meeting on 16 Sept. 2002, CONV 274/02 WGX4, dated 17 Sept. 
 Chapter 11:  European Contract Law and Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters 
 453 
proposals by various members of the Convention.34 More to the point, it had the potential 
to change the course of the constitutionality of European contract law by virtue of certain 
proposals that sought to amend Article 65 EC so as to provide for a specific legal basis 
explicitly conferring competence on the Community to approximate several fields of 
private law, including contract law.   
 
This was not altogether unexpected in light of the contribution submitted by the 
Working Group’s sole expert in judicial cooperation in civil matters, Professor Alegría 
Borrás of the University of Barcelona.35  In the very last point of her extensive discussion 
of Article 65 EC, she drew a link between the revision of this provision and European 
private law: 
 
En fin [sic], pour ne pas alourdir cette exposée [sic] sur des aspects systéma-
tiques, on ne peut pas ignorer qu’au sein de la Communauté a vu le jour une 
tendance en faveur de l’élaboration d’un Droit privé européen, même si les 
méthodes pour y arriver, l’étendue du processus d’unification et sa force, 
contraignante ou non, sont encore l’objet d’un débat assez complexe. Une fois 
encore, si cette tendance pourrait être accueillie dans le Traité, il conviendrait 
d’examiner ses rapports avec les mesures pouvant être adoptées sur la base  
d’un article 65 révisé.36 
 
Article 65 EC was certainly not the only provision in which discussion of the 
Community’s competence to approximate substantive private law, particularly contract 
law, was aired during the European Convention.  The issue also filtered through a few 
contributions submitted in other contexts, particularly in connection with the internal 
market and Article 95 EC.37  Nonetheless, it was primarily in connection with Article 65 
                                                                                                                                                 
2002, point 2; Note on the plenary meeting-Brussels, 6 and 7 June 2002, CONV 97/02, dated 19 June 2002, 
point II.10. 
34
 See Summary of proposed amendments regarding the area of freedom, security and justice – Draft 
Article 31 (Part One) and draft Articles from Part Two, CONV 644/1/03 REV 1, dated 7 May 2003, at 26-
29 (hereinafter Summary Document); see also a list of proposed amendments provided on the European 
Convention website, http://european-convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=849andlang=EN. The 
proposals and contributions discussed herein are available through this website. 
35
 Exposé de Mme Alegría Borras, Professeur de Droit international privé de l’Université de Barcelone, lors 
de l’audition du 30 Oct. 2002, Working Group X, WD 08, dated 4 Nov. 2002.  For the list of experts 
invited by Working Group X, see Final Report of Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice”, 
CONV 426/02 WGX14, dated 2 Dec. 2002 (hereainfter Working Group X Final Report), Annex. 
36
 Exposé de Mme Alegría Borras, supra note 35, point c, at 16 (emphasis added).  To be complete, she 
went on to add:  “Et cela d’autant plus qu’un Droit privé européen, quelle que soit sa nature et son 
domaine, n’exclue pas les règles de conflit de lois et de jurisdictions incluses dans les Directives 
communautaires sectiorelles qui sont un acquis indéniable de Droit communautaire, et il n’exclue non plus 
des règles de Droit international privé pour les relations transfrontières adoptées sur la base d’un article 65 
révisé.”  Id. 
37
 See, e.g., Proposals by the CDU and CSU for a European Constitutional Treaty, CONV 616/03, dated 1 
April 2003, Annex to the Annex, “Internal Market”, at 10 (“examine the need for new EU legal bases for 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of civil law (e.g., commercial and contract law), with a view to 
preventing the fragmentation of law caused by one-off EU regulation based hitherto on general internal 
market provisions, where necessary by allowing individuals and firms to choose which law to apply to EU 
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EC, as opposed to other provisions of the Treaty, that proposals were submitted in this 
regard. 
 
 In total, there seems to have been only two formal proposals for amendment of 
Article 65 EC relevant to European contract law, both of which emanated from 
representatives from Germany.38 Of the two, the most high-profile proposal came from 
Joschka Fischer, Representative of the German Government39,  who sought to introduce a 
new provision concerning “substantive civil law” as part of Article 65 EC.40  Translated 
from German, the proposal read in full: 
 
 Notwithstanding Art. (95 EC Single Market), the European Parliament and 
 the Council may, in accordance with the legislative procedure, adopt laws  
 and framework laws for legislative approximation in the domain of civil law, 
 which have the following fields as subject-matter: 
- Out of the law of obligations, the general and special law of contracts, 
especially rights and obligations from a contract, fulfillment, default, 
prescription, and law of enrichment, 
- Out of material family law, the right to a name, the European contractual 
matrimonial regime, the right of access and the cross-border right of custody of 
children, 
- Out of the law of succession, a European contractual regime in law of 
succession.41 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulation.”) (emphasis added); Contribution by Professor Jürgen Meyer, discussed infra notes 45-47 and 
accompanying text. 
38
 There were other proposals concerning amendment of Article 65 EC, which pertained to matters within 
the realm of private law but without direct bearing on the approximation of substantive contract law or 
related fields.  For example, there was a proposal submitted by Joachim Wuermeling, an alternate 
representative of the European Parliament, which concerned the approximation of copyright law and the 
creation of the European company:  see Summary Document, supra note 34, at 29. 
39
 At the time of the European Convention, he was the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
40
 Suggestion for amendment of Article 14a(neu) by Mr. Joschka Fischer (“Artikel: 14a neu (Materielles 
Zivilrecht”) (hereinafter Fischer Proposal). To be distinguished, he had submitted a separate proposal 
regarding the amendment of Article 65 EC in connection with family matters:  see Suggestion for 
amendment of Article 14 by Mr. Joschka Fischer (“Artikel 14: [Justizielle Zusammenarbeit in 
Zivilsachen]”).  At the time, Article 14 was the counterpart to Article 65 EC. 
41
 Fischer Proposal, supra note 40 (author’s translation; no official translation exists) (emphasis added).  In 
its original German version, it read:   
Unbeschadet des Art. (95 EG Binnenmarkt) können das Europäische Parlament und  
der Rat nach dem Gesetzgebungsverfahren Gesetze und Rahmengesetze zur  
Rechtsangleichung auf dem Gebiet des Zivilrechts erlassen, die folgende Sachgebiete  
zum Gegenstand haben: 
- aus dem Recht der Schuldverhältnisse das allgemeine und besondere Vertragsrecht, 
insbesondere Rechte und Pflichten aus einem Vertrag, Erfüllung, Leistungsstörungen, 
Verjährung, und Bereicherungsrecht, 
- aus dem materiellen Familienrecht das Namensrecht, einen europäischen Wahlgüterstand,  
das Umgangsrecht und das grenzüberschreitende Sorgerecht 
- aus dem Erbrecht ein europäisches Wahlerbrecht. 
As regards the translation of “Rechtsangleichung”, the English word “approximation” was chosen so as to 
correspond to its usage in the Treaty, e.g., in relation the German version of Articles 94 and 95 EC and 
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In his explanation for this proposal, Mr. Fischer stated: 
 
 Until now, the legislative approximation in material civil law takes place 
 on the basis of Article 95 EC competence within the Single Market.  In  
 the framework of the creation of the new title Area of Freedom, Security 
 and Justice, an express competence for harmonisation should be created 
 in material civil law, like in material criminal law, also in order to remove 
 any doubt on the scope of actual Article 95.42 
 
In other words, this proposal sought to ground the Community’s competence for the 
approximation of contract law and other fields of private law listed above under Article 
65 EC, not Article 95 EC.43  Yet, the consequences for the Community’s competence 
under Article 95 EC in the field of contract law were not further elaborated. 
 
Incidentally, Professor Jürgen Meyer, a member of the European Convention 
representing the German National Parliament on behalf of the Bundestag44, submitted a 
contribution entitled, “An area of freedom, security and justice”.45  This contribution was 
not presented in the form of a formal amendment to the text of Article 65 EC.46  
Nonetheless, it was strikingly similar, though not exactly identical, to Mr. Fischer’s 
proposal. The section entitled “Cooperation in civil matters” contained one paragraph, 
which stated: 
 
As far as substantive civil law is concerned, the provisions of Article 95 of 
the EC Treaty relating to the approximation of laws should be supplemented 
by means of a catalogue enumerating the areas of civil law in which  
approximation is required and eliminating any doubts as to the reliability of 
the present Article 95.  This catalogue should comprise the following subject 
                                                                                                                                                 
heading for the chapter concerning Approximation of Laws in the EC Treaty (as well as in the Lisbon 
Treaty). 
42
 Fischer Proposal, supra note 40 (author’s translation; no official translation exists).  In the original 
German version, it read: 
Bisher erfolgt die Rechtsangleichumg [sic] im materiellen Zivilrecht aufgrund der 
Binnenmarktkompetenz des Art. 95 EG. Im Rahmen der Schaffung des neuen Titels Raum 
der Freiheit der Sicherheit und des Rechts sollte wie für das materielle Strafrecht eine 
ausdrückliche Harmonisierungskompetenz für das materielle Zivilrecht geschaffen werden, 
auch um Zweifel an der Tragfähigkeit des derzeitigen Art. 95 zu beseitigen. 
As regards the translation of “Rechtsangleichung”, see supra note 41. 
43
 Incidentally, the summary of proposed amendments may have misstated or misrepresented the import of 
this proposal, since it was framed as primarily relating to family law.  See Summary Document, supra note 
34, at 29 (“One Convention member adds that the laws and framework laws in this field might also relate to 
certain specific aspects of family law (guardianship, name, rights of access, contract law and the law of 
succession”). 
44
 In brief, the German National Parliament is composed of two chambers, the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat:  the Bundestag is composed of representatives of the people, whereas the Bundesrat is 
composed of representatives of the federal States (Länder) at the federal level.   
45
 Contribution by Professor Jürgen Meyer, member of the Convention – “An area of freedom, security and 
justice”, CONV 447/02 CONTRIB 164, dated 12 Dec. 2002 (hereinafter Meyer Contribution). 
46
 As such, it was not listed in the list of proposed amendments to Article 65 EC posted on the website of 
the European Convention, supra note 34. 
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matter: 
• the law of contracts, particularly with regard to rights and obligations from a 
contract; 
• selected areas of substantive family law, particularly married couples’ choice of 
surname, European rules permitting a choice of marital property regime, the right 
of access to children and cross-border custody rights; 
• certain matters relating to the law of succession, particularly European 
provisions on testamentary freedom.47 
 
On its face, this paragraph concerned Article 95 EC, not Article 65 EC, thereby 
advocating that the text of Article 95 EC should be revised so as to include the above-
listed catalogue of topics that included contract law.48  Yet, its placement in a 
contribution concerning the AFSJ under the specific heading pertaining to the field of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters and its resemblance to Mr. Fischer’s proposal at least 
begs some questions as to the extent to whether this suggestion was in some way related 
to Article 65 EC.   
 
The second formal proposal came from Erwin Teufel, one of the representatives 
of the German National Parliament from the Bundesrat.49 He too proposed inserting an 
additional paragraph within the confines of Article 65 EC so as to provide for an explicit 
legal basis for the approximation of contract law: 
 
 The European Parliament and the Council, in accordance with the legislative 
 procedure, shall adopt laws and framework laws for the approximation of  
 substantive civil law concerning contract law, commercial law and law of 
 associations as well as [C]ommunity-wide industrial property and copyright  
law. Beyond these areas of substantive civil law a resort to other legal bases  
or harmonization under Article 16, Part One50, for purposes of approximating 
 national law is excluded.51 
 
He explained the reason for his proposal as follows: “Already at the current level of 
integration there is a need for approximation of substantive civil law in cross-border 
cases. The legal areas which are concerned have to be named explicitly and in detail. 
Beyond theses [sic] areas harmonization must be excluded.”52   
                                                 
47
 Meyer Contribution, supra note 45, point B, at 4 (emphasis added). 
48
 This is for example how other scholars read it:  see, e.g., Ziller, supra note 2, at 110. 
49
 Suggestion for amendment of Article 14bis (Part Two, JHA) by Mr. Erwin Teufel (hereainfter Teufel 
Proposal). There were both English and German versions provided.  See supra note 44 as regards the 
German National Parliament structure. 
50
 At the time, “Article 16, Part One” concerned the areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary 
action of the Union, which was generally denoted by the category of Union complementary competence.  
See further Chapter 8, § 8.4.2.3. 
51
 Teufel Proposal, supra note 49. While Article 14 referred to the present Article 65 EC, with subsequent 
renumbering of the provisions, Article III-165 replaced references to Article 14. As such, Mr. Teufel 
submitted a separate proposal concerning the amendment of Article III-165bis, which was substantially the 
same as that above.  See Suggestion for amendment of Article 165bis (nouveau) by M. Erwin Teufel. 
52
 Teufel Proposal, supra note 49. 
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This proposal did not provide further elaboration as to the ambit of the fields of 
national substantive law listed therein, namely what was meant by “contract law” or even 
“commercial law”. With the emphasis on cross-border cases, it was also unclear whether 
this was meant to limit the  measures to be adopted under this new provision from 
applying to domestic transactions.   In that regard, it should be noted that Mr. Teufel and 
Mr. Wolfgang Senff, an alternate member of the Convention53, submitted a separate 
contribution to the Convention concerning the “German Bundesrat Resolution Having 
Regard to the Themes of the Convention on the Future of the European Union”.54  
Among the recommendations for reform of Title IV of the EC Treaty, the Resolution 
stated:  “In the field of private law, harmonisation competences should be created for 
concrete sectors of law with a typically cross-border importance (contractual law, 
commercial and company law, Community-wide protection of industrial property, 
copyright).”55  Assuming that Mr. Teufel, as a member of the Bundesrat, sought to align 
his proposal with this Resolution, this seemed to suggest that it was the character of 
contract law, i.e., its cross-border dimension, which was why it was singled out along 
with the other areas specified in Mr. Teufel’s proposal. 
 
Altogether, the abovementioned proposals and related contributions apparently 
did not attract much attention during the Convention proceedings.56  At least there was no 
indication in Convention documents that they generated substantial debate among the 
participants, and they did not garner any mention in the Final Report of the Working 
Group X on the AFSJ.  None found their way into the text of the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty and ultimately the Lisbon Treaty.  Instead, the Final Report of Working Group X 
concluded:  
 
The Group has had a discussion about the current drafting of Article 65 TEC,  
and in particular about the limitation of that article to action on ‘civil matters 
having cross-border implications’ and ‘insofar as necessary for the proper 
functioning of the internal market’. While some Members have questioned  
these limitations, the majority of the Group, after careful examination, believes 
that they could be maintained, and that the wording of the current legal base is 
broadly appropriate. However, it takes the view that this legal basis on judicial 
co-operation in civil matters could, within the new overall structure of a single 
Constitutional Treaty, be dissociated from matters of asylum and immigration 
and visa policies. Furthermore, the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions as a cornerstone of this common policy should be enshrined in the 
                                                 
53
 Wolfgang Senff, a member of the Bundesrat, served as an alternative member of the German National 
Parliament at the European Convention, though he was replaced by Wolfgang Gerhards in March 2003.  
See European Convention website, http://european-convention.eu.int/. 
54
 Contribution of Mr. Erwin Teufel, member of the Convention, and Mr. Wolfgang Senff, alternate 
member of the Convention: “German Bundesrat Resolution Having Regard to the Themes of the 
Convention on the future of the European Union”, dated 12.7.2002. 
55
 Id., at 12 (“Title III-Free movement of persons, services and capital (Article 39 et seqq. EC Treaty”), and 
“Title IV:  Visa, asylum, immigration and other policies relating to free movement of persons (Article 61 et 
seqq. EC Treaty)”). 
56
 Ziller, supra note 2, at 110-111.  
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Treaty.57 
 
The Working Group’s recommendations filtered into the substance of the revised text of 
Article 65 EC in the Draft Constitutional Treaty. 
 
To recall, there were two versions of the Draft Constitutional Treaty:  the 2003 
version adopted by consensus by the European Convention, and the 2004 version signed 
by representatives of the then twenty-five Member States at the subsequent IGC.58  They 
shared much in common as regards certain overarching structural changes to the Treaty 
framework in connection with the AFSJ, such as the placement of the AFSJ as a foremost 
objective of the Union side by side with the internal market59 and the consolidation of the 
various provisions on the AFSJ, including Article 65 EC, in a distinct chapter in Part 
Three of the Treaty.60  Yet, as regards the text of Article 65 EC, they were not the same.   
 
In the 2003 version, Article 65 EC was renumbered Article III-170 and contained 
three paragraphs. The first paragraph provided the overarching requirements: 
 
 The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross- 
 border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of  
 judgments and decisions in extra-judicial cases. Such cooperation may  
 include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and  
 regulations of the Member States.61 
 
Aside from explicit language concerning the principle of mutual recognition and 
approximation, the reference to the internal market was deleted, although the “cross-
border implications” requirement remained. Changes were also made as regards the 
various matters to be addressed within judicial cooperation in civil matters.   
 
Now expanded to eight topics, the second paragraph of Article III-170 provided 
that:  “To this end, [European] laws or framework laws shall lay down measures aimed 
inter alia at ensuring: 
 
(a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of judgments 
and decisions in extra-judicial cases; 
(b) the cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents; 
(c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning the 
conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; 
(d) cooperation in the taking of evidence; 
                                                 
57
 Working Group X Final Report, supra note 35, point 5.  
58
 See further Chapter 8, § 8.3. 
59
 See 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article 3(2); 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article I-3(2). 
60
 See 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Part III, Title III, Chapter IV (“Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice); 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Part III, Title III, Chapter IV (“Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice”). 
61
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article III-170(1) (emphasis added).  European laws and framework 
laws essentially referred to legislative measures akin to the present regulations and directives, respectively. 
See id., Article 32. 
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(e) a high level of access to justice; 
(f) the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the 
compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States; 
(g) the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement;  
(h) support for the training of the judiciary and judicial staff.62 
 
As signaled by the italicised language, three new topics concerning access to justice, 
alternative dispute resolution, and judicial training were added to those already found in 
Article 65 EC, though noticeably the “eliminating obstacles” language in Article 65(c) 
EC was deleted in subsection (f) above. The insertion of “inter alia” – harkening back to 
the French version of Article 65 EC – indicated that the list of various topics was not 
exhaustive. Finally, the third paragraph of Article III-170 dealt with measures concerning 
family law with cross-border implications.63   
 
 In the 2004 version of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article 65 EC’s 
counterpart was now renumbered Article III-269 and left the first and third paragraphs 
cited above relatively untouched.64  Yet, as regards the second paragraph, several changes 
were made:  the internal market requirement of Article 65(1) EC was reintroduced in 
modified form; “inter alia” was taken out; the “eliminating obstacles” language of Article 
65(c) EC was brought back in; and “a high level of access to justice” was changed to 
“effective access to justice”.   Thus, Article III-269(2) read in full:  “For the purposes of 
paragraph 1, European laws or framework laws shall establish measures, particularly 
when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, aimed at ensuring: 
 
(a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of judgments 
and decisions in extra-judicial cases; 
(b) the cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents; 
(c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning the 
conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; 
(d) cooperation in the taking of evidence; 
(e) effective access to justice; 
(f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if 
necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure 
applicable in the Member States; 
(g) the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement;  
(h) support for the training of the judiciary and judicial staff.65 
 
The 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty’s reframing of Article 65 EC made its way into the 
Lisbon Treaty, with some further changes. 
 
                                                 
62
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article III-170(2) (emphasis added). 
63
 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article III-170(3). 
64
 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article III-269(1), (3). 
65
 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article III-269(2) (emphasis added).  As with the 2003 version, the 
reference to European laws and framework laws in the 2004 version referred to legislative acts that were 
essentially akin to the present regulations and directives, respectively.  See id., Article I-33. 
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Starting with the revisions to the EU Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty split up the AFSJ’s  
placement on par with the internal market, though the AFSJ is still enshrined – now one 
provision higher than the internal market – as a foremost objective of the Union.66  In 
comparison to the sparse language of the Draft Constitutional  Treaty – “The Union shall 
offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers”67 – 
Article 3(2) EU reads:  “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security 
and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in 
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.”68  Save for the reference to 
“without internal frontiers”, this provision reiterates the old version of Article 2 EU, 
thereby failing to mention judicial cooperation in civil matters. 
 
As regards the revisions to the EC Treaty, now Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (the TFEU), the Lisbon Treaty consolidates the various provisions of the 
former Community and third pillars into a special title devoted to the AFSJ.69 In the 
chapter concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters, the Lisbon Treaty reframes 
Article 65 EC as Article 81 TFEU, which is virtually identical to Article III-269 of the 
2004 version of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, save for certain institutional adjustments, 
e.g., the references to European laws and framework laws were replaced by “measures” 
subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e., qualified majority voting in the Council 
and the co-decision procedure)70. Leaving the third paragraph concerning family law 
aside, the  first two paragraphs of Article 81 TFEU read in full:  
 
1. The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border 
implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of 
decisions in extra-judicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of 
measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 
 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures, 
particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, 
aimed at ensuring: 
(a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of judgments 
and decisions in extra-judicial cases; 
(b) the cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents; 
(c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning the 
conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; 
(d) cooperation in the taking of evidence; 
(e) effective access to justice; 
                                                 
66
 See Article 3(2)-(3) EU. 
67
 See supra note 59. 
68
 Article 3(2) EU.  See also Preamble of the EU Treaty, twelfth recital. 
69
 Lisbon Treaty, Part Three, Title V (“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”). 
70
 Article 81(2) TFEU. 
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(f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if 
necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure 
applicable in the Member States; 
(g) the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement;  
(h) support for the training of the judiciary and judicial staff.71 
 
With regard to these two paragraphs, the remodelling of Article 65 EC in Article 
81 TFEU of the Lisbon Treaty can be considered something of a quid pro quo. On the 
one hand, Article 81 TFEU  broadened to some extent the ambit of the Union’s 
competence in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters.  It provides for the 
adoption of measures “particularly when” – as opposed to “in so far as” – “necessary for 
the proper functioning of the internal market”72, thereby implying less stringent linkage 
between measures adopted under Article 81 TFEU and the internal market as compared 
to Article 65 EC.73  Moreover, the “cross-border implications” requirement of Article 65 
EC is still there, only now it is housed in a separate provision apart from the internal 
market requirement.  Under the first paragraph of Article 81 TFEU, it is stated more 
generally that the “Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-
border implications”.74 Although Article 65(1) EC was not exactly crystal clear as 
regards to whether it was “matters” or “measures” that the cross-border requirement 
modified (“Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-
border implications”), Article 81 TFEU seems to indicate that it is the former, not the 
latter.75  
 
On the other hand, Article 81 TFEU embodies a more circumscribed provision by 
virtue of the “aimed at ensuring” language, which suggests that it is confined to an 
exhaustive list of topics still rooted in procedural, transnational litigation, and private 
international law matters.76  The three new topics added to the list – “effective access to 
justice”, “development of alternative methods of dispute settlement”, and “support for the 
training of the judiciary and judicial staff” – are by no means novel.  The European 
legislator had already adopted, pursuant to its competence under Article 65 EC, measures 
concerning access to justice77, alternative methods of dispute settlement78 and the training 
                                                 
71
 Article 81(1)-(2) TFEU (emphasis added). 
72
 Article 81(2) TFEU. 
73
 This has not gone unnoticed.  See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-353/06 
Grunkin and Paul [2008] ECR I-7639, para. 5 n.2.   
74
 Article 81(1) TFEU. 
75
 Compare Article 81(3), first para. (“measures concerning family law with cross-border implications”); 
second para. (“a decision determining those aspects of family law with cross-border implications”). 
76
 This seems to be more apparent in certain  language versions than others. Compare, e.g., Dutch  version 
(“maatregelen vast die het volgende beogen”); German version (“Maßnahmen, die Folgendes sicherstellen 
sollen”); French version (“mesures visant à assurer”); Italian version (“misure volte a garantire”); and 
Spanish version (“medidas para garantizar”).  Noticeably, however, the various topics are separated by 
semi-colons, with no “and” following subsection (g), which would have clarified matters.  
77
 See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/8/EC of 27 Jan. 2003 to improve “access to justice” in cross-border 
disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, [2003] OJ L 26/41, 
corrigendum, [2003] L 32/15 (hereinafter Legal Aid Directive).  See further infra § 11.3.1. 
78
 See, e.g., Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on 
certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, [2008] OJ C 136/3 (hereinafter Mediation 
 Chapter 11:  European Contract Law and Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters 
 462 
of the judiciary79, some of which bear almost identical language used to describe these 
three fields in the Lisbon Treaty. For that matter, the approximation of national laws in 
the fields of procedure, transnational litigation, and private international law also had a 
well-established record under Article 65 EC. At base, nothing added to Article 81 TFEU 
explicitly had anything to do with (the approximation of) substantive private law.   
 
Consequently, the changes heralded by the Lisbon Treaty in connection with the 
text of Article 65 EC largely fall more on the side of explicit recognition of what was 
already going on as opposed to heralding revolutionary change.80  The additional fields, 
the explicit reference to approximation and the principle of mutual recognition, the 
adjustments to the internal market and cross-border requirements – each of these 
modifications already bore some linkage to institutional activities taking place under 
Article 65 EC. This is certainly not to downplay their inscription in the Treaty framework 
and their bearing on the scope of Article 65 EC.  Nevertheless, the changes envisaged by 
the Lisbon Treaty further substantiate that the adoption of a European substantive 
contract law instrument falls outside the European Union’s competence in the field of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters.  In sum, both under the past and present Treaty 
framework, there is a strong case that Article 65 EC (now Article 81 TFEU) cannot serve 
as a potential legal basis for a European contract law instrument. 
 
11.2.3 Missed opportunity for European contract law? 
Given this finding, it may seem regrettable that the proposals submitted during the 
European Convention seeking to revise Article 65 EC so as to allow for the 
approximation of national contract law were neglected in subsequent institutional 
developments culminating in the Lisbon Treaty.  In fact, this was strongly lamented by 
one commentator amidst negotiations surrounding the Draft Constitutional Treaty: 
 
Given the long lasting debate on European  contract law or even on a more 
general European civil law codification it would have seemed appropriate to 
provide at least a legal basis for a codification of contract law, company law  
and various other areas which have already received major attention during  
the development of the internal market, as has been suggested by members of  
                                                                                                                                                 
Directive), which emanated from the Commission’s Green Paper on “alternative dispute resolution” in civil 
and commercial law, COM (2002) 196 final, 19.4.2002.  It is discussed further infra § 11.3.1. 
79
 See, e.g., Decision 568/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 
amending Council Decision 2001/470/EC establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and 
commercial matters, [2009] OJ L168/35. 
80
 This of course is not to discount the institutional changes surrounding Article 65 EC in terms of decision-
making and the elimination of the restrictions on the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction in relation to the areas 
covered by the former Title IV of the EC Treaty.  By comparison, however, such restrictions on the Court’s 
jurisdiction in the former third pillar concerning Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
(PJCCM) have not yet been completely eliminated by the Lisbon Treaty. Under Article 10 of Protocol (No. 
36) on Transitional Provisions annexed to the the Lisbon Treaty, [2008] OJ C 115/322, the restrictions 
placed on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the former Article 35 EU remain in place for a 
period of five years following the date of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (i.e., 1 Dec. 2009) with 
respect to acts in the field of the PJCCM, which were adopted before the entry into force of such Treaty, 
save for the exception carved out in Article 10(2) concerning the “amendment” of such acts.   
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the Convention.  The draft Constitution has missed this timely opportunity.81  
 
With a closer look, maybe not. 
 
Taken seriously, these proposals had the potential to augment, not resolve, the 
current complexity and controversy surrounding the Community’s competence to 
approximate national contract law and to preclude the achievement of the Community’s 
objectives underpinning the debate about European contract law as a whole.  A common 
thread running through the aforementioned proposals was the intention to single out 
specific areas of private law, including contract law, and hence to “fence them off” for 
Community action as compared to other areas, some of which have gained importance in 
the debate about European contract law, such as the law of extra-contractual obligations 
or the law of movable property law.  Moreover, to have abided by the preference for 
Article 65 EC would have introduced considerable ambiguity with respect to Community 
action in the field of contract law under Article 95 EC, and as for the proposal prohibiting 
further use of Article 95 EC in the realm of contract law, this sits uncomfortably with the 
ongoing activities of the European contract law project. To have revised the Treaty in 
such a manner could have put in jeopardy the possibility of adopting one or more 
European instruments going beyond the scope of contract law based on other provisions 
of the Treaty, thereby stunting Community action under Article 95 EC or Article 308 EC 
for the purposes of achieving the Community’s objectives in the internal market.  
Ironically, then, the failure of such proposals may have done more for European contract 
law than their success.   
 
 Furthermore, for those eager to use these proposals to substantiate the lack of 
Community, now Union, competence in contract law under the Treaty framework as it 
stands now, they are of marginal value in this regard. It has been posited by at least one 
commentator that the fact that these proposals were made and failed demonstrates that 
amendments to the Treaty are needed to sustain the European Union’s competence to 
approximate substantive contract law.82 Given that the proposals (and related 
contributions) emanated from one Member State (Germany) and did not attract much 
attention, it is difficult to assess how much importance, if any, to place upon them. For 
example, it is not known whether the failure of these proposals was due to more to 
neglect in favour of more important matters on the agenda concerning the AFSJ, as 
opposed to intentional rejection of Union action in contract law or even preference for 
such action to proceed under other Treaty provisions in line with the concerns expressed 
above. For that matter, it should be remembered that these proposals concerned Article 
65 EC, a provision traditionally considered to exclude the approximation of substantive 
private law, and hence they did not speak to the extent of the Community’s competences 
under other provisions, namely Articles 95 and 308 EC (or their equivalents in the Lisbon 
Treaty). Therefore, if anything, these proposals substantiated the uncertainties 
surrounding the use of Article 65 EC for the approximation of substantive contract law 
                                                 
81
 See W. Heusel, “Editorial:  The Emerging Constitution and the European Area of Justice”, 4 ERA-Forum  
4, 7 (2003) (citations omitted).  See further W. Heusel, “European Contract Law – Towards a European 
Frame of Reference”, 7 ERA-Forum 4, 6-7 (2006). 
82
 See, e.g., Ziller, supra note 2, at 111-112. 
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and underscored the importance of leaving open potential recourse to the Community’s 
internal market competences of Articles 95 and 308 EC.   
 
 Yet, the question remains why such proposals were advanced in connection with 
Article 65 EC in the first place, since it was very much the intention of these Convention 
members to situate action in the field of contract law within the context of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters and the AFSJ, not the internal market programme.  In other 
words, while they failed, these proposals still said something important about the linkage 
between European contract law and judicial cooperation in civil matters.  As documented 
in Part Two, European contract law has steadily become interwoven within the ongoing 
activities concerning this field as part of the overarching frame of the AFSJ established 
by the European Council’s Tampere, Hague, and forthcoming Stockholm Programmes.  
Yet, so far, there has not been much detailed explanation provided by the European 
Council or the other European institutions as to the connection between the two, with the 
result that the place of European contract law in this context remains ambiguous.  
Nevertheless, European contract law has consistently been viewed as making an 
important contribution to the building of a European area of “justice”, whereby judicial 
and legal barriers to the litigation and settlement of cross-border legal disputes are broken 
down in an effort to simplify the legal context for Union citizens.  At the same time, 
activities in European contract law have been framed as part of the achievement of the 
Union’s internal market objectives, as illustrated by the draft Stockholm Programme’s 
reference to the developments concerning the Common Frame of Reference within the 
section concerning “supporting economic activity” in the internal market.  It remains to 
be seen to what extent the relationship between European contract law, the European area 
of “justice”, and the AFSJ may be fleshed out as the debate continues, and this is 
certainly a viable subject for further research.  Nevertheless, as matters stand now, while 
European contract law may play a part in the building of a European area of “justice”, 
this does not necessarily mean that Article 65 EC is the legal basis upon which a 
comprehensive European contract law instrument can be based. 
 
11.3 The linkage between Articles 65, 95, and 308 EC in European contract law 
To date, there has been a rising volume of Community measures in the field of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters adopted by the European legislator pursuant to 
Article 65 EC.83 Among the most well-known measures are those relating to the 
                                                 
83
 As a formal matter, so far measures adopted in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matter generally 
cite Articles 61(c) EC and 67 EC in some shape or form, not Article 65 EC, as the legal basis.  By virtue of  
its cross-reference to Article 65 EC, Article 61 EC indicates the objectives being pursued by the European 
legislator and on what provision of the Treaty the action concerned is based. This has the result that it is not 
specified which subsection – (a), (b) or (c) – of Article 65 EC is being resorted to, although this is often 
mentioned in the Commission’s proposal for a particular measure and/or ultimately appears in the Preamble 
of the measure adopted.  This situation has been noticed by scholars.  See, e.g., “Editorial Comments: 
Sometimes it takes thirty years and even more . . . ”, 44 Common Market Law Review 1567, 1574 (2007); 
K. Boele-Woelki and R.H. van Ooik, “The Communitarization of Private International Law”, 5 Yearbook 
of Private International Law 1, 12-13 (2002).  Yet, this issue has not yet resulted in litigation among the 
European institutions, even though there have been various attempts during the decision-making process to 
modify the legal basis or the preamble of a particular measure so as to specify the relevant subsection of 
Article 65 EC.  See, e.g., as regards the Legal Aid Directive (supra note 77), European Parliament 
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jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments (e.g., the Brussels I Regulation84, 
the Brussels IIbis Regulation85, the Insolvency Regulation86, the European enforcement 
order for uncontested claims87), the choice of applicable law (e.g., the Rome I 
Regulation88 and the Rome II Regulation89), cross-border civil procedure (e.g., service of 
documents90 and evidence91), alternative dispute resolution (e.g. mediation92), and 
cooperation among judicial bodies (e.g., the European judicial network93).  In truth, there 
is no universal categorisation, and the various measures can be organised in a number of 
ways that overlap and intersect with each other depending upon the labels used.  The 
intention here is not to provide an exhaustive description of the various measures, but 
instead to spotlight certain recent Community measures concerning legal aid, mediation, 
and European procedures for uncontested claims and small claims.  These measures not 
only highlight the increasing controversy surrounding the scope of the Community’s 
competence under Article 65 EC, but also lay the groundwork for evaluating Article 65 
EC’s relationship to Articles 95 and 308 EC in the debate about European contract law in 
the sections that follow. 
 
11.3.1 Community measures adopted under Article 65 EC 
Starting with the matter of legal aid, this brought to the fore the discussion of both 
Article 65 EC’s internal market and cross-border requirements.  Prompted by the 
Tampere Conclusions, the Commission published a Green Paper on the subject in which 
it stressed the problems of extra costs associated with cross-border litigation, which 
included the necessity of hiring two lawyers, translation and interpretation costs, and 
miscellaneous factors, such as extra travel costs of litigants, witnesses, lawyers, etc.94 
                                                                                                                                                 
legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council directive to improve access to justice in cross-border 
disputes by establishing common minimum rules relating to legal aid and other financial aspects of civil 
proceedings, [2003] C 273E/184, at 185 (Amendment 1). Moreover, this practice has also not garnered 
much attention in the case law.  See, e.g., Case C-14/08 Roda Golf and Beach Resort SL, judgment of 25 
June 2009, not yet reported, para. 53; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-435/06 C [2007] 
ECR I-10141, para. 52. 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] L 12/1. 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 Nov. 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347, [2003] OJ L 338/1. 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, [2000] L 160/1. 
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 Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a 
European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, [2004] OJ L 143/15. 
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 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), [2008] OJ L 177/6. 
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 Regulation (EC) No 846/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), [2007] OJ L 199/40. 
90
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial 
and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, [2000] OJ L 160/37. 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the 
Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 174/1. 
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 See supra note 78. 
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 See supra note 79. 
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 Green Paper from the Commission – Legal aid in civil matters: The problems confronting the cross-
border litigant, COM (2000) 51 final, 9.2.2000, at 4, 12-13. 
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This led to a proposal for a Directive to establish certain minimum standards for legal aid 
in cross-border disputes.95  The Commission justified the use of Article 61 EC viz. 
Article 65 EC on the grounds that the establishment of minimum standards on legal aid 
would facilitate the free movement of persons and the smooth operation of the internal 
market.96  As for subsidiarity and proportionality, since the measure approximated 
national law by establishing certain minimum standards, these objectives could not be 
achieved by the Member States action alone but required action at Community level, and 
the proposal was limited to the minimum required to achieve the objectives pursued, 
respectively.97 In response, the European Parliament deleted the restriction of the 
measure to cross-border disputes, so as to ensure that the directive facilitated access to 
justice whether in a cross-border or an internal context.98 This was rejected by the 
Council, however, which reintroduced the cross-border requirement.99  Ultimately, as 
adopted, Directive 2003/8/EC to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by 
establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes100 applied 
only to cross-border disputes101, which was ingrained in its very title. 
 
Thereafter, Community action in the field of mediation added fuel to the fire. In 
line with the mandate set by Tampere, the Commission submitted a proposal for a 
directive on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters.102 The proposal 
devoted particular attention to the legal basis, subsidiarity, and proportionality 
requirements, running about two pages.103 As part of the justification for Article 65 EC, 
the Commission explained that the proposal was “necessary for the proper functioning of 
the internal market” in view of the need to ensure access to dispute resolution 
mechanisms for individuals and businesses exercising their rights of free movement and 
the need to ensure the freedom to provide and receive mediation services.104  As regards 
the requirement of “cross-border implications”, the Commission argued that it would not 
be feasible to restrict the scope of the proposal to cross-border situations because this 
would carry the risk of creating arbitrary and discriminatory effects between parties, 
increase legal uncertainty, and substantially reduce the impact of the proposed directive, 
and therefore, it should apply to domestic situations as well.105  As for compliance with 
subsidiarity and proportionality, the Commission reasoned that in view of the need for 
legal certainty and predictability in situations involving mediation and the need to ensure 
the proper functioning of the internal market relating to mediation services, measures 
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 Proposal for a Council Directive to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing 
minimum common rules relating to legal aid and other financial aspects of civil proceedings, COM (2002) 
13 final, 18.1.2002. 
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 Id., point 2. 
97
 Id., point 3.  
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 European Parliament legislative resolution, supra note 83, at 186. 
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 2455th Council meeting – Justice, Home Affairs and Civil Protection – Luxembourg, 14-15 October 
2002, DOC 12894/02 (Presse 308), at 8 
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 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects of mediation 
in civil and commercial matters, COM (2004) 718 final, 22.10.2004.  
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taken at Community level would be more effective than individual initiatives taken by 
each Member State.106   
 
The Commission’s position on the “cross-border implications” requirement did 
not persuade the Council.  The European Parliament noted in its first reading of the 
proposal that a majority of Member State delegations took the view that the Directive 
should be limited to cross-border cases on the basis of the text of Article 65 EC, which 
prompted it to propose a compromise, whereby the Directive applied only to cross-border 
cases, but additional language was inserted to make clear that the Member States were 
encouraged to apply the provisions of the Directive to domestic cases.107  As matters 
proceeded, the Council maintained a firm stance in limiting the Directive to cross-border 
matters, though retaining the Parliament’s suggestion.108  The Commission responded 
that “in a spirit of compromise”, this limitation was accepted, provided that the definition 
of cross-border cases was as broad as possible.109  Ultimately, in the adoption of 
Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, 
there was explicit recognition of its limitation to cross-border disputes and a specific 
provision defining this concept.110   
 
Matters intensified with Community measures establishing European order for 
payment and small claims procedures, which were conjoined in the Commission’s Green 
Paper devoted to both subjects.111  The idea behind the European order for payment 
procedure was to establish in all Member States the same procedure for the rapid and 
effective recovery of uncontested claims, whereas the European small claims procedure 
was geared at simplifying the requirements of small claims litigation in order to speed up 
such proceedings and limit the costs associated with enforcing claims involving small 
sums of money.112 As a harbinger of what was to come, the Commission posed two 
horizontal questions in the Green Paper concerning the applicability of a European 
instrument to cross-border cases only or also to internal cases and the choice of the 
appropriate instrument to approximate national procedural law.113   For the first point, the 
Commission advanced several arguments to support coverage of both cross-border and 
domestic situations.114  The second point was somewhat ill-framed, since it concentrated 
not on approximation as such, but instead on the introduction of an optional European 
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 Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament 
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recital. 
109
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament concerning the common position of 
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procedure “happily coexisting” alongside the national mechanisms in the areas 
concerned.115 The Commission’s approach in the Green Paper filtered into two separate 
initiatives, which stand at the apex of the controversy surrounding Article 65 EC to date. 
 
Starting with the earliest of the two proposals, in 2004, the Commission submitted 
a proposal for a Regulation creating a European order for payment procedure.116  As 
regards the scope of the proposal, the Commission argued that it would be 
counterproductive to constrain the scope of this procedure to cross-border cases only.117  
In its view, such a restriction was not necessitated by the text of Article 65 EC118; it 
would cause undue complexity, thereby contravening the objective of the European order 
procedure to speed up and simplify the recovery of uncontested claims119; and it would 
jeopardise the functioning of the internal market on the grounds that access of economic 
operators to mechanisms of substantially differing performance levels entails a distortion 
of competition in the internal market, whether such operators were domiciled in different 
Member States or in the same Member State.120 In its view, enterprises from different 
Member States are not on an equal footing if only the one domiciled abroad can make 
sure of an efficient European order for payment procedure, and an enterprise with a 
majority of clients abroad may enjoy a significant advantage over a competitor domiciled 
in the same Member 121  As regards the principle of subsidiarity, it “goes without saying” 
that the creation of a uniform procedure could not sufficiently accomplished by the 
Member States themselves because they cannot guarantee the equivalence of rules 
applicable throughout the Community.122 Furthermore, as regards the principle of 
proportionality, the combination of the use of a regulation with the optional nature of the 
procedure as an additional tool lying alongside comparable mechanisms in the national 
legal orders meant that it “encroaches much less” on national procedural systems than a 
harmonising directive requiring adapting national legislation to the standards set down in 
that instrument.123 Recourse to an optional European procedure allowed Member States 
with an even better-functioning domestic system to retain it, thereby leaving it to the 
creditors to judge which procedure they considered superior or most convenient in terms 
of accessibility.124 This was particularly relevant for creditors operating in several 
Member States, since they would be spared the need to make themselves familiar with 
the procedural law of each of the Member States involved by virtue of the availability of 
this procedure.125   
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 The proposal heralded reactions by the other European institutions, which echoed 
previous practice. The Parliament agreed with the Commission’s internal market 
rationale, emphasising that with cross-border litigation, “[t]here is a risk that citizens may 
not be inclined to assert their rights because of the obstacles they could encounter in 
dealing with the legal systems in another Member State, in particular due to unfamiliar 
procedures and unknown costs. This is considered an obstacle to the proper functioning 
of the internal market and a potential disincentive to the development of cross-border 
business and trade.”126  Yet, when it came to the cross-border requirement, given the 
Council’s reluctance, the Parliament proposed a compromise whereby the instrument 
would be limited to cross-border cases, but the Member States could voluntarily adopt the 
procedure for domestic cases as well.127 As the proposal made its way though the 
decision-making process, the Council stood firm on limiting the procedure to cross-
border cases only.128 The Commission eventually agreed, but attached the following 
Declaration to the common position reached on the measure: 
 
 The Commission declares that the definition of the term “cross-border case”  
 in the context of this Regulation is not an interpretation of the obligation 
 foreseen in Article 65 of the Treaty to limit the action of the Community  
 to matters having cross-border implications, but only one among other 
 possibilities to limit the scope of application of this Regulation in the context  
 of Article 65. 
 
It is not necessary to limit the scope of application for reference to a general 
definition of ‘cross-border’ in the instruments relating to private international  
law. 
 
The necessity or interest to resort to a general definition of ‘cross-border’ in other 
instruments which are not linked to private international law such as the proposed 
directive on mediation the character of which is different from this Regulation 
should be analysed carefully case by case, taking into account the objectives of 
each instrument.129 
 
As adopted, Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment 
procedure contains specific provisions making clear that it is applicable only to cross-
border cases.130 Still, it was emphasised in the Preamble that there were impediments to 
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access to justice and distortions of competition in the internal market caused by 
imbalances in the functioning of procedural mechanisms afforded to creditors in the 
various Member States that necessitated Community legislation guaranteeing a “level 
playing field” for creditors and debtors throughout the EU.131  It was also stipulated that 
this European procedure was “an additional and optional means” available to creditors 
that neither replaced nor harmonised the existing national mechanisms for the recovery of 
uncontested claims.132    
 
Matters again came to a head with the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation 
establishing a European small claims procedure.133  As with the previous proposal, the 
proposal contained extensive discussion of Article 65 EC.134 Starting with the internal 
market requirement, the Commission declared that there was a margin of discretion for 
the European legislator as to whether a  measure is necessary for the proper functioning 
of the internal market135, and that it was fulfilled here:     
 
If some operators have access to efficient and effective procedures while others 
do not, there is no level playing field for operators competing in the internal 
market. The existing disparities in the laws of the Member States put obstacles  
to the proper functioning of the internal market. Consequently, a situation 
implying a marked disequilibrium with regard to the efficiency of the procedural 
means afforded to creditors under different national laws amounts to a distortion 
of competition within the internal market. A European [s]mall [c]laims procedure 
would thus facilitate the proper functioning of the internal market.136 
 
As for the cross-border requirement, the Commission surmised that as far as the term 
“judicial cooperation in civil matters” was concerned, most language versions of Article 
65 EC refer to “matters”, not “measures”, and thus it was sufficient that the “matter” 
concerned had cross-border implications.137  Small claims litigation was such a matter 
since taking account of the development of the internal market, most economic operators 
and consumers would sooner or later be involved in such litigation abroad. 138  In its 
view, the internal market requirement of Article 65 EC was a restriction on the cross-
border requirement, not the other way around:  a measure that is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the internal market has cross-border implications, whereas a measure 
having cross-border implications may not always also be necessary for the proper 
functioning of the internal market.139 With respect to the European small claims 
procedure, it would be inappropriate and counterproductive to constrain the scope of its 
application to only cross-border cases. First, the creation of two different regimes for 
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internal and cross-border cases would be inconsistent with the objective of a single and 
coherent area of justice for all.140  Furthermore, speedy and inexpensive small claims 
procedures were not available to litigants in all Member States, and the lack of such 
procedures made judicial recourse economically questionable in many cases and often 
caused creditors to abstain from taking legal action.141 This also resulted in economic 
costs that had significant negative macroeconomic effects on the proper functioning of 
the internal market.142 
 
 As regards the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the proposal 
reiterated the remarks made with regard to the European order for payment procedure.  
For subsidiarity, the objective to simplify and speed up litigation concerning small claims 
by establishing a European procedure to that effect could not be sufficiently 
accomplished by the Member States since they could not guarantee the equivalence of 
rules applicable throughout the Community.143  For proportionality, the Commission 
stressed the combination of a regulation and the optional nature of the European small 
claims procedure:  whilst ensuring uniformity and the direct applicability of the 
procedure, the measure concerned would only require the Member States to make the 
procedure available as an additional tool, with the result that it encroached much less on 
national procedural systems and allowed the Member States with an even better 
functioning domestic mechanism to retain it.144 It would be left to the creditors in the 
various Member States to judge which procedure they considered as being either superior 
in performance or more convenient in terms of accessibility.145   
 
 The Commission’s remarks received mixed reactions from the other European 
institutions and bodies.  In its Opinion, the EESC fully endorsed the Commission’s 
choice of legal basis, which went beyond a merely formal interpretation of the relevant 
legal concepts, and found that an initiative of this type and scope was only justified if it 
also applied, albeit optionally, to internal disputes in the Member States, since limiting it 
to cross-border disputes could cast doubt on its relevance or even on the need for it at 
all.146  Yet, the Council and the European Parliament constricted the scope of the measure 
to cross-border cases only.147 As adopted, Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a 
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147
 See 2732nd Council meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 1-2 June 2006, DOC 9409/06 
(Presse 144), at 15; Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European small claims procedure, A6-0387/2006 
FINAL, dated 7 Nov. 2006, at 5 (Amendments 1, 7-8). 
 Chapter 11:  European Contract Law and Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters 
 472 
European Small Claims Procedure148 applies to cross-border cases only and is available 
to litigants as an optional procedure alongside national procedural mechanisms.149 Still, 
semblances of the Commission’s internal market rationale were apparent in the Preamble, 
with emphasis placed on the obstacles to obtaining fast, inexpensive judgments in cross-
border cases and distortions of competition caused by imbalances with regard to 
procedural means afforded to creditors in different Member States, which justified the 
need for Community action to guarantee a level playing field for creditors and debtors 
throughout the EU.150   
 
11.3.2 The limits of Article 65 EC competence and the linkage to Article 95 EC 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the interplay between the Article 65 EC’s 
internal market and cross-border requirements have generated considerable debate 
concerning the limits of the Community’s competence under this provision.151  So far, 
these issues have not been addressed in the case law of the Court of Justice, since aside 
from marginal references to Article 65 EC, there is not yet any definitive jurisprudence 
on this provision.152  Noticeably, while there is a rising crescendo of discord among the 
European institutions about the Commission’s expansive approach taken to the cross-
border requirement, the Commission’s approach to the internal market requirement as 
regards to the apparent obstacles to trade and distortions of competition caused by 
disparities in the national rules concerned have not beckoned nearly as much dispute at 
the European level. 
 
 As far as European contract law is concerned, Article 65 EC’s internal market 
requirement is at the base of the potential linkage between this provision and recourse to 
Article 95 EC.  Famously, Professor Jürgen Basedow argued that even though Article 65 
EC cannot by itself serve as a legal basis for the approximation of contract law (and other 
fields of private law), it bolstered the case for Article 95 EC:   
 
Since [A]rticle 65 requires that Community measures taken under that provision 
are ‘necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market’, it presupposes 
that differences existing between the national legislations in the field of conflict 
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of laws may effectively curtail the proper functioning of the internal market; if 
not the explicit reference to measures “promoting the compatibility of the rules 
applicable in the [M]ember [S]tates concerning the conflict of laws” would be 
meaningless. Bearing in mind that conflict rules merely refer a case to a com- 
petent national legal system without providing for a substantive solution we must 
conclude that differences between the substantive private laws of the Member  
States are even more liable to impede the proper functioning of the internal  
market. If that is true in the context of [A]rticle 65, it cannot be denied when it 
comes to the application of [A]rticle 95. Thus, while [A]rticle 65 has a very 
limited bearing upon the harmonisation or unification of substantive private law 
for other reasons, it suggests a new reading of [A]rticle 95 which allows for the 
adoption of a comprehensive private law legislation on that basis.153   
 
Other scholars have voiced similar sentiments, as illustrated by the specific chapter 
devoted to Community competence authored by Professors Walter van Gerven and 
Winfried Tilmann in the European Parliament’s 1999 Working Paper, which emphasised 
Article 65 EC’s role for the assessment of Article 95 EC, even if Article 65 EC itself 
could not serve as a legal basis for a European civil code.154 In their view, by virtue of 
Article 65 EC, differences between national provisions of private international law (via 
Article 65(b) EC) and civil procedural law (via Article 65(c) EC) were regarded as 
having an important bearing on the proper functioning of the internal market, which were 
relevant for the interpretation of Article 95 EC.155   
 
At first glance, such arguments are enticing.  Yet, with utmost respect to these 
prominent scholars, they are open to question on several grounds. First, they seem to be 
premised on a connection between Article 65 EC’s internal market requirement and the 
requirements that must be fulfilled for recourse to Article 95 EC, even if the two 
provisions are not exactly the same.  Although there is some disagreement in the 
literature as to what extent the requirements of Articles 65 and 95 EC are aligned in this 
regard156, there are compelling arguments that the internal market requirement of Article 
65 EC cannot be read in the same way as the standards set for Article 95 EC.  As 
discussed in Chapter 9, Article 95 EC is one of the core provisions of the Treaty to carry 
out the Community’s objectives concerning the internal market, and as dictated by the 
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Treaty, measures adopted under this provision must “have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market”.157  In contrast, Article 65 EC is 
situated within the Community’s objectives related to judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, which in turn gives indirect support for the internal market as enshrined in its 
text (“in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”), but is not 
targeted at the establishment and functioning of the internal market as such.  
Consequently, while Article 65 EC may allow for the approximation of national rules 
concerning private international law and civil procedural law, among other things, to 
achieve the Community’s objectives in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, 
arguably it is not determinative by itself as regards the extent to which Article 95 EC can 
serve as a proper legal basis for the approximation of substantive contract law rules.  That 
inquiry depends upon whether divergences in national contract laws satisfy the 
requirements set down in the Tobacco Advertising I case law, i.e., whether they result in 
obstacles to trade and/or appreciable distortions of competition for which the measure 
adopted under Article 95 EC must have as its object to eliminate.  
 
Furthermore, such arguments seem to have lost some of their salience with the 
changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty.  To recall from the previous section, Article 81 
TFEU has considerably weakened the internal market requirement of Article 65 EC so as 
to allow for the adoption of measures “particularly when” – as opposed to “insofar as” 
under Article 65 EC – “necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”.158 
Yet, Article 81 TFEU contains the same list of topics that had appeared in Article 65 EC 
(supplemented by some additional ones), thereby indicating a looser connection to the 
internal market than its predecessor.159  This further supports the view that the assessment 
of Articles 65 and 95 EC (and their counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty) must be taken on 
their own terms as far as Union action in European contract law is concerned. 
 
That being said, as illustrated by the Community measures discussed above, 
arguments justifying compliance with the Article 65 EC’s internal market requirement 
have the potential, albeit implicitly, for providing further momentum for Union action in 
contract law on the basis of Article 95 EC.  For example, as witnessed by the rationale for 
the European order for payment and small claims procedures, disparities in national laws 
were deemed to cause distortions of competition in the internal market on account of the 
fact that undertakings were not given “equal access to the weapons of law” and thus those 
undertakings that had recourse to certain national (procedural) rules had significant 
competitive advantages over others.  It was further emphasised in relation to these 
measures, and to some extent the measure concerning  legal aid, that there were obstacles 
to trade in the internal market posed by the parties’ lack of familiarity with foreign law 
and the costs associated with litigation and enforcement of cross-border disputes. 
Admittedly, the analogy between these measures and matters of substantive contract law 
is not exact.  Nevertheless,  the objectives underlying the foregoing measures to eradicate 
obstacles to trade and appreciable distortions of competition associated with cross-border 
disputes cannot help but cast an eye to similar issues simmering below the surface of 
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substantive contract law with the result that the discussion of the Community’s 
competence under Article 65 EC may to some extent be considered to exert “gravitational 
pull” towards potential recourse to Article 95 EC. 
 
11.3.3 The exercise of Article 65 EC competence and the linkages to Articles 95 and 
308 EC 
 
As further illustrated by the Community measures described above, the roles 
played by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in guiding the exercise of 
Community competence under Article 65 EC bear some similarity to the exercise of 
Community competence under Articles 95 and 308 EC in the context of European 
contract law.  On the one hand, akin to Article 95 EC, once Community competence 
under Article 65 EC is verified, it seems to be the case that the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality are easily complied with.  As reiterated time and time again, the 
objectives of the measures concerned transcend the capabilities of the Member States 
acting alone, thereby gliding over the subsidiarity hurdle of the second paragraph of 
Article 5 EC.  Likewise, depending upon the objectives pursued by the particular 
measure, the principle of proportionality has also been readily justified.  This may 
provoke concerns that the role played by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
are ineffective to regulate the exercise of Community competence under Article 65 EC, 
though compared to the increasing controversy concerning Article 95 EC, this issue has 
not yet been discussed much in the literature.     
 
On the other hand, inside the lawmaking process, the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality have played an important role, among other things, in guiding the 
choice towards the use of optional instruments in relation to Community action taken on 
the basis of Article 65 EC.   As evidenced by the measures concerning the European 
order for payment and small claims procedures, this has been framed within the context 
of the principle of proportionality, though in view of its role in guiding the intensity of 
Community action inside as well as outside the principle of subsidiarity, this conceivably 
has salience for the principle of subsidiarity as well.  Noticeably, the potential use of 
optional legal forms, i.e., the creation of European procedures that run alongside the 
national legal orders, is not mentioned explicitly in the text of Article 65 EC. Yet, this has 
not seemed to generate concerns on competence grounds at the European level thus far.160 
Instead, as illustrated by the foregoing examples, the use of optional legal forms have 
been accepted as a means by which to find a balance between the achievement of the 
Community’s objectives in the relevant fields and leaving sufficient leeway for the 
national legal regimes to flourish and thus, as repeatedly stated by the Commission, 
encroaching much less on the national legal regimes than the approximation of national 
laws. 
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In this way, as far as European contract law is concerned, Article 65 EC makes 
the fusion between the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the use of 
optional instruments more apparent. So far this has not been explicitly highlighted in the 
institutional documents concerning the debate about European contract law in connection 
with the prospect of one of more optional instruments in the field of contract law to 
achieve the Community’s internal market objectives.  While the dimensions of such an 
optional instrument remain to be seen, Article 65 EC nonetheless helps to capture the 
way in which the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality filter into the choice of 
resorting to an optional legal instrument on the basis of Article 308 EC to the extent that 
it falls outside the scope of approximation under Article 95 EC.161 
 
11.4 Conclusion 
In sum, this analysis demonstrates that even if Article 65 EC (or its equivalent in 
the Lisbon Treaty) may not have a direct role in serving as a legal basis for a European 
contract law instrument, this provision does have the potential to some degree to play an 
indirect role in placing further emphasis on the recourse to the Community’s internal 
market competences of Articles 95 and 308 EC in this regard. First, whether under the 
past or present Treaty framework, there are strong arguments to find that Article 65 EC 
(now Article 81 TFEU) cannot serve as a proper legal basis for the adoption of a 
comprehensive European substantive contract law instrument.  While attempts were 
made during the European Convention to revise Article 65 EC so as to provide for a 
specific legal basis for the approximation of contract law, paradoxically, the failure of 
these proposals may have done more to advance the long-term aims of the European 
contract law project than their success by not foreclosing Community action under 
Articles 95 and 308 EC to achieve internal market objectives in this area.  Second, while 
arguments attempting to use the text of Article 65 EC to strengthen the case for 
Community action under Article 95 EC in European contract law are uncertain especially 
in light of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, Community measures based on 
Article 65 EC nevertheless reveal provocative analogies to arguments justifying resort to 
Article 95 EC and to the interplay between the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and the use of optional instruments in contract law adopted under Article 
308 EC.   
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12 
 
Alternative and Complementary Routes in European Contract 
Law 
 
 
12.1 Introduction 
Over the years, there have been various forms of Member State cooperation 
contemplated in the scholarly literature and institutional documents largely as alternative 
or complementary routes to a comprehensive European contract law (or private law) 
instrument in the debate. These have largely centered on the mechanism of enhanced 
cooperation, an intergovernmental treaty1 adopted by the Member States either under 
public international law or via an ad hoc convention method, techniques drawn from the  
United States (i.e., Restatements, uniform and model laws, and the Uniform Commercial 
Code), and the Open Method of Coordination (the OMC). Moreover, the ongoing 
developments concerning the Common Frame of Reference (the CFR) cannot be left out, 
since the involvement of various academic projects in its preparation and its envisaged 
status as a non-binding instrument for EU lawmaking evidence linkage with “softer” 
forms of Union action. 
 
Together, these various alternative and complementary routes strike at the heart of 
the constitutionality of European contract law in three important ways, which explain 
why they are grouped together here. First, the extent to which these routes can be used to 
displace the need for far-reaching Union action in contract law in all or in part warrants 
inquiry. Second, more generally, they have the potential to inject doubts about the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law altogether.  By their very nature, 
several of these routes direct attention to the considerable overlap and interplay between 
Union and Member State action in the field of contract law and thus beg questions as to 
whether viewing the constitutionality of European contract law through the lens of the 
limits and the exercise of Union competence in contract law is myopic or outmoded and 
hence whether a new frame is needed so as to better accommodate the interaction 
between the European, national, and even international levels in finding possible 
solutions in this setting.  Finally, with particular regard to the American techniques, this 
is essentially where the “fourteen carat gold” questions lie as regards the relevance of 
such techniques in the debate about European contract law and the fruitful comparative 
reflection that can be gleaned through the approach taken to matters of contract law in the 
United States and the European Union.  
 
Following from these remarks, the aim of this chapter is to explore the 
constitutionality and/or the suitability of certain alternative and complementary routes to 
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the adoption of a comprehensive European contract law instrument contemplated in the 
debate.   As the debate about European contract law is ongoing, it cannot be ruled out that 
there may be additional solutions introduced in the coming years.  Nevertheless, this 
chapter places primary focus on the following three categories that have gained a 
prominent place in the scholarly literature and institutional documents surrounding 
European contract law so far:   (1) enhanced cooperation; (2) an intergovernmental treaty 
among the Member States; and (3) certain “softer” models or forms of action comprising 
the OMC, American techniques, and the CFR. This chapter is divided into three main 
parts so as to examine each category in the order set forth above. 
 
12.2 Enhanced cooperation 
12.2.1 General overview:  Virtues and vices of enhanced cooperation 
It may not be surprising that scholars have contemplated enhanced cooperation as 
a possible avenue in the debate about European contract law (and European private law 
generally).2 This is because enhanced cooperation is a specific mechanism set down in 
the Treaties which, provided the requisite conditions are satisfied, allows a certain 
number of Member States to accomplish certain objectives furthering the European 
integration process – as could be posited in the case of a European contract law 
instrument – while leaving recalcitrant Member States behind. It was formally introduced 
into the Treaty framework by the Amsterdam Treaty under the label of “closer 
cooperation”, but this was changed to “enhanced cooperation” by the Nice Treaty. Still, 
both labels are equally apt for imparting the underlying idea that it is a particular subset 
or group of Member States engaging in cooperation amongst themselves in a particular 
matter covered by the Treaty, thereby embodying a departure from the Community 
method, which in principle involves the participation of all Member States in a given 
field.  As such, the discussion of enhanced cooperation is largely transfixed within the 
broader discourse concerning “flexibility” and “differentiation” in the European Union, 
terms which themselves embody a number of different conceptions and have given way 
to a rich and multi-faceted debate in the literature.3  Leaving that debate aside, suffice to 
say that the association of enhanced cooperation with the terminology of “flexibility” and 
“differentiation” not only feeds into some of the reasons to explain why enhanced 
cooperation was inserted into the Treaty framework in the first place, but also is part and 
parcel of the virtues and the vices associated with this mechanism, which sets the 
backdrop for its application to European contract law. 
                                                 
2
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On the one hand, enhanced cooperation can be considered to embrace a positive 
outlook for furthering European integration, since it affords certain Member States means 
by which to reach objectives or goals not shared by all Member States inside as opposed 
to outside the Treaty framework, which was considered particularly important with the 
progressive enlargement of the European Union.4 On the other hand, enhanced 
cooperation can be viewed in negative terms based on its aptitude for jeopardising the 
uniform application of EU law and splintering the relationship of solidarity and trust 
among the Member States.5  Enhanced cooperation therefore embodies both aspirations 
and tensions relating to the participation of less than all Member States, the lack of 
involvement of European institutions and bodies as would be the case under mainstream 
Community decision-making processes, and the need to constrict the proposed forms of 
enhanced cooperation such that it does not endanger the achievements of the Union 
acquis. This carries important implications for its application to European contract law, 
which dictate the structure of the discussion.   
 
First and foremost, enhanced cooperation is tightly controlled by the Treaties.  
The Treaty framework establishes a two-tier set of requirements that must be satisfied for 
the Member States concerned to avail themselves of this mechanism.  In the previous 
Treaty framework, this involved both a set of general requirements for enhanced 
cooperation established in a specific title of the EU Treaty6 and an additional set of 
specific requirements laid down in either the EC Treaty or the EU Treaty depending upon 
which pillar of the Union – the Community pillar, the second pillar concerning Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the third pillar concerning Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) was concerned.7 The Lisbon Treaty retains 
this two-tier approach, the difference being that with the elimination of the pillar 
structure, it consolidates the various provisions on enhanced cooperation in each of the 
former pillars into a specific title of the TFEU devoted to enhanced cooperation8, which 
sits alongside a specific title of the EU Treaty on enhanced cooperation.9 To be clear, 
while it is up to the particular Member States involved to decide whether they want to  
initiate, or join in, a form of enhanced cooperation, this mechanism is orchestrated from 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g., S. Weatherill, “‘If I’d Wanted You to Understand I Would Have Explained it Better’:  What is 
the Purpose of the Provisions on Closer Co-operation Introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam?”, in Legal 
Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty 21, 21-22 (D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey eds, Hart, 1999). 
5
 See, e.g., Weatherill,  supra note 4, at 22 (“blatant assault on at least one cherished, though perhaps 
exaggerated, orthodoxy of European Community law, its uniformity of application”); J.H.H. Weiler, 
“Prologue: Amsterdam and the Quest for Constitutional Democracy”, in Legal Issues of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, supra note 4, 1, at 3 (“represents an abandonment of the principle of solidarity, one of the most 
foundational ideals which counterbalances and justifies the principle of majority voting”). 
6
 Title VII EU (Articles 43-45 EU). 
7
 For the Community pillar, see Articles 11-11a EC; for the second pillar of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), see  Articles 27a-27e EU; for the third pillar of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters (PJCCM), see Articles 40-41 EU.  Incidentally, for the CFSP, enhanced cooperation was initially 
not allowed under the Amsterdam Treaty, but this was eventually changed by the Nice Treaty, albeit with 
certain limitations. The Lisbon Treaty now exacts further changes, particularly in relation to allowing 
enhanced cooperation in connection with defense and security matters.  See Article 333(3) TFEU.  
8
 Title III TFEU (Articles 326-334 TFEU). 
9
 Title IV EU (Article 20 EU). 
Chapter 12:  Alternative and Complementary Routes in European Contract Law 
 480 
the European level by the European institutions10, not by the Member States.  As 
examined in the first part, these conditions highlight the linkage between enhanced 
cooperation and the European Union’s competence in European contract law and raise 
substantial doubts as to whether enhanced cooperation could be granted in this setting.  
This is so, whether in relation to the past Treaty framework or the present Treaty 
framework in view of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty in this regard. 
 
Second, related to some extent with its strict regulation under the Treaties, 
enhanced cooperation has not yet been used in the formal sense.  There have been a few 
occasions in which it has been proposed, but this has never been followed through.11  
Notably, the well-known instances often associated with enhanced cooperation – e.g., 
Economic Monetary Union (EMU), Schengen, and the Social Protocol – did not 
technically come about by way of the framework for enhanced cooperation established in 
the Treaties starting with Amsterdam.12  Thus, at present, enhanced cooperation remains 
a hypothetical possibility, with no concrete evidence as to how it functions in practice 
and as yet scarce attention as to its application in European contract law.  As 
demonstrated in the second part, even assuming that the requisite conditions could be 
met, there are grave drawbacks associated with its use in European contract law. 
 
12.2.2 Can enhanced cooperation be authorised?  
As just mentioned, there is a specific procedure set down by the Treaties to allow 
recourse to the mechanism of enhanced cooperation. The previous Treaty framework is 
taken first, since this laid the basis for the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty. The EU 
and EC Treaties established a two-level inquiry:  first, the general provisions (Articles 
43-45 EU) of the EU Treaty devoted to enhanced cooperation must be satisfied; and 
second, additional requirements must be complied with depending on the pillar in which 
the enhanced cooperation procedure was envisaged. For the Community pillar13, this 
meant Articles 11-11a EC, which were mainly concerned with the procedure to be 
followed by Member States seeking to establish enhanced cooperation and by those 
wishing to participate, respectively.14  While important from a procedural or 
organisational standpoint, they did not have further bearing to the substantive conditions 
placed on the types of matters that could be subject to enhanced cooperation, which 
                                                 
10
 This is so, even if the participation of the Council comprising the Member States has a predominant role.  
Under the previous Treaty framework, for example, the European Parliament was merely informed, 
consulted, or had to give its assent to the authorisation of enhanced cooperation.  Compare Article 11 EC; 
Article 27c EU; Article 40a EU.  Under the Lisbon Treaty, while the pillar structure has been eliminated, 
there is still a distinction as regards the procedures to be followed for enhanced cooperation within the 
CFSP as opposed to other areas (of non-exclusive Union competence) covered by the Treaty, with the 
result that the Parliament’s role can vary. Compare Articles 329, 331, 333 TFEU.   See further M. Dougan, 
“The Unfinished Business of Enhanced Cooperation: Some Institutional Questions and Their Constitutional 
Implications”, in Fifty Years of European Integration: Foundations and Perspectives, supra note 3, 157. 
11
 See J. Shaw, “Enhancing Cooperation After Nice: Will the Treaty Do the Trick?”, in The Treaty of Nice 
and Beyond: Enlargement and Constitutional Reform 207, 217 (M. Andenas and J. Usher eds, Hart, 2003). 
12
 See K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union § 9-004, at 372 (R. Bray 
ed., 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005). 
13
 The provisions for the other two pillars fall outside the scope of this discussion, but see supra note 10. 
14
 See Articles 11-11a EC. 
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explains why focus is placed on the general provisions enshrined in the EU Treaty for the 
purposes of this discussion. 
 
 Article 43 EU stated that: “Member States which intend to establish enhanced 
cooperation may make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by 
this Treaty and by the Treaty establishing the European Community”, provided that the 
proposed cooperation satisfies ten specific conditions listed therein.15 Of the ten 
conditions, some concerned structural components relative to the participating and non-
participating Member States, i.e., that enhanced cooperation involves a minimum of eight 
Member States; that it is open to all Member States; and that it respects the competences, 
rights and obligations of those Member States which do not participate.16  Yet, the 
majority of these conditions related in one way or another to the competences conferred 
on the Community or the Union in relation to the action concerned. In particular, Article 
43 EC required that enhanced cooperation: 
 
 “is aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and of the 
Community, at protecting and serving their interests and at reinforcing 
their process of integration”17; 
 
 “respects the said Treaties and the single institutional framework of the 
Union”18; 
 
 “respects the acquis communautaire and the measures adopted under the 
other provisions of the said Treaties”19; 
 
 “remains within the limits of the powers of the Union or of the 
Community and does not concern the areas which fall within the 
exclusive competence of the Community”20; 
 
 “does not undermine the internal market as defined in Article 14(2) of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community, or the economic and 
                                                 
15
 Article 43 EU. 
16
 Article 43(g), (h), (j).  Although not relevant here, there was a further condition specifically concerning 
the Schengen Protocol.  See Article 43(i) EU, providing that the proposed enhanced cooperation “does not 
affect the provisions of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European 
Union.” 
17
 Article 43(a) EU.  Compare Amsterdam Treaty, Article 43(1)(a) EU (“is aimed at furthering the 
objectives of the Union and at protecting and serving its interests”). 
18
 Article 43(b) EU. Compare Amsterdam Treaty, Article 43(1)(b) EU (“respects the principles of the said 
Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union”) (emphasis added). 
19
 Article 43(c) EU.  Compare Amsterdam Treaty, Article 43(1)(d) EU (“does not affect the acquis 
communautaire and the measures adopted under the other provisions of the said Treaties”) (emphasis 
added). 
20
 Article 43(d) EU.  Compare Amsterdam Treaty, Article 11(1)(d) EC (remains within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon the Community by this Treaty”) (emphasis added). 
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social cohesion established in accordance with Title XVII of that 
Treaty21; and 
 
 “does not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between the 
Member States and does not distort competition between them”22. 
 
In addition to the conditions of Article 43 EU, Article 43a EU stipulated that 
enhanced cooperation “may be undertaken only as a last resort, when it has been 
established within the Council that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained 
within a reasonable period by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties”.23  Article 
44 EU provided that acts and decisions adopted under the rubric of enhanced cooperation 
do not form part of the Union acquis and that they are binding only in the participating 
Member States.24 It also assumed that for the adoption of measures under enhanced 
cooperation, “the relevant institutional provisions” of the EU and EC Treaties apply.25 
 
Of these various requirements, most, but not all, had appeared in somewhat 
similar form in the Amsterdam Treaty.26  Notably, the Amsterdam Treaty had laid down 
certain requirements – i.e., that enhanced cooperation “does not affect Community 
policies, actions or programmes”27 and “does not concern the citizenship of the Union or 
discriminate between nationals of Member States”28 – which were eliminated by the Nice 
Treaty.  Yet, the condition precluding enhanced cooperation from undermining the 
internal market was a new provision added by the Nice Treaty.  Given this evolution, it is 
difficult to determine exactly the extent to which the Nice Treaty loosened, as opposed to 
fortified, the substantive conditions for allowing enhanced cooperation as compared to 
the Amsterdam Treaty.  Under the Amsterdam Treaty, it was considered a point of 
general agreement among scholars that the provisions were drafted so restrictively that it 
was difficult to envision few, if any, forms of enhanced cooperation which could in 
principle be capable of satisfying all of the requisite conditions.29 With the Nice Treaty, 
the changes made to the substantive conditions were considered to lower the hurdles to 
recourse to enhanced cooperation.30 This is often exemplified by the Nice Treaty’s 
elimination of certain requirements noted above or the modification from negative to 
positive language, such that enhanced cooperation merely “respects” the acquis 
communautaire, as opposed to “does not affect” it, as had been the case under the 
Amsterdam Treaty.31  
                                                 
21
 Article 43(e) EU.  This was a new provision brought by the Nice Treaty, which had no counterpart in the 
Amsterdam Treaty.  See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
22
 Article 43(f) EU.  Compare Amsterdam Treaty, Article 11(e) EC (“does not constitute a discrimination or 
a restriction of trade between Member States and does not distort the conditions of competition between the 
latter.”) (emphasis added). 
23
 Article 43a EU (emphasis added). 
24
 Article 44(1), second para. EU; Article 44(2) EU. 
25
 Article 44(1) EU. 
26
 See supra notes 17-20, 21. 
27
 Amsterdam Treaty, Article 11(b) EC. 
28
 Amsterdam Treaty, Article 11(c) EC. 
29
 Shaw, supra note 11, at 216. 
30
 Id., at 222. 
31
 See supra note 19. 
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Yet, certain conditions, especially those relevant to this discussion, remained 
somewhat ambiguous. A salient example is the Nice Treaty’s introduction of the explicit 
requirement that enhanced cooperation “does not to undermine the internal market as 
defined in Article 14(2)” EC.32  On the one hand, this can be viewed as signaling the 
intention to guard even further the sanctity of the Community’s internal market policy 
from the potential disintegrating effects of enhanced cooperation.  The fact that the Nice 
Treaty preserved the other conditions precluding barriers to trade and distortions of 
competition implies that this condition added something more; otherwise, it could have 
been subsumed under the conditions already in place under Amsterdam. On the other 
hand, this condition could be read as making clear for the first time that enhanced 
cooperation could indeed apply to areas relating to the internal market programme, so 
long as it was not undermined.33   
 
As regards the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, the conditions listed above 
were not substantially altered, and the changes generally amounted more to reshuffling, 
with the result that they are now scattered across the EU Treaty and the TFEU.34   Article 
20 EU stipulates that Member States wishing to establish enhanced cooperation “within 
the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences” may make use of its 
institutions and exercise those competences “by applying the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties”, subject to the limits and the detailed arrangements laid down in this Article and 
those Articles in the specific title of the TFEU devoted to enhanced cooperation.35  
Article 20 TFEU further requires that enhanced cooperation “shall aim to further the 
objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce the integration process” and 
can only be resorted to “as a last resort”.36  This provision also makes clear that the acts 
adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation “shall bind only participating Member 
States” and “shall not be regarded as part of the acquis which has to be accepted by 
candidate States for accession to the Union”.37 Moving to the specific title of the TFEU 
devoted to this topic, the very first provision, Article 326 TFEU, declares that enhanced 
                                                 
32
 Article 14(2) EC define the internal market as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty”.  This definition was not substantively changed by the Lisbon Treaty:  see Article 26(2) TFEU. 
33
 See J. Wouters, “Constitutional Limits of Differentiation: The Principle of Equality”, in The Many Faces 
of Differentiation in EU Law, supra note 3, 301, at 339.   
34
 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. This had already been the case under the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty. See 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article I-44; Articles III-416-423, which 
substantially resembled the 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article 43; Articles III-322-329.  During the 
European Convention, the provisions on enhanced cooperation attracted a host of amendments and 
contributions, but were generally concerned with the specific application of enhanced cooperation in 
specific fields such as the CFSP or pertained to more structural or procedural matters, such as the minimum 
participation threshold, the qualified majority requirement, and the clarification of the wording of the last 
resort condition.  See Proposed amendments concerning enhanced cooperation:  draft Articles for Part One, 
CONV 779/03, dated 4 June 2003; and for Part Three, CONV 791/03, dated 6 June 2003; see also the list 
of proposed amendments, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/.  In other words, such proposals 
were not primarily concerned with the substantive conditions discussed above, which are of relevance to 
European contract law. Yet, certain contributions submitted at the European Convention did revisit the 
tensions associated with enhanced cooperation and its questionable utility:  see, e.g., infra note 45. 
35
 Article 20(1) EU. 
36
 Article 20 (1)-(2) EU. 
37
 Article 20(4) EU. 
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cooperation “shall not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial 
cohesion”, “not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States, 
nor shall it distort competition between them”.38  The only glaring omission in 
comparison to the provisions of the old EU Treaty listed above is the deletion of the 
language stipulating that enhanced cooperation “respects the acquis communautaire and 
the measures adopted under the other provisions of the said Treaties”39, though 
presumably this is encompassed within Article 326 TFEU’s stipulation that “[a]ny 
enhanced cooperation shall comply with the Treaties and Union law”.40 
 
The bottom line is that under the previous Treaty framework, as well as under the 
present Treaty framework brought by the Lisbon Treaty, the requisite conditions which 
must be satisfied for enhanced cooperation are no “walk in the park”. Save for the 
explicit addition of the condition concerning the internal market, the other requirements 
have remained firmly inscribed in the Treaty framework, even if in slightly modified 
form, from the beginning.  As such, many commentators’ remarks concerning the 
restrictive nature of these substantive conditions, particularly those concerning distortions 
of competition and barriers to trade, among others, remain as true post-Lisbon as was the 
case post-Nice and post-Amsterdam. It is these conditions that have decisive bearing on 
the potential for enhanced cooperation to play a role in European contract law, and in the 
interests of clarity, their evaluation is divided into three subsets relating to, first, the 
assumptions about the existence of Union competence; second, the internal market-
related conditions; and third, the status of enhanced cooperation as a last resort. 
 
12.2.2.1 The existence of Union competence:  A boomerang to constitutionality 
As seen above, several of the conditions in the Treaties make clear or assume that  
that enhanced cooperation is limited to activities for which there exists a proper legal 
basis in the Treaties.  In other words, enhanced cooperation is permitted for areas in 
which the Union has been conferred the requisite competence under the principle of 
conferral; a fortiorari, in areas where the Union does not have the requisite competence, 
enhanced cooperation cannot be resorted to.41 Consequently, it is often missed that the 
application of enhanced cooperation to European contract law acts as a “boomerang” to 
constitutionality because it predicates the inquiry as to whether the adoption of a 
European contract law instrument falls within the competences of the Union and can be 
considered to be aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union. This explains why in the 
relevant literature contemplating enhanced cooperation in the context of European 
contract (or private) law, the conversation eventually ends up raising the matter of 
competence anyways.  Thus, for those who take a negative position on the Union’s 
competence to adopt a comprehensive European contract law instrument, it is strange that 
                                                 
38
 Article 326, second para. TFEU. 
39
 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
40
 Article 326, first para. TFEU.  
41
 See, e.g., A. Dashwood, “States in the European Union”, 23 European Law Review 201, 210-211 (1998); 
Tuytschaever, supra note 3, at 52. 
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enhanced cooperation is put forward as a mechanism to salvage the endeavour.42  
Importantly, then, in order to have recourse to enhanced cooperation, this requires the 
determination that the particular contract law instrument falls within the scope of the 
Union’s competence.  If not, one need not proceed any further, as enhanced cooperation 
is precluded.   
 
Interestingly, in a recent publication, Professor John A. Usher pondered whether 
enhanced cooperation could serve as a useful method of resolving controversies 
concerning different Member States’ perceptions about the scope of Community 
competence:  those Member States that were of the view that a particular matter fell 
outside the scope of Community competence would simply not participate in it.43 This 
presumably would leave those Member States that were of the opposite opinion to 
proceed with such action under enhanced cooperation.  While it is unclear how much 
Professor Usher himself was advocating such a position44, in all due respect to this 
scholar, this may not be beneficial for European contract law since it would leave the 
matter of competence unsettled and have the potential to exacerbate tensions among the 
Member States even further.  Such a position would also seem to depend upon the area of 
competence concerned, since it may have more relevance to discreet areas divorced from 
the Community’s core competences and objectives such as those concerning the internal 
market in which a European contract law instrument (optional or otherwise) is incased.45   
 
As argued in Chapter 9, a case can be made that Article 95 EC and/or Article 308 
EC (and their counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty) provide sufficient competence for the 
European Union to adopt a European contract law instrument (optional or otherwise) 
pursuant to its objectives related the internal market.46  Of course, there may continue to 
be differing opinions on the subject. The point here is that either way, the determination 
of competence has to be made; it is a precondition for enhanced cooperation itself, which 
adds further impetus to the constitutionality of European contract law.  Moreover, given 
the potential linkage of a European contract law instrument to the Union’s internal 
market competences under Articles 95 and 308 EC, this beckons further inquiry into the 
internal market-related conditions stipulated for enhanced cooperation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 See, e.g., J. Ziller, “The Legitimacy of the Codification of Contract Law in View of the Allocation of 
Competences between the European Union and its Member States”, in The Politics of a European Civil 
Code 89, 113 (M.W. Hesselink ed., Kluwer, 2006). 
43
 See J.A. Usher, “Enhanced Cooperation or Flexibility in the Post-Nice Era”, in Accountability and 
Legitimacy in the European Union 97, 112 (A. Arnull and D. Wincott eds, Oxford Univ. Press, 2002). 
44
 He framed the matter as being suggested by a recent doctoral thesis:  id., at 112 n.48. 
45
 This was strongly asserted in a contribution submitted by MEP Andrew Duff during the European 
Convention, which provided a well-versed summary of the various reasons why enhanced cooperation 
should not be used on a general basis. See Contribution by Mr. Andrew Duff, member of the Convention,  
“Do we really need enhanced cooperation?”, CONV 759/03 CONTRIB 336, dated 22 May 2003. In 
particular, he stressed that while it was well-suited for the security and defence dimension, it was “a much 
less satisfactory way to manage disagreements over the core competences of the Union to which all 
[Me]mber [S]tates have in any case to subscribe, and where the integrity of the acquis is at stake”. Id, at 3. 
46
 See Chapter 9, particularly §§ 9.3-9.4. 
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12.2.2.2  The internal market-related conditions:  Linkage to Articles 95 and 308 EC 
Assuming a proper legal basis, several of the aforementioned conditions, which 
can be grouped under the category of internal market-related conditions, present further 
stumbling blocks to the allowance of enhanced cooperation in relation to European 
contract law.  To recall, under the Treaty, enhanced cooperation must not “undermine the 
internal market”.47  Related thereto, enhanced cooperation cannot “constitute a barrier to 
or discrimination in trade between the Member States” or “distort competition between 
them”.48  As the Treaty provisions on enhanced cooperation have not yet been resorted to, 
it is difficult to determine the extent to which there is the room for maneuver in the 
interpretation of these conditions.   Interestingly, there was somewhat of a “test case” 
documented by one commentator in connection with the unsuccessful proposal to use 
enhanced (then closer) cooperation in relation to the Community measure establishing the 
European company statute, which was eventually adopted under the normal Community 
method pursuant to Article 308 EC.49  As an optional form existing alongside national 
company law, its proposed legal basis ultimately centered on Article 308 EC requiring 
unanimous voting in the Council, with the result that it was held up by one Member State, 
Spain, in the face of agreement by then all other fourteen Member States.50  When 
enhanced cooperation was proposed, Spain challenged this plan as violating the requisite 
conditions, arguing among other things that it would create barriers to trade and 
distortions of competition and otherwise undermine the internal market, as well as 
negatively affect the Community acquis and the interests of non-participating Member 
States.51  In response, the Council’s Legal Service apparently found that all the requisite 
conditions for enhanced cooperation were met and that there was no proof of such a 
negative impact on the internal market, since by virtue of its optional form, it would not 
preclude the national business forms from cooperating and establishing themselves 
anywhere in the internal market.52 The significance to be gleaned from this episode is 
hard to quantify, since the Council’s approach was not determinative, and it cannot be 
discounted that the Court of Justice would take a different approach to the interpretation 
of the relevant conditions.53   
 
Nevertheless, even assuming a flexible interpretation of these conditions, there are 
both textual and structural arguments underlying enhanced cooperation in the Treaty, 
which evidence special vigilance when using it in the internal market setting.  Textually, 
                                                 
47
 For the previous Treaty framework, see supra note 21 and accompanying text; for the Lisbon Treaty, see 
supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
48
 For the previous Treaty framework, see supra note 22 and accompanying text; for the Lisbon Treaty, see 
supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
49
 J.M. de Areilza, “The Reform of Enhanced Cooperation Rules: Towards Less Flexibility?”, in the Many 
Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, supra note 3, 27, at 33-34. 
50
 As a sidepoint, recourse to Article 308 EC had not always been the case; there had been mention of 
Article 95 EC in previous proposals concerning this measure, which contributed to the controversy over the 
relationship between the two provisions.  See K. Gutman, “Case C-66/04, Smoke Flavorings; Case C-
436/03, SCE; & Case C-217/04, ENISA”, 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 147, 178 (Winter 
2006/2007). 
51
 de Areilza, supra note 49, at 33. 
52
 Id., at 33-34. 
53
 Id., at 34. 
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the conditions precluding barriers to trade and distortions of competition were perceived 
from the beginning as discouraging the use of enhanced cooperation in areas that could 
gravely affect the achievements made in the internal market, especially in fields 
involving Community harmonisation measures.54  Going back to the political 
negotiations surrounding enhanced cooperation in the Amsterdam Treaty, there had been 
attempts by several Member States to exclude enhanced cooperation explicitly from 
various fields including the fundamental freedoms, the internal market, and the 
competition rules, among others.55 The fact that an additional provision was added by the 
Nice Treaty protecting the internal market, even if implying that enhanced cooperation 
could indeed touch upon this area, can be taken to ingrain even further that the 
Community activities revolving around the internal market must not be endangered by 
enhanced cooperation.  Thus, while enhanced cooperation is not wholly excluded from 
areas within the internal market, those matters vital for the functioning of the internal 
market would seem to carry special vigilance so as to ensure that enhanced cooperation is 
not taken so far as to destroy the uniform application of Community measures in this 
area.  This view serves to reconcile the reason for inserting a specific provision 
precluding from the internal market from being undermined alongside conditions that 
already existed precluding barriers to trade and distortions of competition. 
 
Structurally, much has been made of the apparent resemblance of the internal- 
market-related conditions for enhanced cooperation – i.e., not to undermine the internal 
market, not to constitute a barrier to trade, and not to distort competition between the 
Member States – with the requirements of Articles 94 EC and 95 EC, even if situated in 
different contexts.  For example, in the years following the first Tobacco Advertising 
judgment, one scholar considered that just as the Court had circumscribed the use of 
Article 95 EC to eliminate only “appreciable” distortions of competition, the differences 
in national legislation resulting from enhanced cooperation would only fall afoul of the 
Treaty if they were deemed “appreciable”.56 This view seems to suggest that Article 95 
EC and enhanced cooperation are in somewhat of an inverse relationship:  as the 
requirement for distortions of competition is interpreted narrowly under Article 95 EC, 
this serves to loosen up recourse to enhanced cooperation, or vice versa.  Presumably, 
similar remarks could be made for barriers to trade in this regard.  Yet, a crucial 
assumption seems to be that the concept of distortions of competition or barriers to trade 
for the purposes of Article 95 EC is interpreted in similar fashion to its usage in the 
Treaty as regards the conditions for enhanced cooperation.  Again, given that enhanced 
cooperation has not yet been formally resorted to, there is no case law of the Court of 
Justice so far that hints at an answer to this question. Nevertheless, the context and the 
teleology of the two sets of provisions are different.  Generally speaking, Article 95 EC is 
                                                 
54
 H. Kortenberg, “Closer Cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam”, 35 Common Market Law Review 833, 
849 (1998). 
55
 See H. Bribosia, “De la subsidiarité à la coopération renforcée”, in La traité d’Amsterdam: espoirs et 
déceptions 23, 55 n.118 (Y. Lejeune ed., Bruylant, 1998); Tuytschaever, supra note 3, at 55-56. 
56
 Usher, supra note 43, at 99. Before the Tobacco Advertising I judgment was delivered, Professor Stephen 
Weatherill noted that with the wide breadth given to distortions of competition under Article 95 EC, this 
cut down on potential recourse to enhanced (then closer) cooperation.  See Weatherill, supra note 4, at 28-
30; S. Weatherill, “Flexibility or Fragmentation: Trends in European Integration”, in The State of the 
European Union 1, 10 (J.A. Usher ed., Longman, 2000).  
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used for the adoption of legislation to achieve the Community objective of ensuring the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market by combating obstacles to the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms and/or appreciable distortions of competition. 
Much of the concern underlying the stipulation of “appreciable” distortions of 
competition in Tobacco Advertising I was to ensure that the Community legislator had 
recourse to Article 95 EC to combat distortions of competition but that a limit must be 
placed on this condition so as to ensure that it was not stretched too far. By comparison, 
enhanced cooperation is a departure from the Community method altogether, thereby 
allowing further action in areas covered by the Treaty involving some, not all Member 
States; thus, the limitations on recourse to enhanced cooperation stem from preservation 
of the functioning of the internal market from possible fragmentation by allowing a 
proposed form of enhanced cooperation to proceed. As such, the provisions on enhanced 
cooperation embody different purposes than Article 95 EC.  Ensuring that proposed 
enhanced cooperation does not distort competition, constitute barriers to trade, or 
otherwise undermine the internal market takes on a broader cast in light of protecting the 
achievements of the Community (or Union) acquis sensu lato that is similar but does not 
seem to be directly transferable from the case law on Article 95 EC.   
 
That being said, the two sets of provisions are related to each other to some 
extent.  Assuming that the underlying legal basis of the action envisaged – as in the case 
of a European contract law instrument – is Articles 95 and/or 308 EC (depending on the 
form of the instrument) with the objective of eliminating barriers to trade and/or 
appreciable distortions of competition in the internal market, this presents tensions with 
the resort to enhanced cooperation.   For Article 95 EC, it is on the basis of the problems 
plaguing the internal market that action is envisaged to approximate the contract laws of 
the Member States under this provision. As such, resort to enhanced cooperation, which 
by its nature involves only a number of participating Member States, has the potential to 
preclude the objectives of approximation in the first place.  Likewise, for Article 308 EC, 
assuming an optional instrument running alongside the national contract regimes, it could 
be argued that this merely adds an additional instrument to be availed of by parties of 
their own choosing and hence would not unduly disrupt the functioning of the internal 
market along the lines of the situation involving the European company statute.  Still, 
proceeding via enhanced cooperation may be likely to reintroduce problems for the 
internal market that the instrument concerned was intended to remedy.  If such an 
instrument, whether optional or not, could be availed of by parties only in certain 
Member States, this carries the potential to preserve, even exacerbate, the apparent 
barriers and distortions of competition as between the Member States that do and do not 
participate and to introduce discrimination in trade as between the parties that can and 
cannot have resort to such an instrument.   
 
As a result, while the adoption of a particular instrument by only some, not all, 
Member States could be viewed by some as furthering cross-border transactions in the 
internal market, the tradeoff of involving only some Member States could arguably fall 
on the side of undermining the internal market by partitioning it in different stages of 
development depending on the Member States in which the instrument would be adopted 
or not. Certainly, each proposed form of enhanced cooperation must be taken on a case-
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by-case basis.  But for European contract law, this evidences a structural tension between 
the Community’s internal market competences and the internal market-related conditions 
of enhanced cooperation:  as the arguments for recourse to Article 95 and 308 EC 
become more pressing, this has the tendency to detract from possible recourse to 
enhanced cooperation in this setting. 
 
12.2.2.3  Enhanced cooperation as a last resort:  Linkage to the principle of sincere 
   cooperation 
 
To recall, Article 43a EU stipulated that enhanced cooperation can be taken “only 
as a last resort, where it has been established within the Council that the objectives of 
such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by applying the relevant 
provisions of the Treaty”.57  As highlighted in the discussion of this provision during the 
European Convention, it left certain questions open such as when and how the Council 
can establish the situation is deadlocked, which the changes brought by the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty and ultimately the Lisbon Treaty attempted to resolve.58 That being 
said, whether under the past or present Treaty framework, an express condition for 
enhanced cooperation continues to be that it is a mechanism of “last resort”, meaning that 
is only triggered under circumstances when action under the Community method has 
failed.59 In other words, the Treaty dictates that the Member States do not have “free 
choice” to pick and choose between proceeding via the normal decision-making process 
or via enhanced cooperation.  The former comes first. 
 
In this regard, the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 10 EC, 
now Article 4(3) EU of the Lisbon Treaty, plays an important role here. On the basis of 
this provision, Member States are under the obligation to “facilitate the achievement of 
the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the Union’s objectives.”60 This provision suggests that the Member States are under the 
obligation to work with each other, and with the European institutions concerned, to 
direct action under the traditional decision-making process involving in principle all 
Member States as far as possible in the area concerned, which again redirects attention on 
constitutionality. 
 
For European contract law, this means that the Member States and the European 
institutions must work as much as possible through the decision-making processes 
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stipulated under the legal basis concerned for the adoption of one or more European 
instruments in contract law depending upon what is envisaged. Enhanced cooperation is 
therefore not an automatic solution than can be thrown out as a middle ground so as to 
allow those Member States most desiring of future progress in European contract law to 
go ahead, while appeasing the more skeptical Member States that prefer to stay behind, 
without first proceeding through the normal channels involving all Member States 
pursuant to the relevant legal basis.  Thus, while the form and the content of a possible 
European contract law instrument remain to be seen, it is incumbent upon the Member 
States to attempt to cooperate amongst each other to reach agreement in the decision-
making process before resorting to enhanced cooperation. As such, enhanced cooperation 
is at most a “second rate” solution coming after Union action pursuant to the Treaty has 
been tried. 
 
12.2.3 Should enhanced cooperation be granted?  
Even if a proposed form of enhanced cooperation in relation to European contract 
law could be deemed to satisfy all of the requisite conditions – which given the 
discussion above is by no means certain – there are further arguments that strongly 
counsel against the use of enhanced cooperation in connection with European contract 
law. These arguments pertain to, first, the status of the measures adopted under the 
auspices of enhanced cooperation and their relationship to the Community acquis; and 
second, the lack of substantial involvement of all Member States, the European 
institutions, and interested stakeholders. 
 
First, as specified by the Treaty, measures adopted under the auspices of enhanced 
cooperation are only binding on the participating Member States and are not part of the 
Community acquis.61  As such, a European contract law instrument would not claim the 
status of a Community (or Union after Lisbon) legal instrument that applied to non-
participating Member States or even to future Member States acceding to the European 
Union. In essence, such an instrument would exist apart from the Community acquis in 
(consumer) contract law and would create complexities in terms of application in relation 
to relationships and transactions involving participating and non-participating Member 
States.  
 
Moreover, as directed by the Treaty, enhanced cooperation must “respect” the 
acquis communutaire and measures adopted under other provisions of the Treaties.62  As 
scholars have noted, this presents difficulties for any proposed enhanced cooperation 
since this assumes that the proposed enhanced cooperation can be neatly segregated from 
the Community acquis, “which is entirely at odds with the intertwining evolution of EC 
activity”.63  Yet, for European contract law, this is especially burdensome because it is 
rooted in various Community measures concerning consumer and commercial contract 
law.  The relationship between the European contract law project and the revision of the 
consumer acquis aptly bears this out.  Even if formally speaking action taken under 
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enhanced cooperation were argued to respect the acquis, practically speaking, there 
would be manifold complexities in terms of interplay between the proposed instrument 
and the surrounding body of Community measures. This is especially so in connection 
with the CFR.  Unless the CFR is adopted under the auspices of enhanced cooperation – 
which as envisaged now as a tool for better lawmaking by the European legislator itself 
seems unlikely – action under enhanced cooperation for the adoption of an optional 
contract law instrument would create the situation that it would be based – as envisaged 
by the Commission – on the CFR but would then be situated outside the institutional 
framework. Moreover, it may be the case that more than one optional instrument may 
eventually be adopted.  As such, using enhanced cooperation in this context may involve 
a different set of Member States for one instrument or type of action versus another.  At 
base, it would be devastating, and not the least bit ironic, that enhanced cooperation 
would be used as part of a project that was built on the impetus of improving the 
coherence of Community law.   
 
Second, enhanced cooperation presents further drawbacks on account of problems 
stemming from the lack of involvement of all Member States, the European institutions 
and bodies, and other relevant actors inside and outside the EU decision-making process. 
Starting with the Member States, at least one commentator has stressed that while 
enhanced (then closer) cooperation may have value for promoting specific projects with 
limited impact on the integration process, it is unlikely to “serve as an appropriate vehicle 
to advance highly debated projects of major interest for all Member States.”64 By the very 
nature of the European contract law project, there are important reasons why it should 
involve the participation of all Member States in principle, such as their input to the 
comparative nature of the project, as had already occurred in the CFR, and leaving some 
Member States out may create inevitable tensions and may even present difficulties in 
those Member States from joining later on.  For example, non-participating Member 
States may likely be suspicious as to the framing of an instrument that may or may not 
adequately reflect their contract law regime and could very well present problems for the 
possibility of adopting such an instrument in such Member States in future years.  This 
would be so whether it was the framing of a binding contract law instrument or even 
something akin to the CFR in which the representativeness of all Member States is part of 
the value and the utility of the project itself, as demonstrated by the Commission’s 
creation of a specific Member State expert group in this regard. In a word, the European 
contract law project by its very nature is a comparative project for the whole of the 
European Union; splintering it into the different factions of Member States could stunt its 
progress and eventual success. 
 
Similar remarks can be made with respect to the participation of the European 
institutions and bodies, as well as various stakeholder groups, involved in the debate. It is 
easy to lose sight of the fact that from the very beginning European contract law has been 
a project in which all of the various European institutions and bodies have played  
important roles.  In large part, the European Parliament and the European Council have 
served as motors and monitors of the project, and in their own way, the Council and the 
                                                 
64
 D. Hanf, “Flexibility Clauses in the Founding Treaties, From Rome to Nice”, in The Many Faces of 
Differentiation in EU Law, supra note 3, 3, at 24. 
Chapter 12:  Alternative and Complementary Routes in European Contract Law 
 492 
Commission have steered the discussion and the approach to be undertaken. The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions have each 
done their part to express the views of their composite members.  Likewise, the various 
categories of stakeholder including businesses, consumer organisations, legal 
practitioners, and academic scholars, throughout the European Union (and to some extent 
beyond) have played an indelible role in the development of European contract law, 
which has been carried through in the specific stakeholder and expert groups set up in 
connection with the CFR. Consequently, resort to enhanced cooperation could likely 
stymie the channels set up within the institutional framework concerning European 
contract law for ensuring the participation of the European institutions and various 
stakeholders.  Certainly, as dictated by the Treaty framework, the European institutions 
would still claim involvement and the Member States concerned would make use of such 
institutions in proceeding with enhanced cooperation.  Nevertheless, there is a perceptible 
danger that the roles played by the European institutions and bodies, as well as the 
various stakeholder groups, could be changed and to some extent undercut by recourse to 
enhanced cooperation in this setting.  
 
In all, while in principle there may be a case that a form of enhanced cooperation 
relating to European contract law could survive the hurdles of the requisite Treaty 
conditions under the past and present Treaty framework, in practice the European 
contract law project seems particularly ill-suited to this mechanism.  As demonstrated by 
the foregoing analysis, enhanced cooperation makes the need to address the 
constitutionality of European contract law more apparent; highlights the importance of 
involving all the Member States, the European institutions and bodies, and the various 
stakeholders within the institutional framework established for the European contract law 
project so far; and carries the potential to denigrate the achievements that can be attained 
by this project in various ways.   
 
12.3 An intergovernmental treaty  
12.3.1 General overview:  Distinguishing levels and approaches 
In the debate about European contract law, two key approaches to 
intergovernmental cooperation among the Member States have emerged so far:  first, the 
possible recourse to an intergovernmental treaty adopted by the Member States under the 
auspices of public international law outside the EU institutional framework; and second, 
the proposal for an ad hoc convention among the Member States inside this framework. 
As regards the first category, this can be further subdivided according to the number of 
Member States involved.  In the literature, this is embodied by the distinction between 
“parallel agreements” and “partial agreements”:  parallel agreements involve all Member 
States, whereas partial agreements, as the name implies, involve only some Member 
States.65   Yet, partial agreements have not been contemplated much, if at all, as a distinct 
route in the debate about European contract law. Thus, an intergovernmental treaty 
involving in principle all Member States will be the focal point of this discussion. In any 
event, partial agreements contain various drawbacks and problems that to a large extent 
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can already be dealt with in other sections of this chapter, i.e., the problems concerning 
the lack of participation of all Member States echo the discussion in the previous section 
concerning enhanced cooperation, and the drawbacks concerning the use of international 
conventions generally follow the discussion below.  
 
12.3.2 An intergovernmental treaty under public international law 
12.3.2.1  Historical relic of days past in the debate about European private law? 
In the 1990s, when the debate about European private law was getting underway, 
mention was frequently made in the literature to the possible recourse to an 
intergovernmental treaty adopted under the auspices of public international law as an 
alternative to the far-reaching approximation of national private law at the European 
level. Yet, as the debate evolved through the present day, references to this route steadily 
dropped off.  This can be illustrated by the evolution of the comprehensive work, 
Towards a European Civil Code, which encompassed the views of prominent scholars on 
various aspects concerning the debate about European private law through the course of 
its three editions published in 1994, 1998, and 2004. Originally, in the general 
introductory chapter authored by Professor Ewoud Hondius in the first edition published 
in 1994, he surmised that “a European Civil Code, although raising serious constitutional 
issues, is not constitutionally impossible (e.g., by way of Treaty)”.66  In subsequent 
editions of this work published in 1998 and 2004, however, the parenthetical reference to 
the use of a Treaty was gone, albeit the general statement remained.67 Just as subtle was 
the transformation of Professor Peter-Christian Müller-Graff’s chapter in the same work, 
which originally framed the discussion of various alternatives including the use of an 
intergovernmental treaty as “Private Law Unification by Means other than of 
Codification”68, but eventually gave way to focus on “EC Directives as a Means of 
Private Law Unification” in the two later editions69, even if his negative opinion on the 
prospect of resorting to such a treaty remained steady throughout.   
 
The popularity of the use of an intergovernmental treaty during this time period is 
not altogether surprising, since by and large these were the years when the use of an 
international convention was envisaged by the Treaties in relevant areas, e.g., the use of 
conventions in the third pillar70 and for particular matters under Article 293 EC in the 
Community pillar.71   Yet, starting with the Amsterdam Treaty, the tide gradually turned 
away from the use of intergovernmental conventions within the EU institutional 
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framework, particularly for policy fields in the Community pillar.  The quintessential 
example is the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters under Article 65 EC, whereby 
various international conventions – including those that entered into force such as 
Brussels and Rome Conventions and others that had not yet obtained all the necessary 
ratifications, such as the Insolvency, Service and Brussels II Conventions – were 
progressively converted into Community instruments.72  With the Lisbon Treaty, this is 
even more apparent, with the elimination of both Article 293 EC and the use of 
conventions in the former third pillar. Interestingly, in the Final Report of Working 
Group IX on Simplification during the European Convention, it was emphasised that 
there were a number of reasons why the use of conventions in the third pillar should be 
abolished:  they had rarely been used since the Amsterdam Treaty; most conventions 
never entered into force; and most were replaced by Community measures in any event.73   
 
As a result, while the prospect of the use of an intergovernmental treaty may 
understandably have been a “tool of the trade” during the timeframe in which the debate 
about European private law was gearing up, matters have changed since then.  In other 
words, the potential recourse to such a treaty can be viewed at least to some extent as an 
historical relic of days past in the debate about European private law, which has largely 
been superseded by more recent developments concerning the European contract law 
project, especially concerning the revision of the consumer acquis, the CFR, and the 
prospect of one or more optional instruments.  That being said, the alternative route of an 
intergovernmental treaty has not been entirely lost from view.  Scholars still continue to 
make reference to this possibility in the literature74, which leaves questions open as to the 
extent to which it may serve as a potential vehicle in the future course of European 
contract law.   
 
Noticeably, the use of an intergovernmental treaty in this context hinges on the 
constitutional assessment of European contract law.  To some extent, the impetus for the 
suggestion for an intergovernmental treaty seems to have been motivated by scholars’ 
assumptions about the lack of sufficient Community competence over the whole of 
contract law or private law generally.75  Thus, part and parcel of this mechanism lies the 
inquiry into Community competence in contract law or other fields of private law, since it 
is to be wondered whether if such competence can be found, this would remove much of 
the impetus for this mechanism in the first place.  As a related point, the use of an 
intergovernmental treaty also implicates the objectives of the European contract law 
project generally.  This is because the recourse to this mechanism could presumably open 
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up the matter to the involvement of non-Member States.  As such, it places emphasis on 
honing in on the objectives sought by the European contract law project in the sense of 
requiring verification as to whether it is the Community’s objectives related to the 
functioning of the internal market at stake or other objectives that would be best served, 
or not, by the inclusion of third States and the proper placement of the project as a matter 
best suited for European or international fora.  Consequently, while perhaps the use of an 
intergovernmental treaty is more historical relic than present reality, it nevertheless serves 
to place matters bearing on the constitutionality of European contract law centerstage. 
 
12.3.2.2 Problems with an intergovernmental treaty:  Potential illegalities, 
   drawbacks, and misconceptions 
 
Surprisingly, detailed inquiry is rarely given to the question as to whether an  
intergovernmental treaty would even be allowed under European law, let alone suitable 
for the purposes of European contract law.  This is because upon close inspection, there  
are serious problems raised by this alternative route. To begin with, it is often overlooked 
that for matters falling within the Treaties, there is no “free choice” as between the 
Member States’ recourse to proceeding outside the Treaty framework by way of an 
intergovernmental treaty as opposed to inside the Treaty framework pursuant to the 
relevant legal basis. As underscored by commentators, the allowance for all (as opposed 
to just some) Member States to proceed via an intergovernmental treaty would pose a 
direct threat to the achievements of the Union legal order and thus constitute a violation 
of the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 10 EC, now Article 4(3) EU of the 
Lisbon Treaty, to the extent that the particular treaty was not permitted by the Treaties 
themselves.76  This would particularly grave in relation to European contract law since 
the envisaged solutions in the debate have been framed inside, not outside, the European 
institutional framework with a view to resolving problems concerning the Community 
acquis and finding solutions based on the Community’s objectives set down in the 
Treaties.    
 
 Second, the use of an intergovernmental treaty heralds countless drawbacks that 
would constitute in many ways a “backwards move” for the European contract law 
project. As witnessed by the debate, the path of European contract law is littered with 
various international conventions, most of which have not yet been ratified by all 
Member States, are plagued with Member State reservations and derogations, and lack 
uniform interpretation by an authoritative judicial body, namely the Court of Justice.77  
Instruments at the heart of European contract law, such as the 1980 (Vienna) United 
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Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)78 amply 
bear this out.79  Taken seriously, an intergovernmental treaty would reintroduce the very 
problems for European contract law in terms of precluding a single set of uniform rules 
for parties engaging in cross-border transactions throughout the European Union, which 
prompted much of the debate about European contract law in the first place.  As such, it 
would likely reintroduce problems concerning the coherency and the uniform application 
of Community law that the European contract law project seeks to remedy.   
 
Finally, in the interests of completeness, there may be misconceptions that such a 
treaty can be taken into account in connection with the principle of subsidiarity.   Over 
the years, there was considerable ambiguity as regards the extent to which 
intergovernmental cooperation among all the Member States, as opposed to each Member 
State acting individually or merely some Member States, could act as a counterweight to 
Community action for the purposes of the principle of subsidiarity under the second 
paragraph of Article 5 EC.80  At present, there are strong indications in the case law on 
Article 95 EC that the Court takes a negative view to such a position.  In the 
Biotechnology case, the Court ruled that it was the action of the Member States “alone” 
that is taken into account in the subsidiarity calculus and that intergovernmental 
cooperation did not displace the need for Community action in the internal market under 
Article 95 EC.81  This was further underscored in Tobacco Advertising II, whereby the 
Court took note of the problems plaguing the relevant convention in the area concerned, 
e.g., not all Member States had ratified it and it would not rule out the risk of divergent 
developments in national laws, which did not detract from Community harmonisation 
under Article 95 EC.82  As demonstrated by these cases, recourse to an intergovernmental 
treaty does not offset Community action in the internal market, but in fact has the 
tendency to bolster the need for such action under the relevant provisions of the Treaty. 
 
12.3.3 An ad hoc convention method 
Among the forms of intergovernmental cooperation inside the EU institutional 
framework contemplated as part of the debate about European private law generally83, 
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one of the most well-known is the potential recourse to an ad hoc convention method 
proposed by Professor Walter van Gerven.  As he explained: 
 
Under that procedure codification could be prepared by experts designated  
by the [M]ember [S]tates who, at an early stage, would take the advice from 
parliamentary commissions in the European Parliament and the national parlia- 
ments on the basis, for example, of a questionnaire approved by the European  
Parliament concerning important value judgments to be made or policy decisions 
to be taken. Once answers would have been received from those parliamentary 
commissions, draft bills could be prepared, on any one subject, by committees  
of experts, and then made public to invite comments from all segments of society. 
After such broad consultation and ensuing amendments, the draft bills would be 
submitted to final deliberation in a ‘Convention’ (which may take the advice of 
any group or person it wants to hear) and finally adopted, in view of submission 
to approval by the [M]ember [S]tates, by the Council and the European Parlia- 
ment. As was the case of the special body set up for the drafting of the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ‘Convention’ would be composed of repre- 
sentatives from the Community institutions and the national parliaments.  
Obviously, the agreement should provide for a preliminary ruling procedure 
before a Community court to maintain uniformity of interpretation. After it has 
been approved by all [M]ember [S]tates, the  agreement would come into force, 
e.g., when half of them have ratified it, on those [M]ember [S]tates’ territory.84   
 
He attempted to counter criticism that the use of a convention would tend to “bury” the 
project for a European civil code for several years, by pointing out that it would 
encourage the Member States to cooperate and could even provide the impetus for the 
insertion of a solid legal basis in the Treaty for such an endeavour.85    
 
 In view of the foregoing, this proposal for an ad hoc convention seems to have 
been based on two key motivations. First, as alluded to by the previous statement, it was 
generally concerned with far-reaching Community action in national private law (i.e., a 
“European civil code”, which was en vogue at the time) and outlined an alternative 
course of action on the grounds that the Community lacked sufficient competence under 
the Treaty.86 Second, the proposal sought in large part to ensure the involvement of the 
European Parliament and national parliaments, as well as other interested parties, so as 
instill the proposed initiative with democratic tenets.87  It was not clear whether assuming 
that the Community could be considered to have sufficient competence in this regard, the 
impetus for such an ad hoc procedure would lessen, given the emphasis placed on these 
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democratic elements.88 In any event, the proposal brought the constitutionality of 
European contract law and other fields of private law to the fore.  It also paid  heed to the 
importance of ensuring the participation of various actors, which have played an 
increasing role in various activities concerning European contract law, particularly as 
regards the CFR. Arguably, with the advances made since this proposal was aired, these 
latter aspects are capable of being dealt with and improved upon within the framework of 
the European contract law project itself.   
 
 Indeed, with the ensuing progression of the European contract law project, the ad 
hoc convention method has lost much of its salience, and in fact, in later years, it seems 
to have been replaced by other suggestions, such as the use of an intergovernmental 
treaty under public international law89 or the OMC.90   In all fairness, Professor Walter 
van Gerven’s proposal was made long before the CFR and the European contract law 
project were underway, and thus, it presented a novel solution for European private law at 
the time.  With a present day perspective, however, it seems to have been superseded by 
the framework of activities and groups taking part in the preparation of the CFR and the 
European contract law project overall, with the prospect of a “European civil code” 
explicitly taken off the political agenda. Furthermore, given the constitutional climate in 
the aftermath of the failed Draft Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty has likely 
sapped much of the impetus for another “convention” for the foreseeable future.   
 
12.4 “Softer” models:  The OMC, American techniques, and the CFR  
12.4.1 General overview 
This section examines the viability of three so-called “softer” models implicated 
in the debate about European contract law:  the OMC, certain American techniques (i.e., 
Restatements, uniform and model laws, and the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC)), 
and the CFR.   They are referred to as “softer” models on account of the fact that they 
carry the potential to exert a lesser impact on the national contract law regimes or to 
afford latitude to the Member States in varying degrees as compared to a comprehensive 
European contract law instrument.91 As such, these three mechanisms are not such 
unusual bedfellows as may first appear, and in fact, it is only when the American 
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techniques and the CFR are placed side-by-side that fruitful comparative reflection can be 
gleaned in relation to European and American approaches to matters of contract law.  
 
12.4.2 The OMC 
 At present, the Open Method of Coordination or the OMC is perhaps one of the 
most hotly debated subjects in European scholarship. As indicated by the rising volume 
of literature on the subject, the OMC evades a short or easy description, since despite the 
label, it does not constitute a single mechanism that applies the same way in the area 
concerned, but in fact embodies a wide variety of processes and proceeds on a case by 
case basis in relation to the particular policy field concerned.92 Still, it has been 
summarily defined as follows: 
 
 It is a new form of coordination of national policies consisting of the Member 
 States, at their own initiative or at the initiative of the Commission, defining 
 collectively, within the respect of national and regional diversities, objectives 
 and indicators in a specific area, and allowing those Member States, on the  
 basis of national reports, to improve their knowledge, to develop exchanges of 
 information, views, expertise and practices, and to promote, further to agreed 
objectives, innovative approaches which could possibly lead to guidelines or 
 recommendations.93 
  
As such, by taking account of the standard “laundry list” of general characteristics 
usually associated with it – e.g., general benchmarking, mutual learning, etc. – the OMC 
is a method that essentially places the Member States in the drivers’ seat, so to speak, as 
far as the action to be achieved.    
 
 As far as European contract law is concerned, discussion as to the potential 
relevance of the OMC is just beginning to flourish. The linkage between the OMC and 
European contract law is not altogether surprising, given that the Commission’s 2003 
Action Plan on European contract law paid heed to the possibilities offered by the OMC 
as part of the “mixed approach” to be taken in this setting.94  Since then, however, it has 
not been further mentioned by the European institutions in the institutional documents 
disseminated in the debate thus far. In the scholarly literature, however, the OMC has 
been considered to have value for the European contract law project. For example, 
Professor Walter van Gerven is a well-known advocate of the role to be played by the 
OMC in European contract law (and European private law generally).95 Distilled from his 
various publications, his advocacy of this mechanism in the context of the debate about 
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European contract law seems to rest on the following two-part rationale:  first, this field is 
a sensitive area in which the Union has not been given sufficient competence to 
approximate the whole of contract law, let alone private law generally96; and second, it 
constitutes a beneficial mode by which to further the convergence of contract (or private) 
law and to address the “spill-over” effects resulting from the interaction between national 
and European law by means such as sharing best practices, enhancing mutual learning, 
and increasing familiarity with the national legal systems involving both national and 
European authorities.97 Notably, he finds similarities between the function of the OMC 
and the CFR as promoting cross-border dialogue between the Member States on matters 
of private law, but envisages the specific application of the OMC in this setting as a 
complementary mechanism to the CFR project so as to bolster both educational aspects 
and practical aspects involving judges and practitioners.98 Similarly, other scholars have 
considered the potential role of the OMC in European contract (and private) law, and in 
doing so, have stressed the competence factor, i.e. finding it suitable in areas where the 
Union has no or limited competence.99 
 
 In this way, the potential application of the OMC to matters of European contract 
law (or European private law generally) enlivens questions about Community 
competence.  This is particularly so, since so far it has been a common attribute of the 
OMC that it has largely taken place in areas where Community competence is limited or 
non-existent under the Treaty, as in the case of policy fields restricting the Union to 
taking merely “supporting measures” and thus where approximation is excluded.  Indeed, 
this was particularly stressed by several Working Groups during the European 
Convention.100 Moreover, it must be recognised that the OMC carries with it the baggage 
associated with the so-called “new modes of governance” in terms of giving way to both 
novel solutions in European policy-making and tensions resulting from its aptitude to 
bypass the mainstream decision-making process.101 The OMC stands apart from the 
traditional Community method and thus breathes fresh air into other, more flexible ways 
of policy making involving a wide variety of actors in the European Union.102  By the 
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same token, the OMC breeds fears of evasion of the normal Community methods 
involving the European institutions and of elitism in terms of cutting against the 
participation of various actors involved.103   
 
 Consequently, as applied to European contract law, the potential role played by 
the OMC necessitates caution so as not to inject inadvertently even more controversy into 
the debate.  Much will depend upon its particular form and application in this setting, and 
it remains to be seen whether it will be “picked up” by the European institutions in the 
forthcoming years.  Indeed, this is a subject that warrants further research within the 
context of European contract law.104 Nevertheless, at present, the OMC has generally not 
been posited as an alternative route standing on its own to displace the activities of the 
European contract law project, such as the CFR or an optional instrument, but instead to 
play a complementary role tied to bolstering the institutional framework surrounding 
European contract law.  Thus, it is arguable that attributes or expressions of the OMC can 
be subsumed and even improved upon inside, as opposed to outside, the European 
contract law project itself.  
 
12.4.3 American techniques  
 Techniques taken from the American private law framework in the form of 
Restatements, uniform and model laws, and the UCC have a complex and ambiguous 
relationship to the debate about European contract law. As underscored in the European 
Parliament’s 1994 Resolution, Restatements, uniform laws, and model laws are not 
formally recognised in the European setting, and there are certain legal instruments 
already at the disposal of the European legislator that serve a similar role.105  
Nevertheless, references to such techniques have steadily made their way into the debate 
about European contract law106, and therefore, beg salient questions as to their potential 
viability in this setting.   
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 First, as far as Restatements are concerned, this American technique seems to 
attract divergent views.  On the one hand, as discussed in Chapter 5, the American 
Restatement continues to be readily associated with the work of prominent academic 
projects involved with European private law.107  On the other hand, when the American 
Restatement is specifically contemplated for use in the European setting, its utility is 
more speculative on account of the fact that it was built on the foundations of the 
American common law tradition and as such was meant for a judicial context wholly 
different from the European setting.108  When examined more closely, however, this 
situation essentially boils down to the  distinction between the Restatement in its more 
“functional” as opposed to “pure” American sense.    
 
By and large, the American Restatement project has played a much more 
prominent role in its functional sense as a general comparative method by which to 
formulate common principles concerning a particular field of private law, as compared to 
the transplantation of the American Restatement in its “pure” sense associated with the 
origins and development of the American Law Institute (the ALI).  Importantly, unlike 
the American Restatements that were intentionally conceived as non-binding instruments 
divorced from the legislative setting, several European academic projects with which the 
American Restatements are affiliated espouse the aim to turn their “comparative” product 
into binding law at the European level, which goes against the modus operandi of the 
Restatement in its American origins.  In addition, the conception of the American 
Restatement in its “functional” form shares much with the CFR in terms of its envisaged 
comparative role for use by the European and national authorities. It thus may be 
wondered whether the discussion of the possible recourse to the American Restatement 
technique in the European contract law project has been transfigured by the current 
activities envisaged for the CFR or could even be viewed as already encompassed to 
some extent within the CFR project itself.   
 
 Second, the American technique of uniform and model laws, which includes the 
UCC as a comprehensive type of uniform law, has also permeated the debate about 
European contract law. As a starting point, it is not always clear whether either or both of 
these terms are being used in the strictly American sense as linked to the uniform law 
process of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the 
NCCUSL) or in conjunction with the ALI in the case of the UCC.  As already explained 
in Chapter 4, there is an important distinction be made in relation to the way uniform 
laws and model laws are viewed in the American setting:  uniform laws are specifically 
envisaged for adoption by state legislatures in principle without the insertion of non-
uniform amendments in areas where uniformity among the states is needed, whereas 
model laws constitute more of a guiding norm pertaining to areas where uniformity is not 
a priority or where a particular uniform law has not garnered general acceptance across 
the states and has essentially been demoted.109  Thus, from the American perspective, 
talking about the possible use of uniform laws is a very different story than that 
concerning model laws, and in various instances it seems to be the case that it is really 
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uniform laws, not model laws, which is being referred to in the commentary surrounding 
European contract law. Nevertheless, both uniform and model laws seem equally ill-
equipped and even superfluous in connection with European contract law. 
 
 For both uniform and model laws, there is no exact equivalent in the European 
Union.  Yet, there are already several legal instruments in the Treaties that can arguably 
“do the job” better, particularly when it comes to matters of contract law.  The 
recommendation has been considered comparable to model laws (and Restatements110) by 
scholars111. This is because it allows the European institutions to adopt a non-binding 
instrument at the European level that can “recommend” suggested action to the Member 
States but does not place them under a binding obligation to do so. 112  Moreover, the 
directive is somewhat similar to a uniform law but with “bite”, since it is binding on the 
Member States as regards the result to be achieved but allows the Member States leeway 
as to the form and methods. Thus, it evades one of the chief defects of a uniform law in 
the sense that a Member State cannot choose to forego transposition of a directive or do 
so with the inclusion of non-uniform amendments that preclude its effectiveness and thus 
the objectives to be achieved. 
 
Moreover, it is not clear to what extent those who advocate the use of uniform and 
model laws are fully aware of their defects.  Particularly in the case of uniform laws, 
despite their name, they embody a route that gives the states full room for maneuver 
when it comes to the adoption of a particular act and thus provide no guarantee that any 
such uniformity will be achieved.  As illustrated in Chapter 4, this was as apparent with 
uniform laws covering a particular area of contract or commercial law, as it was with the 
UCC cutting across various such areas.  This may of course be why they were proposed, 
so as to lay the primary responsibility for European contract (or private) law in the hands 
of the Member States.  The uniform law process could thus be seen to represent a 
solution imbued in subsidiarity.113  Yet, making this proposal a reality has great aptitude 
to do more to harm than good in the context of the European contract law project.  If in 
fact an instrument of contract law is needed in the European setting, it is highly 
questionable whether utilising a method that leaves the Member States free to adopt it or 
not and to insert non-uniform amendments would be the answer. In short, transplanting 
some variety of the uniform law process in the European Union carries the danger of 
injecting the very problems that the European contract law project is attempting to 
overcome.   
 
Finally, with particular regard to the UCC, to recall from Chapter 4, the UCC 
embodies a “functional approach”, thereby encompassing rules in various areas of private 
law, including but not limited to contract law, with a view to ensuring a systematic 
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approach to commercial transactions among the states.114  Thus, the UCC automatically 
carries with it the assumption that the scope of coverage goes well beyond contract law 
into other fields of private law.  As discussed in Part Two, the extent to which rules on 
related fields of private law should be taken into account in the formulation of a 
European contract law instrument, optional or otherwise, has been a viable issue in the 
debate since the beginning and still remains to be decided.  Nevertheless, it should not be 
overlooked that, in addition to the problems associated with uniform laws generally, the 
contemplation of an American UCC in the European setting implies more comprehensive 
action, which has the potential to exacerbate tensions as regards the linkage of contract 
law to other areas of private law in the debate. 
 
Taking the foregoing into account, there is a strong case to be made that, aside 
from the more “methodological” form of the Restatement already resorted to in the 
context of European contract law, the American techniques of Restatements, uniform and 
model laws, and the UCC carry significant drawbacks in comparison to the instruments 
already available in the European setting, have the potential to denigrate the objectives to 
be achieved by the European contract law project, and in the case of the UCC, may even 
inflame sensitivities as regards the scope of action that needs to be taken.  Taking a step 
back, however, the American techniques help to illuminate striking parallels between the 
European Union and the United States in the approach taken to contract law and other 
fields of private law.  On the one hand, as demonstrated above, there are various 
arguments to support the position that techniques taken from the American private law 
framework should not be readily grafted onto the debate about European contract law and 
that the European Union has at its disposal a different array of legal instruments and 
techniques, which are better suited to remedy the problems in the field of European 
contract law.  On the other hand, although the specific techniques used in the European 
Union and the United States may be different, both the European and American 
frameworks seem to be moving in similar directions. The American private law 
framework as a whole embodies the use of sui generis instruments or hybrids – i.e., 
Restatements, uniform laws, model laws, and the UCC – that sit apart from the traditional 
federal and state statutes and constitute creative and novel solutions to address the 
problems associated with the diversity of state private law, including contract law, in the 
United States. The European Union seems to be heading in a similar direction in terms of 
creating its own sui generis, hybrid forms suitable for and adjusted to the European 
contract (or private) law context, as illustrated by the CFR and the prospect of one or 
more optional instruments in the field of contract law.   
 
As a result, while both the European Union and the United States have created 
mechanisms uniquely suited to each setting, both manifest similar paths in attempting to 
find the balance between “unity” and “diversity” in terms of what is needed to remedy 
the problems associated with the diversity of national or state contract laws (and other 
fields of private law) and what can be done to preserve leeway for the Member States in 
this regard.  Thus, while American techniques, at least in the way in which they have 
been conceived of in the United States, invite difficulties that discount their viability in 
the debate about European contract law, they still play an indirect role in directing 
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attention towards the novel instruments that are being created or will be created at the 
European level and their importance for the relationship between the European Union and 
the Member States in this setting. This leads to the discussion of the CFR. 
 
12.4.4 The CFR 
 At the time of writing, the constitutionality of the CFR is unsettled. This is 
understandable in the sense that the CFR project is still ongoing, such that the final 
decisions on this and other issues are still to come with the conversion of the academic or 
DCFR, in all or in part, to the final, political version of the CFR to be adopted at the 
European level in some shape or form.  This can explain why the Commission was loathe 
to inquire into this subject in the 2004 Communication and subsequent 2005 and 2007 
Progress Reports. Delving into the attributes of the CFR, however, reveals the importance 
of its place in the debate about European contract law and the need to confront its 
constitutional dimensions. 
 
In light of the evolution of the CFR within the European contract law project, the 
CFR essentially can be viewed in two ways.  As widely heralded by the European 
institutions, the first view of the CFR is that of a “better lawmaking” instrument for the 
European institutions in the formulation of measures in the area of contract law  (and 
other fields of private law as the case may be).  From this angle, it provides the 
background tools that feed into EU policy-making, with a view to improving the 
problems concerning the coherence and the quality of Community measures and making 
the European legislator aware of the background of national private law systems so as to 
ensure a “better fit” between such measures and the national legal orders.  As the UK 
delegation framed the matter in recent discussions in the Council, the CFR allows the 
European legislator to make an “informed decision” as to how it should address a 
particular issue in the decision-making process.115  As such, labels affixed to the CFR 
such as the “toolbox” description or even its very name – “Common Frame of Reference” 
– aptly fit this view.116  The second view of the CFR is linked to the prospect of an 
optional instrument in contract law, the idea being that the work on the CFR will 
constitute the basis for further discussion as to the need for such an instrument in 
European contract law. From this angle, it may serve as a gateway to a systematic 
European contract law instrument or at the very least help to refine the future path to be 
taken.   
 
These two views are useful for distinguishing the overarching character of the 
CFR from the tensions associated with it.  On the one hand, they demonstrate that the 
CFR stands as a novel, sui generis private law experiment taking place in the European 
Union.  From its envisaged progression from academic to political version, the CFR 
constitutes the unique blending of the European institutions and several academic 
projects and involves a wide range of actors at both the Union and Member State levels.  
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Indeed, it is easy to miss that the CFR represents a project that is wholly unprecedented 
in the European setting.  Each in their own way, the academic DCFR and the political 
CFR are destined to change the face of European law, whether in relation to the DCFR’s 
implications for comparative private law research and scholarship117, or in relation to the 
political CFR’s implications for lawmaking processes and European “governance” 
generally.  On the other hand, the CFR beckons considerable sensitivity particularly from 
the standpoint of EU competence, which was greatly stimulated by the breadth of the 
academic CFR to matters well beyond contract law and its structure resembling aspects 
of a code familiar to at least some Member States. Thus, as the Commission has not yet 
been forthcoming with its plans for the form that the CFR will take and the legal basis 
upon which it will be adopted, concerns continue to percolate throughout the literature 
stemming from the fears that the CFR is a “Trojan horse” for a full-blown European 
private law code or at least some form of far-reaching Union action in various fields of 
private law including contract law.118   
 
As a result, it seems to be the case that a large part of the sensitivity surrounding 
the CFR is not so much a criticism of its nature as a novel instrument never before known 
in the European Union as the “Common Frame of Reference”, but more on account of the 
lack of engagement as to where the CFR is going to lead and the form it will take, which 
then stimulates fears of its potential encroachment on the Member States’ competence 
over private law.   In other words, distinguishing the two views of the CFR makes for a 
very different “constitutional” picture.  As a non-binding instrument for “better 
lawmaking” in the European Union so as to underpin the framing of Union legislation 
with a view to upgrading its quality and ensuring its coherence with the national legal 
orders, the CFR embodies tenets of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.  Its 
flipside as a pathway for far-reaching Union action in contract law and other fields of 
private law evokes a very different response.   
 
This argues for a start to be made in confronting the constitutional dimensions of 
the CFR.  Even if it is a long-term project, the initiation of further dialogue amongst the 
European institutions and other interested parties and possibly further documentation at 
the European level would at least allow the matter to be placed on the table, as opposed to 
remaining hidden underneath.  While it is difficult at this juncture to provide salient 
outlines of the constitutional assessment, it is nevertheless important that the 
constitutionality of the CFR as a non-binding instrument for Union lawmaking is 
distinguished from its pathway to an optional instrument.  The objectives, the form, the 
binding nature, and hence the legal basis and the operation of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, are different, even if the two views of the CFR are 
interrelated.  As illustrated by the debate so far, an optional instrument in contract law 
running alongside the national legal orders has been rooted in the Community’s 
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objectives to improve the functioning of the internal market and in line with the analysis 
presented above there are strong arguments that Article 308 EC can serve as the legal 
basis to the extent that such an instrument, or certain elements, exceeds the scope of 
approximation under Article 95 EC.119  By comparison, a non-binding instrument to 
provide guidelines for the European legislator in preparing legislation in matters relating 
to contract law (and other fields of private law as the case may be) whether related to the 
internal market or not, has not been framed in terms of its aptitude for achieving the 
Union’s objectives in the internal market and thus may likely claim a different legal basis 
and form, such as an interinstitutional agreement that has been posited in the discourse.120 
   
 Importantly, however, as gleaned from the American setting, one does not replace 
the other.  In the United States, the need for instruments setting forth  a set of uniform 
rules for facilitating transactions in the American “single market” embodied by uniform 
laws and the UCC stands alongside the Restatement project generally envisaged to 
provide greater coherence and simplification in areas of state private law on a non-
binding basis. Likewise, in the European Union, whatever may come of the final CFR, 
the extent of the problems generated by disparities in national contract laws that present 
obstacles to trade and/or appreciable distortions of competition in the internal market are 
likely to persist notwithstanding an instrument gauged at improving EU lawmaking for 
the European institutions.  As such, while the final stages of the CFR project remain to be 
seen, the constitutionality of a European contract law instrument, optional or otherwise, 
loses none of its salience. 
 
12.5 Conclusion 
As the debate about European contract law (and European private law generally) 
has progressed, it has become something of a “buffet table” in which scholars often pick 
and choose among various alternative and complementary routes without detailed 
consideration as to whether such routes are allowed under EU law or would be better-
suited than mainstream forms of EU action under the Treaties.  Leaving aside the CFR, 
this analysis shows that most of the commonly mentioned alternative routes in European 
contract law, namely enhanced cooperation, an intergovernmental treaty, and the 
American techniques, entail drawbacks to varying degrees, which make them ill-
equipped to provide a suitable working alternative to a comprehensive European contract 
law instrument and in fact have the potential to take the European contract  law 
“backwards” by reintroducing problems that the European contract law project is trying 
to overcome and jeopardising the progress already attained.  With regard to the OMC, 
while its role in the European contract law project warrants further research, at present it 
constitutes a complementary route that in large part embodies methods that are capable of 
being subsumed within the activities taking place inside this project, as opposed to 
standing outside on its own.   
                                                 
119
 See Chapter 9, § 9.4. 
120
 See, e.g., M.W. Hesselink et al., “The legal basis for an optional instrument on European contract law”, 
Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2007/4, available at 
http:ssrn.com/abstract=1091119, at 66-69; House of Lords European Union Committee, “European 
Contract Law: the Draft Common Frame of Reference”, Twelfth Report of Session 2008-09, supra note 
116, points 72-73. 
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Together, these alternative and complementary routes illuminate three common 
themes.  First, they assume or beg questions concerning Union competence that 
stimulates the need for the constitutional assessment of European contract law, rather 
than demoting it as a passé topic. Second, they demonstrate the apparent tensions in 
proceeding outside, as opposed to inside, the confines of the EU institutional framework. 
Third, the American techniques reveal striking parallels between the European Union and 
the United States in relation to the approach taken to matters of contract (or private) law.  
In this way, these various routes make the constitutionality of European contract law 
shine brighter than ever and call attention to the unique and sui generis path of European 
contract law in attempting to find a balance in the European Union-Member State 
relationship in this setting. 
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13 
 
Conclusion 
  
Looking back over the course of this doctoral thesis, the constitutionality of 
European contract law has been an arduous and complex inquiry beset with numerous 
pitfalls and ambiguities the deeper one goes.  When the research for this doctoral thesis 
began, it was assumed that the investigation of the European Union’s competence in the 
field of contract law would mainly require parsing out the scope of certain prominent 
Treaty provisions cited in the debate on the basis of the relevant literature and case law.  
Yet, as the research proceeded, it became apparent, for example, that there were no 
universal definitions for most of the terms used in the debate; that not much consideration 
had been given to the extent to which issues regarding the European Union’s competence 
had been discussed in the institutional documents disseminated at the European level; and 
that the particular Treaty provisions cited in the debate (i.e., Articles 94, 95, 153, 65, 308 
EC and their counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty) and certain alternative and 
complementary routes to Union action in this setting each sat atop their own distinct set 
of institutional developments and controversies, all of which necessitated the construction 
of a semantic and a legal framework from the “ground up” in order to examine the 
constitutionality of European contract law.   
 
Furthermore, as regards comparative reflection between the European Union and 
the United States in this setting, it was also assumed that given the length of time in 
which several strands of the American private law framework cited in the debate, such as 
uniform laws, Restatements, and the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC), had 
developed, this would simply require scanning the relevant literature and case law in 
order to parse out salient issues relevant to European contract law.  Yet, with closer 
examination, it became apparent that there was in fact a deeper story underlying these 
strands that revealed numerous problems and repeated attempts to federalise areas of 
private law, including contract law, which had to be built “from scratch” by piecing 
together the relevant institutional documents and scattered publications over the years.  
Altogether, this makes the constitutionality of European contract law a “heavy” topic, 
both literally and figuratively.  Yet, by taking account of, first, the central findings 
emanating from the controlling purpose of this doctoral thesis, and second, the 
implications of the three-part framework (including the relevant chapters within each 
part) established by this doctoral thesis for the future path of the debate on European 
contract law, this may stimulate further discussion on this subject by European 
lawmakers and scholars. 
 
13.1 Central findings emanating from the controlling purpose 
 The central findings of this doctoral thesis can be gleaned by referring back to the 
controlling purpose of this doctoral thesis.  First, on the basis of the foregoing 
assessment, a case can be made that the European Union has been conferred sufficient 
competence under Articles 95 and/or 308 EC (now Articles 114 and/or 352 TFEU) to 
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adopt a comprehensive European contract law instrument in order to achieve its 
objectives to ensure the establishment and functioning of the internal market.  As 
examined in Chapter 9, in line with the case law so far, there are compelling arguments 
that Article 95 EC can serve as a proper legal basis for such an instrument approximating 
the contract laws of the Member States, and that Article 308 EC can serve as a proper 
legal basis for an optional instrument of contract law to the extent that it creates an 
optional set of contract law rules running alongside the national contract law regimes and 
exceeds the ambit of approximation under Article 95 EC.  Furthermore, while further 
case law is needed on the relationship between Articles 95 and 308 EC, it is likely that 
Articles 95 and 308 EC can be used together under circumstances where certain elements 
contained in an instrument approximating the national contract laws could be deemed to 
fall outside the scope of Article 95 EC, on the one hand, and/or where the instrument 
concerned encompasses both approximating and optional elements, on the other hand.  
 
 With respect to the other relevant Treaty provisions, Articles 94, 153, and 65 EC 
(now Articles 115, 169, and 81 TFEU, respectively) are unlikely to serve as a or the 
proper legal basis for a comprehensive instrument of substantive contract law.  As 
discussed in Chapter 9, Article 94 EC (now Article 115 TFEU) is unlikely to constitute a 
proper legal basis for a European contract law instrument on account of the order of 
preference set forth in the former EC Treaty and enhanced in the Lisbon Treaty for 
recourse to Article 95 EC by virtue of the relevant changes to the text and the position 
between the two provisions. While in principle there are differences in the substantive 
scope of Articles 94 and 95 EC (i.e., “common market” versus “internal market”; 
“directly affect” versus “object”; and establishment “or” versus “and” functioning”, 
respectively), the approach taken by the Court of Justice and the elimination of the 
reference to common market in the Lisbon Treaty strongly suggest that apart from the 
particular fields “fenced off” from Article 95 EC, Article 94 EC (now Article 115 TFEU) 
does not have a residual role vis-à-vis Article 95 EC as regards the adoption of a 
European contract law instrument.   
 
With regard to Article 153 EC (now Article 169 TFEU), the analysis in Chapter 
10 reveals that while this provision has broader ambit than is commonly perceived, it is 
not likely to serve as a viable legal basis for a European contract law instrument 
encompassing or limited to consumer contract law.  This is so, given the nature of the 
Community consumer contract law acquis, at least as it stands now, which is rooted in 
the dual objectives relating to the internal market and consumer protection, as opposed to 
the achievement of consumer protection objectives divorced from the internal market.  
  
Similarly, Article 65 EC (now Article 81 TFEU) is unlikely to constitute a proper 
legal basis for a comprehensive European contract law instrument.  As discussed in 
Chapter 11, this is because such an instrument would likely exceed the substantive scope 
of the Union’s competence under this provision, despite attempts made during the 
European Convention to revise this provision in order to set forth an explicit legal basis 
allowing for the approximation of contract law. That being said, the increasing 
controversy concerning the scope of the Union’s competence under this provision and the 
ongoing ambiguities surrounding the interface between European contract law and the 
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European Union’s objective to build a European area of “justice” to which Article 65 EC 
is linked could not be resolved by this doctoral thesis and is a viable subject for further 
research. 
 
 As regards the constitutionality and the suitability of various alternative and 
complementary routes discussed in Chapter 12, the majority of these routes – i.e., 
enhanced cooperation, an intergovernmental treaty, and American techniques – are ill-
fitting and have the potential to detract from the objectives to be achieved by the 
European contract law project.  The Open Method of Coordination (the OMC) has been 
viewed merely as a complementary, not alternative, route that can arguably be taken into 
account inside, as opposed to outside, the framework of the European contract law 
project, although this is an area in which further research is needed as regards its concrete 
application in this setting.  While it remains to be seen the extent to which the Common 
Frame of Reference (the CFR) may impact the future need for a European contract law 
instrument, optional or otherwise, distinguishing its status as a non-binding lawmaking 
instrument, on the one hand, and its potential gateway to the adoption of one or more 
optional instruments, on the other hand, is important for assessing its constitutional 
dimensions as the debate progresses. Depending upon further developments, further 
investigation into the constitutionality of the CFR may be warranted. In all, these various 
alternative and complementary routes make the need to confront the constitutionality of 
European contract law more apparent and illuminate the importance of proceeding inside, 
as opposed to outside, the framework established for the European contract law project, 
which encompasses the participation and the involvement of the European institutions 
and bodies, the Member States, and various stakeholder groups. 
 
 On the  whole, this doctoral thesis illustrates that it is important to look at 
constitutionality in toto since it is the linkages between and within the existence and 
exercise of Union competence under Articles 94, 95, 153, 65, and 308 EC (and their 
counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty) that loom large in the debate about European contract 
law.  Importantly, while Articles 94, 153, and 65 EC may not play a direct role in serving 
as a legal basis for a comprehensive European contract law instrument, they nonetheless 
play an important indirect role, in varying degrees, by drawing further attention to the 
viability of Article 95 EC and to a lesser extent Article 308 EC. Moreover, despite 
sensitivities underpinning the apparent weaknesses of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality in conjunction with Articles 95 and 308 EC, this doctoral thesis highlights 
that these principles have the potential to play an important role “inside” as well as 
“outside” the lawmaking process in guiding the exercise of Union competence under 
these provisions and thus have the potential to lessen some of the sensitivities associated 
with the adoption of a comprehensive European contract law instrument on the basis of 
one or both of these provisions, depending upon the form (optional or otherwise) of the 
instrument.  Moreover, on the basis of this study, the interplay between the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as the principle of sincere cooperation to some 
extent, and Articles 65 and 153 EC is a subject that warrants further development in the 
literature. 
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 Finally, comparative reflection with the United States provides striking parallels 
for the constitutional assessment of European contract law. As investigated in Chapter 4, 
the American private law framework is imbued to a considerable degree with attempts to 
approximate areas of private law including contract law at the federal level, as shown by 
the emergence and development of American “federal common law”, the uniform law 
process, and the UCC. For that matter, each strand of the American private law 
framework – i.e., American “federal common law”, uniform and model laws, 
Restatements, and the UCC – embody their own distinctly American connotation and 
their own share of problems, which are not often recognised in the European setting.  
Consequently, as discussed in Chapter 12, there are strong arguments that American 
techniques of uniform and model laws, Restatements, and the UCC carry significant 
drawbacks for potential use in the debate about European contract law and that the 
European Union has an array of mechanisms at its disposal better suited to solve the 
problems highlighted in the debate about European contract law, which include not only 
the relevant legal instruments provided in the Treaties but also the specific measures 
emanating from the debate, particularly the CFR and the possibility of one or more 
optional instruments in contract law.   
 
Paradoxically, however, while the techniques used in the European and American 
settings may be different, the approach taken to matters of contract law in the European 
Union and the United States is similar in the sense that each legal order manifests its own 
particular form of unique, novel mechanisms that are adeptly suited for finding the 
respective balance of powers in the relationship between the Union / federal and the 
Member State / state levels in this context. Yet, there is an important difference as 
regards the role played by constitutionality in this regard. For the United States, while 
issues concerning federal competence had bearing in shaping the course of developments, 
the path of the uniform laws, Restatements, and the UCC took place outside the federal 
level. By comparison, in the European Union, the path of the ongoing activities in 
European contract law, such as the CFR, the proposed Directive on consumer rights, and 
the prospect of one or more optional instruments in contract law, are situated inside the 
confines of the Union institutional framework, with the result that the limits and the 
exercise of Union competence under the Treaties are destined to play an important role in 
shaping events taking place in this setting.  Moreover, given the limited discussion so far 
of the attempted federalisation of private law in the American setting, this may in fact 
prompt further research relating to matters concerning federal competence in this area 
and ongoing developments in the consumer sphere, which may provide further outlets for 
comparative reflection between the United States and the European Union. 
 
13.2 Potential implications for the future path of European contract law 
By and large, this doctoral thesis could not completely resolve the ongoing 
controversy surrounding the European Union’s competence to adopt a comprehensive 
European contract law instrument.  Nevertheless, the three-part framework established by 
this doctoral thesis has the potential to make a significant contribution to the future path 
of European contract law and its constitutional dimensions.  First, by virtue of the 
template established in Part One, this may help to set a firm foundation for the 
constitutional inquiry concerning the debate about European contract law and 
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comparative reflection with the United States.  By virtue of the semantic framework 
established in Chapter Two, this may help to facilitate a constructive discussion of the 
“constitutional conversation” about European contract law, with cognisance of the 
meanings and the nuances that underpin much of the prevalent terminology used in the 
debate, even if some of the functional definitions provided by this doctoral thesis to 
delineate markers between the terms, such as that between approximation and 
harmonisation, are not picked up in the discourse.  Furthermore, the elucidation of the 
“hard core” of Community contract law in Chapter Two can help to draw out the 
perennial themes relating to the role and the competence wielded by the European 
legislator in the field of contract law.  As far as the Court of Justice’s role is concerned, 
Chapter Three demonstrates that its contribution to European contract law is more 
extensive than is generally perceived, thereby encompassing not only the Court’s 
interpretation of various Community contract law measures but also the Court’s 
formulation of judge-made rules of Community and Union law referred to as European 
“federal common law”, as well as the increasing recourse to comparative European 
contract law materials in the Opinions of the Advocates General.  Nevertheless, the role 
played by the Court of Justice exposes the problems underlying the Community contract 
law acquis and makes the need for a systematic response at the European level more 
apparent, thereby stimulating further momentum for the debate about European contract 
law.  Moving to Chapter Four, through the lens of four strands of the American private 
law framework comprising American “federal common law”, the uniform law process, 
the Restatement project, and the UCC, the extent to which the United States has been 
grappling with similar issues surrounding the need, or not, for the federalisation of certain 
areas of private law including contract law and the interplay between federal and state 
competence in the consumer sphere can be fully appreciated in the European setting. 
 
 Second, the institutional record for constitutionality set forth in Part Two reveals 
the extent to which constitutionality has been discussed, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
at the European level. In Chapter Five, the European Parliament’s assertion of sufficient 
Community competence to undertake far-reaching action in the field of private law in its 
early resolutions laid particular emphasis on the field of contract law and was rooted in 
large part in the EU’s internal market objectives concerning Articles 94, 95, and 308 EC, 
whereas the European Council meeting at Tampere injected ambiguities concerning the 
role played by Article 65 EC in European contract law that continue through the present 
day.  While underscoring the Commission’s lack of engagement with constitutionality in 
its three seminal Communications on European contract law, Chapter Six nonetheless 
captured the extent to which matters of competence, whether it was the explicit and 
implicit references to the Community’s internal market competences, particularly Article 
95 EC, and the engagement with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
infiltrated these Communications and the responses of other European institutions and 
stakeholders. Chapter Seven highlighted the continuing linkage between European 
contract law and the Community’s internal market competences, although the reference 
to Article 153 EC alongside Article 95 EC in the Parliament’s first 2006 Resolution and 
the express rejection of Article 65 EC, as well as the lack of Community competence in 
contract law altogether by certain Member State delegations, underlying the Council’s 
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2008 Report on the CFR enlivened questions concerning the European Union’s 
competence in this field. 
 
Lastly, by virtue of the legal framework underpinning the constitutional 
assessment of European contract law provided in Part Three, this doctoral thesis may 
provide a basis for examining the roles played the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, 
proportionality, and sincere cooperation governing the existence and the exercise of 
Union competence in this setting in Chapter Eight; for analysing the scope of Union 
competence in the field of contract law under Articles 94, 95, 153, 65, and 308 EC and 
their counterparts in the Lisbon Treaty in Chapters Nine through Eleven; and for 
evaluating certain alternative and complementary routes to a comprehensive European 
contract law instrument in Chapter Twelve.  In this way, while there may never be 
unanimous agreement on the scope of the European Union’s competence in relation to 
European contract law (or European private law for that matter), this framework may at 
least provide common ground upon which to frame the relevant arguments concerning 
the potential recourse to the abovementioned Treaty provisions and alternative and 
complementary routes.   
 
 In closing, with the ongoing development of the debate about European contract 
law, it remains to be seen whether or to what extent the European Union may utilise 
Articles 95 and/or 308 EC (now Articles 114 and/or 352 TFEU) to adopt a 
comprehensive European contract law instrument, optional or otherwise.  But whatever 
happens, it is the modest hope of this author that this doctoral thesis may facilitate an 
ongoing “constitutional conversation” about European contract law and a fruitful 
“comparative conversation” with the United States and thus may help to identify the most 
appropriate solutions to the problems raised by the debate about European contract law in 
the years to come. 
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